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Abstract
The district staff members o f incumbents in the United States House of Representatives 
perform vital representational and electoral functions. Nearly half of all personal staff in 
the United States Congress work ‘back home’ in district offices far removed from the 
normal designs of “beltway” politics. This dissertation seeks to address this heretofore 
under-studied set of political actors. It will examine the allocation and variation of 
district staff by incumbent members of the United States House of Representatives. It 
will focus on who those staff are, what they do and what impact they have on our 
political system. This dissertation argues that congressional district staff members have a 
variety of effects on the American political system. Their service on behalf of 
incumbents clearly worked to enhance the representative function. Yet some staff had 
more exclusive interactions with elite constituents. These relationships served to bias 
representation to select groups and to detract from the system of free, fair and 
competitive system of elections established by the founders. Congressional district staffs 
are deserving of further attention from academics, journalists, political reformers, and the 
citizens who finance their activities.
X IV
Congressional District Staff 
An Introduction
The Question
The district staff members of incumbents in the United States House of 
Representatives perform vital representational and electoral functions. Nearly half o f  all 
personal staff in the United States Congress work ‘back home’ in district offices far 
removed from the normal designs of “beltway” politics. This dissertation seeks to 
address this heretofore under-studied set of political actors. It will examine the allocation 
and variation of district staff by incumbent members o f the United States House of 
Representatives. It will focus on who those staff are, what they do and what impact they 
have on our political system. This dissertation argues that congressional district staff 
members are one of the many “increments and margins” that serve to bolster incumbency 
advantage in the House election after election. The regular representational functions 
carried out by district staff members likely have real electoral impact. Some incumbents, 
their staff and supporters (hereafter referred to as the district or incumbent “enterprise”) 
actively seek out elite constituents as a cost-effective way to fulfill their representative 
functions and gain access to an important class o f political actors.
Ironically, by carrying out what might be described as representative functions in 
their interactions with elite constituents, district staff members serve to subvert free, fair 
and competitive elections. The staff and the overall “enterprise” accomplish this through 
the co-optation of elite support and the diminishment of a base for potential campaign 
challengers. The expansion o f the district staff perquisite over the past four decades has
served to distort the preferences of the citizenry in their voting for what Madison and the 
founders considered to be the “People’s” body. Consequently, congressional district staff 
enterprises are worthy of both future academic study as well as political reform.
The paradigm guiding research on the United States Congress over the past three 
decades seems to accept the high rate o f re-election as an objective entity with little 
normative consequence. Works such as Mayhew (1974) or Fiorina (1977) are 
uncommon in this field. They are uncommon not only because they offer larger 
frameworks or explanations of legislative action, but also because they spend time 
discussing the consequences of legislator’s behaviors and motivations. My findings on 
district staff suggest that the discipline needs to get beyond descriptive explanations of 
how incumbents get re-elected and spend more intellectual energy discussing the 
consequences of incumbents who are elected largely without challenge. This dissertation 
proposes that the discipline take a deeper look at the presence, motivations and impact of 
Congressional district staff.
The genesis of this nroiect
There is a presumption amongst much of the literature that is echoed in the behavior 
of many average citizens. That presumption is that incumbents are solitary figures, 
passing legislation, running campaigns, and protecting the needs of their constituents.
The literature affirms this stereotype with its overwhelming emphasis on the incumbent 
as a rational actor whose decisions, actions and motivations often seem to occur in 
vacuum-like settings. Constituents seem to embrace this notion o f the individual 
legislator as well. They were observed asking district staff members to have “him” (the 
incumbent) pass a piece of legislation or have “her” call the 1RS to resolve a tax dispute.
It seemed that constituents made these requests without realizing the many demands on 
the incumbent or the substantial number of staffers who are responsible for conducting 
activities in the name of the incumbent. Both the literature and the constituents who 
make these assumptions about legislative behavior fail to appreciate the significant 
numbers o f staff who are also part of the incumbent enterprise. They fail to appreciate 
that the staff sometimes act independently of the incumbent, either to help the enterprise 
or even to promote their own self-interests. In short, the modem incumbent enterprise is 
built on the backs of thousands of legislative staff, some integrally involved in the 
machinations of the legislative process, others who rarely ever call or visit the Capitol. 
The literature tends to be somewhat familiar with the contributions o f  the Washington 
staff. Yet, even the bulk of the literature that appreciates the significance of the work 
performed by the Washington staff fails to recognize that the individuals in the district 
offices are also vital to the overall incumbent enterprise.
The bias in the literature toward Washington-based staff is easy to understand. For 
starters, nearly sixty percent o f all congressional staff members are employed in 
Washington, which presents researchers with a more cost-effective research setting 
because all o f the cases are within blocks of each other. Furthermore, Washington staff 
members are largely occupied with the legislative efforts of the incumbents. In simple 
terms, there are a lot of them there and what they do appears at first glance to be more 
intriguing than the stereotypical imderstanding o f a congressional district office. The 
underlying premise of most of the literature seems to be that district offices are generally 
made up o f five or six people sitting in a remote location spending their days taking calls 
about passports and Social Security cases. The literature has long treated the Washington
staff as being more relevant to the accomplishments of individual legislators and the 
entire institution. I would also accept that staff growth is a relatively recent phenomenon 
and that the literature has been playing catch-up just to examine the patterns and 
implications of staff expansion within the Capitol itself. I do not dispute the literature’s 
focus entirely, but the absolute avoidance of a discussion of the functions of over forty 
percent of the incumbent’s personal staff is unwarranted. Some of the authors might 
defend the approach suggesting that the literature has looked at relevant district affairs; 
from incumbent’s ‘home styles’, to how often incumbents travel home, to the size of 
office budgets and the amount of casework that is performed. While this research 
provides useful subject matter that was previously unstudied, it has not come to grips 
with the full range of functions performed by district staff and it certainly has not grasped 
the important electoral and representative impact of district staff. My reading o f the 
literature combined with an internship experience suggested further contextual analysis 
was necessary.
The impetus for this dissertation arose from my personal experience with a void in 
the discipline’s understanding of congressional district staff. My experience interning in 
a congressional district office led me to an investigation of the relevant literature, which 
left me with a substantial body of research about congressional staff and their impact on 
the institution and the legislative process. Apart from one doctoral dissertation written in 
1975, there was little to be found about district staff apart from aggregate analyses of the 
amount of casework that they performed. Furthermore, that one previous dissertation had 
limited itself to a comparison of state, county and federal political staff in Los Angeles 
County. The literature leaves one with the impression that all district staff members are
strictly engaged in limited casework and service functions. My observations during a six- 
month internship suggested that district staff performed other relevant tasks beyond 
casework. Furthermore, my subsequent political experiences suggested that district staff 
have electoral value beyond that which the discipline assigns to their contact and impact 
on the “personal vote.'’ In both settings, I found that district staff members performed 
vital representational roles in the name o f the frequently absent incumbents and, on 
occasion, were valuable elements of their re-election campaigns.
What this dissertation offers 
This dissertation offers four important contributions to the current literature. First, it 
provides a framework for understanding who district staff are and what functions they 
perform for the district enterprise. Contrary to the stereotypes of the literature, my 
observations found that district staff members have varying motivations and functions. 
Second, this dissertation probes why the staff enterprises vary. Based on a limited 
number of observations, 1 hypothesize about several variables that future research on 
district staff can test. Third, and most importantly, this dissertation suggests that district 
staff matter! They matter because they interact with elite constituents, a group of people 
who are recruited into the incumbent enterprise to assist with reelection efforts and other 
goals of the incumbent. It is argued that staff recruit or co-opt elite constituents to 
become part of the incumbent enterprise, thereby depleting the potential pool o f resources 
that challengers have to draw upon. In this context, the behavior of district staff is well 
explained by Parker’s (1992) “discretion-motivated” model o f incumbency. Parker found 
that it was difficult for the principals (constituents) to monitor their agents (incumbents) 
so their control or oversight of incumbent goals and motivations was limited. Because
incumbents generally do not confront substantial oversight of their goals and behaviors 
from all constituents, Parker suggests that their concerns tend to be more highly targeted 
to a select group of constituents who can impact the re-election prospects. Most 
interestingly, Parker believes that increased perquisite use by incumbents serves as a 
“barrier to entry” for potential challengers. Here my observations of district staff offer 
confirmation to Parker’s argument. My findings further suggest that the incumbent-staff- 
elite interaction is not only negatively motivated to erect “barriers to entry.” Rather, 
incumbents seemed to encourage staff-elite interaction for multiple purposes, ranging 
from the solidification of the electoral base, to the gathering of political and economic 
information about the district, to the simple act of collecting ideas for future legislative or 
representative functions. In short, the presence of district staff serves to widen the ability 
of incumbents to pursue their own “discretion-motivated” behaviors. A set of proactive 
district staff who energetically interact with the elites of the district allow the incumbent 
to turn his or her attention to other legislative or political goals. In many cases, the staff 
even act as a barrier to what Parker might consider “too much discretion,” or inattention 
to district affairs.
The final contribution, found in the concluding chapter, takes a normative tract that 
most Congressional research seems to avoid. I suggest that the discipline more fully 
wrestle with the implications and consequences of the interaction of incumbency 
advantage and perquisite use. Taxpayer-financed perquisite use by incumbents distorts 
the election process by failing to offer constituents adequate choices in election contests. 
The Constitution established that the House of Representatives was to be the ‘people’s 
body’ and that frequent (biennial), fair and open elections were vital to the expression of
the people’s voice.' In fact, Madison and the founder’s believed that the “habitual 
dependence” o f regular and competitive elections would keep the Representatives close 
to their constituents. What has been lost over the past two centuries, however, is that the 
“dependence” o f that relationship also demands that incumbents have a “real possibility” 
of being removed from office." Given an average re-election rate of 93% over the past 
three decades, most voters are not truly offered accoimtability or electoral choice. It is 
well-established the money, name recognition, advertising, etc, have a substantial impact 
on the outcome o f contemporary House elections. Additionally, this dissertation argues 
that the interaction of incumbents, district staff and elite constituent further diminishes 
the potential pool of campaign challengers and the quality of campaigns that they will 
mobilize.
Given this electoral impact, congressional district staff members also have an impact 
on American political parties. Because staff members contribute to the secure electoral 
positions of individual incumbents, they further weaken collective accountability within 
Congress and cloud the ability of individual voter’s to hold their representatives 
accountable at the ballot box. Furthermore, the incumbent enterprise competes with, and 
usually bests, the parties in a competition for volunteers and financial contributions. In 
both ways, district staff contribute to the already weak position of American political 
parties.
Not only do staff contribute to the demise of electoral choice and the weakening of 
the party system, their presence also assists in further demands for the creation and 
maintenance o f particularistic programs that come at the expense of broader national
' See especially Madison’s Federalist Papers 52,53, and 57 for this discussion. 
’ Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan & Ferguson, 1959, p.753.
interests. District staff members work with local elites to fund projects ranging from city 
sewers, to industrial plant relocations, to the building of international airports or military 
bases. Madison did desire “masters of the public business” who lingered in Congress 
awhile to make sure that the public was well served. Yet, it is a reach to suggest that the 
founders desired the setting of the current Congress with its high rate o f re-election, a 
staff of thousands, and the aimual maintenance of hundreds of billions of dollars of 
particularized programs that benefit the legislators’ constituencies.^ At some point in the 
past four decades. Congress became too “masterful” in serving the public and this 
proficiency in serving the local has come at a cost to the collective. Given the staff 
connection to incumbency advantage, decline of parties and maintenance of 
particularistic programs, there is a solid foundation to discuss not only future study and 
academic implications, but also the need for political reform.
In focusing on district staff and their interaction with elite constituents 1 am not so 
much refuting other methods or explanations so much as I am improving them by adding 
in-depth contextual analysis. Four approaches within the literature might profit from the 
findings of this dissertation. First, I add my voice to those that question re-election as the 
sole motivation for congressional incumbents. Clearly incumbents have other 
motivations beyond being ‘self-interested seekers’ of reelection. I found incumbents 
early in their legislative careers who were less than willing to sacrifice personal and 
policy goals simply to attain re-election. The manner in which some incumbents utilize 
staff and interact with elite constituents seemed to confirm the presence of other motives 
beyond the simple desire to attain re-election. Along those lines, I make a second 
suggestion that the framework of incumbent behavior needs to include the ‘rational’
?  See Federalist Paper 53
calculations of those actors around them. In this case elite constituents and staff 
members in particular have personal goals that impact the size, shape and direction of the 
overall incumbent enterprise. Third, I suggest to those who study congressional staff that 
roughly half of their subjects work outside of Washington and many perform interesting, 
important and electorally relevant tasks. Finally, I would suggest that because there is so 
much variation in the types of behaviors that district staff members perform and the ways 
in which they conduct them that the literature would benefit from more contextual 
analysis. Previous studies based on aggregate analysis of budget figures and annual 
reports fail to capture the spirit of the tasks performed by a proactive district enterprise. 
Furthermore, because many of these tasks are politically sensitive behaviors, 1 would 
suggest that survey instruments would not accurately capture the importance of some 
staff behavior.
Methods
1 was able to uncover staff functions, their variation and the impact on elections and 
representation because I spent time with the incumbents, staff and elite constituents. I 
spent time with them while I interned in a congressional district office, gaining an 
understanding of the types of things that district staff did and what they legally could and 
could not do. I also observed the types of people that they regularly interacted with. I 
spent time with them when I watched them do their jobs. In each of the primary case 
studies I spent a day or two observing each incumbent and any district staff member 
whose responsibilities had them interacting with constituents outside the confines of the 
office. I spent time with them as I conducted intensive interviews with the incumbents 
and interacting staff members. These interviews were conducted to let them elaborate on
the behaviors that I had observed and provide rationales for what they did or did not do. 
And finally, I spent time with them when I talked to elite constituents. To verify the 
claims of incumbents and staff in each of the primary case studies I interviewed at least 
twenty elite constituents, some referred by the office, some who had contributed to their 
opponent, and some simply because they worked on “main street.” When all was said 
and done, I had a collection of roughly thirty opinions about each o f the four incumbent 
enterprises. To acquire additional anecdotal information and provide further variables for 
contrast, 1 conducted an intensive interview with the senior district staff person in nine 
other district offices.
Because of limited time and resources, I was imable to examine more than four 
primary cases. And while these four (and nine) cases are geographically limited to the 
middle of the coimtry, 1 was able to include enough other variables to propose some basic 
hypotheses, not to mention imcover relevant variation between the cases. The most 
significant justification for the in-depth contextual analysis lays in the finding of the elite 
interaction, a behavior heretofore uncovered by the literature.
What’s next
Because this dissertation raises significant questions about the publicly-financed 
resources that incumbents use to maintain their electoral advantage and the 
appropriateness of the types of relationships that some staff establish, this dissertation 
demands future research. From an academic perspective, it demands a wider study to test 
the hypotheses tested within this work. Is personality the most relevant indicator o f 
office differences? Or do age, gender, or region have something further to say? But the 
larger questions to be asked are ones that are important for the health of American
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democracy. Congress itself might want to wrestle with the issue of whether having 
thousands of paid professionals conducting ‘permanent campaigns’ is conducive to the 
practice of free, fair, and competitive elections. Might Congress want to remove this 
perquisite in order that voters be given a frequent and fair choice in elections? While the 
prospects of this type of reform are unlikely, it does not reduce the importance o f the 
issue at hand. And having dealt with campaign finance and other ethical dilemmas, one 
might hold out hope that Congress might also want to address the appropriateness o f staff 
participating in campaign activities, raising money and interacting with a special class of 
constituents.
Contents
Chapter One sets the tone for this dissertation by looking at the literature on the 
behavior and motivations of congressional incumbents. What are their attitudes about 
reelection? And what kinds of resources do they have at their disposal to assist them with 
their representative functions? How and why do they utilize staff? The review will also 
look comprehensively at the literature’s understanding of legislative staff as a whole, but 
with a particular focus on the district staff. A review of the methods and case studies will 
be undertaken in Chapter Two. While there are shortcomings to a study based on such a 
small number of cases, this chapter will also make the case for the value of contextual 
research. With the literature and methodology reviewed. Chapter Three will turn to a 
basic examination of the staff themselves. Who are they? What kinds of functions do 
they perform? Do all staff do the same things? The answers to these questions all 
suggested that there was no single norm or ideal type. Consequently, Chapter Three 
explains district staff operations from two different perspectives; one of a “routine” office
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doing just what it takes to get by, and another more “aggressive” enterprise that feels 
more vulnerable and is more proactive in its behaviors. Chapter Three will also look at 
the district staff members themselves as relevant political actors. It will address their 
individual motivations and the manner in which many of them come to work for the 
incumbents. The fact that some offices were different than others is the central focus of 
Chapter Four. While the data gathered in the dissertation emphasizes the value of small- 
scale contextual analysis. Chapter Four switches gears and offers a number of variables 
for future large-n comparisons. Based upon my limited case set, I offer a number of 
variables that seem to explain some of the variation that exists between offices. 1 include 
a mixture o f demographic (age, race, gender), political (seniority, party), and personal 
variables (personality, philosophy) to explain some of the variation from Chapter Three. 
Chapter Five will return to a contextual analysis of staff functions with an examination of 
a particular form of staff behavior: their interactions with elite constituents. My 
observations suggested that this was the one staff behavior that had the greatest impact on 
the incumbent’s electoral position, as well as the one behavior that had the greatest 
consequences for the act of representation. This chapter asks “why elites?” What is it 
about this particular group of constituents that attracts such interest from the incumbent 
enterprise, and why are elites part of the enterprise? Chapter Five will conclude by 
examining the potential benefits that this service provides. In the conclusion. Chapter 
Six, 1 will address several of the most relevant questions that district staff and elite 
interaction beg. The utilization of district staff has myriad consequences. Their presence 
should impact how the discipline sees the legislature. More importantly, the presence of 
district staff impacts the quality of representation that incumbents provide as well the
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ability of said incumbents to attain re-election. Consequently, district staff members 
contribute greatly to the individual incumbents’ impact on the strength of the political 
parties and the overall direction of government policies and programs. The consequences 
for the staff and incumbents, the discipline and the health o f oiu- democracy are examined 
in the concluding chapter. This dissertation argues that a large part of incumbency 
advantage can be traced to their service to elite constituents, which engenders future 
support and decreased opposition at the polls. So what does the literature say about all 
this?
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Chapter One 
Literature Review
The American public holds low levels of trust for politicians. Popular support for 
government has dwindled to the point where improper, incompetent, or immoral behavior 
is often expected firom government officials. In fact, recent opinion polls have shown the 
lowest levels of trust and confidence in Congress in the postwar era and demonstrated 
that many Americans perceive Watergate to be an event not atypical o f today’s political 
behavior (Cooper, 1999). Congress is often the object o f the public’s derision. Despite 
the discontent amongst the public, it has become a near truism of modem elections that 
incumbent members of the U.S. House of Representatives get reelected. Even though 
Americans are skeptical of the “self-serving” motivations of incumbents (Craig, 1996), 
Americans continue to re-elect “their congressmen” in virtually every case. Richard 
Fenno identified this paradoxical situation twenty-five years ago when he asked: “If our 
congressmen are so good, how can our Congress be so bad? If it is the individuals that 
make up the institution, why should there be such a disparity in our judgements?” (Fenno, 
1975, p.278) The literature happens to be full o f explanations as to the causes of this 
“disparity” in our collective judgements at election time.
The election cycle is best viewed as a two-year process, not simply an event that 
occurs every other fall. Furthermore, the resources that House incumbents allocate both 
before and d’iring campaigns have an impact on the electoral outcome. These resources 
come from two distinct sources: their campaign coffers and their taxpayer-financed office 
budgets. While the literature dealing with the impact o f the campaign resomces is direct
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and substantial (for a review see Jacobson, 1997), the office budgets are less well 
understood and explained by the literature. Nevertheless, these resources are both likely 
to have an impact on election outcomes and they are both likely to answer Feimo’s 
question about the “disparity” in our evaluations of individual incumbents. The efforts of 
the individual incumbents and their staff to serve constituents counteract the low 
expectations that Americans have of Congress as a collective body. The use of district 
staff and perquisites by incumbents leads one to ask important normative questions about 
how these staff affect the act of representation and the outcomes o f congressional 
elections. 1 will return to these questions in the final chapter.
Before proceeding to study congressional district staff themselves, it is first 
necessary to put them into the appropriate context. The context is probably most 
appropriately drawn with incumbency advantage in the background. Over the past four 
decades incumbents have paradoxically become more electorally secure while at the 
same time acting aggressively to protect themselves fi-om those rare occasions when 
incumbents do get defeated. They have undertaken aggressive efforts both with their 
campaigns and by allocating themselves more resources to effectively represent their 
constituents. In this chapter I will review the literature that details the rise of incumbency 
as a major determinant o f congressional elections. The bulk of this research focuses on 
the increased allocation of individual incumbents’ time and attentiveness as well as their 
allocation of resources, notably staff, to the home districts. 1 will conclude this chapter 
with a survey of the literature on congressional staff and how they are part of the modem 
congressional “enterprise.”
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Incumbency Advantage 
What is it?
One of the most reliable predictors of the outcomes of U.S. House elections is the 
status of the candidate. Whether the candidate is an incumbent, a challenger, or an open 
seat candidate is vital in determining many things about an election. This status will help 
determine the amount of financial support, voter respect, volunteer assistance, free media, 
and party support that each candidate will receive. But most importantly, that status has 
been shown to have a near deterministic impact on the outcome of the vote.
Incumbent House members do not lose very often. In recent decades, incumbents 
have been defeated only about 2% of the time in primaries and 7% of the time in general 
elections (Jacobson, 1997, p.20). Even 1994, an election that observers identify as a 
landslide defeat for Democrats, saw 84% of incumbent House Democrats retain their 
seats. Given that the modem House incumbent wins roughly 93% of the time in general 
elections, the story of aberrant election years like 1994 still tell a tale of substantial 
incumbent advantage. Incumbency advantage is not something peculiar to one party. 
While research has shown that incumbency advantage was helpful in preserving 
Democratic majorities throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the average Republican 
incumbent has also been the beneficiary of these increased advantages in the past few 
decades (Jacobson, 1990).
The most significant advantage enjoyed by incumbents is the rate of familiarity and 
name recognition that they enjoy with their constituents. Name recognition, recall and 
approval ratings are all substantially higher for incumbents than they are for challengers 
(Jacobson, 1997 p96). In most elections, challenger name recognition and approval
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remain at such low levels that the incumbents face no serious threat. Yet, incumbents are 
especially desirous and courting of this recognition as it increases their vote totals in 
November and protects them from surges in national political and economic tides. 
Incumbents also desire comfortable victory margins to deter future challengers and 
prepare themselves for future runs for higher office. The literature detailing and debating 
incumbency advantage is massive, yet in many ways contradictory and incomplete. One 
scholar feared that a “primal scream” amongst congressional scholars would take place 
should another piece be written (Jones, 1981, p.458), and that was twenty years ago. 
Pardon me while I muffle the scream that the following literature review should produce.
When did wider margins begin to appear?
Two of the notable trends in the last century of American politics have been the 
decline in turnover in congressional elections and the rise of the professional political 
career (Loomis, 1998, p 63; Bullock, 1973). While some scholars choose to address 
turnover decline as a contemporary phenomenon, in truth, turnover has been in steady 
decline since the 1850s. What made it a more interesting topic was its connection to the 
rise in careerism and the increased vote totals and simple name recognition of incumbents 
that also began to rise in the 1960s. Research has shown that the electoral value of being 
an incumbent rose from less than 2% in 1950 to between 7% and 9% by 1994 (Jacobson, 
1997; Gelman & King, 1983). In addition to higher vote totals, research began to detail 
the “sophomore surge”, the relatively new electoral success of freshmen incumbents. 
Freshmen members, historically the most vulnerable group of legislators, have become 
much more successful in their initial reelection bids. From 1946 until 1966, 35.9% of the 
freshmen incumbents were defeated. Over the next two decades, from 1968 to 1988, that
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rate had fallen to 8.5% (Jacobson, 1990). With a freshmen reelection rate of over 90% 
and a decline in the number of retirements, the contemporary Congress is marked by 
relatively low turnover. '
One of the main factors explaining the rise o f incumbency is the nature of 
incumbents’ districts and their political fit within them. Mayhew (1974) argues that the 
electoral positions of incumbents were almost unchallenged by the 1970s because very 
few incumbents sat in ‘marginal’ seats by that time. A ‘marginal’ member is defined as 
having received less than 55% of the two-party vote in a previous election. Most 
academics consider this to be a level of electoral safety for most incumbents. Note that 1 
referred to academics. Discussion below will reveal that congressional incumbents do 
not subscribe to the same terminology. It should also be noted that this figure is not 
universally accepted amongst academics. Some are more comfortable defining electoral 
safety as 60% of the two-party vote (see Smith, 1995). It is Mayhew’s contention that 
marginal’ districts had become electoral artifacts, in part due to the use of perquisites 
and service by the incumbent. An analysis of postwar House election returns reveals that 
the increased safety of House incumbents occurred in two stages. Jacobson (1990, p.28) 
demonstrates that the number o f marginal incumbents declined in two stages. While 
roughly 40% of incumbents were considered to be marginal from 1946 to 1964, that 
number had declined to less than 30% by 1980 and had then fallen to historic lows imder 
20% in the 1980s. Ansolabehere, Brady and Fiorina (1992) added that incumbents today 
are only about one-half as vulnerable as incumbents from the 1950s. These findings are 
supported by the fact that the national political parties appear to challenge fewer and
‘ Jacobson (1997, p24) combines the rise of careerism or “retirement slump” with the “sophmore surge” to 
describe what he sees as incumbent “siurge.”
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fewer of each other’s incumbents. In the 2000 elections, each party appeared to 
concentrate their efforts on no more than ten percent of all seats.
Nevertheless, there are detractors to the ‘declining marginals’ school of thought. 
Jacobson (1987), among others, maintains that “marginal” elections never really 
“vanished”. Instead, Jacobson argues that there arose a much greater volatility in 
individual election outcomes. While incumbents were attaining higher reelection 
percentages, the number of incumbent victories did not increase after the 1960s. Instead, 
the individual incumbents were confronted by the paradox of increased victory margins 
and the sudden and unexpected defeat of some of their colleagues. One can see how this 
might result in a feeling of uncertainty on the part of the incumbent. Jacobson and the 
detractors argue that when assessing electoral marginality, politicians and scholars must 
account for more than the previous electoral margin. They should also account for 
district history, challenger quality, scandal, national tides among other factors. This 
dissertation suggests that the activities of district staff are among those other factors that 
should be considered. A more thorough listing of variables will help to account for, and 
perhaps even prevent, victimization by random electoral defeats.
Why did incumbents become advantaged?
Is it because of micro or macro factors?
Congress has evolved as an institution both in practice and in the eyes of the voters 
over the past three decades. The average member o f Congress has become a much more 
active and visible figure. Before proceeding, it is important to discuss whether 
incumbency advantage is a cause or a consequence of the changes in American politics. 
Perhaps it has been the case that the efforts and intentions of those who occupy the halls
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of Congress have changed American politics. If this is the correct interpretation, it would 
be the case that new members or cohorts of new members have altered the processes and 
structures of Congress. An alternative explanation is that Congress and its occupants 
merely came to reflect the values of the mass political culture and that new members of 
Congress were nothing more than a reflection of their constituents’ desires. A variety of 
factors have been posited to explain the changed behavior and electoral success of 
incumbents. These are best classified as either micro or macro-level explanations and the 
literature is so vast that one scholar (Jacobson, 1997, p.3) calls it a “fruitful problem” to 
coordinate the competing explanations of change. While one can find many apples in the 
orchard of the “incumbency advantage” literature, none of them seems to provide the 
golden explanation. In short, incumbency advantage does not appear to be wholly 
explained by either micro or macro-level explanations.
The macro interpretation looks at Congress as a collective and suggests that the 
powers and norms of the body have evolved because of collective pressures brought by a 
cultural mass shift. Uslaner (1993) found that the changed “comity” in Congress was 
largely due to changing values and interests in American culture at large. The decline o f 
political parties and issues left constituents demanding new styles of congressional 
candidates and campaign strategies. When these new candidates got to Congress, the 
decentralization of power was caused by the need for new incumbents to represent and 
serve their constituents. Inevitably this new set of culturally responsive legislators 
clashed with a party and committee leadership that had fewer sanctions available than the 
previous leadership (Dodd, 1985). Ultimately party leaders were left with little choice 
but to respond to the macro level changes brought by the new legislators.
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The micro interpretation suggests that change occurred not so much as a result of 
mass culture or the efforts of party leaders. Rather they credit the developments as a 
result of the changed motivations and behaviors on the part o f individual incumbents and 
challengers. These individuals took advantage of slight cultural changes to enhance their 
power within the institution. Fiorina (1977) and Mayhew (1974), among others, assume 
that members of Congress behave as rational individuals. The incumbents’ motivations 
and behaviors are seen to be products of rational decision-making, which, in turn, result 
in changes in the collective. The evidence on “institutionalization” can also be explained 
by this second approach as rational or progressively ambitious politicians sought to 
increase the number of positions and responsibilities available to themselves within 
Congress itself (Polsby, 1968). The development of the whip system or the proliferation 
of new sub-committee chairs and powers are good examples of how a rational approach 
resulted in collective change. Perhaps one might make the case that incumbents came to 
be aggressive and advantaged because o f both micro and macro-level factors.
Societal reasons
The most common explanations offered to explain the recent changes in 
congressional behavior are the macro-level theories that cite broad societal or cultural 
change. The most obvious cultural target would be the “decline” of American political 
parties and the concurrent development o f issues, mass media and interest groups. There 
is an extremely well ploughed field o f research that details the declining attachment of 
voters to American political parties and the parties’ subsequent decline. The detachment 
of the voters is usually attributed to both structural reforms, most notably the direct 
primary, and to changes in the electorate’s ideological preferences.
21
Structural reforms such as primary elections and secret ballots have lessened party 
control over the election process. In simple terms, party officials have a greatly 
diminished capacity to nominate candidates and influence the outcomes of elections. 
Another area of diminished capacity is campaign finance, where political parties have 
declined as a source of incumbent’s total receipts and expenditures. In 1978 incumbents 
received 5.6% of their total receipts firom national parties. By 1992 the national party’s 
contribution had shrunk to 0.6% for the average incumbent (Smith, 1995, p.67). When 
one considers that the cost of elections perhaps tripled fi-om 1978 to 1992, that decline 
becomes even more meaningful. While the parties have always been involved in 
candidate recruitment and finance, the perceptions of the national tides increase or 
decrease the party’s ability to recruit candidates and to raise money for them. Jacobson 
(1989) concluded that the aggregate quality of a party’s stable o f challengers is strongly 
related to national political and economic conditions. For example, given predictions of a 
Democratic takeover of the House of Representatives in 2000, it was relatively easier for 
Democrats to: 1) persuade incumbents to stay in office, 2) find new candidates to contest 
open seats or challenge marginal Republican incumbents, and importantly, 3) to raise as 
much money as the Republican committees who usually outspent them. While 
Republican incumbents maintained a substantial financial advantage on a race-by-race 
basis, the House Democrats substantially narrowed the overall contributions gap in 2000 
relative to past elections.
Additionally, a “growing firaction” of the electorate has come to emphasize personal 
factors over partisan considerations in their voting patterns (Jacobson, 1990, p.72). The
22
decline o f partisanship in the electorate over the past five decades has been well detailed 
by scholars and journalists (Broder, 1970; Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976; Wattenberg, 
1984; Lunch, 1987; Sabato, 1988). While once a solid predictor o f voting intentions and 
loyalties, partisanship has given way to an increased number of independent and split- 
ticket voters. The number of voters splitting their tickets between the presidential and 
congressional level tripled firom the 1950s to the 1980s (Smith, 1995, p.63). Presidential 
coattails have declined since 1950 (Smith, 1995, p.75) and the unwritten law that a 
president’s party loses seats in the midterm elections was broken in 1998 for the first time 
in over 60 years. All this evidence suggests that partisanship is not the dominant 
influence on voting behavior that it once was. Yet, one should be careful not to follow 
the herd of journalists, scholars and textbooks that have already buried political parties as 
a variable in the voting equation. The number o f voters who identify themselves as 
independents is substantially reduced if  one takes account of individuals who “lean” 
toward one party (Wattenberg, 1990). Furthermore, recent studies have found that rates 
of identification with the parties “rebounded” in the late 1980s with the increased 
polarization and regionalization between the Democrats and Republicans (Bartels, 2000, 
p.35). To the extent that there are more independent voters who will firequently defect 
from one party to another, Jacobson notes that they overwhelmingly jump ship to 
incumbents (1997, p.93).
Nevertheless, with the relative decline o f resource rich and electorally reliable party 
organizations, incumbents were faced with a dilemma. In many districts, there were no 
longer sufficient numbers of strong party identifiers to ensure that they would have strong 
campaign machinery. Consequently, incumbents needed to create their own bases o f
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support or what Jacobson refers to as “personal, rather than impersonally partisan, 
electoral coalitions” (1990, p.3). The less partisan electorate has also become “more 
fickle” because of this individual attention (Jacobson, 1997, p.33) and they are not always 
a benefit to candidate-centered campaigns. As was mentioned above, the increased 
electoral volatility requires the average incumbent to do more to ensure the stability of 
their electoral coalitions even though incumbents will usually attract more ‘independent’ 
support than will challengers, hence the value of an active district staff.
A societal variable that complements the decline of parties is the decline o f issues. 
Jacobson (1990, p.20) believes that when consensus over New Deal programs was 
reached and that when new, more confusing, but equally divisive issues such as civil 
rights, race, and abortion came to the fore, party declined as a useful voting cue. 
Furthermore, these new issues created cleavages that did not clearly divide the parties.
For the most part, these issue cleavages diminished in their presence by the 1980s as the 
power of incumbency and the lack of quality challenges to incumbents based on 
ideological divides muted the presence of issues in congressional campaigns. When 
combined with the lack o f quality challengers, the decline of issues meant that voters did 
not often get to make clear ideological choices in U.S. House elections. This is not so 
much determined by the candidates’ ideological proximity as it is the ability of 
incumbents to determine the issue content o f most campaigns.
Many of the new issues, especially Viemam and civil rights, were beamed directly 
into people’s homes on their television sets, and the media began to replace the political 
parties as the source of information for a growing number o f voters. In fact, some believe 
the media have replaced parties as the main intermediating institution in American
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politics. The number and prevalence o f media outlets and the increased 
professionalization of politicians and their staff has made the media another tool in the 
decline o f political parties. From daily faxes, press releases, video clips and radio 
actualities to visits to editorial boards, incumbents are aggressive about putting their 
names before the media of their district. Eighty percent of House members regularly use 
party facilities in Washington to send radio actualities back to district stations and a 
growing number are taping television segments to be beamed back as well (Smith, 1995, 
p. 109. It is not a surprise then that the average House incumbent receives thorough 
coverage from their local media over the course of a two-year term, especially from small 
towns or limited budget media outlets. This coverage makes it difficult to mount a 
challenge, let alone an ideological debate, against any incumbent with media 
sophistication and a press secretary who has done his or her job over the preceding two- 
year term.^
A final societal variable is the increasing political activism of groups in American 
politics. A tremendous “explosion” of interest group representation took place in the 
1960s as the new issues and styles of politics stirred the creation o f single-issue groups 
and the fracturing of large umbrella organizations into many splintered groups.^ This 
splintering was most notable amongst trade and ideological associations. Like the media, 
interest groups were increasingly important for the incumbents because of the resources 
that they could provide. The presence of interest groups was felt inside the halls of 
Congress through lobbying and the provision of information about issues that the party 
structure could less adequately provide them than was previously the case. This
See Cook ( 1990) or Hess ( 1982) for an extended discussion o f the rise o f press secretaries.
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information was also made available to the incumbents’ constituents through their 
television sets and mailboxes. Incumbents, for the most part, have been able to utilize 
interest group activity to their advantage. For the incumbent, the interest group 
represents a lucrative source of contributions, volunteers and votes. However, interest 
groups can be double-edged swords as incumbents can be defeated by their application of 
contributions, letters, votes, and volunteers. In fact, in many of the swing districts where 
members are struck by the “random terror” of the electorate, one will probably find the 
interests and activities of an interest group that feels that the incumbent no longer serves 
their interests. From term limits to abortion and gun owners, interest groups provide a 
silent but deadly core o f constituents around which an incumbent’s electoral coalition can 
be dismantled.
Interest groups have not replaced the parties as key institutions for incumbents 
though. Salisbury (1992) identified something of a paradoxical role for interest groups in 
Washington in that while there are “more groups” active at all levels of American 
society, he found that they tend to counterbalance each other and give the individual 
interest group “less clout.” Because of this decline in “clout” there is a less substantial 
body of literature detailing the role and impact of interest groups in Congressional 
politics. Nevertheless, these groups are an important resource to the individual legislator. 
Groups seek out candidates who favor their ideological or trade’s positions and favor 
them with information, resources and approval. Over the past half century then, members 
have been able to look to issues, the mass media and to interest groups to replace the
’ See Truman (1971), Wilson (1975) or Salisbury (1992) for a discussion of the growth and splintering of 
interest groups in America.
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resources that were previously provided by the parties. During that same time period, the 
type of person in Congress has also changed.
Individual reasons: A ‘‘new breed” of entrepreneurs
An alternative to the societal literature is an approach that explains the growing 
incumbency advantage more as a product of a “new breed” of politician who took 
advantage of societal change. Instead o f focusing on broad societal change, this research 
looks to the individual incumbents, their motivations, goals, and resources. The most 
basic assumption of this literature is that members of Congress are “single-minded 
seekers of reelection” (Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1977). There is also a more sophisticated 
view of this approach, however, that emphasizes reelection as merely one of a number of 
goals that incumbents seek to accomplish in Congress (Fenno, 1973; Parker, 1989;
Parker. 1992). The notion that incumbents are “single-minded” is debatable. What is 
less questionable is that incumbents do focus at some point on reelection and the more 
recent literature has developed the concept of a “new breed” of rational incumbents.
The “new breed” of representative is a political “self-starter” (Smith, 1995) in an era 
of “candidate-centered” politics (Ehrenhalt, 1992). In previous eras, political parties 
were the dominant influence in the structure and finance of political campaigns. Today, 
the candidates themselves are the determining agents at nearly all points of the campaign. 
From the most basic decision to enter the race, to the formal announcement, to the 
financing and planning of the campaign, it is the individual candidates that assess the 
risks, the costs and make the decisions. It is not only during the campaigns that the 
Incumbents are generally free from structural or institutional constraints. As compared to 
legislators from other countries, members of the American Congress have an ideal setting
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for self-promotion and re-election. They belong to weak parties, with generally weak 
institutional leadership that lacks the ability to impose sanctions on incumbents with 
deviant voting behavior. Furthermore, this same party leadership bestows considerable, 
and generally equitable, resources on all members, with slightly larger allocations 
reserved for party and committee leadership. In short, party leadership enhances and 
encourages “self-starting” incumbents. This is especially the case in the contemporary 
Congress where parties are dependent on razor-thin margins to govern.
It appears that this “self-starting” behavior commenced in the 1960s with the not-so- 
paradoxical intersection of declining electoral marginality and the increasing electoral 
activity and campaign spending by incumbents. The argument is made that this 
paradoxical intersection was enhanced or created by the arrival of a “new breed” of 
politician in the House. The “new breed” was younger and more ambitious for higher 
office (Payne, 1980; Fowler and McClure, 1989; Maisel, 1986; Kazee, 1980). Cooper 
and West (1981) found a complementary increase in the rate of retirement by senior 
House members during the 1960s and 1970s and concluded that many of these older 
members simply could not, or did not wish to adapt to the “new way.” Parker and Parker 
(1989) assert that the elections of 1964 marked the beginning of this “new” era. The 
“new” members of the House elected after 1964 are described as being more concerned 
about their electoral situations. Some might actually use the word paranoid. 
Consequently the “new” incumbents began to campaign harder, spending more time and 
resources on their reelection efforts. This “awareness” also offers an explanation to the 
finding that the “new” incumbents were more likely to allocate substantial resources to 
servicing district needs than were the “old” cohorts (Parker and Parker, 1985).
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Other research has attributed change in Congress not so much to a fresh set o f legs 
but rather to a “new era” where even senior members have changed their behavior. 
Parker ( 1986) found the same increase in attentiveness to the district by senior members 
who remained after 1964 and (1989, pp. 107-108) went on to demonstrate that each 
successive cohort has increased their attentiveness, with the older group quite often 
leading the increases.
It Is not vitally important to prove which interpretation is correct as all scholars 
concur that congressional behavior changed in the 1960s. Given Cooper and West’s 
finding that there were substantial retirements in the 1960s and 1970s, it would not be a 
reach to argue that the “old” incumbents that stayed had the desire and the means to 
protect their seats. Subsequently they became “new” converts to the politics o f “self- 
starting” that is now required of all candidates. The decline of turnover was probably a 
determining factor in the expansion of seniority and the desire of incumbents to receive 
some sort of reward for their expanded careers (Price, 1975). Whichever explanation is 
correct, the end result was the same; the decline of the parties coincided with the rise of 
personal electoral followings and the party leaders had limited ability to withhold perks 
or finances for members as they needed their support in the changed electoral climate. 
Arnold (1990) argued that congressional leadership must be predicated on an accounting 
of incumbent’s electoral needs. This point o f view would argue that Congress is a loose 
collection of individuals and that in the “new” era, leaders are often required to bargain 
with their individual members if the majority is to be held or taken back.
The decline o f partisanship in the electorate was accompanied by a decline of party 
leadership in Congress. Congress in the past thirty years has become much a more
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individualized, fragmented or decentralized body. “Political maneuverability” or leeway 
has reduced the “incentives to follow party leaders and thereby weakens party cohesion” 
(Parker, 1989, p.218). Where power was traditionally exercised by a small number of 
key party leaders in Congress, a relatively sudden expansion of the subcommittee system, 
a widening of party leadership positions, and the rise of informal groups and caucuses 
widened the “power” structure o f Congress quite dramatically. Furthermore, the nearly 
equitable allocation of office resources and perquisites and the continued norm o f 
seniority further undercut the ability of the leadership to enforce party discipline. Finally, 
the increase in split-ticket voting allowed the average member a sense of independence 
from their president or party’s preferences. In fact, rebellion against the party leadership 
is often popular with home district independents or weak identifiers of the opposition 
party. As noted above, Jacobson (1997) found that incumbents are more likely to be 
beneficiaries of partisan defection than are challengers. Along similar lines, an important 
theme of this dissertation will detail the efforts of incumbents and their staff to persuade 
people outside of their partisan electoral bases, who are not normally their supporters to 
become active supporters, or minimally passive supporters of their opponents.
The discussion of a “Post-Reform” Congress has somewhat mediated the strong 
position of incumbents (Davidson, 1992; Smith 1995). Over roughly the past decade, 
there has been a need to pull back from the “rampant individualism” of the 1970s that had 
substantially decentralized power to individual incumbents. Smith characterizes this 
retreat as a “tradeoff’ where leaders “set some direction, narrow the agenda, and reduce 
the uncertainty” while still allowing the individual member the discretion and the 
resources to pursue the necessary reelection strategies (Smith, 1995, p. 18). This
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argument is bolstered by findings o f increased party loyalty in congressional voting 
(Loomis, 1996, p. 122). While the House is a collection o f435 legislators from vastly 
different electoral settings, their constituents are similar in their demands for legislative 
production. Cox and McCubbins (1993) would argue that the need for production and 
the ideological polarization of the two parties resulted in the party leadership gaining an 
expansion of their ability to pass legislation. This new style of party loyalty should not 
be overstated, however. A classic illustration of this new style of partisanship is seen in a 
comparison of the 104'*’ and 105'*' Congresses. In the aftermath of a significant 
Republican victory in the 104'*’ Congress that produced a unified and loyal Republican 
caucus, the next Congress wimessed the reemergence of dissent from committee chairs 
and from within certain elements o f the Republican caucus. While the “new” cohort was 
initially disposed to partisan unity in the 104'*’ Congress, many of the incumbents 
resumed or adapted to the post-1964 trends after only one term of party loyalty.
During this era of “new” incumbents, the national parties have joined the 
congressional leadership in playing more circumscribed roles. This role, where the 
national parties act more as supplements than controlling influences is a new one. The 
most active players in congressional campaigns are the four respective “Hill” or 
“Congressional Campaign Committees” (CCC). These committees have been in 
existence since the late 1800s but their current nature and role was developed in the post 
reform days of the 1970s and 1980s with the development of “soft” money (Hemnson, 
1988; Kolodny, 1998). While scholars disagree on when the CCC’s became involved in 
channeling resources to incumbent’s campaigns, it is clear that the magnitude of their 
involvement expanded substantially in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, as was mentioned
31
above, candidates now receive a smaller portion of their campaign contributions from the 
national parties. On occasion the national party will play a role in identifying, recruiting, 
or financing select candidates. Furthermore, while the national parties direct 
contributions to campaigns are very small, their interaction on behalf o f the individual 
campaigns that they target will result in greatly enhanced funding from national 
individuals, interest groups, and PACs (Fowler, 1993, p. 116). For example, with control 
of the House of Representatives to be determined by five-to-ten seats in the 2000 election 
cycle, the leadership of both parties were active in protecting incumbents in a number of 
swing seats, recruiting candidates for open seats or challengers for incumbents in swing 
districts. Because of scarce resources and the competitive balance, however, national 
parties have generally confined their resources to fewer than ten percent of all House 
races.
Instead of focusing on the national party or issues, a more contextual factor relevant 
to incumbents is the individual whom they face on the ballot. Coinciding with the 
increased level of activism by incumbents has been the diminished level of quality 
opponents that incumbents have come to face over the past three decades. With the 
diminished impact of national tides and political parties on elections, the literature has 
subsequently placed an increased focus on the challengers to House incumbents.
Jacobson and Kemell (1983) argue that challenger quality is highly related to the 
electoral success of challengers and open seat candidates. Furthermore, Jacobson (1990, 
p.20) and Fiorina (1992) believed that the “notable dearth” of quality Republican 
challengers opposing a sizeable Democratic “farm team” in the 1980s was the main 
reason contributing to incumbency advantage and the consequent Democratic majorities.
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Given that it is now an accepted fact in the literature that incumbents operate in a 
“rational” manner, it should come as no siuprise that the same behavior labels are applied 
to many of their challengers. “Quality” challengers, instead of butting up against the 
orthodoxy of 90% reelection rates of House incumbents, have acted in the same 
“rational” manner as incumbents by waiting for them to retire or move on to other offices 
or opportunities. A “quality” challenger is someone judged to have a reasonable chance 
of electoral success, usually a former legislator or an individual with access to substantial 
resources because of their family wealth, career, or celebrity status. Jacobson (1990) 
conclusively demonstrates that there is a relatively higher level of “quality” candidates 
seeking open seats than challenging sitting incumbents. While the quality o f challengers 
to incumbents has remained mired at roughly the same low level since mid-century, 
Jacobson found that the quality of open seat candidates nearly doubled during that same 
time period. Finally, an examination of campaign expenditures over the past four 
decades finds that the average open seat candidate spends more than the average 
incumbent and more than double the average challenger (Smith, 1995, p.69). This 
evidence strongly suggests that quality challengers are contributing to the self-fulfilling 
prophecy of incumbency advantage by not bothering to run until they have a decent 
chance o f electoral success. Ultimately though, it caimot be stated that challenger quality 
is the sole factor in explaining incumbency advantage as challenger quality has not 
declined at a steady level mirroring the rise of incumbency advantage (Jacobson, 1990). 
Institutional Reasons
A final explanation for the increase in incumbency advantage derives firom 
incumbents taking advantage of the expansion of government programs with thankful
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constituents paying them back at the ballot box. This explanation generates two 
approaches for the increase in activities and resources of incumbents. First, the growth of 
government engendered in the development of New Deal and Great Society programs 
created heightened citizen demand for service and assistance with federal bureaucracies 
and regulations. Patterson (1970) and Fiorina (1989) explained that staff growth is 
attributable to the growth in the size and complexity of the entire federal government 
since the 1960s. Along with government growth, there was a complementary increase in 
the level of complaints from constituents as this complexity had an increased 
invasiveness in the constituents’ daily lives. It was logical for members of Congress to 
increase the number o f staff and other resources to provide more service for the 
heightened constituent demand. Patterson’s argument bolstered Johannes’ (1980) finding 
that many more people are in contact with congressional offices than used to be the case. 
In fact, 71% of the staffers that he surveyed agreed that there has been an increase in the 
volume of casework requests largely because of new programs and regulations that 
constituents encounter. A similar, but more political argument is that Congress had to 
“keep up” with the growing size and complexity o f the executive branch (Romzek and 
Utter, 1997). The desire to “keep up” with more sophisticated resource allocation was 
also found in the more professional state legislatures. Weberg (1988) found, from a 
sample of twenty states, the ten largest had decentralized routines where the individual 
incumbents and their staff could more directly assist their constituents, while the ten 
smaller states tended to rely on smaller and more centralized staff to assist constituents.
The second institutional explanation for the expansion of resources lies in the 
aggressive solicitations by incumbents for greater levels of constituency service. Fiorina
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suggested that incumbents purposefully designed broad legislation in the hope that 
growing bureaucracies would create more regulation and complexity and thus more 
opportunities for the incumbents to do “favors” for constituents.** While Fiorina’s 
approach provides a cynical portrait of legislators, there is little argument that incumbents 
do allocate staff and resources to serve their constituents, in addition to the programs, 
grants and outlays that they provide for their home districts. To some, these programs are 
“pork”, to others they are “gravy” and still others refer to this spending as 
“particularistic” programs designed to directly please their constituents (Jacobson, 1997, 
p. 185-188). After these programs are established, incumbents become prolific “credit 
claimers” even when they are not directly responsible for said programs (Fenno, 1973). 
Even supporters of the institution have a hard time denying the electoral motivations of 
this behavior. Whether it be the mobile home offices of the 1970s or the office hours, 
town hall meetings, and newsletters of today, modem members are clearly more 
solicitous of their constituents than were their predecessors.
Defenders of these services would use less cynical terms and assert that the modem 
incumbents are merely looking to represent their constituents with the complexities of a 
large federal bureaucracy. While Fiorina may take the cynical view of this behavior, 
perhaps we ought to credit members of Congress for taking an entrepreneurial view of the 
demand confronting them. Incumbents and their staff are aware of the political value that 
expanded service to constituents provides. Chapter Five will detail how incumbents and 
their staff act on this awareness. In sum, incumbency advantage can be seen as a product 
of the above factors: societal change, a rise o f “new” incumbents and the creation of
■' Interestingly, Gross (1953) had raised questions about the appropriateness o f staff expansion and 
previewed Fiorina’s argument thirty years earlier. It was Gross’s contention that creating new staff
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expanded institutional resources. It is this last factor, however, that incumbents have the 
most direct control over and are most easily able to manipulate to protect their positions 
as incumbents.
Incumbent resources 
Incumbents have fear 
Preceding evidence pointed out the fact that while incumbents’ margins of victory 
have increased over the past four decades, their numbers of victories have not. On the 
other hand, one might point out that the irony of the past few decades is that while party 
influence has weakened in Congress and the electorate, there has been less electoral 
turnover than in earlier decades. What unites these disparate descriptions of 
congressional elections is their impact on the average incumbent; the modem 
congressional incumbent is often “running scared” of the uncertainty of their electoral 
future (Mann, 1978; Ansolabehere, Brady and Fiorina, 1992). This is especially true 
when the prospect of occupying a marginal seat looms on the horizon. Despite much of 
the preceding evidence that seems to paint a pictiure of near electoral invulnerability, the 
modem House incumbent often lives in a state of “random terror” o f a “more volatile and 
idiosyncratic” electorate (Jacobson, 1997, p.27).
Many scholars and joumalists base their assumptions about congressional behavior 
on incumbents’ consuming drive to be re-elected (see especially Fiorina, 1989). It is 
offered that every aspect of congressional behavior revolves to some degree around the 
drive to reelection: from the raising o f campaign funds to the selection of committee 
assignments, the resolution of constituent problems, the support or proposition of 
legislation, and the solicitation of media attention (Smith, 1995). Mayhew (1974) lays
positions would create more work and new challenges for the legislature.
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out incumbent behavior into three basic activities that revolve around the electoral 
motive: they claim credit for votes and projects, take positions on issues of importance to 
their district, and finally, they advertise successful votes or projects that benefit their 
districts. Other scholars make a more sympathetic explanation o f the sincere incumbent’s 
need to keep up with their constituents’ needs and desires while also attempting to 
legislate their own policy goals (see especially Fenno, 1973). What is clear fi-om both 
lines of thought is that the average incumbent tends to have a sense o f imcertainty about 
his or her future legislative career. Faced with this impredictability, incumbents in the 
past three decades have become more responsive and active then were their predecessors.
Incumbents, their staff and consultants can never determine with certainty what 
worked in the last election or during their preceding term in office. In order to reduce the 
feeling of electoral insecurity, incumbents, their staff and consultants have been willing 
to attempt many activities, from the “campaign” to the “federal” side, and with many 
things in between. On the campaign side, incumbents have raised and spent more money 
with each succeeding election cycle. New technologies and the need to nm more 
television ads have astronomically increased the level of campaign spending. On the 
“federal” side, incumbents have dramatically increased the niunber and variety of 
resources in their district offices to serve their constituents and increase their name 
recognition.
The uncertainty of modem incumbents has even turned the very explicit federal rules 
governing the allocation of staff and other resources, most notably the Hatch Act 
provisions, into a murky gray area. In the Senate each incumbent is allowed to employ 
three “political designees” who work in “official” positions in the federal offices. These
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“designees” are permitted to take active roles in all elements of the incumbent’s 
campaign provided that they do not perform said activities on government time or utilize 
government property (like phones, postage, or offices). They can even plan fund-raisers 
and receive campaign contributions as long as they do not use government time or 
resources. The same rules apply in the House, except that all staff can act as “designees” 
provided that they do so on their own time.^ I would suggest that the activities of these 
“designees” are clearly political in nature and contribute to incumbency advantage. As 
such, they are of interest to this dissertation and will be examined in-depth in later 
chapters.
On the campaign side, incumbents have come to run “permanent” campaigns, 
continually raising and spending massive campaign warchests. For example, in 1998, 
newly elected Dennis Moore o f Kansas had his first fundraising event the weekend after 
the election, two months before he was even sworn in to office. These early events are 
becoming the norm, with incumbents concerned about their cash-on-hand showings on 
their Federal Election Commission reports even in the year before they are to be re­
elected. The cash-on-hand obsession is driven by the discussion above on quality 
opponents. If an incumbent is found to have a lower than average cash-on-hand report 
even as early as the mid-year report before their reelection (a full 14 months preceding 
election), than the opposing party is likely to devote attention and resources to that 
district in the hopes of luring potential challengers. Weak incumbents often mean that 
the party does not have to work very hard as the line of potential challengers will have 
already been formed. Consequently, the solution for incumbents is to deter any potential
’ It was not my observation that all staff were directly involved in campaign-related activities. In each 
office these activities seemed to be mostly performed by a small number o f the most senior staff.
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challengers by raising more money than they did in the previous election cycle.
Increased campaign expenditures, however, have been found to have only a “marginal 
return” on election outcomes (Jacobson, 1997). Generally, incumbents who spend the 
most also have the slimmest victory margins.^ Obviously then, there are other activities 
of incumbents that help explain re-election success. Rather than focusing merely on 
campaign expenditures, one needs to examine all of the “increments and margins” that 
enable an incumbent to attain re-election (Miller and Stokes, 1963).
The incumbent who “runs scared” operates on the basic assumption that to be 
perceived is to be perceived favorably. Consequently, “scared” incumbents will be more 
active in advertising their name and achievements to their core group of supporters, to 
swing voters, and possibly even to individuals who might have voted for their opponent 
in the previous election. Parker and Davidson (1979) found that voters based their 
recognition o f incumbents on their attention to the district and personality to a much 
greater extent than to the incumbents’ ideological or partisan attachments. Cain, 
Ferejohn and Fiorina found that “all else being equal, a very favorable image as a good 
constituency representative is more important to the candidate in determining the vote 
than having the same party affiliation as the voter” (1987, p. 119). It is these 
assumptions that best explain the growing activism and perquisite use o f incumbents. 
With the decline of partisan coalitions in their home districts, it became necessary for 
incumbents to “cultivate personal bases of support” in order to provide the incumbent 
with a “personal vote” to overcome potential national swings, economic conditions and 
personalities (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987). Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina found that
* This is an illusory finding, however, in that incumbents tend to draw well-financed opponents when they 
are vulnerable. The simple act o f spending more money does not make one more vulnerable.
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the American single-member districts are largely unique in that they require legislators to 
construct and maintain their own electoral coalitions. Moreover, the individual coalitions 
can best be built and maintained with individualized contact and familiarity with 
constituents. This contact would hopefully lead to a “personal vote” in favor of the 
incumbent. Upon simple examination, these efforts appear to have been overwhelmingly 
successful over the past few decades. Voters are two (Jacobson, 1997, p.99) to three 
times (Smith, 1995, p.73) as likely to encoimter House incumbents than challengers. The 
incumbent has higher levels of contact in all forms, from television ads to actual personal 
encounters, to the mail that constituents receive. The literature (Jacobson, 1997; Cain, 
Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987) largely finds that these contacts have a net effect to be 
helpful at election time.
So Incumbents use official resources
It's not only campaign ads and fund-raising that returns incumbents to office. They 
also have a wide arsenal of official perquisites at their disposal that are useful in 
developing and maintaining name recognition. It was postulated above that incumbents' 
resources have expanded over the past three decades because: I) there has been an 
increase in the organizational complexity of Congress and a corresponding need to 
comply with constituent demands; 2) many incumbents have a feeling of electoral 
insecurity, and 3) the increase of congressional budgets have permitted incumbents the 
luxury o f more staff and resources to allocate to their district operations.
In distributing these resources back to their home districts, incumbents are 
characterized as being responsive “errand boys” to their constituents and organized 
interests. “They spring in to action with uncritical zeal, determined from the outset to
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win for the complainant because he is a constituent, not because his cause is known to be 
just” (Gellhom, 1966, p.71). Incumbents tend to have a very clear notion of what 
“errands” they need to perform and whom they need to serve. In nearly every visit to 
state and federal legislative offices 1 witnessed elaborate maps, lists of zip codes and 
phone prefixes that clearly demarcate constituents from non-constituents. The lack of 
interest in serving non-constituents further underscores the electoral motivation of 
incumbent behavior.
Modem incumbents have developed “home styles” to cultivate their constituents and 
provide them with a positive image of their activities. Fenno (1978) believed that an 
average “home style” was composed of three things: the incumbent’s presentation of 
him/herself to the constituents; their allocation of personal time to district needs; and the 
explanation of their Washington activities. Almost identical to Fenno, Parker (1989) 
identified four activities that incumbents pursue: casework; the use of personal time; the 
allocation of office resources; and the promotion of the incumbent’s image. What 
follows is a review of the “home style” allocations that incumbents have made over the 
past four decades.
Fenno (1978) described the allocation of resources to the district as one of the best 
ways that incumbents could counter the decline o f parties and solidify their hold on 
office. The allocations o f resources to be discussed below suggest that Fenno’s depiction 
appears to be a bipartisan belief. Something has been made o f Democratic and 
Republican ideological differences toward the allocation of resources. However, in the 
aftermath of the 1994 elections, the new Republican leadership largely spared personal 
staff and the fi’anking privilege. The cuts that have occurred were usually bipartisan as
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Congress has been “sensitive” to media charges about the inequity of incumbent 
advantages over challengers. Therefore, over the past decade. Congress has cut some 
staff and perquisites, reformed the ethics o f the body, and some individual legislators 
have even returned their pay increases (Smith, 1995, p. 18). But, on the whole, the system 
has been largely preserved with only minimal cutbacks in the allocation of incumbent’s 
official perquisites.
Time
The most basic resource that incumbents can allocate is their own time. They have 
enhanced the value of this resource by: 1) increasing their salaries, 2) ensuring that they 
have the ability to travel home at taxpayer expense, and 3) hiring additional staff to 
maximize the value of their own schedules. These changes had an impact on the amount 
of time that incumbents began to spend in their districts. While the average incumbent 
spent only two to three days per month in the district before 1970, by 1980 the average 
incumbent was home for ten days per month (Parker, 1986). It was in large part because 
of the aforementioned reforms in the allocation of resources, and the changed attitudes in 
the “new” members discussed above, that incumbents increased their travel home during 
the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1980s there was a change in attitude amongst 
incumbents in both houses that led to the creation of a Tuesday-Thursday Washington 
schedule that would allow them more time at home. Even though the House went to this 
Tuesday-Thursday schedule and it increased the number of official recess days to over 
100 by the mid-1980s, they still met the same number of session hours that had been 
taking place before the reforms. After reforms in 1973 and 1978 incumbents were 
compensated for unlimited travel home, as long as it came out o f  their office accounts.
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Not so coincidentally, as will be seen below, incumbents have continued to increase their 
office budgets. However, the value of this resource is o f debatable utility. Parker and 
Parker (1980, 1985) conclude that the time members spend in the district is unrelated to 
their vote margins.
Committees
Research on the expanded resources of incumbents first focused on the development 
of committee resources at their disposal in the 1960s and 1970s. Not only did 
incumbents increase the number o f committees and subcommittees, they also increased 
the turf, budgetary resources, and the number of staff serving those committees. For the 
“rational" incumbent, expanded committees provided the means to provide a heightened 
level of service to their constituencies and to hopefully gain increased exposure with their 
constituents, interested groups and potential contributors. Like incumbents’ time, 
committee resources are also not a mono-causal explanation of incumbent advantage. 
Over the past fifteen years, the number, turf and staffing of committees and 
subcommittees has begun to be pared back, with no subsequent impact on the overall 
level of incumbent advantage.
Communication and Earned Media
The most basic way for incumbents to increase their familiarity with their 
constituents has been to take advantage of advances in communication technology.
These technologies allow them to “publicize” their accomplishments (Smith, 1995, p.65). 
Yet strangely, the most common form of constituent contact, the “frank”, or the 
stationary allowance, is the contact that is least affected by increases in technology. This 
is a perk incumbents have enjoyed going all the way back to the First Continental
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Congress. In the past few decades the level of mail going through Capitol Hill has 
expanded tremendously. The incoming mail has expanded because o f the increased 
number o f requests coming from individuals affected by government programs, the 
presence of C-SPAN as a catalyst to individuals responding to what they see on the floor 
or in committee and, last but perhaps most importantly, from the tremendous expansion 
of form letters and requests coming from interest groups (Smith, 1995, p. 108). It is 
logical than, that the amount o f outgoing mail has expanded in response to the amount of 
incoming mail. But it has also expanded as incumbents started to send increased 
numbers of mass mailings to their constituents in the 1960s and 1970s.^
Other technological perks that incumbents have capitalized on include the now 
standard presence of press secretaries in each congressional office. Not that long ago, 
press secretaries were found only in the offices o f leadership or prominent members o f  
Congress. Today, the press secretary is a cornerstone of the congressional office, linking 
the incumbent’s daily Washington and district activities to the home district press and, 
ultimately to the constituents (Cook, 1989). Incumbents also have access to television 
and radio studios, provided by their national parties, to beam back nightly messages to 
their district media outlets. This is an illustration of the ironic position of the national 
parties today, as they largely finance a resource that serves to reinforce the dominant 
position o f individual incumbents. And they do this even on those occasions when the 
incumbents require use of the facilities to emphasize to their constituents how they are 
representing district over partisan interests.
’ A recent study by the Congressional Research Service concluded that the number of mass mailings by 
Congress have decreased over the past decade (Pershing, 2000). It was speculated that the substantial cost 
o f these mailings was starting to generate negative publicity for the individual members. This has lead to 
several waves of reform of congressional mail expenditures.
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While Rosenthal (1973) found that press releases had little impact for legislators 
during the 1960s, except in some marginal districts, and Cover (1977,1980) found little 
impact of “franking” on final vote totals, it is likely that incumbent communications are 
another variable in the equation of incumbent success. It is not, as Rosenthal would 
probably agree, the only factor explaining incumbent success. In fact, the use of 
“franked” mail has declined in past three decades because of increased ethics and rules 
restrictions that were imposed in 1973,1989, 1992 and 1995 (Smith, 1995, pp.56-57, 
Pershing, 2000). Restrictions aside, incumbents have also become less prolific (rankers 
due to the increased scrutiny imposed by the media on incumbents who are at the “top of 
the list.”
Office Budgets
Perhaps the simplest means of examining the expanded perquisite use by incumbents 
lies in their overall office budgets. Over the past three decades. Congress has 
dramatically expanded office budgets while at the same time streamlining the way in 
which individual legislators pay for all the services that they provide. In 1995, House 
Republicans consolidated incumbents’ official expenses, mail and staff salary budgets 
into one account, a “Member’s Representational Allowance” (MRA). These accounts 
vary in size from $858,000 to $1.3 million per year per incumbent (Omstein, Mann and 
Malbin, 2000, p. 135). The variations reflect the obvious instances o f distant location and 
local costs of office space, materials and salaries.* The U.S. Congress is notable, 
however, for granting basically equitable resources to all members of the institution 
regardless o f tenure of majority/minority status. The increase in the number and salary of
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congressional staff perhaps reflected the increased perception o f vulnerability by 
incumbents and the weakening of party control m the legislature.
The expansion of incumbent staff and office resources is argued to have an impact 
on election outcomes because of the increased contact and name recognition that said 
resources will purchase. In research at the state level. King (1991) concluded that a 
$10,000 increase in a state legislator’s official operating budget will profit an additional 
1.54 percent at the polls and be speculated that a sunilar effect works for national 
legislators when they increase spending on constituency service. It might further be 
argued that incumbents shift staff and resources back to their home districts to capitalize 
on voter demands. Aggregate analysis over the past four decades seems to confirm this 
trend. Research found that the district allocation of staff has not been uniform, however. 
Fenno (1978, p.44) found that seniority, margin, family residence and distance from 
Washington do not make a difference in staff allocation, while the region of the 
incumbent has “substantial effect on staff allocation patterns and home style.” There will 
be a further discussion of the variation in allocation of staff in Chapter Four.
Obviously, office budgets and the number and quality of staff contribute to 
incumbent’s electoral success but they cannot be argued to be the sole factor explaining 
their success. This dissertation will in later chapters demonstrate that some incumbents 
use their staff more “aggressively” to assist their electoral positions. Because of the 
permeable rules governing staff political behavior, they can easily make the campaign- 
govemance transition during the course o f a single business day, to say nothing of the 
crossover work that they might perform over an entire electoral cycle.
‘ There were numerous reforms in office budgeting during the 1960s and 1970s. Ultimately the House 
(1978) and Senate (1973) went to the basic universal budgets that included travel, rent and other office
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Quirky collateral stuff
Additionally, the wild imaginations of incumbents with varying degrees of 
advertising experience from every far flung comer of the country resulted in a wide 
variety o f other forms of office and campaign expenditures that were made to increase 
name recognition with constituents. These items are as idiosyncratic as the members. 
Some of these other types o f “collateral” resources include: the mobile office van of the 
1970s, stickers and handouts, baby care books mailed to new parents, and “I saw you in 
the news” clips. These “collateral” resources have dubious electoral value. Nonetheless, 
they should be considered a part of the overall incumbent protection program.
Casework
Finally, there is the most analyzed element of the incumbents’ resources: casework. 
Casework is a service provided by congressional staff, both in Washington and in the 
home district that deals with individual constituent problems and demands. It was argued 
above that incumbents expanded the volume of casework activity in order that they might 
help their constituents navigate through the increased complexity of government. 
Consequently, defenders o f the system celebrate casework as a non-controversial, “non- 
partisan, non-ideological” activity (Fiorina, 1989) but in reality, it has become a 
“partisan, vote-getting opportunity” (King, 1991). “Much of the advertisement and 
service (about casework) has been regulated by Congress itself and is, in theory not to be 
used by representatives in their reelection campaigns. In reality, however, these activities 
play vital, if sometimes indirect, roles in the election campaigns of incumbents” (Kean, 
Gowda, and Farmer, 1993, p.2). There is a substantial debate about the electoral value
materials. Staff salary and mail expenses had always been kept in separate budgets.
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of “assistance” to constituents and the weight of the evidence seems to suggest some 
beneficial value.
Casework activity is deemed by district staffers to be “pure gravy” as it makes no 
enemies but almost certainly wins votes (Lunch, 1987). Furthermore, Congressional 
staffers felt that the cases where they intervened with a bureaucracy for constituents were 
successful nearly 40% of the time (Johannes, 1981). The hope is that service creates 
some measure o f gratitude. Much has been written about the use of casework services as 
an advantage of incumbency and its positive effect on the saliency and evaluation of the 
incumbent (Cover, 1980; Cover and Brumberg, 1982; Parker, 1980; Fiorina, 1989; Serra 
and Cover, 1992). Serra (1993) found that casework assistance increased the evaluation 
of incumbents by 14.6 degrees on a 100-point thermometer scale. Clapp (1963) found 
that voters pay back favors with increased probabilities of voting on their behalf, which is 
supported by findings of psychologists that people find it disagreeable to “owe” favors 
and tend to quickly find means to repay their debts (Cialdini, 1985; Regan, 1971). In 
simple terms, a particular case study found that “those that received service did vote in 
greater percentages for (the incumbent) than those who were not served” (Kean, Gowda 
and Farmer, 1993, p.32). The value of an effective casework operation was valued by 
one study at three to five percent to the total turnout in an average district (Fiorina, 1989).
Some scholars are dubious of the value of casework activity. First, the fact that a 
relatively small percent of people actually request service limits its overall value 
(Johannes, 1984). Second, casework alone has “no significant effect” on evaluations of 
incumbents and voters tend to be “ingrates” as service is an expected long-term activity, 
not something for which a short-term reward can be gained (Johannes and McAdams,
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1987). Finally, it is possible that incumbents “overestimate” the role of constituency 
service and their degree of electoral marginality (Mayhew, 1974). Furthermore, Jacobson 
(1990, p. 45) points out the lack of value in staff and resources by showing that the 
growth in staff and office resources in the 1980s had flattened out while the incumbency 
advantage had grown.
The problem with this criticism of the value of office resources is that the approach 
downplays the growth in resources that took place during the 1960s and 1970s and served 
to entrench incumbents while at the same time discouraging potential “quality” 
challengers. At a minimum then, casework is perceived to be something that should be 
pursued in order to counter any loss in approval that an incumbent may accumulate over 
the course of a term and compensate for the loss of partisan coattails. Since party 
identification can now only guarantee a representative roughly twenty or thirty percent of 
the vote, it is inherent upon the incumbent to maintain the electoral coalition. While one 
might conclude that contacting “seven-tenths of one percent” o f the total constituents or a 
ten percent increase in party defections are not monumental, one should not forget the 
“marginal” psyche of the member. As electoral victories in the present era are so 
“unpredictable”. Miller and Stokes’ (1963) advice on representatives winning through 
“increments and margins” seems even more apt. The overall utility of additional staff 
and resources may be debatable to scholars. Perhaps the more interesting or relevant 
focus though should be the psychological impressions of the incumbents. The comments 
o f incumbents and staff in this study suggest that they perceive vulnerability and 
consequently worked harder to get re-elected (i.e. increased allocations of resources to 
their district offices and election campaigns). It is hard to argue with the reality o f the
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fact that incumbents have numerous staff at their disposal, especially those positioned in 
their home district offices. Perhaps a headline from Roll Call sums up the attitude o f 
incumbents best: “Top Frankers Also Have the Stiffest Challengers” (Simpson, 1992).
While there has been a growing amount of research on incumbent’s efforts to attain 
reelection, the bulk of this work has focused on aggregate analyses of incumbent’s time 
and/or their overall budgets, numbers o f employees, or amount o f casework performed, 
congressional district staff remain a relatively understudied element o f the incumbent’s 
total effort. A gradual improvement in the quantity and quality o f research on 
congressional staff has taken place over the past thirty years, yet holes remain.
Congressional Staff 
Staff as a resource
Congressional staff were rarely found in the halls of the Capitol until late in the 
Nineteenth Century. It was not until 1893 that the House first made an allowance for pay 
from the federal government. Before that time all staff were either privately paid by the 
incumbent or were family members (Smith, 1995, p. 103). Furthermore, there wasn’t 
room for staff as the individual incumbents did not get their own offices until the early 
Twentieth Century when office buildings began to be built around the Capitol. Since the 
turn o f the century, the size and pay of staff has increased dramatically. At the turn o f the 
century, the House had no personal staff on payroll. By 1930, there were roughly one 
thousand personal staff members in and around the Capitol.’ By 1965 that number had 
quadrupled and by the mid-1980s it had increased to seven thousand five hundred 
personal staff. That number has largely leveled off in the 1990s with only seven
’ “Personal” staff work directly for individual incumbents, as opposed to committee or institutional 
research staff.
50
thousand two hundred personal staff on payroll in 1999 (Salisbury and Shepsle, 1981; 
Smith, 1995, p. 107; Omstein, Mann and Malbin, 2000, p. 129). Figure 1.1 demonstrates 
the incredible growth o f  staff over the past century.
Figure 1.1 The Growth o f Congressional Staff, 1891-1999
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(Omstein. Mann, and Malbin. 2000. p. 130)
There is also a comparative element to the growth of legislative stalf in the latter half 
of the Twentieth Century. Ryle (1981). Campbell and LaPorte ( 1981 ) and Blischke 
(1981) found incremental staff increases in the UK. France and Germany. All three 
studies concluded that these increases occurred largely at the insistence of incumbent 
demands, a situation highly similar to that o f the United States Congress.
In the latter half o f  the Twentieth Century, each incumbent was entitled to a "Clerk 
Hire” allowance that would pay the salaries o f their staff. This allowance steadily 
increased over the past four decades. In 1955 enough funds were allocated to allow each 
House member the resources to employ eight full time staff. That number increased to 10 
staff in 1965 and 18 in 1975. By 1977. each incumbent was allocated S238.580 to
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employ 18 individuals. That number was finally increased to $475,000, and “up to” 22 
staff in 1991. Of those twenty-two, eighteen could be full-time employees and four could 
be part-time. There are still no requirements as to which of these staff must work in 
Washington and which must work in the district. As was noted above, the House 
combined their budgets for staff salaries, office and mail expenses in 1995 so the 
employment requirements have been loosened considerably. Staff increases have been 
commensurate in the Senate. Hammond’s (1976) research found more sophisticated and 
growing personal offices in the Senate. She found that the number o f legislative aides in 
the Senate increased from .7 per senator in 1960 to 5.3 per senator by 1975. Today, the 
Senate staff allowance ranges from SI.2 to $2.1 million depending on size of state 
(Omstein, Mann and Malbin, 2000). In fact, at the high end, it is possible for one senator 
to employ four or five times as many staff as the average House member. In 1992, 
Senator Moynihan who both represented a state on the large side of the allocational 
formula (New York), served as chair of the Senate Finance Committee and held two 
other subcommittee chairmanships was entitled to employ 100 staff (Smith, 1995, p. 106). 
Furthermore, there are no restrictions determining how many staff a senator can employ 
or limitations on where they have to be placed.
Finally, it should be noted that the increase in the number of staff has had a distinctly 
“district” edge to it. Incumbents have increasingly allocated resources to their home 
districts. The numbers o f district staff have risen both in aggregate number and in the 
total proportion of all congressional staff. As the Figure 1.2 shows, while only 22% of 
staffers were located in district offices in 1972,1992 the number of staff working at 
“home” had doubled to nearly 50% by the late 1990s.
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While the literature has managed to discover the increase in the size, complexity and 
specialization legislative staff from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, that growth has not 
been nearly as remarkable as the overall growth in number and responsibilities of 
personal staff. Susan Webb Hammond's (1984. 1996) review articles on legislative staff 
provide the most comprehensive review of this literature and the following review draws 
heavily from those two articles.
The early literature (pre-1970) was very descriptive but o f limited utility in 
constructing comparative analyses or drawing conclusions about who the staff members 
were, what they did. and what their importance was within the institution. While Huitt 
( 1965) noted that the relationship between the members and their staff in the Senate was 
“largely unexplored”, very few of his colleagues chose to examine this connection. By 
the late 1960s. scholars had begun to think about the policy impact that staff were having 
on their legislators, their committees, the institution and the overall outcome of policy
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(Clapp, 1963; Fenno, 1966; Huitt, 1966; Jewell and Patterson, 1966; Manley, 1966; 
Matthews, 1960) but staff where often nowhere else to be seen in this literature.
In the 1970s, while the descriptive studies continued, the literature took a turn toward 
more systematic analyses of who the staff were and what they did, as well as asking 
normative questions about the impact of staffing on the legislature and the policy process. 
It was in the 1970s that staff began to be examined functionally and were included as 
important institutional actors. When the congressional literature more substantively 
began to turn its focus on the individuals who populated the institution in the 1960s and 
1970s, studies began to compare staff across different sub-units of Congress, but they 
retained an almost exclusive focus on committee staff (Fox and Hammond, 1977, 
Patterson, 1970, Hammond, 1984). Saloma (1969) was the only researcher to study the 
allocation of personal staff time, while all other studies chose to focus on the incumbents’ 
time or the aggregation of other resources and functions. Hammond found the literature 
after the 1970s to be marked by increasingly diverse types of research. Furthermore, 
there was a growing recognition of the impact that staff were having on the institution 
and the overall policy process. She noted “theory building is progressing on the role and 
functions of staff, the impact o f staff on legislatures and policy making, and the effects of 
legislators and of legislatures on staff’ (Hammond, 1984, p.302).
Staff as an important legislative tool
By the late 1970s. there were a number of works that detailed the growing 
importance of staff in Congress and it was recognized that that importance was not 
limited to reactive casework performed in Washington and in the district offices (see 
especially Malbin 1977, 1981,1980). For example. Fox and Hammond (1977) foimd that
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committee staff in Congress spent more time in committee hearings, writing speeches, 
and working with other staff or interest groups than they did researching information or 
responding to inquiries. The literature began to develop the “recognition that staff does 
more than process information or assist constituents” (Hammond, 1984, p.277). In fact 
Malbin’s work expressed a concern that “unelected Representatives” were having an 
undue impact on the legislative process through their access and control o f legislative 
committees.
In short, congressional staff began to be considered as a variable in the process for 
the first time during the 1970s. Hammond notes that by 1984 there was a “subtle but 
important shift in research direction.. .toward analysis o f factors affecting variation in 
staff work and influence and toward assessment and measurement o f staff influence and 
impact” (p.304). Staff were recognized by Patterson (1970) and Price (1971, 1972) who 
found that staff in committees, if not having influence, had the potential to impact policy 
outcomes because of their number, control and proximity to the legislative process and 
principals. Omstein (1975) was one of the first to focus on the patterns of staff 
allocation. He found that yoimg, northern, liberal incumbents tended to be more “active” 
and that consequently translated into the fact that they had larger and more active staff 
involved in their legislative efforts. Wolman and Wolman’s (1977) research was driven 
by the assumption that staff had an impact on senators’ attitudes and legislative positions. 
Fox and Hammond (1977) found that committees with significantly larger staff were 
considerably more active in their pursuing their agendas while the individual 
representatives and senators had become more reliant on their staff for voting cues than 
had their predecessors. Finally, Fenno (1978) and Cavanaugh (1981) included
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Congressional staff as a variable in explaining legislative outcomes. By the time that 
Hammond wrote her first literature review (1984), congressional staff were being treated 
as either an independent, dependent or intervening variables, and were finally part o f the 
equation. Unfortunately, most of the studies were done in aggregate form “at the slate 
level” (Hammond, 1984, p.299) and did not seek to examine individual variations and 
idiosyncracies. Ironically, just as there began to be an investigation of staff and their 
impact on the process, some offered that staff might have a detrimental impact on the 
democratic process. Malbin’s work suggests too much authority had been devolved to 
staff at the beginning, middle, and end of the legislative process to initiate legislation and 
to negotiate policy and compromises in the name of their employers. Malbin believes 
that staff had contributed to the isolation and distance that individual legislators had come 
to feel for each other. Given the incredible growth in the number of staff assigned to the 
districts, the same might also be said about district staff and their interactions with 
constituents.
Staff are increasingly considered as part of an enterprise 
As was mentioned above, by the late 1970s the literature began a more thorough 
examination of Washington staff and what roles or jobs they performed. For example, 
Hammond (1975) provided very insightful demographic data on who the Washington 
staff were, where they come from, etc. Because of the constituency orientation discussed 
earlier in this review, some scholars have come to refer to modem incumbents as 
“entrepreneurs”, or the operators of “small business/member enterprises” because o f the 
many activities that staffers perform in the name of the incumbent (Loomis, 1979; 
Salisbury and Shepsle, 1981). The “enterprise” is defined as including the individual
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legislator, the committee and personal staff employed by the legislator, as well as the 
incumbent’s former staffers and intimate advisers (Salisbury and Shepsle, 1981).’° While 
the numbers and utilization of committee staff have been more constant over the past 
century, the numbers and roles of personal staff have increased much more dramatically.
By the late 1980s the literature had a fairly well established acceptance of 
congressional staff as part of the overall congressional “enterprise.” But it has only been 
more recently that the literature has accepted staff as a “political aspect” of Congress and 
begun to deal with them as individual actors of importance. The growing number of 
articles focusing on the individual congressional staff member as a candidate is witness to 
the increased understanding of staff as a political variable/factor." However, the focus of 
the recent literature takes an overwhelmingly aggregate look “primarily on the institution 
and its staff’ (Hammond, 1984, p.287). Staff then, as a collection of individual political 
actors are woefully under-examined in the literature. Questions such as: who they are, 
what they do, and what are their motivations are left unanswered. This lack o f attention 
seems not only unwarranted but it also misses the importance of a large portion o f the 
legislative institution. The fact that staff are running for office in greater numbers has 
seemingly stirred the interest of more research. Do staff only become suitable topics for 
research and analysis once they announce their candidacies for office?
In the aftermath o f Fenno’s focus on the goals, motivations and resources o f 
incumbents, Loomis (1979) was a lonely voice including a focus on the district staff as 
part of what he called the incumbent’s “small business.” In order that incumbents could
[ will argue throughout this dissertation that the literature’s definition o f the “enterprise” is too limited. 
District staff are rarely included and the elite constituents with whom staff and incumbents interact are 
almost never discussed.
“ See Hemnson (1994) for an excellent review o f this literature.
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fulfill the multiple goals of policy-making, increased influence (in Washington) and 
reelection, the literature usually assumed that incumbents did things in aggregate (e.g. 
increase their budgets) to make themselves more electorally secure so that they could 
concentrate on the more important goals. Loomis was the only scholar to detail how 
these allocations of resources included the district staff.
The literature on congressional staff has some solid infrastructure, but as Susan 
Webb Hammond (1996, p.571) notes, staff are still viewed as a “subset of the enterprise” 
that remains a “useful avenue for future research” but few have pursued the task. What is 
lacking is research that examines the political nature of staff and the tasks that they 
perform. Hanunond notes that researchers “accept the political aspect of staffing” (1984, 
p.278) but the only study that truly looks at “political” behavior of district staff was 
Macartney’s (1975, 1982) dissertation based on mimicipal, county, state and federal 
legislative offices in Los Angeles county. While Hammond calls Macartney a “unique 
and valuable” contribution, she fails to uncover any other explicitly political 
examinations of legislative staff in the district.
Literature retains a focus on Washington staff while overlooking district
The above review shows that the Washington-based staffers have not been 
overlooked by academic research. Hammond (1984) divided the literature on legislative 
staff into 5 areas: 1) individual aide, 2) legislative sub-units, 3) the institution within 
which staff work, 4) and 5) legislative information needs and output. These inquiries 
were all advanced during the 1970s and 1980s but they failed to address the district staff. 
Her updated review from 1996 added no further contribution for the district other than the 
fact that Washington staffers were returning there to run for office.
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Not only do we need to look at staff as an important political sub-unit of the 
legislature, but we also need to look at another sub-unit of staff itself; the district staff. 
Perhaps the absence of research on district staff can be explained by three factors: 1) they 
are of seemingly less interest or aggregate importance in the process because they do not 
have a finished product such as legislation that makes them easy to examine or compare; 
2) they are less compelling objects of study because they do not seem to have interesting 
output (or as I will argue later, that perhaps they do have important output with regard to 
elites, but that this output is harder to measure); and 3) that they are harder to study 
because they are dispersed in 435 districts across the country. While academic research 
has not addressed the topic of district staff, the numbers of staff allocated to the district 
and the continued perceptions of vulnerability on the part of the incumbents more than 
justify the need for research into the political roles and impact of Congressional district 
staff.
Much of the literature on the relevance of staff emphasizes the importance of 
Washington-based staff and ignores the contributions of district staff. This is problematic 
because district staffers comprise over 40% of all personal staff and the typologies and 
descriptions that are based on Washington staff do not translate well to the district. There 
are other problems that can be identified in looking at some of the seminal articles on 
congressional staff. Hammond (1975) provides a thorough demographic analysis o f 
Washington staff but not district staff. She even mentions the “district ties” of 
Washington staffers. Are district staffers any less worthy of demographic analysis? And 
might not we want to know from where the staff came (other political offices, campaigns 
or first time in government)? Fox and Hammond’s (1977) typology of staff is thorough
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but does not translate well to the district staff, nor was it designed with them in mind. 
Burks and Cole (1978) found the role orientation of Washington staff to be either 
“professional” or “entrepreneurial”. One might also inquire about the role orientations of 
district staff. Cavanaugh (1979) provides a focus on Washington staff to show the 
“leeway” they buy for members of Congress, without mention of how the district staff 
members perform the exact same function. Schiff and Smith (1983) show that of three 
cohorts (pre 60, 60-67 and 68-78) that the most recent cohort, with its larger staff allows 
members to pursue reelection and policy goals at the same time. Again, this work has a 
focus on Washington staff with only a marginal reference to district staff in aggregate. 
Finally, Hammond (1984) suggests that comparisons across governmental institutions 
and the private sector have “not been done and would be useful.” Perhaps it would be 
more appropriate to start with a simple intra-institutional comparison of staff members 
before such extravagant comparative exercises are undertaken. These examples from the 
literature show that a need for further research on district staff remains.
Hammond (1981) suggested that the distribution of staff within the legislature is 
largely determined by the idiosyncratic nature of each representative and his or her ties to 
the district. This was a good suggestion that might be more systematically examined so 
that we can understand that allocation patterns and consequences o f district staff. 
Macartney (1975) echoed Tip O’Neill’s fundamental dictum about politics as a local 
event in stating that the “Capitol is by no means the only arena” of investigation and that 
an examination of district staff is necessary for a complete understanding of 
congressional politics. I would conclude this review by praising Macartney’s path- 
breaking look at political staff from Los Angeles County. There are four main
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contributions of his dissertation that are embraced and expanded upon in this dissertation. 
First, he identified fourteen functions performed by staff ranging from simple 
representation to oversight of other branches of government. Second, rejecting the 
literature’s assumption that all district staff look and act the same, he found that they are 
different, look different, are set up differently and have different functions. Third, he 
very briefly recognizes the political impact that staff might have on their incumbents. 
Finally, he shows that staff can assist constituents in a variety of ways, not simply by 
completing casework. Yet, further work remains to be done after Macartney’s analysis. 
While the above four contributions were path-breaking, they were based on one 
extremely unique county, compared across different levels of government, and his 
identification of the important political values of district staff was exceedingly brief. For 
example, his discussions of the fourteen functions were often limited to not much more 
than a single page o f analysis each. Furthermore, he replaced the bias of the literature 
that asked questions simply of the incumbent, with a simple focus on the senior staff 
member in each office. Chapters Three through Five will take a much deeper look at 
some of the more important political functions performed by district staff, as well as 
comparing staff from different regions. It also was based on interviews with all staff 
members in these case studies as well as some of the constituent with whom they’ve 
interacted. In sum, it will more fully place district staff in the context of their actual 
functions and motivations than has any previous research.
Conclusion
District staff are vital tools for incumbent members o f the United State House of 
Representatives. While incumbents utilize them in a variety o f fashions, this dissertation
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will show that that all staff perform important representational tasks and that some offices 
are extremely proactive in representing the absent incumbent. Some of the more political 
behaviors o f these proactive staff bias the representation of constituents and hinder the 
process o f free, fair and open elections.
This chapter detailed how incumbent’s attitudes towards elections and resources 
changed during the 1960s and consequently how these new resources, with staff in 
particular, began to evolve into a more significant element of the Congressional 
institution. More specifically, this chapter demonstrated how incumbents who continued 
to feel a sense of electoral vulnerability increased the resources at their disposal to serve 
their constituents and build their odds of being re-elected. The academic literature has 
only recently begun to appreciate the political value of legislative staff with district 
staffers remaining largely unstudied.
62
Chapter Two 
Research Methods: The Value of Context
Chapter One placed congressional district staff in their appropriate context. They are 
a resource utilized by incumbents to serve the needs of constituents in their interactions 
with the government. Additionally, district staff members have come to serve the 
electoral needs of inciunbents by performing the basic representational functions and 
some more political behaviors as well. Yet, the discipline knows very little about 
legislative staff in general, and district staff in particular. The observations of this 
dissertation make a compelling case for further study of district staff and the functions 
they perform. This chapter will explain the methodology that was utilized in this study of 
congressional district staff. It will also provide a justification for a district-based, in- 
depth contextual examination as the best approach to study and imderstand these staff and 
the impact that they have in the re-election of incumbent members o f the United States 
House of Representatives.
Research Methods 
Theory-Building Dissertation 
This is a theory-building dissertation built on a number of in-depth, contextual case 
studies. Chapter Three will present findings on who staff members are, what they do, and 
how Incumbents utilize them. In Chapters Five and Six 1 will utilize the data I’ve 
collected to propose a theory of how interaction between incumbents, staff and elite 
constituents impacts Congressional election outcomes. Chapters Four, Five and Six will 
expand on the in-depth contextual examination to probe incumbents’ home activities so
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that I might propose variables that might better explain incumbent behavior and 
motivations and further clarify the high reelection rates o f incumbent members of the 
House of Representatives. This dissertation leaves the door open for researchers in other 
districts to consider this new variable as they examine incumbent advantage.
While I did not have the resources to conduct a systematic testing of the hypotheses 
presented here, I will offer a theory that is based on the literature, my observations, 
interviews, and a pinch of guesswork. This dissertation is designed to provide insights 
into some of the key questions raised by earlier academic studies o f legislative staff. 
Meller (1953), Macartney (1975, 1982), Fox and Hammond (1975, 1977) and Hammond 
(1984, 1996) all lead in the direction of congressional district staff as important political 
actors. Apart from a brief glimpse by Macartney, they all seem to stop short of grasping 
who these staff members are and their political importance to the incumbents. As a result 
of my research, I will offer a theory that understands the roles and motivations of the staff 
members as individual political actors and how they contribute to incumbency advantage.
I feel that the literature’s comprehension of incumbency advantage has become 
somewhat stale over the past decade and that some conjecturing about new theories and 
variables is called for. Lofland and Lofland argue that conjecture plays “an important 
and indispensable role in the social sciences” for three reasons. They suggest that: 1) 
quantitative theorists are often “distant from the phenomena.. .and variables they study”, 
2) that researchers don’t understand the participant’s own “causal theories” and that 3) 
“elaborate quantitative research may only contribute small increments of precision to a 
thorough qualitative study” (1984, pp 103-104). Throughout this chapter one will see
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evidence of how each o f these three instances are eminently demonstrated in the area of 
congressional district staff, elite constituents and election outcomes.
As I intentionally started writing this dissertation with the task of gaining an
understanding of what congressional district staff did, it was important that I have a
flexible research design and not be tied to a deterministic theory and a specific set of
variables from the outset. In that sense, a theory-building/hypothesis-creating research
design allowed me the apprupriate measure of research flexibility. As opposed to more
descriptive or explanatory designs, exploratory research requires “flexibility more than
precision” and prefers designs that “need produce only an opportunity to observe the
phenomena in question” (Manheim and Rich, 1991, p.73). This approach was echoed by
Fenno’s call to “find it in the field.” This is how Fenno described the formulation of his
theory for “Home Style”:
(You must) become interested in some observable set of activities and 
then decide to go have a look at them...only after a prolonged 
unstructured soaking is the problem formulated. Home style didn’t occur 
until I’d taken quite a few trips...Participant-Observation (P/0) seems less 
likely to be used to test an existing hypothesis than to formulate 
hypotheses for testing by others or to uncover some relationship that 
strikes others as worth hypothesizing about testing. It may be an 
appropriate method, however, at any stage of a research endeavor where 
there is a felt need for a fresh line of thought. (1990, p.57)
What 1 “found in the field” was that the discipline had very little understanding about 
what legislative staff did in the “field.” The aggregate studies of perquisite utilization 
and casework service were all predicated on a faulty assumption that every district office 
looked alike and did the same things. Furthermore, the literature failed to appreciate any 
political or electoral value that district staff might have beyond their ability to complete 
casework requests. After spending time observing incumbents and staff at work, I first
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focused simply on providing a “fresh line of thought” about legislative staffers: who they 
were and what they did. After “prolonged soaking” it became apparent that the 
interactions between incumbents, staff and elite constituents would provide a more 
important “fresh line of thought” about the act of representation and how incumbents get 
re-elected. A simplified view of the literature’s understanding o f incumbency advantage 
looks something like the following:
Media
Perception of ^  Allocation of ^ Challengers ^  Reelection
vulnerability resources Campaign Receipts
In Chapter Five, 1 will improve on this model by suggesting that district staff be 
included in the literature’s understanding of incumbency advantage. 1 was able to 
formulate some hypotheses about staff behavior and their electoral impact precisely 
because 1 was able to see the context o f district staff. The observed context suggested 
that district staff had a role to play in each of the steps in the figure above. While not a 
determining factor in these elections, district staff are clearly involved at the “margins” 
and have an impact on the re-election prospects of incumbent House members.
Contextually Based
Contextually based research goes by a number of different names and methods. It 
might be more commonly referred to as “qualitative social research”, “participant 
observation”, “intensive interviewing”, “field research” or some other combination of 
terms (Lofland and Lofland, 1984, p .l, 11,47). What these methods commonly share is 
a “goal to collect the richest possible data...to earn intimate familiarity” with the subjects 
and their data is arrived at by “looking, listening, and asking.” Fenno most simply
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depicts contextually based research with the label “soak and poke.” He calls it the “study 
of people in the natural setting...just hanging around...(it is a) blend of observation, 
interviewing and participation” (1990, p.55). Fenno sees “immersion as a qualitatively 
different experience.” These forms differ, however, in how their data should be collected 
from the context. Once the behavior is observed, there is a difference in method amongst 
qualitative researchers. At one end of a continuum might be anthropologists who suggest 
that one must simply observe the subject as an unknown individual, not interacting or 
seeking to gain an explanation of behavior. At the other end of the continuum would be 
the known observer who mainly collects data through observations and then questions the 
subjects for explanations of the meanings of their behavior. In the middle of this 
continuum might be P /0 where an observer perhaps hopes to capture the essence o f both 
these models: the anonymity of the anthropologist but also the explanations of the 
subjects.
While I would truly have preferred to do a P /0 investigation of a number of different 
offices, 1 simply did not have the time or monetary resources to be able to complete such 
a project. Instead, I decided to gather my data based largely on intensive interviews that 
were complemented by as much observation as could be gathered in my four primary 
case studies. As I was persuaded that one could obtain better data by actually travelling 
to the subject’s environment, I decided to take that one step further and observe the 
subjects’ behavior in their roles. This contextually based research utilizes slightly more 
immersion into the case studies than interviewing subjects either in their Washington or 
their district offices. Rather, this model sought to “listen in context” to the responses that 
the subjects made in interviews and then apply those thoughts, rationalizations or
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explanations to behaviors that I observed in much richer context over a period of time, 
longer than an interview. Lofland and Lofland suggest that the contextual researcher 
should “look and listen, watch and ask” (1984, p. 13). The practical application of this 
advice was to spend several days observing the behavior of the incumbent and staff of 
each office as well as gaining an explanation from them in interviews.
What unites all of the qualitative approaches is a commitment to good science. As 
Lofland and Lofland describe, the qualitative researchers strive to be neither “descriptive 
ethnographers” nor “grounded theorists”. Rather, well-trained qualitative researchers 
will usually sit in the middle o f these two stereotypes, seeking to “mix observation with 
theory and methods that matter” (1984, pl51). It is the purpose of this dissertation to use 
the contexual data, which was collected in an identical manner from a number of 
different case studies, to build upon the discipline’s theory of incumbent’s political 
behavior.
Justification
This dissertation holds that in-depth contextual examination is necessary to fully 
grasp the political significance o f district staff; who they are, what they do and how that 
contributes to a more complete imderstanding of incumbency advantage. As was 
demonstrated in Chapter One, Congressional district staffers are an imder-observed but 
numerically and politically significant group. Additionally, the literature’s grasp on 
incumbency advantage is based on aggregate evidence of district resources that are 
usually not observed. The few examples that are contextual in nature tend to be 
constrained to candidate-level decision-making (e.g. Fowler and McClure). This 
dissertation will add an important contextual shade to the substantial literature on
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incumbency advantage. Chapter Four will slightly depart from the contextually based 
examination to offer some generalizations about staff behavior and motivations. Given 
that this is a theory-building dissertation, 1 did not want to preclude different avenues of 
analysis for future research.
Neither Journalists nor Political Science does context well
1 would agree with Richard Fenno that contextual research is necessary because 
neither journalists nor political scientists tend to do it well. Journalism is condemned by 
most scholars for being a typically shallow depiction of anecdotal case studies that have 
an intellectual attention span of a drive-thru meal. In Fenno’s own words; “journalists 
don’t have the patience, training or interest to conduct a dialogue with political 
theorizers" and that political science will “produce a better balanced, more useful 
understanding of politicians, more likely to focus on the political activity of politicians 
than journalists” (1990, pp.52-53,127). The basic motivation of journalism is to focus on 
the curious, the anecdotal and the fresh and unique settings or environments.
Comparisons of what appear to be common or regular activities, like the allocation of 
district staff for example, do not often merit journalistic attention. My research turned up 
several journalistic accounts of legislative staff and as Fenno might have predicted, they 
tended to focus on the interesting anecdote about the power o f an individual staff member 
or why a staff member was running for Congress. There were no sustained journalistic 
reviews of district staff. Contextually based research such as this dissertation is not 
journalism. It is not journalism precisely because political scientists do have the 
“patience, training and interest” to investigate the variables, environments and contexts of 
political situations and then engage theorizers on the relevance and findings of their
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research. This dissertation for example, delves into the contextual variation that exists 
between various congressional district offices and then offers, to that subsection of 
political science which studies congressional elections, a new variable to discuss and 
investigate.
While journalists do not often meet the scientific standards for contextual research, 
political science also tends to dismiss this research method. Fermo finds there to be a 
great “reluctance” on the part of political science to embrace the observation and 
discussion of politicians “up close” (1990, p.l). I would amend this to say that political 
scientists have grown more comfortable dealing with members of Congress “up close” hi 
their Washington offices. A survey of the literature over the past few decades would turn 
up a substantial increase in the amount of research that is based on interviews conducted 
with incumbents in their offices. There has not been a corresponding increase in the 
amount of investigation of incumbents in their home districts, however. When the home 
district or the campaign come to be the subject of the study, the average political scientist 
is more comfortable relying on aggregate comparisons of spending patterns or allocations 
of resources complemented with an interview of the incumbent and/or campaign staff 
after the election is over. The contextual model holds that going home to the district 
allows one to get a “better feel” than interaction with members in their Washington 
offices (Fenno, 1990, p.92).
Gaps in the research
1 received a “better feel” for congressional district staff and incumbents’ “home 
styles” when I completed an internship in a district office in 1993. Contextual 
researchers often suggest that “where you are” is the best place to conduct research
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because you have built-in advantages of access, comprehension, interest and concern 
about the material. Lofland and Lofland refer to this as “opportunistic research” (1984, 
p.7). While I was doing the internship, I also began the requisite background reading on 
congressional staff for the dissertation prospectus. The absence of district staff in the 
literature, combined with my direct observation of the numerous political activities that 
were being performed by said staff convinced me that this was an eminently worthy topic 
for study. Given the substantial resources that incumbents spend on staff salaries, office 
rent and other district activities, it furthermore has a relevance to a wider social audience. 
It Is my belief that the consequences of staff utilization and behavior have a direct impact 
on the reelection prospects for incumbent representatives and senators, which then leads 
to an obvious impact on the policies made by the legislature. When journalists and others 
debate elections, representation and incumbency advantage, one rarely hears reference to 
the thousands of individuals employed in district offices. Public awareness o f district 
staff seems as limited in scope as the literatures’, except perhaps for the “elite” 
constituents and those constituents with federal problems who regularly interact with 
incumbents and their staff at home.
1 was further inspired to do this dissertation by Susan Webb Hammond’s consistent 
mention of research “gaps” in her 1984 literature review on congressional staff.
Following are some o f the key observations in this seminal review article: “Further work 
on the consequences of the characteristics and patterns (of staff recruitment and 
communication patterns between offices) would be useful and could shed light on the 
policy process and on legislative change.” She went on to request work on ways to 
measure staff influence and power in a more “empirical” fashion (p.280). In writing
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about the few individual levels studies that exist, she noted: “further research might be 
directed toward filling gaps in the data base” and the need to “gather data for longitudinal 
analysis.. .and assessing the impact of observed patterns and testing the generated 
hypotheses” (p.286). She did note that: “theory building is progressing on the role and 
functions of staff, the impact o f  staff on legislatures... and the effects of legislators on 
staff’ (p.302). But, she goes on to mention that other important “gaps” exist where “few 
studies explicitly link the micro and the macro levels” and concluded that “there 
continues to be a need to map the terrain and to fill in data gaps” by building on earlier 
case studies and surveys (p.305). I would assert that my review in Chapter One 
combined with my internship experience clearly demonstrate the “gap” in the literature 
when it comes to the roles, functions and motivations of congressional district staff.
Apart from a smattering of research about the “personal vote” and constituency service, 
there is a “gap” that exists around congressional district staff and how they interact with 
both their employers and their constituents, elite and otherwise.
Research Methods
This dissertation examines congressional district staff and their interaction with 
incumbents and elite constituents from three different perspectives or sets of data. The 
primary research perspective was based on four in-depth case studies of the home district 
offices of incumbent members o f the United States House of Representatives. The 
second research perspective was based on a more limited investigation of an additional 
nine district offices. The third and final perspective was that o f the elite constituents in 
the four primary case studies.
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Sample/Case Selection
The four primary case studies were selected for two reasons: 1) because each case 
was different from the other three on a number o f independent variables and 2) because 
they granted extremely open terms of access. As the research progressed, the four 
primary case studies were selected on the grounds that each of the incumbents and 
districts were different from those that preceded it. I started “where I was” and then 
began to go places that were different. The different variables in these cases most 
notably reflect the geography of the districts, the age and seniority o f the incumbent, and 
the political behavior and vulnerability of the incumbent. Secondary case studies were 
further added where possible to enhance these variables or to explore new ones. This is 
precisely the method by which Fermo expanded his original pool o f cases for Home Style 
from four cases in 1970 to eighteen by 1976. Before I detail the case studies, 1 will first 
discuss the research methods that were utilized.
Some comments about the general process o f research 
Starting Out
The legislative internship sparked my interest in this dissertation topic. The first 
decision that I had to confront in my research methods was how to collect data. As was 
mentioned in the previous section, I decided to use a contextually based method of data 
collection where I would conduct intensive interviews with complementary observation 
where possible. My internship experience persuaded me that I would quickly be able to 
recognize the functions and importance of district staff behavior. While I was surprised 
not to find a wider degree o f universality in staff behavior, I was able to modify my 
theory and variables quickly because I had a general understanding o f staff and
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incumbent motivations from the lengthy internship. Given that I had to conduct intensive 
interviews with the subjects and the individuals with whom they interacted, it meant that 
I had to be a “known” observer, subsequently rendering further limitations to my ability 
to do a true P /0  study. Where I did my observations, however, 1 was very successful in 
remaining relatively “unknown” to the constituents.
This dissertation found inspiration in Richard Fenno’s path-breaking investigations 
of incumbent “home styles.” In an idyllic setting this dissertation would have more fully 
followed the rigors of his “Soak and Poke” or P/0 style. However, limitations of time, 
money, and access meant that it would not be possible for me to complete the eighteen 
case studies (with return visits) that he accomplished over a seven-year period. What I 
was able to emulate from his research was the basic directive of how the “soaking and 
poking” gathered research. In his words, P/0 is the “practice of gathering data by 
watching and talking to people in their natural habitats” (1990, p.6). I concurred with 
Fenno that interviewing and observing incumbents on their home turf put them in a more 
natural and relaxed situation to demonstrate and explain the complexities of 
representation. In Fenno’s own words, we know to a much greater extent “what they are 
like” when we “spend more time looking at individual members” (p. 99). Furthermore, I 
could immediately identify or understand their styles in ways that interviews in their DC 
offices simply could not allow me to capture. The same motivation applied then to the 
district staff. Questions that sought to uncover how they identify key constituents and 
how they proceeded to deal with those constituents could simply not be captured by 
surveys, even with open-ended questions. Alternatively, spending an afternoon with staff 
allowed them ample opportunity to express their thoughts, motivations and daily routines
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that couldn’t be expressed in a questionnaire. They drove me around the district, took me 
to meetings, or just went out for lunch. In each situation I was able to observe them in 
their work setting. On numerous occasions, questions that I asked staff about observed 
actions or statements created sudden realizations, perceptions, or explanations of things 
that they had never thought about. Therein lies the main value o f contextual observation. 
Interview and observe the incumbent
In each of the primary case studies, I spent at least one week in the district 
conducting the required interviews and observations. Of this time, at least one full day 
was spent in each of the primary cases with the incumbent member o f Congress. During 
this day 1 gathered data in two fashions. At some point early in the data gathering in each 
district, 1 conducted an intensive interview with the incumbent. The purpose of this 
interview was to gain a comprehensive portrait o f the incumbent’s perceptions of his or 
her job, district and constituents. To complement the interview with the incumbent, I 
spent the other part o f the full day in each case observing the incumbent interact with 
staff and constituents as a way to verify the portrait that I constructed in the interview. 1 
attempted to gain as wide a profile of public observations as possible. In most cases 
these observations included large “town hall meetings”, smaller meetings with 
constituents with individual problems or key supporters in the communities, visits to 
editors of local papers or radio/television studios, and occasionally with partisan 
supporters. In fact. Chapters Three and Four will reveal that the latter group (electoral 
supporters) tends to be well represented amongst the ranks o f people with whom 
incumbents and their staff interact. This raises substantial representational questions that 
will be dealt with in Chapters Five and Six.
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Interview and observe the staff
In addition to spending a day with the incumbent, I also interviewed and spent a full 
day with the ranking district staff member (RDSM). In most cases these individuals are 
referred to as the District Director (DD), the Administrative Assistant (AA), or the Chief- 
of-Staff (COS). ‘ As the incumbents are frequently absent from their districts, this 
dissertation (and political reality) holds that RDSM’s are extremely relevant elements of 
the political “enterprise” that is the modem member of Congress. As such, 1 felt that it 
was vital to collect data on at least three vital concepts when I was interviewing and 
observing staff leadership. First, what was the relationship that existed between the 
incumbent and the RDSM? Second, what kind of relationship existed between the 
RDSM and the other staff? In this case, as in the first question, I needed to understand 
the office hierarchy; who exercises power, how much, in what ways? I also needed to 
capture the hierarchy of power that existed between the Washington staff and the district. 
Third, just as 1 wanted to capture the incumbent’s personality and perception, 1 also 
wanted to gain as comprehensive as possible an understanding of the RDSM’s perception 
of the district. Did observations of the RDSMs tend to be similar to those of the 
Incumbents? I will show in the next chapter that RDSMs quite often act as surrogates for 
the absent members, speaking at Rotary limches, visiting with local elected officials, 
representing the incumbent at opening ceremonies, etc. 1 also observed district staff 
leadership interacting with local elites and partisan supporters. It was my experience that 
the interviews and observations of the RDSMs provided more substantial and insightful 
data than did the interviews with the incumbents. Or to be more precise, district staff
‘ I did not encounter any offices where the RDSM did not have one of these three titles. As Chapter Three 
will detail, however, there is substantial variation in the roles and titles between offices.
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leadership gave open, honest explanations without the “on the record” mentality that 
incumbents more often seemed to offer.
Once I had finished with the two principal actors in each office, I turned my attention 
to the remaining staff. These staff could be split into three categories. For the purposes 
of my research, staffers with “political” or “field” responsibilities outside of the office 
were more relevant than were the other district staff. The former staff usually carried the 
title “field representative” or “district representative.” As will be seen in Chapter Three, 
the functions of the people who hold these titles have substantial variation, and the 
distinction here is quite stereotypical. The second category of people in the district staff 
would be the press secretaries/media relations and schedulers. While these individuals do 
perform tasks of a “political” nature, they deal overwhelmingly with the same small 
group of elites and were less central to this dissertation. For example, the press 
secretaries and their relationships with district media have been well ploughed by the 
literature. Alternatively, while the schedulers also have interaction with district elite, 
they tend to deal overwhelmingly in the political minutiae of scheduling the incumbents’ 
time and events. The third and final category o f staff is the caseworker and receptionist. 
As these individuals are entirely office-bound and deal, for the most part, with 
individuals not considered “elite” constituents, they are not the focus of this dissertation.
I would also note that this is the category of staff for which there is the least amount o f 
variation between offices. There is a simple need to help constituents and all incumbents 
I observed allocated this final category of staff to deal with those requests.
I allocated interview time for each of the three categories of staffers in the 
descending order o f importance as they were listed. In the primary cases, at a minimum,
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I interviewed every flill-time member of the district staff for at least twenty minutes. For 
the first category of staffers, the “field representatives”, I additionally spent at least a 
morning or an afternoon observing their routines and interactions. I foimd the field 
representatives to be much more firank in their discussions of their employers and the 
political environments that surrounded them than most other staff. What some field 
representatives lacked in the quality of their interaction with truly “elite” constituents, 
they made up for by having lower thresholds of reservation in talking about their 
employers, their job roles, and the constituents they interacted with. I did not conduct 
extra interview time with the other two categories of staff. Some might suggest that this 
is unfortunate in that there was less focus on media and schedulers. My remarks above 
suggest that 1 am not missing any data by focusing on other staff. 1 also do not feel that 1 
compromised more than a minor amount of data by quickly dealing with caseworkers. 
Interviewing elites
Finally, I interviewed at least twenty “elite” constituents in each of the primary case 
study districts. These constituents were spread out across various cities reflecting the 
demography of the district. Some of these elites were people that I actually observed 
interacting with incumbents and their staff, others were interviewed based on reference 
from others or previous research 1 had compiled. Still others were encoimtered on drop- 
by visits. 1 will provide more information on the elite interviews later in this chapter. 
Advance work
Prior to traveling to each case study, 1 undertook some basic research about the 
incumbents and their districts. Most useful was the profile provided by Congressional 
Quarterly’s Almanac of American Politics. This resource provided a profile of each
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district and its incumbent. Because of its concise and standardized depiction o f districts, 
the Almanac provided me with conveniently comparable descriptions for quickly 
selecting and learning about my case studies. For further research on the districts, I 
examined CQ’s Congressional Districts in the 1990s. which is basically an extension o f 
the political, demographic and economic descriptions of each district. Next, 1 turned to 
the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) website, and a related spin-off 
( wAVAv.trav.com') to gain profiles of the incumbents’, as well as their opponents’, fund- 
raising situations. This resource provided a quick understanding of the electoral 
environment of each incumbent for the current and previous campaigns. Additionally, 
these resources provide the names of donors who had given the candidates and their 
opponents more than $200 in a calendar year. 1 would suggest that these websites are an 
underutilized tool for future research on the political behavior of elites. Finally, I did 
searches on website engines and in local newspaper indexes where possible to get recent 
clips on the incumbents and their political environments.
Multiple trips
For three of the four primary cases (A,C and D), 1 undertook numerous trips spread 
out over time. These trips were not dispersed in a manner adequate to come to 
longitudinal conclusions about how an incumbent’s staff and style might change over the 
duration of a career. What the staggered trips did provide, however, was some level of 
control over whatever political events might have been occurring at one given point of 
observation. Staggering the trip times also allowed me to observe the offices at different 
points in the electoral cycle. While most scholars and journalists write of a “permanent 
campaign”, I observed there to be clearly different states of “permanence” during the
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two-year session of congress. For example, visiting during a “district work period” 
where the incumbent is at home is a far different experience than observing a typical 
weekend visit. Alternatively, one finds very different things going on in most offices 
when you compare two months and twelve months before the election. I would 
recommend repeat visits if anyone chose to replicate this study in order that they might 
check the veracity of their data.
Anonymity bargain
Access is a highly sensitive matter and extremely important to this research design 
and those of other political scientists to follow.^ As Fenno noted, journalists have a 
different “bargain” with politicians in that they are able to attain greater access to 
politicians in return for highly valuable media coverage. In short, politicians need 
Journalists. They do not need political scientists for anything other than satisfaction of 
ego or a scholastic desire to further academic research.^ This fact may serve as a 
deterrent to many researchers even attempting to gain access to elected officials. The 
patient and persistent researcher can, in fact, get through this veil o f secrecy, cynicism 
and mistrust but he or she must be mindful of those who follow. 1 was respectful of 
offices that did cooperate by promising to respect their anonymity and confidentiality and 
by not prying information about offices that decided not to participate in my study. As 
Fenno notes, a researcher bears the burden o f protecting access for those graduate 
students and faculty that will follow; “getting, keeping, and preserving access for others
'  The findings and data from this dissertation pose little or no threat to anyone that I interviewed or 
observed. There was no data collected about any illegal or unethical behavior. Furthermore, I completed 
the necessary human subject questionnaire with the University of Oklahoma.
 ^ In a true P/O study the subjects might be able to “get something” from the researcher in the sense that 
they are performing the same tasks as the subjects (e.g. Fenno working on the campaign by stuffing 
envelopes), but in the case o f  this research it would have been impossible for me to provide a trade-off for 
their time.
80
is the central worry of participant-observation” (1990, p.22). Leaving an incumbent or 
RDSM with a bad taste for academics can have an impact for years to come.
In my interviews and observations with all levels o f actors, I emphasized the 
anonymity and confidentiality of their actions and comments. In return for this 
anonymity, as well as what 1 perceived to be an increase in many staff and elite’s sense of 
self-worth or political importance, I was able to attain an enhanced level of access and 
inside observations, complaints, and reactions from these actors. This is much the same 
“bargain” that Fenno struck with incumbent politicians. In most cases it seemed that the 
staffers had rarely, if ever, entertained inquiries about their jobs and the political 
significance of their actions. Spector (1980) actually found there to be a converse with 
public officials. He found that anonymity impeded access to quality data from public 
officials. While there may be something to this finding, I do not think it is logically the 
same with district staff, as they are not truly “public officials” and know that their 
remarks to me were not being quoted in the next day’s newspaper. I tend to disagree with 
Spector in that public officials seemed to have a natural skepticism toward academics and 
that anonymity was not perceived to be a problem. None o f the incumbents were overtly 
anxious about the publication of my dissertation.
Access to offices
I utilized four suggestions from Lofland and Lofland to gain and maintain access to 
the primary and secondary case studies (1984, pp25-27). First, they suggest that the 
researcher use any connections or “preexisting relations o f trust” to obtain access to a 
research setting. Second, the researcher should provide brief, straightforward accoimts of 
the research and not mislead the subjects. Third, the researcher should demonstrate a
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competent level of knowledge and interest in the subject. And finally, the researcher 
should act courteously and professionally.
Connections
As was mentioned earlier, it is often useful to “start where you are.” Not only does a 
researcher have the advantage of greater levels o f interest, even more importantly the 
researcher has heightened levels of access to situations where he/she has familiarity with 
the subjects. My initial research subject was the office in which 1 previously completed 
the internship and his successor in that district. Hence, I was able to use “preexisting 
relations of trust” to gain access to my early case studies.
Provide account
Given that I could not do internships in all of my case studies, it was unrealistic to 
expect access being so easily attained. Therefore, I had to procure access in some other 
manner. Fenno (1990, p.61) got access to his case studies either through personal 
association with congressional incumbents and staffers or through “cold turkey letters” to 
the offices. Given that 1 was a relatively unknown graduate student with few contacts on 
Capitol Hill, I deduced that a more informal method would be required to procure access. 
What I might refer to as the drop-by method entailed a phone call and letter being sent to 
the office shortly before 1 arrived there in person to meet with the RDSM. Several weeks 
in advance of my visit to the district, 1 called each office to obtain the name o f the 
RDSM, or relevant individual in charge of the district operation, and then mailed a letter 
to that individual. This letter was mailed on University stationary and provided a very 
general explanation of my research topic. Each letter was accompanied with a note from
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my dissertation committee chairman, confirming my identity, the utility of my project, 
and the confidentiality that accompanied the research.
Not being a prominent tenured faculty member with numerous contacts in universities 
and on Capitol Hill meant that I would likely have not had the same success or response 
rate as Fenno. Nor did I have the resources that Fenno had, seeing my meager salary and 
research stipend. On the other hand, being a graduate student with fewer time 
constraints, 1 had the capacity to be more aggressive and industrious in my travels. It 
seemed to me that “dropping by” the offices after sending the initial letter gave me a 
twofold benefit over a “cold turkey letter”: 1) the offices could see me. The initial 
suspicions of the staffers appeared to be eased in most cases and I think there is a greater 
assessment of trust and honesty when you can actually see an individual making a 
request. .\nd 2) my presence in their office likely made it harder for them to refuse my 
request. In fact, this drop-by method was successful in four out o f six attempts where I 
was hoping to gain complete access. In other cases where the offices were less willing to 
grant access, or where distance and time limited my ability to focus on that incumbent, I 
settled on making those offices into secondary case studies. When the offices were 
unsure of my request or blatantly uncooperative, I was minimally able, in all but one 
case, of at least getting an interview with the RDSM to obtain enough information to 
utilize them as a background case. In most cases, the drop-bys were scheduled in 
geographic proximity to each other so that I could maximize my research time and 
resources. As was just mentioned, in every case except one drop-by, I was able to at least 
obtain an interview with the RDSM. In most cases it took several days to accomplish the 
interviews and observations of the staff working in the offices. I then spent the remainder
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of the week conducting the elite interviews. In some settings, this workload was split 
over repeat visits.
The drop-by method also seems to be advantageous over Fenno’s means of procuring 
access in that the district staffers are in a known place at a known time. Incumbent 
members of Congress have extremely fluid schedules. Meetings can quite often be 
cancelled, delayed or rescheduled. One might also make the claim that the incumbents' 
time is “more valuable” and that having an academic trailing them around is an 
annoyance at best. In this sense, the activities and personalities o f district staff are less 
sensitive for the most part. To put it more jftankly, they were less nervous about having 
me around. Actually, the converse was often the case, district staff were normally 
resigned to anonymity and the presence of a researcher who was spending a substantial 
portion of time observing their “daily routine” was explained to me as being 
“vindicating”, “worthwhile” or “just plain interesting.”
Because of the nature of the daily routines o f the average district staff member it was 
quite possible for me to insert myself into virtually any day they were at work without 1) 
inconveniencing them or 2) missing out on important data. On the first point, 1 do not 
perceive that my drop-by visits were an inconvenience in that the my “interviews” could 
be conducted on the fly, with questions coming in the car or over limch or a drink at the 
end of the day. For the most part, I simply wanted to see them in action and then debrief 
their perceptions at the end of an encounter or a time period spent with them. The second 
point refers to the random nature of my interactions with staff. Unlike Fenno, whose 
study was largely based on the quite standard weekend visit o f  the incumbent, my study 
subject has a much longer working week, leaving open the possibility that I would not
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capture the entirety of staff jo b s/ I believe that the variation in staff work weeks were 
captured by: 1) spending substantial amounts of time with each field staffer (an average 
of over day in each case); 2) frequently asking them to reflect and compare their days 
and the experiences to what I had observed in my time with them; and 3) that field staff 
tend to perform a wide representation of their weekly tasks on most given days.
Gaining access to elite constituents was accomplished in a similar fashion. I would 
usually call a list of elite constituents that 1 had assembled fi-om my research and the 
recommendations o f staff and other constituents. I would make these calls a day or two 
prior to my visit and explain that I needed to interview “elite constituents” about their 
interactions with congressional inciunbents and their staff. 1 have a sense that this 
introduction and/or the fact that they were “recommended” by another elite constituent, 
often played to the egos of local journalists, lawyers, and executives, and procured me 
access in virtually every case.
1 also combined the first and second suggestions to increase the possibility of 
cooperation and access. This technique was to obtain letters of recommendation from 
several of my early case studies for use in the offices to follow. 1 was able to obtain 
favorable letters from three offices o f differing political persuasions that assured potential 
subjects of my confidentiality and anonymity and that my studies had posed no 
inconveniences to their daily routines. These RDSMs also volimteered to be listed as 
“references” had anyone want to call to confirm these letters. In several situations, 
having a letter from an office of a fellow partisan granted a sense of ease, and greater 
access. Overall, however, it was not difficult to move back and forth between
* I also note that my research was a more accurate reflection o f what staff do than was Fenno’s portrait o f 
incumbents’ home styles, as his research was heavily based on several weekend trips in the fall o f election
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Democratic and Republican offices. Appearing competent and presenting background 
material and references were almost universally successful in assuring the offices of my 
legitimate academic background.
Be competent and courteous
The third and fourth issues were more elements of style than access. Lofland and 
Lofland ( 1984) suggest that when dealing with public figures, researchers should 
approach the subject as neither “socially acceptable incompetents” nor as know-it-alls 
that anticipate everything a subject states. Rather, access will be best attained and 
preserved when the researcher acts as something of a “student” with a competent level o f 
background in the subject matter, but interested in getting the complete perspective from 
the subject “teacher.” I found this to be a useful suggestion in dealing with all ray 
subjects, from incumbents to staff and local elites. The final suggestion, to be courteous 
and professional, needs little comment. As noted above, I called and wrote in advance o f 
my visits, was respectful of decisions to decline participation, dressed appropriately, and 
gave the subjects any space or anonymity that they requested.
Feasibility
When preparing my prospectus, I concluded that this dissertation was both 
strategically and tactically feasible. Because I initially chose to pursue a theory-building 
dissertation with a limited set o f case studies, I deduced that ray findings and proposals 
were highly achievable and realistic at the strategic level. If ray purpose were to offer 
more substantial and specific conclusions about district staff and their role in American 
politics, I would have had to wrestle more heavily with the issue of feasibility.
Tactically, 1 found this dissertation to be a highly feasible project given the preceding
years.
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discussion of access to offices and staff. Furthermore, my research method was much 
more time and cost flexible than Fenno’s. I knew that if I was imable to obtain access 
after one morning or afternoon I departed that district and pushed into the next district on 
that same day. As mentioned above, three of my four primary cases involved return 
visits, as did a number of the secondary cases. When setting up appointments for my 
initial drop-bys, I clustered offices in close geographic proximity into a one-week 
schedule to maximize my efficiency of data gathering. In this sense, I knew that it would 
be feasible to access the four (and nine) cases that I needed to observe. Finally, 1 should 
note the limitations of being a graduate student. As Fenno observed, younger researchers 
have lesser problems with physical rigors than with financial rigors o f field research.
This dissertation was an expensive proposition made cheaper by the couches o f friends 
and family and the thousands of miles logged on my ever-dependable Ford Escort.
Data collection
My data was collected in two diverse forms: interviews and observations. The 
majority of the data came from interviews with incumbents, staff and constituents. In 
each of the primary case studies, 1 conducted a roughly one-hour interview the 
incumbent, at least another one-hour interview with the RDSM, widely variant interviews 
with the rest of the staff (ranging in time from fifteen minutes with non-essential staff to 
multiple interviews exceeding three hours with other staff), and roughly twenty elite 
interviews per district. Following Lofland and Lofland’s advice, 1 completed roughly 
twenty interviews per district in a sacrifice of “breadth for depth” (1984, p.62). The elite 
interviews, like the staff interviews, ranged from the uninterested fifteen-minute 
annoyance to the in-depth and engaging ninety-minute conversation. The interview data
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was complemented by observations o f the incumbents and staff interacting with each 
other as well as with elite constituents. In each of the primary cases, I observed the 
incumbent interacting with staff and constituents for at least one full day. In the case of 
three incumbents (A, C and D) I had substantially more observations spread out over 
longer periods of time. I additionally spent roughly one full day with the RDSM doing 
the interview and the observations. For the remaining “field” staff, my interviews and 
observations were of varying lengths, ranging from an hour to over a day in total. As 
mentioned earlier, I only conducted brief interviews (in most cases twenty minutes) with 
the district staff members who did not have “field” responsibilities. In the secondary case 
studies, 1 gathered the data exclusively through interviews.^ While 1 would have liked to 
include observational data to improve the accuracy of my data in the secondary case 
studies, 1 simply did not have either the time or the financial resources to be able to 
interview the additional incumbents, staff and elites in nine more districts. In short, 1 
made the decision of whom to interview and observe based on cost and access.
Interviews
1 utilized intensive or unscheduled interviews because of their flexibility in gathering 
rich data. As opposed to a standard interview or questionnaire, unscheduled interviews 
have a “general objective with no predetermined set of questions” (Manheim and Rich,
1991, p. 140). The unscheduled interview is meant to be more free ranging and less 
structured than the standard interview. Moreover, unscheduled interviews are highly 
appropriate for theory-building research designs as they are more interested in 
discovering facts and patterns than in measuring pre-selected phenomena. According to
 ^Secondary case studies were done by interview with the exception of one case study (E). i gained a 
substantial amount of data through observation in that office while I was completing my internship.
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Lofland and Lofland, the intensive or unscheduled interview is a “guided conversation 
whose goal is to elicit from the interviewee rich, detailed materials that can be used in 
qualitative analysis... (it) seeks to discover the informants experience of a particular topic 
or situation...where the scheduled interview seeks frequency (of a behavior/topic)... the 
unscheduled seeks to find out what kinds of things exist in the first place” (1984, p. 12). I 
approached each interview with an interest in understanding that subject’s perceptions of 
politics, representation and the purpose of their interactions. If the subject was amenable, 
my goal in each interview was to achieve a sort of relaxed and free-flowing conversation 
that would allow them to comprehend and explain their “experience”. Lofland and 
Lofland refer to this goal as a “guided conversation” where the researcher has an 
“interview guide” to lead the questions (p.59). Invariably, I found that the relaxed 
conversation allowed me to put the subject at ease and obtain richer and more plentiful 
data than I would have been able to obtain utilizing standardized questionnaires.
This is not to imply that unscheduled interviews collect data based on random strings 
of thoughts, anecdotes, and observations. Rather, there were many common themes in 
the interviews and questions that I posed. After a thorough reading of the literature and a 
semester spent interning in my initial case study, I had established what I had thought to 
be a rather comprehensive set o f topics and questions that was to serve as the foundation 
for each interview. When I set out on my first few case studies I found that my initial 
questions and topics were somewhat predetermined and/or biased by my first case study. 
But since my initial research design was merely to examine the variation in staff activities 
and allocation, I simply added a few questions or noted new observations that I felt 
enhanced the concepts under study, or proved to be more important elements o f theories
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that would need to be developed in future research. I also felt that with each additional 
case study that I became more skilled in making observations and developing a more 
refined theory and set of questions. Furthermore, as the list o f “questions” was created 
and expanded, I made a point o f regularly refreshing the questions in my mind to ensure 
that I was utilizing and comparing the same questions and observations from one office to 
the next.*^  Each interview revolved aroimd basic inquisitions about the nature of the 
incumbent, politics and interaction. There were a number of questions that were asked in 
virtually every interview. These basic questions were mostly neutrally worded, open- 
ended questions that 1) tested the respondent’s level of understanding and interaction 
with the incumbents and/or the elite constituents and 2) sought to evaluate their 
normative perceptions of those same individuals. For example, the data-gathering 
portion of nearly every interview with elite constituents began with me asking the 
interviewee to “discuss the nature of the interaction that you have had with 
Representative X.” Starting with simple but very broad open-ended questions allowed 
me to deduce the interviewee’s ability to gamer a passing grade on the two ‘tests’ just 
mentioned.
I utilized several other interview techniques suggested by Lofland and Lofland ( 1984, 
pp.55-61). I began each interview with an introduction of myself, the research topic and 
by giving the subject assurances of confidentiality and anonymity. I then asked the 
subject a basic question to deduce their interaction with the constituent, but then I sought 
to “build rapport” by asking them more basic questions about the nature of the political 
environment and their job before proceeding to more cmcial questions about the
 ^See the Appendix for an abbreviated listing o f some o f the questions and topics that I pursued in each 
“guided conversation.”
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incumbent’s staff and reelection efforts and whether they were supporters of the 
incumbent. As noted above, each interview was conducted more as a conversation based 
on several large thematic avenues that I sought to discuss with the subject. I also utilized 
probing questions so that the subjects might extend on topics that they only slightly 
mentioned or avoided altogether in my basic questions.
The quality and quantity of data varied with each interview. For every successful 
hour-long interview data rich in answers to questions, anecdotes and sudden realizations, 
there were several painfully short interviews in which staff or constituents were either 
uninterested or unfamiliar with the subject matter I asked of them. This is not to say that 
brief interviews were always unproductive. Instead, they occasionally acted to 
(dis)confirm statements of other staff or constituents about the levels of service and 
Interaction that were carried out. Given that I interviewed similar types of people in each 
district, 1 felt that if a majority of the twenty plus elite interviews that 1 conducted were 
consistently brief and unflattering, that there was probably a rather passive 
o ffice/incumbent/staff in that district. The results were usually in the opposite direction, 
however, with constituents seeking to provide some form of cover for the incumbents 
even if they didn’t have more than a few minutes of data worth discussing.
Observations
The research based on observations of the incumbent, staff, and elite interactions was 
much different in style. Anthropologists would probably not categorize Fenno’s several 
day drop-by as actual participant-observation (P/0) for the important reason that one 
cannot truly obtain an understanding of a culture with only several days of observation. 
Furthermore, anthropologists would probably not consider Fenno’s efforts to be truly
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“participant” in nature. On the other hand, Fenno might argue that limited, but still 
personal and direct, observation is more likely to preserve the researcher’s ability to 
maintain reliable, unbiased data. This dissertation more fully mimicked Fenno’s 
“soaking and poking” research design than true P/0 research. The difference between 
my observations and Fenno’s, however, is that mine were of much shorter duration and 
were spread out over a number of staff in each district office. The drawback of my 
design compared to Fenno’s was that I was not able to spend as much time as he did with 
each individual incumbent. The main purpose of this dissertation was not, however, to 
obtain lengthy portraits o f the individual incumbents’ personalities and perceptions. 
Rather, my goal was to look at staff collectively and the variation that exists in their jobs 
and political responsibilities. Consequently, 1 made a sacrifice of “depth for breadth” in 
focusing on a group of staff. Given the discussion above, it was unlikely that an 
unknown graduate student was going to be able to achieve the degree of access that 
Fenno had attained. To make up for this loss of data, I improved on Fenno’s research 
design through my ability to capture the district and office psychology by observing a 
variety of the incumbents’ employees in a variety of settings.
In each of the primary cases I observed the incumbent interacting with staff and 
constituents for a minimum of one day.’ These observations covered a variety of 
settings, ranging from Town Hall meetings, to one-on-one visits in offices, to tours o f 
schools or industrial plants. I also observed the RDSMs for one day. This period of 
observation was much more a reflection of an average day. These days were a mixture of
 ^While it would provide excellent material, it is highly improbable that an academic researcher can ever 
truly observe incumbent-staff interaction. Having worked for a number o f politicians permits me to speak 
o f a code of silence' that usually extends over these interactions. It would be great material, but is rather 
difficult to obtain.
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returning phone calls, talking to staff, speaking at luncheons, and meetings inside and 
outside the office. There isn’t a typical day for the RDSM. Rather, much of their 
schedule is determined by the priorities of the incumbents and the political environment. 
Finally, I observed the field representatives from each district for a morning or an 
afternoon. Each office had several field reps and their interactions were also quite 
variant, but usually more individualized than the RDSM. Most o f the field rep 
interactions that I observed were one-on-one meetings between staff and individual 
constituents who either had problems to resolve or they were being visited by the field 
staff to get a “lay of the land.”
The appendix of Fenno’s Home Style was extremely helpful in guiding my research 
design and providing me with perhaps by two golden rules of observational research; 1) 
“go where you are driven and be quiet” and 2) “be unobtrusive, blend in” (1990, pp. 68, 
71). With each observation my goal was to be as invisible as possible while still being 
close enough to the incumbent or staffer to be able to overhear and observe all 
conversations. If possible, I did not want to be a subject in the conversations between 
staff and constituents. I was surprised that more often than not I was able to act as if I 
was a member of the incumbent’s staff providing additional support. In virtually all 
cases where I was identified, the staff member or the incumbent kept the recognition to 
minimal levels, usually stating that I was there to observe him or her at home, or that I 
was studying “congressional staff and what they do.” I would note that anonymity was 
more difficult to preserve in situations where the incumbent was not present. It is likely 
that constituents had no problem buying that a member of Congress would have multiple 
staffers present, but when the staff were out in the field interacting with constituents on
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their own, constituents seemed slightly more aware o f my presence. From a practical 
standpoint, being invisible meant looking and acting like congressional staff. This meant 
standing just outside of the conversation, being alert to what the incumbent was talking 
about, dressing professionally, and having a notepad available to capture any remarks, 
complaints or addresses. Also, having worked in a number of campaigns over the past ten 
years has provided excellent training on how to staff an incumbent. These situations 
allowed me to “look, listen, and ask” the incumbent and staff about representation from 
the most ideal position.
1 would conclude my remarks about observation with a word of caution. Lofland and 
Lofland suggest that when conducting observations it is best to adopt a “stance of trust 
combined with a heady dose o f skepticism” (1984, p.37). Incumbents and staff are 
human beings; they have egos to preserve. In fact, most research would suggest that 
political figures have above average egos. Undoubtedly this has an impact on the types 
of people that they choose to interact with. While this dissertation is predicated on the 
fact that newly elected and vulnerable incumbents seek to “expand” their constituencies, I 
would also offer that they deliberately choose to set up networks of supporters in the 
different communities of interest in their districts so that their personal interaction with 
“new” supporters is minimized. The impact of this hypothesis is that incumbents and 
their staff tend to seek out people they like and can relate to. That way, if they do have 
bad news about people who are upset or issues that are going unresolved, at least they can 
hear it from a friend, and that friend can then perhaps work to resolve the issue. 
Consequently, when observing the interactions between incumbents, staff and elite 
constituents, it is best to follow Lofland and Lofland’s advice and understand whom you
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are observing, what they are saying, and what is the meaning of that conversation. From 
a practical side, this often meant following up with a bit of research on whom individuals 
were and what people or projects they were referring to. It certainly also relied upon my 
taking good notes.
Data recording and analvsis
1 found that it was important to be flexible in how I recorded the interviews and 
observations. At the most formal level, I took fairly structured notes o f an interview as it 
took place, recording the thoughts, comments, and reactions to every question. Some 
situations called for this high level of structure, and in those situations I asked the subject 
it was permissible for me to record the conversation. I approached each interview with 
the attitude, however, that data would be recorded in a more intermediate style. This 
intermediate style relied on a small notebook that 1 kept in my coat or pants pocket in 
order that I might jot down a few topics or buzz words during the interview that would 
trigger my recollection of the interviews. Standard rules for unstructured interviews 
dictate that the comfort level o f the subject is the most important variable in determining 
interview success, and that note taking can often inhibit the subject’s willingness to speak 
frankly. Here Fenno suggests that the lack of encumbrance encourages “frank and 
spontaneous remarks” from incumbents (1990, p.81). Given this recommendation, at no 
point did 1 consider the extremely formal method of tape-recording conversations, despite 
the fact that Lofland and Lofland suggested that recording was absolutely necessary so 
that the interviewer can focus on the subject. In all my research and political experience, 
it has been my observation that politicians and elites tend to be significantly more 
guarded and tightlipped when they are “on record.” With a tape recorder running, there
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is the perception that they are always “on record” even when they have been assured of 
anonymity and confidentiality. Given the heightened level o f partisanship and the 
“gotcha” mentality that exists in politics today, I thought it important to reinforce the 
comfort level of elected officials when seeking to gather qualitative data.
At the least structured, and what 1 perceived to be the most desirable, level o f data 
collection, 1 relied on no overt data collection tools. During all interviews and 
observations a notebook was available in my pocket. I entered each situation with the 
intent to either have a relaxed conversation about incumbents and their staff or to observe 
interactions and be perceived as a member o f the incumbent’s staff. As was just 
mentioned, note taking in interviews might possibly cause “on the record” discomfort 
with subjects. It was also less likely that the incumbent or staff would have to explain my 
presence if 1 did not produce a notepad to record the entirety o f the interaction. 
Alternatively, not taking notes might give the subjects the impression that I was 
lackadaisical in my approach. I deduced that the former was more often a greater threat 
to data collection than the latter. I would add, however, that note taking in observational 
settings was much easier to disguise. If  my goal was to appear to the constituents as a 
member of the incumbent’s staff, it would be quite natiual for me to take notes on 
individuals and interactions. In these cases I would quickly jot down several key words 
about the individual’s characteristics and the nature of the interaction, much as if  I were 
noting their name and complaint or issue. As a testament to the success of this style, 
several constituents approached me after their interactions to make sure that I had their 
address correctly listed.
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Regardless of whether I took notes, I followed a similar process o f data recording 
with all three levels of data collection. This process allowed me to have a quadruple 
check of my data coding to ensure its accuracy and comparability. The first step of data 
gathering was simply to sit and listen and/or observe as intently as possible. Before the 
interview began I tried to make as many mental notes as possible about the physical 
environment of the interview. When the interview began my attention turned fully to the 
subject. As 1 was doing my research internship and background reading, I realized that 
data recording and observational skills would be a valuable asset. Before embarking on 
my research trips 1 developed my observational skills by mentally noting detailed 
depictions of social interactions or television programs. In response to the question posed 
to Fenno, “how do you remember” what you observed, he replied; “you train yourself.” 
Here too my campaign experiences were quite helpful. In a campaign setting, one 
interacts with dozens of people on a daily basis on a wide variety of issues. As a 
practical method, 1 always carry around a small notebook to jot notes about conversations 
and personalities after I leave the scene of the interaction and then relay them to a 
database at a later point.
1 followed a similar procedure for this dissertation. Immediately following the 
interview or observation, I would do the first data check. Sitting in my car or in a 
restaurant over a cup of coffee, 1 would quickly draft out the flow of the interview and 
key quotes as closely as I could remember. In order to facilitate later mental recollection 
of the interview 1 also noted physical details about the subject and the environment as 
well as my personal reactions to the subject and setting if I noted any abnormal 
preference or dislike. I felt that any “bias” should be noted for later consideration as 1
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was considering that interview or observation in comparison with others. I followed 
Lofland and Lofland’s advice for dealing with quoted material; quotations set off 
verbatim quotes, apostrophes denoted paraphrasing, and reasonable recall was left in 
plain text (1984, p.65). Some days the notes would be only a few pages in the pocket 
notebook, whereas on other days where I might have taken more notes or had better 
interviews, I had upwards of twenty pages recorded in the notebook.*
The second data check would take place that night at the hotel or wherever I 
happened to be staying. In the second step I drastically expanded the key words and 
quotes that had earlier been recorded in my notebook into full sentence form. In this 
stage I clearly noted the formal names and titles o f the subjects as well as the date and 
time of the interviews. To the obvious titles and descriptions, 1 added physical 
descriptions (age. gender, race, building/office traits, dress, decorations etc.) that would 
allow me to add context to the interview and quotes at this stage and the next.
Observation and analysis are not mutually exclusive processes. In fact, successful 
qualitative research is built on “concerted” analysis and observation, where ideas that 
come to the researcher in the field are quickly incorporated into the notes and not left to 
languish imtil the formal writing process commences (Lofland and Lofland, 1984, p. 149). 
To that end, I began to develop the coding, early theoretical memos, insights, questions 
and descriptions that allowed me to develop this into a functional database with 
categories and variables for comparison at this stage. Notes, memos and other non­
observed comments were usually set off in parentheses for quick identification. On 
average, five to ten pages taken firom a day’s worth o f pocket notebook notes became five
‘ I seemed to be a much more prolific note taker than Fenno, for he remarked that, on average, three days o f 
observations produced twenty-five to thirty five pages of notes (1990, p.81). I would guess that my tliree-
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to ten pages on a legal pad. On the days where I had lengthier notes (like the example 
above with twenty plus pages) it would have been unrealistic to spend eight hours 
transcribing notes immediately upon arriving back at the hotel. In those few cases, I 
would work as long as I could that night and then complete the rest o f the transcriptions 
the first thing the next morning before beginning any data collection that day. Lofland 
and Lofland suggest that the researcher should spend “at least as much time immediately 
(to) study, and analyze as you spent in the interview, and caution that the tendency for a 
“novice graduate student” will be to “do not quite this much” (1984, p.61). Knowing this 
beforehand, I put forth the effort to conduct immediate and concerted analysis and 
transcription of my field notes.
When I returned to campus 1 initiated the third data check. Within a week, or two if 
it was a longer trip, I took the handwritten notes from step two and added in more detail 
and analysis. Having noted physical and environmental characteristics often added even 
further context to the field notes. The increased substance and context also added to the 
volume of the notes. Here the five to ten pages often became ten to twenty pages of 
typed text. The most important element o f the third data check, however, was that 1 was 
usually logging field notes from more than one case study, or the notes represented a 
nearly complete case study of one congressional district office. Working at one time with 
data collected firom such a large number of sources permitted fertile comparisons and the 
making of theoretical notes. It was at this stage where most of the development of my 
memos, theories and analysis took place. In fact, significant sections of Chapters Three 
through Five were written at this stage while I was transcribing my notes. I also 
enhanced or verified the coding of the observations into useful categories at this stage.
day average would probably have generated five to ten pages more o f final notes.
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Finally, when a phase of research was completed, which usually occurred over spurts 
of roughly a month, I would complete the fourth data check by going over the notes to 
add further questions, verifications and comparisons based on all the data that had just 
been accumulated. Using the above example, at this stage the ten to twenty typed pages 
could become fifteen to twenty-five pages. The fourth data check became less intensive 
as the research wore on. This is logical given the number of cases completed and the 
amount o f analysis that was extrapolating with each interview and case study completed. 
My questions had gelled and I was beginning to formalize my equivalent o f Fenno’s 
Home Style. These several week trips or periods o f concentrated study were, perhaps, 
the biggest facilitator of concerted analysis because o f the substantial amount of recently 
collected data that was being analyzed at one given period of writing.
A few remarks on data filing and coding are necessary. As I proceeded through the 
second, third and fourth stages o f data recording, 1 kept an outline of the main substantive 
points of my dissertation handy. With each major point and sub-point, I associated a one 
or two word phrase that was used to code relevant quotes and theoretical notes. I would 
also note that as my subject and hypotheses changed and later questions and thoughts 
were added, 1 had to go back to my earlier notes to change and reclassify some of the 
coding and analysis so that when I began writing chapters Three through Six in the 
summer of 2000, all the coding was standardized to the same outline. The most 
substantial barrier to concerted analysis came from the fact that 1 had much more 
thoroughly developed understandings of my hypotheses and subjects during the later case 
studies and so much in the field writing was more sophisticated, while my earlier notes 
had to be amended and recoded. Occasionally, when I wanted to add or amend or
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compare an earlier case study with something from later data, I added a date with the 
later additional material. Finally, my notes were obscured with initials so that I could 
protect the anonymity of my case studies. To protect the names of the substantial 
numbers of staff and elites I kept a code sheet of their initials and descriptions in a 
separate location.
Rapport
For the qualitative researcher there is a dilemma that most quantitative researchers 
rarely confront. Fenno, in his study of Dan Quayle, introduces us to the potentiality of 
becoming a “cross over” who actually comes to like or approve of the subject and begins 
to advise the politician, or at least think of them in very supportive terms (1990, p. 14).
At that point, the academic loses all claims to objectivity on the subject. This is often 
referred to as “going native” or developing “private feelings” for the subject (Lofland and 
Lofland, 1984, p. 147; Fenno, 1990, p.77). In some sense it becomes very logical to root 
for all your subjects, as having them continue in office can only increase the level of 
future access. Building a sense of rapport is not an entirely negative development. 
Establishing a close relationship with a public figure might lead that individual to think of 
the researcher as one of the team and erode the “on the record” mentality that can exist 
with academics. To build this sense of rapport, and to complement my note taking 
method, I often did not take notes when I observed the incumbents and staff and then 
immediately afterward asked probing questions about that immediate situation. Fenno 
suggested that this approach helped to build confidence and trust into his relationships 
with incumbents. Losing a few juicy verbatim quotes was usually rewarded with greater 
levels of trust and better overall context. Because I did not spend the amount o f time
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with each subject as Fenno did. I’m sure that he established more rapport. Yet, I can 
confirm that even my short relationships with staff and incumbents often produced 
feelings of good will.
The issue of rapport between the qualitative observer and subject also spills over into 
the academics relations with the rest of his or her colleagues. Fenno refers to an 
“ambiguity” in the boundary that exists between participant-observers (who observe and 
talk to politicians) and political scientists who study them from the isolation of the tower. 
This leads to “boundary problems” where other political scientists are less inclined to 
trust the objectivity of researchers who do observational work (1990, p. 17). Having spent 
the last ten years with my feet planted firmly in both worlds of academia and campaigns,
1 feel that 1 am aware of these botmdary issues. As 1 believe Fenno recognizes, there is 
no true solution for “going native”. Rather, maintaining an acute awareness of people’s 
perceptions and biases and trying to remain objective in your attitudes about your 
subjects is the best way to avoid being “contaminated”. Lofland and Lofland concur in 
their remedy; “knowing they’re there may lessen their impact” and the researcher should 
strike the appropriate balance between being a fully native “convert” and a distant 
“martian” observer (1984, p.35, 16).
In fact, 1 would argue that my experiences over the past decade, as both a 
campaigner and an academic researcher, have taught me how to objectively analyze 
situations involving human interaction. These experiences have also combined to 
demonstrate the value of stepping to the back o f the room and just watching what goes on 
and retaining objectivity as long as humanly possible. Campaign staffs that are blindly 
loyal to their cause and refuse to be candid with their candidates are usually quite harmful
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in the long run. Given these experiences, I feel that I have acquired an effective ability to 
cut through the hyperbole and rhetoric o f elected officials, especially in the statements 
that they might give to academics or journalists. Working in a campaign office on a daily 
basis (watching CSPAN, talking to constituents, asking people for money) makes one 
sensitive to people’s differences of opinions and the need to be objective in analysis and 
in approach from one conversation to the next. In this sense, relating to district staff and 
elite constituents is something that I have substantial experience with in each of the past 
four election cycles and in working as a full-time campaign fundraiser for the past two 
years. In terms of the case studies, I do not feel that my perceptions of the candidate’s 
ideological positions biased my understanding or explanation of their activities in this 
dissertation. I am quite confident in stating that this dissertation is about the structure and 
function of congressional district offices and that while 1 have ideological differences of 
opinion with nearly all o f the office holders, that these differences were virtually 
irrelevant to the dissertation at hand. In fact, 1 might add that 1 have the most cordial 
personal relationship with the individual who is probably most ideologically distant of all 
the case studies included in this dissertation. You know what they say about politics and 
strange bedfellows...
Given my previous political experiences in campaigns and in congressional district 
offices, rapport was fairly quickly accomplished, whether it was an interview with an 
incumbent or a constituent or it was an observation o f elite-staff interaction. 1 generally 
understood what was going on in these settings and what each actor’s motivations were. 
My knowledge of these interactions, however, was greatly enhanced by the interviews 
and observations that I conducted.
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Fenno and access
When I read Home Style for the second time, one of the things that troubled me was 
the timing of Fenno’s visits. Having had considerable campaign experience 1 would note 
that evaluating an incumbent’s attentiveness to their home districts in the few weeks prior 
to an election is not a representative portrait of their behavior over a two-year election 
cycle. Even the most “inside the beltline” members tend to go home for most of the 
Labor Day to Election-day push. Given that these incumbents have been in office for a 
relatively long period of time, they tend to have a lot of residual knowledge of their 
districts and the people and could make it appear that they are in touch, even when they 
are not. They might even be convinced that they are still in touch, given that they see and 
interact with the same people every other fall for twenty years. My visits were done at 
periods that included election seasons, but more often the visits came at varying periods 
of time, most of which were not during election season. Furthermore, I got to “know” 
each district much better than Fenno in that 1 arrived with more comprehensive research 
on the background of the political and economic makeup of the district and could get 
around in it by myself. Fenno’s notes indicate that he arrived mostly blind; he “didn’t do 
preliminary” research except to read CQ profiles o f districts and incumbents so he would 
“see it through the eyes of the member.” My divergence with Fenno follows from his 
assumption that a researcher will be able to observe all of the incumbent’s activities and 
perceptions. Given the varying levels of access and quality of data that both he and I 
were able to attain, I am not prepared to accept this assumption. Therefore, I did the 
preliminary research and interviewed elite constituents to get many confirming or 
divergent viewpoints that would allow me to apply much more context, especially
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because of these elite interviews. Furthermore, even if Fenno were to study incumbents’s 
home styles at times other than the fall of election years throughout their two-year cycle,
1 hypothesize that he would still find regularity in the kinds of activities that they 
conduct. I speculate that he would be shown the regularity of the “schedule” where the 
Incumbent goes to parades, town hall meetings, and bean suppers etc. My suspicion is 
that procuring genuine access to incumbents is a much more tenuous task than he detailed 
in Home Style. He recognizes that “gatekeepers” such as family and staff exist to guard 
access to the incumbent (1990, p.70) but often doesn’t seem to connect these individuals 
to his own lack of access. 1 think he also overstates his own “participation” in his 
research method. Making a few phone calls and sealing a few letters do not today equate 
to access. I think this marginal level of participation would be unlikely to procure the 
same style of access today that it achieved twenty-five years ago. One other advantage I 
feel that I might have over Fenno in this respect is that I physically fit in more; I look like 
a volunteer or staffer. Consequently, a politician might be less reluctant to drag me 
around with his or her staff.
Dealing with staff as the subjects, on the other hand, involved a much lower 
threshold of ego, secrecy and conflict for the researcher to overcome. As was detailed 
above, staff were overwhelmingly willing to talk and be observed in the research for this 
dissertation. In many cases, I witnessed very unflattering depictions of the incumbents 
by constituents, media, government officials, and in some cases even firom the staff 
themselves. I would also speculate that because staff do not live in the same scrutinized 
world that their employers do, that they aren’t as likely to screen their comments and 
behaviors. In simple terms, observing staff is much more likely to pay off with more
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access, higher quality and more accurate data compared to dealing with the actual 
incumbent. This belief was substantiated by Lofland and Lofland: “reliance on multiple 
informants is probably preferable to reliance on only one” (1984, p.42).
Some final thoughts on starting out
1 entered the dissertation research with some expectations about my research design. 
Some of these held and some did not. Most notably, this research began as a descriptive 
effort to compare the activities of congressional district staff. As the research progressed, 
the concepts and questions began to change. Fenno encountered the same basic dilemma 
in his examination of incumbent home style. When he first set out to study the topic in 
1970 he was unsure of the complexity and variation in individual member’s home styles. 
From that perspective, it would have been stifling for him to impose the same kind of 
scientific strictures upon his research design that one would impose on a survey-based 
instrument. Consequently, his case set and variables were constantly evolving over the 
seven years of research, as were his questions. He began his initial case studies with no 
questions prepared (p.60). This stands in stark contrast to the more basic social science 
precept that research questions must be prepared “before we march into the field” 
(Manheim and Rich, 1991, p. 10). I would argue that it was more advantageous to spend 
time understanding the culture and standard operating procedures o f one district office. 1 
would argue this not only because there exist similarities between the district offices but 
also because I was able to more fully comprehend the motivations and daily behaviors of 
congressional district staff. I would argue that an observer with no experience or 
background on district staff would not be able to as fully appreciate their observations 
had they not had my experiences.
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My district internship provided a useful start while I was completing my coursework 
and the lengthy background reading on congressional staff. While my initial 
observations of other offices were perhaps biased by my feeling that this office was an 
“ideal type” and by my personal investment in that “enterprise”, 1 ultimately was able to 
understand the initial district operation as merely one o f four hundred and thirty-five 
district operations. The substantial variation in the number of staff, physical layouts and 
mission orientations o f each office quickly allowed me to understand this diversity. In 
this sense, my internship experience and the first few visits to the first case study were 
almost something of a pretest to ensure that I had reliable concepts, variables and 
operationalizations. 1 wrote a research paper based upon my internship and ultimately 
delivered a conference paper based on that data and some of my early field findings from 
a few other cases. The paper was an exploratory project where I was able to refine my 
methods, develop theoretical insights, learn the lingo of the trade, etc. Given the quality 
of the data I obtained in my five months of research, I decided to retain the internship 
office as a secondary case study. Lofland and Lofland reassured me that this was the 
appropriate decision; “We believe that any such difficulties are a small price to pay for 
the very creative wellspring of the naturalistic approach” (1984, p. 10). The office, 
nevertheless, was retained only as a secondary case study because of my personal 
experiences and interactions with personnel. Tm afraid that making it a primary case 
study would have been based on severely biased data.
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4 Primary Case Studies 
In each of the following primary case studies, I visited ail district offices and 
interviewed all members of the district staff. Additionally, 1 observed staff interact and 
then interviewed constituents in a variety o f demographic elements of the district, from 
the urban to the suburban and rural. 1 typically apportioned the numbers o f interviews 
and the time of observation by the physical layout of the district. In other words, in a 
district that was 70% urban, 1 did roughly 14 of my 20 interviews in the district’s urban 
areas. In areas that were more heavily rural, 1 did the interviews in a number of the 
smaller villages and townships throughout the district. Following are descriptions of the 
four primary case studies of this dissertation.’ Using the same label and protector of 
anonymity as did Fenno, the primary case studies will be designated throughout this 
dissertation with letters ranging from A through D. The secondary case studies discussed 
in the next section will be referred to with letters from E through M. 1 should also note 
that the fieldwork for this dissertation was spread out over a six-year period from the time 
of my initial internship to the completion o f my final interviews. The physical and 
political descriptions of each case study reflect the time that 1 conducted my observations 
rather than the current disposition of each incumbent and district. For example, an 
incumbent who was just elected in 1994 and was studied in 1995 would be referred to as 
a freshman incumbent, not a legislator with six years of experience.
108
Incumbent A
The first primary case study, incumbent A, is a Southern Republican who was 
ambitious to move quickly past his status as a congressional fresh face and onto a 
productive legislative career. A prominent Republican in his home state, A hit the 
ground running in Washington and quickly moved into the ranks of party leadership. 
Consequently, his personal style is much more ideological and partisan than one might 
expect for a newer member of Congress. This ideological/partisan bent was reflected in 
his early campaigns, where he defeated quality challengers in controversial and negative 
campaigns, while also heavily outspending them. In this sense, A is by no means a 
typical member of Congress who first serves a partisan apprenticeship before moving into 
prominent leadership roles.
Incumbent A’s district is demographically and economically diverse. The district 
stretches from a large metropolitan area to include a number of suburbs as well as a 
substantial amount of rural and agricultural area. It is the largest district in area o f the 
four primary case studies. While there are nine cities with over ten thousand people, the 
majority of the district is to be found in three suburban cities with populations over 
50,000 and two other mid-sized cities at the other end of the district. This distribution of 
population is reflected in the two newspapers and two network affiliates located within 
the district’s boundaries. Some might consider this district homogenous in that it has 
three significant military bases within its boundaries. But within its boundaries are also a 
major state university, substantial agricultural and oil interests, and numerous mid-sized 
industries as well. This district is among the least homogenous of the case studies.
 ^Much of the political and demographic data is derived &om Congressional Quarterly’s Almanac o f 
American Politics. 1 do not provide page citations for the obvious reason that they would eliminate any
109
While slightly more rural than the average district, the age, race, education and income 
variables suggest that this is a very typical district. To cover the substantial size and 
diversity of interest, incumbent A has two district offices for the two major population 
centers. Politically, A’s seat has a long Democratic lineage and tradition of voting for 
other Democrats. But typical o f many southern states, it is trending Republican with each 
election, having voted against Clinton twice. During the period o f observation A was in 
the process of making the seat safe. Currently CQ suggests that this seat “retains a 
Republican advantage” and A is clearly to be regarded a safe incumbent in a marginally 
Republican seat.
While the demographic and political portraits of this district seem at first uninspiring 
to serve as a case study, incumbent A offers a number of unique positions. First, is his 
desire to move up quickly evident in the activities o f his district staff? Does the typical 
expansionist/protectionist continuum apply in this case? Second, he is unique because 
his Chief of Staff is stationed in the home district and has considerably more focus and 
responsibilities at home than other chiefs. Are these two trends related? And third, 
where does he find home given the diverse interests of his district?
Incumbent B
In contrast to A, incumbent B is a long-serving Democrat who does not share A ’s 
motivations to quickly move up the party ladder in Congress. B has had a political career 
that has stretched over five decades, only part o f  which has been in the United States 
Congress. While A’s motivations appear more personal and ideological, B’s motivations 
seem much more heavily personal, given his long career in public service, and are 
perhaps more driven by loyalty to serve the community and the party.
possibility o f anonymity for the office.
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What unites A and B is the physical and political geography of their districts. Both 
are Southern members o f Congress and represent districts that include a mixture of urban, 
suburban and rural populations. B’s district is only slightly smaller than A ’s and they 
both share average demographic traits o f race, age, size, education and income, except 
that this district is slightly the oldest, poorest and least educated of the four primary 
cases. This district’s demographic profile is more varied than A’s, however, as this 
district lacks a predominant single employer. About one-third of the population is 
clustered around a large metropolitan area, while roughly half o f the population lives in 
rural settings. There are only three cities in this district with a population over thirty 
thousand. Furthermore, this district is the most rural of the primary case studies and 
nearly as rural as incumbents J and L. With six small newspapers and only 1 network 
affiliate, the district has a typical pattern of rural news coverage. However, because of 
the district’s proximity to a large metropolitan area, only a small fraction o f the 
inhabitants are employed in the agricultural sector. So clearly J and L are much more 
truly rural districts. There has been substantial growth in the new technology sector, with 
a number of sizeable companies to accompany the increasing number o f corporate farms 
running the ag sector in the district. Given the greater diversity and size, it should not be 
surprising to find out that B has three district ofBces spread across the district. The 
counties and towns of the district are largely Democratic in their historical roots. But as 
is the case in most Southern districts, while many of these individuals continue to elect 
Democrats to local and state offices, most federal and statewide elections in this district 
are dominated by Republican outcomes. Clinton lost this district twice, both times by 
large margins. As might be expected, the new suburban growth areas are much more
I I I
conservative and Republican and are having an impact on election outcomes. The county 
closest to the metropolitan area has seen its entire slate o f Democratic officeholders 
replaced by Republicans in just over a decade. Furthermore, B’s victory percentage 
shrunk to its lowest total in decades in 1998 when he faced a quality and well-funded 
challenger, his first in a long time. As Chapter Five will later rationalize, quality 
challengers are most likely to emerge when they have a reasonable chance at success.
Or, in this case, to circulate their name to run again the next time after the incumbent has 
retired or rethought their desire to campaign again.
There are two interesting factors that added to my desire to include B as a primary 
case study. First, there is a substantial amount of new growth taking place in one urban 
comer of B’s district. Consequently, the district he represented at the time of this study 
was not the same one that he had represented for a substantial period of time. It struck 
me that it would be interesting to find out what kind o f impact the demographic change 
will have on the incumbent’s allocation of staff and his political and campaign efforts. 
And did this have an impact on his desire to switch parties or retire? The second factor is 
B’s age. As an older member o f Congress, with a lengthy political career in another 
office, how has B reacted to change over time in office? While B is not from the pre- 
1964 class in Congress, he has held elected office almost continuously since the 1950s 
and his attitudes and staff seem to reflect the standard behavior and expectations 
consistent with the older cohort that was discussed in Chapter One. For example, he 
drives himself around the district, tends to employ older staff, and indicates no evidence 
of being “handled” by any of his staff. So, did he have a certain allocation pattern for his 
original staff? And has that changed over time?
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Incumbent C
Incumbent C is a moderate, long-serving Northern Republican. While not active in 
the partisan structure, C would be considered a leadership figure in the House of 
Representatives. Like B, C is not a vocal partisan. Observations fi-om this dissertation 
and from journalistic accounts universally refer to C as “nonpartisan”, “moderate”, and 
“intellectual.” In short, he is not a typical member of the House of Representatives in the 
late 1990s. That is not to say, however, that C’s motivations are of the same personal sort 
as typified by B. In fact, C seems to have the most policy-directed motivations of all the 
case studies.
He hails from a district that is largely comprised of three mid-size cities, each with 
over one hundred thousand people. This district is the smallest in area o f the primary 
case studies, slightly more than half as big as A’s district, and roughly average as 
compared to the secondary case studies. There is a substantial amoimt o f rural area with 
numerous small farming communities between the cities but the population is largely 
urban. In fact, CQ refers to this district as the “most urbanized district in the state.” But, 
this district is only slightly more white, urban, educated and wealthy than A and B. 
Additionally, the cities are large enough that the major economic interests of the district 
are urban-based manufacturing and service industries. Agricultural spin-offs are also 
important economic interests in this district. The major employer in the district is a major 
state university found in the fourth largest city of the district. C enjoys very localized 
media markets within his district with five daily newspapers and four network television 
affiliates. C has 3 Vi offices in his district, reflecting not so much the diversity of the 
district as the three clear population centers. Despite its historic patterns o f voting
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Republican, the district took a more blue-collar industrial tilt with redistricting in the 
1970s and 1980s, and it is not then surprising to find out that this district leans 
Democratic in most elections. Clinton won the district comfortably in both 1992 and 
1996. In this sense, C is certainly a political aberration in his district. He has faced 
strong recent challenges and was actually outspent in 1996. His victory totals make him 
a “marginal” incumbent by percentage. CQ suggests that when C decides to retire that 
"this district will be hotly contested...until then (he) remains a solid favorite.”
C is an interesting case study from three perspectives. How do his policy interests 
(and lack of partisanship) as well as his electoral marginality (on paper) affect his staff 
allocation and utilization? C was also included because he was a prominent member 
notable for having young staff members who were not particularly active or aggressive in 
the district. The third perspective comes from his having three major cities with three 
offices. Is there a demographic element to representation and staff utilization?
Incumbent D
The final primary case study, incumbent D is a newly elected Northern Democrat. D 
represents the ideological balance to A. While evoking clear policy interests like C, D 
would definitely be considered a partisan member o f  the House along the same lines as 
A. D is not entirely a newcomer to politics, having held elective office for a number o f 
years prior to running for Congress. 1 would suggest that D’s electoral motivations are 
based on a complex mixture o f personal, ideological, partisan, as well as interest group 
affinities.
D’s district is a largely urban district, the population of which is almost three-quarters 
within one county. This county includes a major university, the state’s capitol, which
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employs about one-third of the district’s workforce, a number of mid-sized corporations 
and a host of emerging technology industries. Surrounding the main county are a number 
of smaller counties, all of which are rural and agricultural in nature. These outer counties 
contribute to the district’s average size by area while not contributing large amounts of 
population. This district is the whitest, most educated, most white-collar and wealthiest 
of the four primary case studies. The city at the center of the main county is clearly the 
center of the district. With a population of over two hundred thousand it dominates the 
political and economic makeup of the district. It’s two newspapers and four network 
affiliates also represent the core of the district’s media. Given this, it should be no 
surprise that D has only 1 district office and that it is located in this central city.
Politically the district is something of an enigma. Largely based in a northern university 
town, one might think this to be a solidly Democratic district. And given that a former 
Democratic incumbent held the seat for three decades might further reinforce that 
thought. However, the economic growth of the city and surrounding area has brought 
substantial suburban growth and large numbers o f moderate voters. In fact, D’s 
predecessor was a Republican who served a number of terms and was elected by 
comfortable margins. Today the district on paper would have to be considered a swing 
district. CQ calls it “potentially competitive” but with presidential level turnouts it will 
continue to have solidly Democratic performance. Clinton won the district both times by 
solid margins.
D presents a number of obvious characteristics for inclusion in this dissertation. 
Primarily, she is a fireshman member of Congress. Will observations of D reveal the 
expected expansionist behavior of the newly elected? She faced a very competitive
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primary and general election in her first campaign. Will that have an impact on how she 
utilizes and allocates staff? Or were rumors of her protectionist activities more apparent? 
There are clear comparisons to be made here between her one office in the center of her 
district versus C’s three offices dispersed throughout his district. Another valid reason for 
inclusion is gender. D is the only female primary case and one of the few female case 
studies. Does gender play a role in staff and utilization? D is also the youngest of the 
four primary cases. Much as one might speculate about the impact o f B’s cohort, we 
might also investigate the impact o f belonging to the youngest cohort in Congress.
9 Secondary Case Studies 
In order to accumulate more variables for contextual comparison, I also added a 
series of secondary case studies. The secondary case studies differ in that this data is 
based simply on a single office interview with the RDSM, and in some cases is 
complemented by interviews with the actual incumbent and other staff or advisors. In a 
few cases some elite interviews were conducted. As was stated earlier, in most cases 
offices that were less vibrant in their offers of access were more likely relegated to this 
secondary level.
Incumbent E: The internship office
The initial secondary case study is actually the site o f my first research. Incumbent 
E i s a  senior Democrat from a Southern district. While doing much of the background 
reading on congressional staff, I interned in E’s office for a semester. In the interests of 
full disclosure, I should confess that I later went on to work in E’s campaign for higher 
office, a clear violation o f Feimo’s line of “ambiguity.” I simply had too much good data 
from this case study not to include it in this dissertation. I make this disclosure so that
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readers will be aware of my connectioii to E when one reads passages in the coming 
chapters.
Incumbent E is also an interesting case study for inclusion because he was A’s 
predecessor in office. Incumbent A was always rumored to be a potential opponent, but 
the two never faced off, as E gave up the seat to run for other office, giving A the chance 
at an open seat. E was clearly a legislative leader and was unique among these case 
studies in that he had “gone Washington” to a much greater extent than any other case 
study and he rarely returned home during his last few terms in office. E’s “gone 
Washington” attitude provides an interesting case study from which to examine the 
impact o f status on the hierarchy and utilization of the district staff.
Incumbents F. G. H. 1
Incumbent F was a mid seniority Democrat who represented an entirely urban 
district in the South. F is a loyally partisan Democrat whose motivations appear to be 
personal ambitions and representing group interests from her district. F’s was the second 
smallest district, including the downtown core of one metropolitan county. One city 
represents over eighty percent of the district’s entire population. Obviously, F has one 
district office. As might be expected, it is also a minority-majority district. Along with 
these demographics, it is also a younger, poorer, and less educated district than average. 
This district has a high percentage of service sector jobs, reflecting the presence of a large 
number o f corporate offices and executives who actually reside in other districts. 
Additionally, large numbers of residents work blue-collar industrial jobs in adjoining 
districts. The largest employers in F’s district are hospitals and local government offices. 
Politically, F’s district was overwhelmingly Democratic at all levels. Clinton won the
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seat twice by substantial margins. In addition to being unique as one of the smallest and 
most urban seats, F was also included for her demographic characteristics. F is both 
female and African-American, a not uncommon combination in urban Southern seats. F 
had held elective and appointive office for over twenty years at the time of this study. 
With the unique demographic characteristics and the extremely homogenous nature of the 
district, F provides an excellent case study subject.
Incumbent G, a mid-seniority Democrat from the South, had a different type of 
district. His constituency included a mixture of both urban and suburban population and 
was much smaller than the primary case studies. Like D, G’s district was largely based 
around one urban area, with a population of over a quarter million people. G’s district 
was perhaps even more homogenous than D’s, or the average district, because of the 
concentration of high tech and transportation industries. It was largely one county with 
some urban, suburban and some rural population, with a mixture of some wealth and 
some poverty. G’s district was largely reliant upon one massive employer and the 
resulting spin-off companies. Because of that one employer, G’s district had the largest 
blue-collar workforce o f any of the case studies. Like D’s district, G’s had a growing 
suburban, technological, and political face. This district was also average in terms o f the 
age, race, education and income level of its inhabitants. Also like D, G had one district 
office located in the center o f his district’s main population. This district was electorally 
marginal, but it was relatively safe while held by G. As with most of the other Southern 
seats, this seat had a long Democratic heritage but afrer G retired and was replaced by a 
Republican, the seat continued its trend of slowly becoming more Republican, with 
Clinton’s margin being much more narrow in 1996 than in 1992. Given the southern tilt
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in politics, it is not surprising to learn that G was a moderate incumbent, who often 
worked with Republicans to protect the interests of his district. With the electoral and 
demographic comparisons to D’s seat, this proved to be an interesting case study. G also 
came from roughly the same area as F, so how do these three cases compare?
Incumbent H was a senior Republican who represented a district that included a 
mixture of urban, suburban and rural elements that intertwined with G’s borders. While 
this district is largely based in a metropolitan area, the economically and numerically 
dominant part of the district was found in the suburban population. The district is much 
more white, urban, young, educated, and wealthy than the average district or case study. 
H’s main district interest was two large airports and the accompanying defense and 
technical industries. The industries and the suburban nature of the district made it more 
homogenous than the average district. It was smaller than any of the primary case studies 
but it was an elongated district including twelve towns with populations of over ten 
thousand. Because of this elongation, H had two district offices: one in the population 
center and one at the end of the district. This district has very little local media. The 
newspapers and the television affiliates were all metropolitan and based outside this 
district’s botmdaries. H’s district was comfortably Republican, drawn to avoid urban and 
more Democratic areas. H still holds this seat and regularly receives in excess o f seventy 
percent o f the vote while Clinton lost this district twice by substantial margins. Given the 
demographic and political characteristics o f the district, it should not be surprising to 
learn that H is a conservative Republican. Additionally, H is a partisan and committee 
leader in Congress. To complement his partisan and constituency ambitions, H clearly 
has both ideological and individual motivations. His personal motivations are reflected
119
in his attempts to run for higher office and his ideological motivations are reflected in a 
number of the fairly strident causes he has pursued while a member o f Congress. Given 
the geographic similarities with both A and G, and the ideological comparison with C, H 
provides an interesting case for comparison.
Incumbent I was a senior Republican with a very small urban-suburban district in a 
large metropolitan area. The district was much smaller than the primary case studies and 
almost entirely urban in nature. Its population was largely concentrated in three 
contiguous cities with populations of over one hundred thousand and was an extremely 
wealthy district. CQ called it one of the “most affluent, educated and Republican areas in 
the country”. There was virtually no local media as it was the heart o f a metropolitan 
area. There was only one small college and no military, agricultural or mineral 
industries. It was also an extremely homogenous district, home to mostly white, young, 
white-collar professionals that worked in the numerous corporate headquarters and 
technical industries that have moved to this district over the past ten years. Usually such 
population influx into a district causes an incumbent to become worried about future 
election returns. However, given the homogeneity o f these new constituents, there has 
been little change in incumbent I’s final election returns. Because of this small size and 
homogeneity, there was only one office in the middle o f this district. Politically the 
district was very Republican. Bob Dole won the district by a wide margin in 1996. This 
incumbent was one o f the more ideologically driven members of this selection of cases, 
having only a brief career in elective office before running for Congress. CQ concludes 
that this seat is perhaps the safest Republican seat in country and the fact that he is rarely 
opposed, even by opponents with virtually no resources, confirms that it would be
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difficult for him to lose this seat. This district is included to examine the staff utilization 
of an ideological incumbent in an extremely homogenous district. In that sense, is 
incumbent I much different than the average district office?
Incumbents J and K
Incumbent J was a junior Republican from the South. J’s district was the largest, 
poorest, oldest, and the most rural district in this study. With no substantial urban 
population, tlie area was dominated by small towns and agricultural concerns. The 
largest employer in the district, a major state university, was the only city with a 
population over thirty thousand. There were few other large employers and most of the 
district’s employees were blue-collar or ag workers. The media in this district was 
dominated by larger media markets in cities outside the botmdaries o f the district and a 
number of small daily newspapers within the district. J represents a district that is 
extremely large and homogenous. Given that size and diversity, he operated three district 
offices. Politically the seat was almost imiversally Democratic. It hadn’t elected a 
Republican member of Congress until J in 1996, but culturally it is a part o f  the Bible- 
belt and very conservative in its issues. Consequently, it had begun to vote Republican in 
most statewide elections but for Democrats at other levels. The fact that it twice voted 
for Clinton suggests it still holds its Democratic roots. The most unique thing about this 
case study, besides the demographic factors, was that J had previously held the seat for a 
number o f terms as a Democrat, before he retired and ran for higher office as an 
independent. Without his long background as a Democrat, he most certainly would not 
have been able to recapture tfiis seat, and when he leaves it will unquestionably revert to 
the Democratic column. He has confronted quality challengers in his two elections as a
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Republican, winning one closely and the other by a wide margin. While he may now 
hold the seat safe personally, it is not a partisan majority. Incumbent J was characterized 
by many as a “good old boy.” His voting record as a Democrat was very “middle o f the 
House” and his need to continue supporting the programs that assist a substantial portion 
of his constituents ensure that he is still in the “middle of the House” as a Republican. 
Also as a “good old boy” he has retained strong relations to district politicians and elites 
and used the same offices and much of the same staff that he had employed before he left 
office originally. By reputation, it also seems that he did much o f the interaction with 
elites on his own.
Holding the seat during the interim of J’s departure was Incumbent BC, a junior 
Democrat. K also very much fits the “good old boy” mentality. He held elective office 
for a lengthy period prior to entering the House and simply chose to retire to pursue other 
personal (i.e. economic) interests. Politically, he was a good fit for the district, just like 
the early version of J, very “middle of the House.” K was a leading figure amongst the 
conservative Democrats in the House and was also a reflection o f J in that he employed 
and sought the advice o f many of the same individuals in the district. J and K are 
Included to examine the differences between two individuals who operate ideologically 
and politically so similarly within the same district.
Incumbents L and M
Incumbent L was a relatively junior Democrat. Like J, L had a very large and rural 
district but it was much more homogenous than J’s district. With two mid-sized 
industrial towns in the middle of the district (each with a population over 50,000) and the 
rest o f the district engaged in agriculture, L had considerably fewer miles and interests to
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cover. It was a very homogenous district racially and there was not likely substantial 
variation from the average household income. The district is average in age, education 
and income categories and has a number of state college campuses, with a significant 
total number of students. Within its borders, L’s district has two daily newspapers and 
three network television affiliates. There are numerous small-to-mid-sized industries in 
the two main towns of the district but no single firm stands out. Given the two major 
population centers of the district, and the fact that most Democrat votes come from these 
two cities, it is not surprising to see that L has two offices, based in these two cities. 
Personally, L is a yoimg, focused, and very expansionist legislator, clearly holding 
ambitions for higher office and very moderate in ideology. L had limited elective 
experience before he went to Congress. Politically, L’s seat leans Democratic and it has 
become electorally safe for him. While Clinton won the district in both 1992 and 1996, 
he was outpolled by incumbent L in both elections. L serves as interesting comparison to 
many of the Southern cases listed below in that he too has a large district with mixtures 
of urban and rural constituents. L is also interesting as a relatively junior legislator with 
progressive ambition. How do his staff function such a situation?
The final case is M, a mid-seniority Northern Democrat. M represented an entirely 
urban district, the smallest amongst the cases in this study he represented roughly Vz o f an 
urban county. M’s district was also substantially populated by African-Americans but 
was not a minority-majority district, as is the case in most Democratically held 
metropolitan districts in the North. M’s district is also unique in that it combines (and 
segregates) traditional inner-city poverty-stricken areas, with an equally large number of 
white-collar families. This combination is reflected by the fact that the average
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household income for the district is relatively average compared to the other case studies 
despite having such a large number of white-collar employees. The district is also 
average in most o f the other demographic characteristics, except that it has no rural 
population or employees. There is a substantial mixture of white-collar corporations, 
blue-collar industry and service sector jobs such as hospitals and local government in M’s 
district. Additionally, there are several large universities and the expected metropolitan 
television and newspaper. Obviously, there is one central district office. As might be 
expected, this district is comfortably Democratic. Clinton won the district by substantial 
margins in both elections. M is a moderate-to-liberal member of Congress. His 
motivations appear to be largely electoral in nature, given that he held elective office for 
a number of years prior to serving in Congress. CQ considers M’s seat “safe” so his most 
immediate electoral fears probably stem from the coming redistricting. The demographic 
factors of M’s district lead to an interesting element for his inclusion; how does a 
Caucasian represent a district with a large minority population? A majority of the state 
legislators who serve in M’s district are black. Does this impact how he utilizes his staff?
Elite Constituents
Who are they?
In the four primary case studies, I complemented my interviews and observations of 
staff with roughly twenty interviews of elite constituents. Elite constituents are found 
amongst the ranks o f executives, journalists and lawyers. But they are also contributors 
and party activists. Most basically, elite constituents are the opinion leaders of their 
towns, neighborhoods and associations. As such, I hypothesize that elites enjoy
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heightened levels o f access and are disproportionately represented in the ranks of 
constituents that have interaction with incumbents and their district staff.
Whv thev are included
The elite interviews could be characterized in much the same way as staff 
observations. Having the opportunity to sit and discuss their interactions with 
incumbents and staff for thirty minutes to an hour allowed me to more fully develop the 
elites’ thoughts and let them explain their remarks. This enhanced data took the form of 
observed facial expressions, tangible examples of their activities (eg. award plaques) or 
tours of their facilities. This kind of data simply cannot be captured in a survey 
instrument. Furthermore, elite constituents are probably much less likely to cooperate 
with survey instruments than they are with someone in their office having pleasant 
conversation about their actual lives and districts. One can imagine the cynical 
impressions of elite constituents about survey instruments coming from academic 
institutions, especially in cases of conservatives who support Republican incumbents.
Interviewing elite constituents beyond incumbents and staff adds an important 
contextual layer so that the theories developed in this dissertation do not rely solely on 
the perspectives of incumbents and their staff. As mentioned above, I felt that even 
Fenno’s P/0 study was subject to outside control. The true P/0 study would have the 
time and resources to study and comprehend the meanings of staff activities. Given that a 
true P/0 study was not achievable, I needed a contextual tool that would allow me to 
probe for meaning beyond what was merely presented by incumbents and staff. For 
example, data such as who the staff take you to see, what they allow you to observe, and 
what they happen to schedule during your visits will have an enormous impact on the
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events and the meanings that are derived from them. In some sense, the elite interviews 
serve as a control group, especially those elites interviews that I tracked down with my 
own research as opposed to those mentioned by the incumbents, staff or other elites.
While I would have liked to complete elite interviews in all of the case studies, time and 
monetary constraints limited the elite interviews to the primary case studies only.
How thev were selected
The first elites to be interviewed were those that were recommended by district staff 
as having had different types o f interactions with the incumbent and/or staff. 1 asked the 
staff to recommend a mixture o f elites; some partisan, some issue-based and some that 
were just plain friendly. It was not surprising then when many of these people gave 
glowing reviews of the staff and incumbents. Even these subjects were useful in that they 
often were not members of incumbents’ inner circles and in some cases were willing to 
give very frank impressions of the incumbent. However, I did not intend that this first 
ring of interviewees was going to be my most productive source of information. They 
did prove to be useful in leading to the second source of elites by acting as sort of a 
referential index. The second source then were people that elites recommended as either 
a) being notable “elites” at the local level or b) also had some sort o f substantial 
interaction with the district office. The third source of elite interviews was obtained by 
“walking Main Street”; the regular sources I dropped by in pretty much every city spread 
out across the primary case studies. These regular sources were Chamber of Commerce 
directors, local journalists, and prominent attorneys. These were deemed to be regular 
sources because each of these three professions tends to be politically active. Finally, 
there were the active partisans or campaigners. There were individuals that I identified in
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the incumbents’ (and their opponents’) FEC reports. In each case, I made sure to pull at 
least two supporters and opponents to provide different perspectives on the incumbent.
In some cases, these elites were partisan and not usefid data sources. However, in many 
cases, it should be noted that elites who are political contributors are open-minded to the 
game of politics, are well informed about people and events, and tend to offer fairly 
objective criticisms and advice.
How thev were interviewed
I interviewed the elites in much the same fashion as 1 observed their interactions with 
staff. I tried to emphasize and maintain a high comfort level with each interview, with 
the goal that it would be more of a conversation than a formal interview. In all cases a 
notebook was handy to either fully note the conversation as it took place, or to jot down 
key words, phrases, or names that they mentioned. As mentioned above, since these 
interviews tended to be roughly ‘/z hour in length, 1 usually did not use the notepad until 
immediately after the interview ended when 1 would more fully transcribe the notes.
Limits to Contextuallv Based Research 
I recognize several limitations to contextually based research. The most obvious 
limitation to this research design is the cost of interviews in both time and money. This 
limitation can be overcome by conducting a smaller number of interviews and focusing 
on the quality of data that is produced from each case. The main criticism that is usually 
leveled at contextually based research is that it is merely descriptive and that it lacks 
generalizability. This dissertation is not immune from this criticism, but neither is this 
merely a descriptive dissertation without variables and comparison. As a theory-building 
doctoral dissertation, it is not my purpose here to generalize about what happens in all
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435 districts. Rather, it is my purpose here to begin to examine the contextual differences 
between offices that generalized analyses might fail to incorporate. A third criticism of 
contextually based research is that the data it provides is overly idiosyncratic. As Fenno 
pointed out, his case studies, like mine, are time bound “best estimates” of four individual 
case studies at four specific time points (Fenno, 1990, p.61) while large-n surveys can 
usually test for time-based or geographic idiosyncracies. This dissertation holds that 
taking the time to examine and compare the individual idiosyncracies is fhiitful for the 
development of new theories and hypotheses about incumbency advantage. Fourth, in no 
sense are my four and nine case studies a random sample of all House “enterprises.” 
Given my economic constraints, I was simply unable to do studies firom all regions. With 
more resources and time I would have definitely included additional case studies from the 
West Coast, the Deep South, the Northeast as well as an incumbent close to D.C. 
Certainly there are other variables that warrant inclusion as well. The purpose here is 
only to offer a theoretical starting point from which to examine Congressional district 
staff.
A final concern that is raised about observational studies is the so-called “Hawthorne 
effect” or what Fenno refers to as a “loss of control over the research process” (1990, 
p. 114). Measurement error may be introduced by subjects that act differently in the 
presence of their bosses or because they make exaggerated claims about the activities of 
staff and the incumbent. This final criticism might be more valid for studies such as 
Fenno’s that are entirely observational in nature. I believe, however, that my inclusion of 
open-ended staff and elite interviews, which selected both supporters and opponents 
away from the main subjects, introduced some element of control and verification on the
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data. I found that one way to control for the “Hawthorne Effect” was to limit the amoimt 
of information that the subjects have about you as a researcher or your topic. I strove to 
achieve this control in two ways: I) In many cases I was able to blend into the 
background enough to either not be introduced or to be introduced as someone who was 
doing some research on staff. In only a handful of cases did the staff or incumbent make 
attention-drawing statements about my research; and 2) bias is also problematic if the 
researcher shares too much information about the research design and/or variables that 
they are focusing on. In an attempt to limit this bias I would keep responses to inquiries 
from the interviewees brief and vague.
What Contextuallv Based Research Adds 
As was discussed in Chapter One, the bulk o f the research on incumbents’ home 
behavior and their staff is aggregate in nature. This dissertation improves the literature 
by: 1) seeking to add contextual clarity to the mass o f literature on incumbent advantage, 
2) adding some concrete observations to the considerably smaller body of literature on 
congressional district staff, and by 3) building theoretical propositions for future research 
on staff and incumbency advantage.
The aggregate research lacks clarity 
The aggregate examination o f incumbents’ home behavior and resource allocation is 
not sufficient. Any explanation of incumbency advantage should include a variable that 
captures the contextual nature of district staff activity. Constituency-level data provides 
much greater clarity than do ^gregate studies o f National Election Surveys or allocations 
of congressional resources. This dissertation selects a small-n approach as a “deliberate 
decision to sacrifice analytical range for analytical depth” with a detailed examination of
129
a few cases (Fenno, 1990, p.6G). This observational approach is not widely approved of 
by the discipline. Fenno notes that this type of “research is a rarity in the American 
Political Science Review” and that he would “like to tease a few more graduate students 
into trying” to talk directly to politicians (1990, pp.lOl, 128). I am not arguing for a 
decrease in the amount of large-n analysis carried out by political science. Rather, I 
would suggest that given the mass of large-n analysis of incumbency advantage that 
seems to focus on the same variables time after time, that it is now time to go to the field 
and bring back some fresh variables for analysis. This is especially called for if neither 
the discipline nor the subjects (incumbents and staff) recognize the meaning of their 
activities. In this case it is important for the researcher to articulate the unrecognized 
meaning and importance of activities (Lofland and Lofland, 1984, p.74).
Individual variables are much more fully fleshed out by qualitative research.
Fenno’s “soak and poke” approach is “valued added” in that it provides the observational 
richness of one case with all the variables seen up close. Fenno embraces the “bias” of 
this individual case approach. This approach maintains that a thorough understanding of 
the resources, motivations and behavior of a select few incumbents leads to a more 
thorough understanding of the collective. For example, political campaigns are highly 
studied and generalized about by political scientists, but how often are individual 
campaigns and decisions studied in depth? Fowler and McClure’s research on political 
ambition and the pool of quality challengers further demonstrates the need to get fully 
immersed in the context of a specific district. It is difficult to obtain an appreciation of 
the overall context until you’ve come to grips with the intricacies o f one case. It is 
precisely the intricacies o f one case or experience with an individual legislator that led to
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Mayhew and Fiorina’s seminal pieces of research (Fenno, 1990, p. 100). It would have 
been more challenging for Mayhew and Fiorina to theorize about all legislators’ 
motivations had they not been able to deeply probe one incumbent. The context of one 
example shows it importance and the need for new questions as the researcher moves 
from one office to the next, seeking comparison and similarity. It is the contextual 
comparison of these few individual cases that often breeds inquiry and that is why it is so 
important for the researcher to make analytical notes and comparisons while the research 
process proceeds. Finally, fully embracing the intricacies of an individual case allow the 
researcher to use more than one type of measurement to study incumbent activity. In this 
case I can observe multiple numbers of variables, behaviors, activities, whereas aggregate 
analysis of incumbency advantage tends to rely on one or a few variables that are coded 
and have little reliable verification.
Less biased data
Another strength of contextual research is that it can be argued that data collected at 
the actual point of observation is immune to many of the biases implicit in large-n data 
collection. The contextual researcher has substantially fewer data problems with survey, 
questioner or translation error because the researcher is there to ask and interpret all 
answers, both verbal and non-verbal. I might add that this type o f research reduces 
measurement error from surveys filled out by congressional aides (or even interns) who 
are not from the district or travel there rarely. At another level, the unscheduled 
interviews and observations allow insight that standardized questionnaires have difficulty 
capturing. Asking a staffer to explain an action that the researcher just observed is going 
to provide a higher quality (and quantity) o f data than responses to open-ended questions
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that the subject completes away from any interactive behavior. Finally, the observational 
researcher has the ability to amend or alter the research design, if  he/she realizes that 
important questions are going unasked or unanswered. For example, my initial research 
impetus was simply to categorize district staff and their daily tasks. Early in the research 
process, 1 realized that an equally important concept in need of study was the staffs 
interaction with elite constituents. This required me to alter the data that 1 needed to 
observe and collect from interviews.
It improves the discipline’s understanding o f staff 
Much of the literature that does exist on staff has as its focus either Washington- 
based staff or aggregate categories of behavior such as the number of staff or the amount 
of casework that is performed. Contextual clarity emphasizes that such tasks are not the 
only functions performed by district staff. They are not the most common, most 
interesting or even the most electorally relevant behavior performed by staff. So the 
question should be posed, why then do studies of congressional staff continue to focus on 
Washington staff or the aggregate allocations of resources? The simple answer is that it 
is virtually the only easily quantifiable and accessible data about legislative staff. 
Hammond noted this problem nearly twenty years ago: “It is not possible to gather data 
on changes in the number o f caseworkers or press aides in the U.S. Congress, because 
until recently names but not titles of staff aides were reported by Congress. Interviews 
and other data may be unclear... (for there is a) lack of data and a noncomparability of 
data.” Furthermore: “legislatures do not keep data on other output: constituent contacts 
or staff memoranda. If researchers want to use quantitative measures, they often must 
use surrogates for the phenomenon they are tapping” (Hammond, 1984, p.303, p.304). I
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can confirm Hammond’s statements with my observations of the varying states of 
recording and readiness of information that staff kept on: 1) their daily routines, 2) their 
interactions with constituents, and 3) their casework activities. While there are databases, 
training seminars and congressional statutes guiding these behaviors, congressional 
district staffers demonstrate wide latitude in how they record their behaviors.
Furthermore, these materials in many cases are electorally sensitive and staffers are most 
likely instructed not to share this data with journalists or inquiring academics. The 
Implication then, is that more political scientists must go out and observe this behavior if 
the discipline is to gain a full understanding o f what goes on in incumbents’ home 
districts. As an example of the weakness of quantitative analysis in the study of district 
staff, 1 might cite Salisbiuy and Shepsle’s (1981) investigation of incumbent 
“enterprises.” In their study, they make conclusions and associations about Washington 
staff turnover and ambition but they do so without any individual-level data on the 
subjects (Hammond, 1984, p.293). In other words, they crunch the numbers without any 
suitable explanation or investigation into the causative factors of staff behavior. Again, I 
note the relevance of getting out into the field to find new variables for comparative 
analysis.
On the other hand, I would accept that the literature has improved. As Hammond 
notes, research in the past few decades has admitted the relevance o f staff and begun to 
cast an eye towards the variations in their performance, but more work remains to be 
done as this research is still largely bound to DC staff. This leads to the final strength of 
contextual data; that it serves as fertile ground for the development of new theory about 
incumbents and staff.
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What I looked for: Concepts. Operationalizations and Questions to Ask 
Concepts I am going to explore and build my theory around 
The main concepts that I examined were incumbency advantage and the allocation 
and utilization of district staff. After I started this research I felt it important to add a 
third concept or dimension to the study; how incumbents and their staff interact with elite 
constituents. As was demonstrated in Chapter One, incumbency advantage is thoroughly 
studied by the discipline. Yet it has been my consistent claim that even while the concept 
has been thoroughly analyzed, it is missing certain elements, most notably congressional 
district staff. Developing the discipline’s understanding of congressional district staff 
serves two purposes: First, it will contribute an imderstanding of who staff are, what they 
do, and what their incumbents want them to do. Second, following from that 
understanding, the discipline might utilize the knowledge gained from the study of staff 
to bring another variable into the discussion of incumbency advantage. An examination 
of the utilization of district staff leads to the third concept under study: the intersection of 
congressional incumbents, staff and elite constituents. It is with this third concept that 
the discipline’s understanding of incumbency advantage might be most improved by this 
dissertation.
How 1 operationalized the concepts 
It is my belief that to fully understand incumbency advantage, one must be able to 
see and measure district activity. Studies of incumbency advantage have traditionally 
focused largely on campaigns or budget allocations. In these cases the necessary 
variables are usually very obvious. Examples include the amoimt raised and spent in 
campaigns, the number of television ads, or the number o f casework requests resolved.
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These are fine measures but they are incomplete. This dissertation suggests that when 
someone desires to study incumbency advantage, that they should also include a measure 
of staff political activity in the district. This dissertation operationalized district political 
activity by looking at how district staff were allocated and utilized by the incumbents. I 
defined district political activity as being those things that district staff did to assist the 
incumbent’s enterprise. This is a fairly broad concept. Included within it would be 
activities that I) served the incumbent’s constituents (in hopefully a favorable manner),
2) built the incumbents name recognition and/or the 3) perception that the incumbent was 
working hard for the district, 4) sought to interact with “opinion leaders’’ in the district, 
and 5) also sought out and countered any potential opposition that might arise.
These sub-concepts were then operationalized by looking at measurements such as:
1 ) how many staff had “field” assignments, 2) how much time the district staff spent out 
of the office, 3) who they talked to/met with, 4) what was the role of the RDSM, 5) how 
did the staff interact with the incumbent in completing these tasks, 6) how did the staff 
explain (and perceive) their responsibilities, and 7) did the office have any special 
techniques, forums, etc, for interacting with constituents. Once I had studied the 
concepts and operationalizations in each office, I could then suggest theories about 
district political activity based on each incumbents’ differing variables; age, race, gender, 
party, seniority, and electoral status of each incumbent. For the most part, these variables 
are easily compared. Even the “electoral status” variable can be easily compared through 
an examination of previous electoral margins. With contextual research, one might 
further examine the electoral status of the incumbent based on his/her perception of 
vulnerability. In this example, electoral status might be operationalized through the sheer
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numbers of district staff employed, or the types of district staff employed, or the staffs’ 
political and quasi-political activities and daily responsibilities. These 
operationalizations appear to be much more subjective than simple measures such as age, 
seniority, race and gender, and from a simple coding perspective I would agree. 
However, after observing a number o f different case studies, patterns of similarities and 
differences clearly arose. But clearly, this is exactly the kind o f concept that requires 
contextual study because even the staff under study would have a difficult time agreeing 
on the definition and measurements o f this concept.
How the concepts were measured: What questions were asked
Once I defined my concepts and operationalized the manner in which they would be 
studied, 1 began to compile the relevant list of questions and observations that would 
measure these variables. The items and questions that I came up with as 1 was doing 
research varied quite a bit for each category: incumbents, staff and elite constituents. 
What tied the questions together was the implicit aim of uncovering the goals, 
motivations and resources of incumbents and their staff, and the political environment of 
each district. As noted earlier, some of these questions are in the appendix. What 
follows are summaries of the most important questions that ultimately drove the research 
for each of the three research categories.
For incumbents the key questions centered on their perceptions o f the political 
environments and Job requirements that surrounded them. I wanted to pair these 
perceptions with questions about how the incumbents allocated their resources and spent 
their time and whether there appeared to be a connection. I also needed to see and 
understand the political opportunities and constraints that their districts provided and.
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generally speaking, who were their friends and adversaries. I wanted to understand why 
they hired the specific individuals that staffed their district offices.
Questions for the staff centered on their employer’s demands and instructions. In 
simple terms, I needed to understand what they did on a daily basis and what drove these 
activities. Was it their training, their staff boss or perhaps the perception of what might 
help their incumbent? Did they understand the political meaning o f the tasks that they 
were performing? It was also important to understand individual staff motivations, how 
they got their jobs, and where they ultimately wanted to go. Just as I examined the 
incumbents’ perceptions, it was equally important to understand staffs  perceptions of the 
political environment, friends and foes.
Finally, with elite constituents in the primary case studies, I needed to understand 
what they thought about politics and the incumbent (i.e. are they a supporter?). I also 
needed to examine what kinds of contact they had with the incumbent and staff, how 
often that interaction took place, and whether they understood the meaning of these 
activities from the staff and incumbent’s perspective. For all subjects, I wanted to 
understand if  they comprehended the consequences of these behaviors, both for election 
outcomes and for the concept o f representation.
In order to preserve the validity of the study, in all cases I attempted to observe the 
same concepts and operationalizations by paying attentions to these motivations and by 
talking about certain similar topics. Hopefully the extended discussion above o f my 
methods and operationalizations and the inclusion of the relevant questions in the 
appendix provide the means to make replicate this study in the future.
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Why the House and not the Senate?
As a final issue in this chapter, I would like to explain why this dissertation studies 
incumbent members o f the United States House of Representatives but makes nothing 
more than mention or quick comparisons with United States Senators. Members o f the 
U.S. House of Representatives provide for much more suitable case studies on the 
variation and impact o f district staff. For one, while all 435 House districts are of 
comparable population, senators represent states with widely divergent numbers of 
constituents. Along those lines. House seats tend to be much more homogenous in their 
political, economic and demographic characteristics. This facilitates House members and 
their staff having much more manageable levels of contact with their constituents. This 
is not to say that senators and their staff do not conduct constituent relations. Rather, 
because of the different size o f states, senators are allocated more substantial resources to 
run their federal “enterprises”, with some senators receiving substantially larger 
allocations. Hence, Senate offices lack the comparability found between House offices. 
Another difference is reflected in the number and importance of tasks that must be 
performed by said staff. One can easily imagine that the political power and relevance of 
the state directors for senators from California and Wyoming are not in the same 
ballpark, to mention nothing of the sheer difference in numbers of staff that would work 
in each state. On the other hand, all 435 District Directors confront roughly the same 
number of constituents with relatively homogenous political, economic and demographic 
dilemmas to resolve.
A second difference lies in the fact that there are fewer Senate elections and that 
these elections experience a greater fluctuation in the quality and types of candidates and
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issues. Furthermore, individual Senate elections tend to be more idiosyncratic with 
greater levels of activity by interest groups and national parties than exist in House races 
(Jacobson, 1997). This is increasingly the case with the growing utilization of soft 
money at the congressional level. It is easier and more cost effective to raise and 
distribute soft dollar resources for an entire state than for a specific congressional district. 
Not to mention that there are fewer races that will actually be targeted by the national 
parties from election to election.
The third factor is the different set of attitudes and behaviors that comport with being 
a senator or a representative. It has been found that senators function with “cyclical’ 
periods of attention to legislation and their districts (Taggert and Durant, 1985; Fenno’s 
books on US Senators) and that senators and their staff devote proportionally less time to 
casework activity than do representatives and their staff (Breslin, 1977; Johannes, 1984).
1 have directly witnessed this evolution in my current job working for a United States 
Senator. Where in the initial period the senator can work on policy interests with little 
regard for reelection prospects six years hence, the House member must immediately 
begin to raise resources and posture on the correct issues to attain reelection just 18 to 20 
months away. Members of the House are basically stuck in a permanent campaign mode. 
As my research investigated the political tasks of staff (both House and Senate), there 
was ample evidence to demonstrate the impact of the different election cycles on staff 
activity and motivations. While the “permanent” campaign may initially appear to be a 
disadvantage, such efforts also bring perks to the incumbent House members who are 
closer to their constituencies than the senators (i.e. more contact/service/familiarity). As 
was noted in the previous paragraph. House members and their staff perform more work
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at the local level, and because their constituencies are smaller and more homogenous it is 
much easier for representatives to get a feel for the needs of their constituents. It might 
also be argued that House electoral outcomes are more affected by these same constituent 
activities.
Finally, the regularity of proximity to their constituencies allows House incumbents 
to regularly scout their opposition (and deter it) in a way that senators would be hard- 
pressed to match. The fact that representatives are closer to their constituents than are 
senators may be a substantial determinant of the fact that incumbent representatives are 
much less likely to confront quality challengers than are senators (as was discussed in 
Chapter One). Given that House incumbents confront lower quality challengers, it should 
not be surprising that the literature has foimd that House elections receive lower levels of 
media coverage and campaign expenditures. Perhaps these outcomes are much more tied 
to district staff and the activities that they perform than the literature realizes. All of 
these factors tie into perhaps what is the clearest difference between the representatives 
and the senators; incumbent House members enjoy a more substantial incumbency 
advantage than do senators. From 1952 to 1992, roughly eighty percent of incumbent 
senators were re-elected. The comparable figure for representatives was ninety percent 
(Loomis, 1998, p63). Anecdotally, nearly as many incumbent senators as representatives 
were defeated in the 2000 elections. Each of the above examples contributes to the fact 
that House incumbents rarely lose.
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Conclusion
This chapter discussed and justified the methodology that was utilized in this 
dissertation’s investigation of congressional district staff. The purpose o f the 
observational method of research is to “inform, enrich, and guide theories o f politics” 
(Fenno, 1990, p i 14). The concepts and measurements of House incumbents, their district 
staff, and their interactions with elite constituents will help to further “inform, enrich, and 
guide” theories of legislative staff and incumbency advantage. The next chapter will 
thoroughly examine congressional district staff. It will propose a framework to 
understand who they are, what they do in their jobs representing members o f the US 
House of Representatives, and why some of them choose to work for politicians in the 
first place. This contextual understanding will then be useful in understanding how 
district staff members impact representation and the outcome of congressional elections.
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Chapter Three 
Who are District StalET?
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine congressional district staff and 
understand the ways in which they are allocated and utilized to assist in the reelection of 
incumbent members of the US House of Representatives. Through their interactions with 
elite constituents, district staff members both enhance and detract from the representative 
purpose of their district offices. This chapter will begin to examine the roles and 
motivations of congressional district staff in pursuing these representational and electoral 
functions. It will propose a framework to understand who they are, what they do in their 
jobs representing members o f the U.S. House of Representatives, and why they choose to 
work for these politicians. This chapter will examine district staff from three different 
focal points. It will examine the roles and functions of individual staff members. It will 
also detail the hierarchy that exists between the various staff and incumbents. Finally, 
this chapter will begin to look at the relationships that exist between staff, incumbents 
and constituents.
Who are district staff?
Staff are part of the district enterprise 
While there is no one common set o f motivations or role descriptions for district 
staff, loyalty to their incumbent employers is perhaps the most consistent unifying 
depiction of district staff. This chapter, in fact this whole dissertation, is built on the 
assumption that all district staff are motivated in large part out o f a desire to serve and 
promote the incumbent enterprise. Previous literature confirms the importance o f
1 4 2
promoting the ‘owner’ of the congressional “small business” (Loomis, 1979; Salisbury 
and Shepsle, 1981). When asked what was the purpose of their job, a majority of the 
staff replied “to get the boss re-elected.” This chapter will make clear, however, that 
some district staff have mixed motives and varying interpretations of the means and ends 
of their job requirements.
As was noted in Chapter Two, the universe of this dissertation is the personal staff of 
incumbent members of the United States House of Representatives who work in the 
home district offices. This universe does not include personal staff from Washington, 
committee staff or other institutional support staff. As opposed to the district staff, these 
latter three categories have received attention from previous academic inquiries. While 
these studies have adequately dealt with the roles and motivations of said staff, this 
dissertation maintains that district staffs are qualitatively different in their behaviors. As 
such, they demand their own classifications.
Fuzzy titles
Moving from district office to district office, one finds that job titles quickly shift. 
Unlike Washington, where office positions such as Chief o f Staff and Legislative 
Director carry clear connotations o f office function, titles in the district office are of 
much less utility in determining who does what. While the titles varied, there were 
clearly functional differences that reflected similar hierarchies in each office. Upon 
entering each district office, one of my initial goals was to acquire the staff job titles, but 
also to ask them individually about their actual function and position in the office. From 
these discussions, I was able to establish several distinct groups that exist in most district 
staff operations. Bear in mind, however, that these relationships and titles will vary from
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office to office. Furthermore, it is difficult to make historical comparison based on these 
positions because there was no tracking of jobs or titles by Congress until the early 1980s 
(Hammond, 1984, p.303).
The Ranking District Staff Member (RDSM)
Macartney suggests that the top district aide to politicians often acts as their “alter 
ego”; sharing their offices, appointments and grasp on power (1982, p.76). Yet, given the 
variety of ways in which incumbents distribute power between their Washington and 
district offices, it is often difficult to discern who is ‘in charge’ in the district. There is no 
one universal scenario where a specific individual(s) exercise power. In Washington, one 
will most commonly find the incumbent’s chief aide to be the Chief o f Staff (COS) or the 
Administrative Assistant (AA). In most Washington offices, these terms tend to be 
interchangeable. Back home, the District Director (DD) is usually the person ‘in charge’. 
If only it were always so simple. The reality, however, is that incumbents dole out power 
and decision-making authority in widely divergent manners. While it is still the case that 
COS’s are most commonly the chief aides, in Washington and in the district, there are an 
increasing number of incumbents who have shifted power to their chief district aides, 
sometimes retaining their titles of COS, and other times adding to the confusion by 
calling them DDs. To clarify the hierarchical situations in the district, I think it necessary 
to first identify the district staff member that exercises the most hierarchical power, the 
Ranking District Staff Member (RDSM). Once that individual has been identified, it is 
useful to determine what kind of decision-making authority he or she has vis-à-vis the 
ranking staffer in Washington. Chapter Four will offer some generalizations about why 
incumbents utilize different systems of hierarchy. Before that discussion of power and
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office hierarchy, it would be useful to examine each of the categories o f district staff and 
their basic roles in the enterprise.
As was just implied, not all RDSMs exercise the same levels of activity or decision­
making power. Even with the limited sample o f this dissertation, it is eminently clear 
that incumbents place varying levels of trust in the political abilities o f  their district staff, 
and especially their key district staffer, theRDSM. The following discussion details the 
basic tasks performed by RDSMs listed in order from the least active or powerful job 
functions to the most active. Figure 3.1 provides a basic conceptualization of the range in 
job functions o f the RDSM. While not comprehensive, it does provide a thorough range 
in activities.
Figure 3.1 Roles o f Ranking District Staff Members (RDSM)
Coordinate Conduct Schedule Represent Surveil Resolve Political
Staff Casework Incumbent Incumbent District Conflict Tasks
(More reactive roles) (More proactive roles)
The most basic function of the RDSM is to coordinate the district staff. In the words 
of Member B, his RDSM “handles the administration of the office.” Based on comments 
by both B and his RDSM, as well as through interviews with subordinate staff, it was 
apparent that a substantial portion of her time was devoted to basic administrative tasks 
and the supervision of younger staff members. Throughout my interview with her, the 
RDSM repeatedly mentioned the amount of time she spent dealing with staff salaries, 
working conditions and requirements imposed by the Fair Labor Standards Act in
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particular. No other RDSM was so entrenched in the minutiae of office management. In 
fact, most other offices employ a subordinate assistant to the RDSM who carries the title 
and duties of Office Manager (see below). Nevertheless, B’s RDSM serves a vital 
function in his enterprise. In the words of a fellow district staff member, she “holds it all 
together” allowing B and the district staff to focus on their own individual job functions. 
Another limited RDSM can be found in C’s district office. To be fair, the RDSM in C’s 
office has truly been an acting executive for nearly two years and carried the title o f 
“Special Assistant”. His seven subordinate staffers all shared the simple title o f “Staff 
Assistant.”
Relatively few RDSMs perform constituent service (aka casework). Once again 
indicative of the relatively Junior role played by B’s RDSM is the fact that a significant 
portion of her job was devoted to casework. She estimated that between one-quarter and 
one-half of her time was devoted to this task. Only I’s RDSM spent a larger portion of 
the job on casework (50% in her instance). Spending time on individual casework 
assistance is argued to be a routine job function as compared to the more substantial 
projects and opportunities for outreach that other RDSMs pursue. This argument is made 
because RDSM’s have the ability to have a larger representational and electoral impact 
through other types o f behaviors.
While virtually all offices have a full time scheduler, the RDSM invariably has some 
involvement in this portion of the incumbent enterprise.* From the minimal decisions of 
who is responsible for transporting the incumbent around the district to strategic
' In fact, incumbents commonly employ two schedulers; one for their Washington schedule and one for 
their district schedule. Given the large numbers o f incumbents who now live in their home districts, or at 
least travel there 30-40 weekends per year, it became logical to devote substantial office resources to 
ensuring that incumbents were going to all the places they needed to be going in both o f their ‘homes’.
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decisions about the location and message of incumbent events throughout a month-long 
recess period during an election season, RDSMs usually have some level of involvement 
in the planning process. As such, the scheduling function provides an excellent 
microcosm to analyze the position of the RDSM in the incumbent’s enterprise. I’s 
RDSM is found at the relatively weak end of the continuum, as she is merely responsible 
for the acquisition, listing and scheduling of all invitations. In short, she is the office 
scheduler. At the other end of the spectrum, A’s RDSM is involved in the scheduling 
process only at the strategic end, suggesting groups or geographic areas that are in need 
of attention from the incumbent or staff and leaving the process o f scheduling to other 
staff.
Moving outside of office-based functions, some RDSMs carry out representative 
roles for the absent incumbent. The RDSM is usually the staff member most entrusted 
with delivering a speech, accepting an award, overseeing a politically sensitive meeting, 
etc., but there is variation within offices. As with scheduling, one can also construct a 
continuum of authority for this job function. At the most limited end of the continuum 
the RDSM would be unwilling to even accept an invitation for the incumbent. I’s office 
most closely approximates this position, where she was clearly uncomfortable with the 
notion of representing the incumbent at public events. In her words, it would be 
“inappropriate” for her to try and represent the absent incumbent. B’s RDSM represents 
only a slightly more proactive position in that she on occasion would fill invitations that 
B had accepted but wasn’t able to attend but that she “would never speak for B.” 
Occupying a more moderate position on this continuum would be C’s office where his 
acting RDSM regularly attended events in C’s place and on occasion would read the
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incumbent’s prepared remarks. At the proactive end of the continuum, A’s RDSM 
frequently was invited to and attended events in his capacity as A’s chief assistant. In the 
case of A and D, the RDSM is acting comfortably as a surrogate for the absent 
incumbent. In the other three cases mentioned here, either the incumbent is 
uncomfortable with the notion of having a surrogate, or merely with having their federal 
staff carry out that role.
Incumbents who are comfortable with their RDSMs performing surrogate roles will 
also likely expect their top district aides to help with more sophisticated surveillance. In 
the more limited role, here best seen again in the case of 1, the RDSM’s surveillance 
responsibilities are limited to nothing more than clipping newspapers and recording 
media coverage of the incumbent, with the occasional tallying o f constituent reaction or 
street gossip. Again at the other end of the spectrum, the RDSM from A or D’s 
enterprise is more fully expected to gamer political information from journalists, local 
elected officials, constituent supporters, party leaders, etc. Incumbents with empowered 
aides expect them to produce much more valuable political intelligence.
Possessing information is only half of the equation. RDSMs also vary in their 
authority to resolve situations that are brought in to their offices or that their surveillance 
uncovers. It is hard to imagine I’s RDSM maneuvering to resolve important disputes 
involving constituents or political players. As was mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
it is unlikely that I’s RDSM would even be more than roughly acquainted with such 
delicate situations. G’s RDSM represents a more moderate position on this 
power/resolution continuum. In this case, he noted that on delicate issues, the general 
procedure is that constituents “call 0 , he sends me, then I report back to him, then it gets
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taken care of.” In this sense, G’s RDSM acts as an intermediary between the incumbent 
and his constituents. The most active RDSMs have the information and the authority to 
resolve disputes with little involvement o f the incumbent or Washington staff As H’s 
RDSM explained it, he does “outreach” and “sets up meetings” with interested or 
complaining constituents and then takes care o f the problems himself. This district aide 
noted that he only involved the incumbent when it was an abnormally delicate or 
involved situation.
The tasks listed above and shown in figure 3.1 mostly reflect the official federal 
responsibilities o f the RDSM. There are other political and campaign functions that some 
RDSMs conduct that go beyond this minimal legalist job description. The most proactive 
RDSMs are also involved in some elements of the incumbents’ re-election campaigns. 
While these are not official federal tasks, some RDSMs are involved in strategic 
decision-making, fund-raising, and representing the incumbent with affiliated and 
partisan organizations. This level o f activism by federal staff was not common to district 
offices. Only the most proactive o f the incumbents from these case studies seemed to 
utilize their district staff in such a fashion. Discussions later in this chapter and in 
Chapter Five will more fully investigate these more expansive powers. Suffice it to say 
here that incumbents like A and D tend to fully integrate their RDSMs into their entire 
enterprise, bridging their federal and campaign entities, as well as serving as a link 
between the incumbent and the important base communities of their geographic or 
reelection constituencies. As will be seen in Chapter Five, these empowered and 
proactive staffers can be important surrogates for the incumbents that grant them leeway 
to pursue multiple political goals simultaneously.
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I noted two interesting variables in this equation of how much power incumbents 
granted to their RDSMs. The first variable was the RDSMs personal relationship with 
the incumbent. Staffs who were long time friends of the incumbent tended to have more 
empowered positions relative to other RDSMs. In this case, G and H’s RDSMs clearly 
were able to derive this long-term trust and translate it into the ability to make political 
decisions in the office. Simple longevity in the relationship is not likely to be sufficient 
in this power equation, however. For example, B’s RDSM was a long-time friend and 
employee of B. In this case, however, her employment in his law firm and state 
legislature stamped her as a clear subordinate early in her tenure with B, a hierarchical 
relationship that functioned for decades in the same manner. The relationship variable 
also applies to RDSMs who are hired as district staff members without a pre-existing 
personal relationship. In this case, it appears that individuals who are hired young, or 
with limited experience (best seen in the case o f C’s RDSM), are unlikely to evolve to the 
status of RDSMs who are hired because of their political clout or connections (best seen 
in the A’s office). The latter employees are often hired almost as “semi-incumbents”.
The other variable was the staffer’s employment status. I found that this status is not 
necessarily descriptive of the RDSM status on the continuum in Figure 3.1. Both G and 
H employ part-time RDSMs who work between twenty and thirty hours per week. The 
initial image provided by this explanation is that surely these individuals must tend to be 
on the more limited and reactive side of the continuum. That turned out to not be the 
case. In fact, G and H’s RDSMs were among the more empowered district staff that I 
encountered. It was precisely because these two individuals held part-time elective
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offices and had familiarity with the personalities and issues of the district that made them 
attractive to the two incumbents.
Field Representatives
The second group of district staff is a diverse collection of individuals commonly 
holding the job title of Field Representative. Just as with the RDSMs, however, there is 
substantial variation in both the titles and functions of this category of district staff. 
Alternatives labels to Field Representative include Staff Assistant, Special Assistant, 
Outreach Coordinator, and numerous other potential titles. For the purposes of this 
dissertation I will refer to all district staff in this second category as either Field 
Representatives or occasionally as ‘interactors’. These titles reflect the major job 
characteristic of this layer of district staff. What separates them from other staff is that 
the field representatives tend to spend a substantial portion of their job interacting with 
constituents, both individually and in groups, in settings outside o f the district office.
The remaining staff members, who will be discussed below, tend to have fewer 
opportunities to interact with constituents and do less proactive work for the incumbent.
Just as with the RDSM, the job description of the field representative varies from 
office to office. Virtually all field representatives conduct at least some casework. 
Casework is here defined as the one-on-one assistance that staff members provide to 
individuals or groups of constituents. Some typical items of casework include small 
business loans, immigration concerns, entitlement payments, etc. It is perhaps erroneous, 
however, to suggest that there is a “typical” casework issue. Given the expansion of 
federal programs and statutes covering the incumbents’ constituents, it is not surprising 
that the constituents have encountered more and more regulatory mistakes, miscuss and
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oversights. What is more, this casework assistance does not need to be o f a federal 
nature. Discussion below will demonstrate that quite often constituents will request that 
congressional staff provide them with assistance on municipal, county, state, or even 
personal matters. Field representatives dedicate varying amoimts of time to casework 
assistance. At one end of the extreme, field representatives in B’s district offices rarely 
venture outside of the offices. These staffers probably spend in excess of three-quarters 
of their time in their offices receiving cases, inquiring about the facts of the cases, and 
interacting in attempts to resolve the cases. At the other end of the extreme, the four field 
representatives firom F’s office spend in excess o f three-quarters of their time out in the 
field attending meetings, talking to constituents, observing the community, all the while 
generating new casework requests that the two office-bound caseworkers then deal with.
I would note that incumbents B and F seemed to be outliers in the pool of offices under 
study. Most of the offices tended toward a situation where field representatives spent a 
roughly equal amount of time out in the “field” and in the office working on cases. It is 
important to reiterate, however, that there is substantial variation in what field 
representatives do on a daily basis.
There is also substantial variation in the numbers of field representatives each 
incumbent utilizes in district offices. As incumbents are firee to hire their own staff and 
make their own allocation decisions with their office budgets, they can choose to spend 
substantial resources hiring a highly effective RDSM, leaving fewer budgetary dollars to 
finance salaries for field representatives or other office staff. Alternatively, an incumbent 
might choose to hire a highly qualified press secretary, or spread the resources amongst a 
number of experienced caseworkers. The open budget allows the incumbent to choose
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from a wide variety o f potential employee mixes. In terms o f the field representatives, I 
observed offices that ranged firom having virtually no field representatives (Incumbent I) 
to an office that employed four field representatives whose simple job task was to create 
casework requests for the two caseworkers that remained in the office (Incumbent F). 
Chapter Four will propose a framework from which we might better understand how or 
why incumbents hire and utilize district staff for different situations.
I observed participation by field representatives on both the administrative and 
scheduling functions mentioned under the RDSM category. I would note, however, that 
their participation in both of these tasks was limited in time and content. For both 
reactive and proactive offices, it appears that field representatives tend to spend more 
time on the casework function than either on scheduling or administrative 
responsibilities.
In the more proactive offices, field representatives could be found carrying out the 
representative/surrogate and surveillance roles. It seemed to follow logically that in 
offices where the RDSM was empowered to be politically active on behalf of the absent 
incumbent that he/she would utilize the field representatives to assist in this task. In this 
matter, incumbent A’s field representatives provide an excellent illustration.^ The DD 
and the three field representatives in A’s office are all on the proactive side of staff 
functions, spending substantial portions of their job time out o f the office interacting with 
constituents, looking for new opportunities for their boss. In being proactive, they were
- In A’s case, the District Director (DD) is actually not the RDSM, but rather the “day-to-day” manager o f 
the district field staff and caseworkers. The Chief o f Staff (COS) in this office spends three weeks per 
month in the district office. In the words o f the DD, the COS acts as the “hammer” pursuing “district” 
matters, “putting out fires” and running the entire enterprise. Because he is not the ranking staffer, the DD 
would have to be considered something o f a hybrid between the RDSM and the field representatives in A’s 
office.
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often called upon to represent the incumbent at award ceremonies, deliver prepared 
remarks, and make honorary commendations for schoolteachers and successful business 
owners and on and on. While they were performing these proactive tasks, the staff 
members were expected to acquire new problems in which the office could assist, new 
names of potential supporters (or even opponents) and the latest in political gossip firom 
the field.
Alternatively, nearly all of the field representatives of incumbents B and I appeared 
to be operating on different job descriptions. Following the lead of their RDSMs, these 
staffs were largely confined to the casework, administrative, and scheduling functions 
described above. Occasionally, these staff might venture forth to spend a day per month 
in a remote city of the district doing office hours, making themselves available to local 
constituents. The intensity with which they sought these opportunities, the degree to 
which they advertised their resources and the times in which they proactively solicited 
further casework requests were all substantially less than in proactive offices such as A’s 
enterprise. Finally, I would note that even in proactive offices such as incumbent A, did I 
rarely observe field representatives conducting the either conflict resolution or more 
political tasks discussed in Figure 3.1. While it is likely that field representatives are 
party to the discovery and resolution of complex district issues, none occurred during my 
observations.
What’s explains the difference between the RDSM and the Field Representative?
The obvious answer to this question is that the RDSM is in charge of the office 
hierarchy. The more subtle answer to the question is reflected in what I observed to be 
different demands placed upon the occupants o f the two different jobs. As the previous
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paragraph suggested, whether the office tends to be reactive or proactive in its mission, 
there appears to be some overlap in what the RDSM and the field representatives do in 
their jobs. While RDSMs and field representatives have different job responsibilities, 
they are similar in that they are both the ‘interactors’ of the office, dealing with 
constituents and groups on a larger scale than the other district staff. Ultimately, 
however, I observed there to be different daily motivations driving these two sets of 
district staff.
For the RDSM, the demands of their job tend to be more heavily determined by their 
incumbent’s needs and the political environments they occupy. For example, in many 
districts, especially the ones that tend to be more homogenous, there tends to be a single 
large industry or institution that demands special attention. Each of the four primary case 
studies provides excellent examples o f an employer or institution that demands special 
attention from the RDSM. In the case of A it is three military bases, for C there is a large 
state university, D’s district includes the state capitol and most of the state’s executive 
branch employees, and for B, there are a series of high-tech companies. In each of these 
cases, with the clear exception of B, the RDSM spent a disproportionate amount of time 
on that primary district institution. The military base, university and state capitol all 
provide a myriad of individual casework items, budget requests, state and federal 
regulatory issues, and most simply, opportunities for political success (or failure). The 
presence of such large interests also poses representational opportunities and dilemmas 
that will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
Occasionally field representatives might also be assigned a narrow set o f casework 
responsibilities, like veteran’s issues or immigration. Generally, field representatives
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who are assigned such responsibilities have additional issue or geographic areas of 
representation. This stands in contrast to the RDSM who is much more heavily attuned 
to the military base, state university or state capitol. 1 would also note that only RDSM’s 
on the extremely limited or reactive end of the continuum would have casework 
responsibilities. B’s RDSM had some casework responsibilities to accompany her 
largely administrative portfolio and C’s acting RDSM had to pick up some casework 
simply because they were shorthanded two staff.^
While the RDSM is highly constrained in a focus on the primary institution, the field 
representatives tend to find themselves pulled in many different directions on a daily 
basis. To start, their jobs are much more individually based as they are dealing largely 
with the cases and problems of individual constituents. Not only are these cases widely 
divergent in their subject matter, they also tend to be of a much smaller nature than 
projects usually handled by the RDSMs. For example, in C’s district, one of the field 
representatives who worked in the town with the state university spent nearly half of her 
casework time on immigration issues relevant largely to the university. The RDSM, on 
the other hand, was involved, although peripherally, in several large research projects to 
bring federal funding to the university. Clearly the work of the two staff is o f a different 
magnitude and purpose. The field representatives are also different when they find 
themselves out in the “field” conducting the surrogate and surveillance functions. As 
noted above, RDSMs also perform this function. The difference is that when RDSMs 
perform this function it tends to be more targeted in nature; they go to a specific town or
- As C’s ‘acting’ RDSM, this individual felt his job to be “ever-changing.” In this role as “Special 
Assistant”, he felt that his main requirement was to “keep it flowing for the member of Congress.” In order 
to keep things “flowing” this RDSM carried out an odd mixture o f meetings, casework, campaign and
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a specific meeting for a specific purpose. For field representatives, on the other hand, 
their surveillance is just like their casework, it tends to be more generic and one-on-one. 
They go to more, and smaller meetings, to discover smaller amoimts o f political 
intelligence. This is not to shortchange them, however, in the aggregate their “small” 
amount o f work is as valuable to the incumbent’s enterprise as are the relatively larger 
works performed by the RDSMs.
Another difference between the RDSM, the field representatives, and the other staff 
lies in their involvement on the “other side” of the incumbent enterprise: the campaign. 
The RDSMs tend to have a larger role in the planning and conduct o f  the incumbent’s 
campaigns. Substantial involvement in the campaign side by the RDSM was clearly 
observed in incumbent A and D’s office even outside of the election year. In each of 
these cases, the RDSM was traveling with the incumbent to out-of-state political events, 
attending and/or planning fund-raising events for their incumbent or other candidates that 
their incumbent was supporting, and doing the many other tasks that are part of the 
“permanent campaign.” While the connection was not quite as continuous or clear in C’s 
office, it was interesting to discover that his acting RDSM had served as his campaign 
manager in the previous election and was gearing up to resume the role at the time of this 
research. I did not observe B’s RDSM in this role, and given that B had not had a 
competitive election in recent years, I thought it unlikely that his RDSM has had more 
than token campaign roles.
whatever other tasks arose on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. In short, 1 found him to be atypical because 
o f his “acting” status.
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Other district staff
Besides, RDSMs, DDs and field representatives, there are a number of other district 
staff that should at least be recognized for the roles they play in the incumbent 
enterprises. As was noted in Chapter Two, however, these staff members are less central 
to the observations of this dissertation for a variety of reasons. The most commonly 
discussed group of staff other than those mentioned above are the press secretaries. The 
press secretary is responsible for building and maintaining relationships with journalists, 
both in the district and in the national press, to ensure that the incumbent’s activities are 
loudly broadcast to his or her constituents and other potential campaign supporters. The 
proliferation of these individuals in Washington offices has been paralleled by an 
increase in the amount o f academic attention paid to them over the past two decades. 
Numerous works by have demonstrated the important role that press secretaries play for 
incumbents.'* While the majority of press secretaries tend to work exclusively from the 
Washington offices, significant numbers o f them travel back to the district for at least 
several weeks per year, and a not insignificant number of them work there for even 
longer periods of time. Based on my observations, I would hypothesize that the presence 
of the press secretary in the district is determined by the electoral vulnerability o f the 
incumbent, and perhaps slightly influenced by their individual styles. In the case o f 
incumbent C, the press secretary was reassigned to the district office for what appeared to 
be two distinct reasons. First, C was confronting a rematch with an opponent who had 
given him his first real election test in over a decade. Second, the press secretary was 
fairly new to the office and needed to establish relationships with the journalists o f  the 
district. Conversely, prior to taking a job in politics, D’s press secretary had spent a
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number of years producing a television show for the media market that was almost 
exactly D’s congressional district. Her credentials and contacts allowed her to move the 
operation directly to Washington and maintain her contacts by phone. This press 
secretary is probably typical in that she spends eighty percent o f the year in Washington, 
returning to the district only during extended recesses or work periods so that she can be 
with the incumbent. In both cases, the press secretary’s main responsibility is to ensure 
that the incumbent receives positive press coverage. Personal relationships with 
journalists can be helpful in the creation and maintenance of positive press coverage.
Paralleling the increase in the number of press secretaries has also been an 
observable increase in the number of schedulers employed by incumbents. The increased 
amount o f travel by incumbents, and the proliferation of invitations, as well as 
Washington commitments that they have received certainly have caused incumbents to 
dedicate increased staff attention to the task of scheduling their time. Further 
demonstrating the increased importance o f this task has been the fact that many 
incumbents now have both Washington and district schedulers to ensure that their travel 
is efficient.^ Not so ironically, schedulers seem to be the staffers whom often have the 
most contact with the incumbent.
As members of Congress increased their legislative budgets to cope with the 
increased constituent demand created by New Deal and Great Society spending (see 
Fiorina!), caseworkers became the largest group of district staff, and perhaps, the largest
■' See especially Cook (1989) and Hess (1982).
 ^ It was also quite evident &om my observations that virtually all district staff, from caseworkers to field 
representatives to ranking members, had at least some role in the scheduling process. Again, this is a 
reflection o f the increased travel on the part o f the incumbent It was rare that senior staff devoted much 
time to scheduling (only observed with incumbent 1), but I did observe scheduling by committee with input 
from all staff (D’s office).
1 5 9
group of all legislative staff. As was noted above, field representatives tend to have some 
political responsibilities that take them outside of the office to interact with constituents. 
By definition, caseworkers are largely office-bound and spend their days accumulating 
and resolving individual constituent problems that are presented to them either by 
constituents coming in to the office or by work generated by the incumbent and other 
staff.^ It was rare to find an office that employed such a stark division in staff 
responsibilities. Of all the offices that I observed, only F maintained such a clear split 
between her four field representatives, who each spent only one day per week in the 
office, and her two caseworkers, who never left the office. Once caseworkers obtain the 
necessary information from the constituents, their basic purpose is to navigate through 
local, state and federal bureaucracies to deduce whether the constituent’s problem can be 
rectified. At that point there is often a philosophical split between offices. Some 
incumbents will direct their staff to go to great lengths to actually resolve cases for their 
constituents. Others take a different philosophical interpretation of their role as public 
servants and direct their staff merely to provide information for the constituents to help 
themselves navigate through the system. A large majority of the observed cases preferred 
the former style to the latter.
The remaining three staff types can be found in every office and their roles are fairly 
self-explanatory. In offices where the RDSM does not want to be burdened with 
administrative duties, as in D’s case, one can often find an office manager who takes care 
of payroll, benefits, the purchase of office supplies and any other projects as they arise. 
Quite often the office manager will also occupy the role of receptionist. Some
* One should note that most field representatives have at least some casework responsibilities and that there 
are some individuals that spend in excess ofV* o f their time in the district offices performing tasks identical
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incumbents, as in the case of incumbent B, also retain a personal assistant who usually 
works part-time and will drive or run errands for the incumbent when he or she is at 
home. Finally, interns are a staple of virtually every congressional office, with more of 
them found in districts with large collegiate populations. On the rare occasion where 
incumbents have excess funds in the budget and a need for additional labor, interns might 
be made part-time employees. Whether paid, or un-paid, full or part-time, all o f these 
staffers should be considered part of the incumbent’s enterprise.
Beware of titles
While the previous discussion appears to suggest that there is a clear procession of 
power from RDSM down to intern in congressional district offices, one should be careful 
in assuming that this hierarchy can be found in every enterprise. Many staffers with 
some of the lesser job titles are in fact much more political than their titles suggest. 1 
found this to especially be the case for the long-serving staffers. For example, B’s 
personal assistant/driver is a long time friend of the incumbent. Given that B appears to 
have a relatively weak district staff and no clear set of advisers, it is likely that this staffer 
plays a key advisory and support role for the incumbent during their long drives 
throughout the district. While most incumbents are likely to observe the hierarchal 
relationships provided by Job titles, it is clear from B’s examples that there will be some 
that will buck that trend and look for advice farther down the office chart. It was also 
clear in the case of B’s caseworkers and field representatives, o f whom many were with 
him for the entirety of his congressional career, that some staff are relatively less 
controlled by office hierarchy. B explained to me that he gave much less thought to the 
work that the more experienced staff were doing, while the two new hires, both recent
to caseworkers. Conversely, caseworkers in some offices perform tasks similar to the field representatives.
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college graduates, were much more likely to receive frequent calls from his RDSM and 
were not “cut loose” like the “old gals.” There is clearly variation in the authority o f 
individual staffers with the same job titles.
Individual district staff members can, on occasion, buck the office hierarchy through 
the overall commitment to the inciraibent’s enterprise. Whether it be a willingness to cart 
the incumbent across the district (like B’s assistant) or long after-work hours put in either 
on political campaigns or interacting with community and political groups, it appeared to 
me that staff could earn the equivalent o f “extra credit” by proving their value to the 
incumbent. Personal experience and interest also can increase the value of district staff. 
For example, staffers who had experience or interest with a particular issue area 
(examples include military, education, housing agencies, etc.) or staffers who previously 
held elective office tended to be more valued by incumbents and granted greater levels of 
access to the incumbent and the COS. In short, I would conclude that who staff “are” 
depends on what they bring to the job. It also depends on where their office is located. 
Staff members that work in the remote reaches of large geographic districts tend to have 
less of a role in the incumbent’s enterprise. This was most stark in comparing the four 
offices of B to the single office of D.
The extended enterprise: Campaign, Cabinet and Surrogate
Observations of the incumbents in their home districts suggest that our understanding 
of the enterprise needs to be widened even further than current and former congressional 
staff. Besides the obvious groups of staff, family and friends, the district enterprise 
properly includes campaign staff, a kitchen cabinet, and other individuals who perform 
“political” services for the incumbent
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While there is common discussion o f the permanent campaign, we have not yet 
reached the point where incumbents keep fully staffed campaigns running for their entire 
two-year cycle. It is becoming more common, however, for them to keep a fundraiser or 
administrative person fully employed for that period. As will be seen below, federal 
district staff members are also permitted to assist in the incumbent’s reelection 
campaigns, often even serving as the incumbent’s chief fundraiser (as in the case o f D’s 
RDSM or A’s DD).’ Even with these political ‘designees’, political uncertainty and the 
quest for larger campaign coffers has caused more and more incumbents to employ 
campaign staff throughout their two-year cycle. While these staff are not allowed to 
work in the federal office an examination of incumbent’s schedules and an observation of 
their behavior found numerous examples of campaign staff, usually fund-raisers, 
sprinkled throughout their district activities. Other incumbents freely transfer campaign 
and federal staff between their political worlds. C’s RDSM served as his campaign 
manager in the previous two elections, each time making the transition back to the federal 
office. As will be discussed below and in the next chapter, staff who can cross into both 
worlds are invaluable to the incumbents as they meet whole new worlds of political 
specialists, constituents and potential supporters who can assist the incumbent’s 
enterprise in vastly different manners on both sides of the federal/campaign split. On this 
point, C’s RDSM noted that his campaign experience was extremely useful in preparing 
him for the next two-year cycle because of the new relationships that he was able to form. 
Clearly the discipline must expand its conception of the enterprise to include staff in both 
the federal and the campaign worlds.
 ^These joint duties are perfectly legal as long as the federal employees perform the campaign work on 
personal time or take a leave or part-time status and are compensated by the campaign. Despite all the
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Some incumbent enterprises should be defined as including a “kitchen cabinet,” a 
collection of informal advisers that serve a number of fimctions. The basic cabinet 
ftmction is to be a political sounding board, but some cabinet members help with political 
surveillance, fundraising, and strategic planning. The “cabinet” is an amorphous 
category of advisers. 1 found that incumbents who have a stronger “personal” style, 
which I will explain in Chapter Four, tend to have relatively fewer formal and informal 
advisory structures than other incumbents. Incumbent C is an illustration of this type of 
individual. He has identified a few friends, selected because of their expertise on certain 
issues or geographic areas, that he calls individually when he has a question. This group 
should not be thought of as a typical “kitchen cabinet” that gives political advice. At the 
other extreme is D’s key advisory body, commonly known by political players in her 
district as “D”2. This group consists of five long-time friends who directed her transition 
to office after her initial election and continued to give input on large strategic issues. 
“D”2 is also not a typical “kitchen cabinet.” By definition, a traditional “kitchen cabinet” 
is a select group of finends/ advisers that enjoy continued and personal access to the 
incumbent and high-ranking staff. Because of the sensitive and private nature of these 
advisers, incumbents were reluctant to include me in these meetings or admit that they 
were reliant upon these groups. Clearly they exist, albeit in different forms and levels of 
importance. Fortunately, I was able to interview several elite constituents that staff or 
incumbents confirmed were key advisory figures. As opposed to the elite constituents 
mentioned above that incumbent C calls upon for specific issue advice, the “cabinet” 
adviser tends to have more regular contact with the incumbent, and provides political 
advice on the issues and surveillance on the district. In the case of B’s key fund-raiser
regulations, this is clearly a murky gray area.
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and long-time friend, the usual pattern was for B to send the constituent a fax of 
speeches, ideas and legislative proposals to mull it over and get the sense of support from 
his “circle o f friends.” This constituent had the ability to contact the incumbent at any 
time and generally talked to him on a weekly basis. This individual is much more clearly 
a part o f B’s enterprise than virtually all of the incumbent’s federal staff. “Kitchen 
Cabinet” members are also vital to the incumbents’ fundraising activities. In the case o f 
B’s constituent above, this individual was responsible for raising a substantial portion of 
the incumbent’s in-district individual contributions. The constituent relayed to me that 
four or five times a year he invites several different groups of friends to his cabin to fish, 
talk politics and raise money for B. Additionally, one of the “D”2 members served for a 
time as D’s fund-raising director on the campaign staff.
The most powerful “cabinets” will provide incumbents with more formal and regular 
assessments of political strategy. Here again, “D”2 is an illustration of a highly 
formalized “cabinet.” In her case, this group of advisers were vital in making her a viable 
candidate for office, assisting her in an extremely competitive primary and general 
election, managing the transition team for her first federal staff, and giving her strategic 
advice on her career and national politics. It occurs to me that “D”2 is a rare advisory 
structure for a freshman legislator.* It also occurs that it might be possible for these 
“cabinet” advisers to have a measure of authority over district staff that I did not observe 
in these four primary cases. While unlikely, it does seem possible that fnends of the
* Logically comparing senior legislators to the freshmen struggling to get that first reelection, I thought 
that there probably exists an interesting paradox o f  “kitchen cabinets”; while it is the freshmen that could 
probably make greater use o f their advice, it is more likely that the senior members will have them. Ah, the 
perks o f  seniority!
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incumbent could be tasked important political responsibilities or leadership roles that 
casual observation would not detect.
The final additions to the extended enterprise are surrogates who perform “political” 
services when the incumbent feels that his or her staff members are not suitable or 
qualified for the occasion. An example of the former situation was encoimtered at an 
awards dinner where B couldn’t make the invitation, so he delegated the reading of his 
remarks to a local attorney and supporter, instead of his long-time aide in that city. The 
federal staff person appeared later by telephone to answer questions. In this case, B 
probably concluded that his aide, while well known in the area, did not have the savvy to 
deliver the remarks, so he used a surrogate to deliver the proper image and in typical 
fashion provided for a district staffer to clean up the nuts and bolts. Sometimes a 
“suitable” addition to the enterprise is not someone who has savvy or valuable skills but 
instead, provides an important political connection. In one observed case, the wife o f a 
prominent state legislator served as C’s “person” or contact in that county. Surrogates 
are also used in situations where the staffs are not qualified to assist constituents. A 
common example is foimd in issue forums, where incumbents bring together specialists 
on health care, education, housing issues, etc., to give advice to large gatherings of 
constituents. Inciunbents on occasion will mobilize attorneys that support them to sit for 
office hours offering free legal advice. Both of these are excellent examples o f the 
incumbent broadening his or her enterprise to include expert advice that assists 
constituents and theoretically results in positive evaluations of the incumbent — which is 
the overriding purpose of the enterprise. Keeping these disparate elements on the same 
page can often be a challenge for the incumbent and their chief aides.
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Hierarchy: How does the enterprise function as an institution?
Who runs the district show? Who handles problems, does representation?
Patterson (1970) and Fox and Hammond (1977) found that legislators structure their 
Washington offices in hierarchical, coordinative or individualistic styles. As was hinted 
at above, reflections of these styles can also be found in the district offices. Incumbents 
vary in the amount of decision-making authority they grant to their RDSMs. In the next 
chapter I will suggest some factors that might explain this variation in office style. Here I 
will focus on the relationship between the incumbent, the COS and the RDSM.
The first scenario involved autonomy for the RDSM. In E’s office, the RDSM 
functioned with substantial autonomy largely because the attentions of the incumbent and 
the COS were almost entirely focused on legislative activity in Washington. The 
incumbent had been in office for more than a decade and returned home mostly only 
during extended recess or work periods. Because of his position in the party leadership, 
his COS was equally drawn into legislative activity. Apart from monthly telephone 
conference calls and staff training retreats, he had little interaction with most of the 
district staff. The incumbent and the COS had the luxury of the reduced attention 
because the RDSM was an extremely capable and loyal servant with strong ties to the 
community. In short, his presence gave them the leeway to focus on other activities.
This RDSM carried substantial authority to investigate, mediate and resolve political and 
constituent matters. 1 did not encounter another RDSM who appeared to carry such 
political authority.
Another model that I observed in only one case was similar to Fox and Hammond 
coordinative model. D’s office structure could be described as very coordinated or
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consensual. In this model, the COS and the RDSM have a very cooperative relationship. 
The RDSM suggested that they are on the phone ten to twenty times per day and that the 
incumbent’s image, message, schedule and legislative issues are all regular topics o f 
these phone conversations. While the COS tends to focus more on the legislative issues 
and the RDSM tends to have more autonomy on district issues, there is very little that 
they do not discuss with each other. This model is clearly different from E where the 
RDSM and the COS tend to operate at higher levels of autonomy.
I more commonly found that the COS was empowered by the incumbent to run the 
entire staff enterprise, with the RDSM acting in a more restricted manner; the 
"hierarchical” model. Based on previous experience, I would suggest that this is 
probably the most common model of enterprise structure. Fox and Hammond (1977) also 
suggested that this was the most typical model o f staff hierarchy. From my observations, 
this structure was clearly seen in C’s office, although I would note that C is perhaps even 
an extreme case of this in that he designated a temporary title of “Special Assistant” to 
his RDSM for a two-year period. Based on observations of staff and constituents, C and 
his COS were clearly in charge of all facets o f the district enterprise when they needed to 
be. 1 will hypothesize in Chapter Four that this model applies to the large number o f 
long-serving safe incumbents who choose not to devote substantial attention to their 
districts, or grant their district staff significant decision-making power. This model is 
also preferable for many incumbents and COS for two reasons. First, it grants them 
substantial control over the strategic direction and daily routine o f the district staff.
Indeed, in the case of C, the eight district staff members were merely extensions o f the 
employer’s authority. Secondly, this model prevents district staff from using their
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positions to bolster their own standings in the community for a future run for office. An 
excellent illustration of this choice was provided by one of C’s district staff who 
suggested that the COS devoted roughly 10% of his attention to the district over a two- 
year term, and the only reason they got to 10% was because o f the increased attention 
over the last six months of the cycle. Over the first eighteen months, the district staff 
member felt that the COS’ presence was much closer to 0%. The COS was also unique 
in that his role appeared to be more reactive than other chiefs. A number of staff 
characterized him as having an “open” door model of decision-making: that he trusted the 
staff to do their jobs, but that they should and could always call on sensitive issues. This 
model seemed to work in cases where staff were long serving and got the sense of what 
required the COS and the incumbent’s attention. In fact, one staff member suggested that 
she only calls the COS when an issue needs “Mr. C’s” attention. I do not get the 
impression that this model was functioning as well with the more recently hired staff. 
These staff members were often frustrated by a lack of direction and clarity about when 
to involve their superiors. Furthermore, the vacuum of authority in this office led to an 
openly hostile competition between staff. Staff openly commented about this situation; 
“for a variety of reasons... the position was kept vacant.” “Some voids are not filled 
because there is no one person responsible.” “There are too many chiefs, not enough 
Indians.” Clearly this particular case called for increased supervision and control at the 
local level.
The hierarchical model can also be found in a style that is the converse of C’s district 
structure. For incumbent A, the COS spent a more substantial period o f time in the 
district (3 weeks per month) than in Washington (I week). In this case, two of the
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incumbent’s three key staffers, the COS and the DD, were devoted to district political 
activity. As noted above, they are the “hammer” and the “day-to-day” director o f district 
affairs. The third key staffer, the press secretary who was later promoted to “Deputy 
COS”, was responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Washington office when 
the COS was in the district. This model is becoming more in vogue with junior 
legislators. In fact, more than 40 of the 72 Republicans elected in 1994 opted to go with 
this model.^ While this model also serves to increase the political clout and attention that 
the incumbent directs toward the district, it too had its detractors. Several of the staff felt 
that there was “intermittent micro-management” from senior staff members. This 
varying interference caused confusion amongst the junior staff as to their proper roles as 
field representatives and caseworkers. In fact, the DD in this case would have preferred a 
“distant but constant micromanagement” where he would have had more autonomy to 
direct the district staff and report to the COS everyday, but from afar. Constituent 
opinion was also divided on this model. While some constituents appreciated the time 
that the COS devoted to district issues, some more sophisticated constituents suggested 
that the COS would be more useful in Washington. As one of A’s constituents remarked, 
“the last he’d heard, the Armed Services Committee doesn’t meet in (A’s hometown).”
He approves of the job the COS was doing, but he would like to see him spend more time 
in Washington, defending the district’s military bases there.
On occasion, the incumbent might take an individualistic stance and run the district 
operation on his or her own initiative. As observed with incumbents B and G, there is no
 ^This may be an effort by contemporary Republicans to use their COS’s to get back to a Jeffersonian-style 
representation o f interests. In the previous two decades, the Democratic majority bad been more interested 
in policy-making in Washington, so there was a tendency to allocate more staff, and especially the COS, to
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clearly identified district boss other than the incumbent. The models above all presume 
the incumbent to take a larger interest in Washington-based activities, with the possible 
exception of D. The individualistic incumbent travels home regularly, virtually every 
weekend in these two cases, and largely sets their own priorities and schedules. There 
was a presumption in the literature’s models that the inctunbent is an “infrequent actor” 
in district issues such as casework and constituent meetings. For example, Macarmey 
simply concluded that most incumbents spend no more than 5% of their time in direct 
communication with constituents. That seems to mask substantial variation that I 
observed in incumbent activities. The activities of both B and G suggest the need for a 
‘personal’ category where an incumbent is more active in the routine functions of the 
office. These incumbents drive their districts, attend meetings alone, and call 
constituents from Washington to inquire about their casework/projects. To direct this 
system, B had a unique system of communication with his staff. The usual procedure 
was for them to “leave messages” on his voice mail that he would “take care o f ’ at his 
own discretion. In fact, one staff member suggested that she communicated about 50% 
of the time with B, 33% with the RDSM and the remaining 15% with the COS. Another 
staff member characterized the district leadership as “split”, where the long-serving staff 
had the ability to float along in their jobs with minimal supervision firom the RDSM or 
the COS. Clearly, B was the incumbent who delegated the least amount o f work to his 
staff but was most reliant upon the staff to keep him informed of the specifics o f the 
district. Interestingly, there appears to be little hierarchy in this model.
Washington to assist with the legislative tasks. It will be interesting to see whether this pattern remains the 
case in the fumre.
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To summarize, the power of the RDSM, like the role of the field representative 
discussed above, is largely contingent on the abilities that these individuals bring (as in 
the case of E’s top aide) or the particular electoral environment they find themselves 
occupying (as in the case of a junior legislator who needs the help or a senior legislator is 
who is less concerned about the district). The role and autonomy of the RDSM is also 
likely affected by their personal relationship with the incumbent. Hammond (1975) 
found that the ranking Washington staffers tend to be older and have a longer tenure than 
the rest of staff. More recent data from the Congressional Management Foundation 
suggest that this is also the case for the RDSM as compared to the rest o f the district staff. 
Based on my observation of several district operations, I would speculate that incumbent 
B is a common model; the incumbent keeps the important decision-maker in the district 
for the first few terms and then move that staff member to DC as the incumbent moves up 
the institutional ladder. B characterized it as an “easy decision” to move that person to 
DC once she had “gotten to know pretty much everything going on in the district.” It is 
also easier for the incumbent when, as in B’s case, there was a reliable old hand to remain 
on the scene and not make a power grab.
Caught between a rock and a hard place: The RDSM and the district staff 
Once the issue of authority between the incumbent, COS and RDSM is resolved, the 
incumbent and RDSM must ponder to what degree the RDSM is in charge of the day-to- 
day and overall direction of the office. As the examples above demonstrate, office 
hierarchy varies considerably based on the role the incumbent plays and the power that is 
invested in top district aide, and in the end it varies based on the personality and electoral 
needs of the incumbent. Worman (1975) found that Florida legislative staff members
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agree with their incumbent on legislative tasks, but they often have different role 
perceptions for what their constituent responsibilities are supposed to be. That appears to 
carry over into the daily functioning of the office. My research found that district staff 
members often feel that they have more autonomy than Washington staff because the real 
boss is not around the office very much, although there is variation in the degree of 
absence. Macartney (1982) made the same observation with Los Angeles county staff.
As was noted with A’s DD, however, the “intermittent micromanagement” provided by 
the COS and the incumbent is not always an ideal relationship between the employer and 
the staff. This situation can result in a senior staff member such as A’s DD or C’s “acting 
Special Assistant” to be in a precarious situation directing the staff for much o f the year 
but subject to random intervention by the incumbent or COS. I would suspect that these 
are precisely the types o f management problems that staffs try to work out when they 
have training retreats. Many offices have these training retreats back in the district in the 
off-year summer. It provides the senior staff a chance to interact with employees they do 
not regularly work with, and for some offices, it offers the chance for a number o f the 
Washington staff to return to the district office and meet the people with whom they 
regularly deal with only by phone or email.
The DC-District Tension 
In a number o f the offices that 1 observed, there appeared to be a near complete 
segregation between casework and legislative work. This segregation was often 
accompanied by hostility between the two different sets of staff. What surprised me 
about this finding was that in the majority of cases, long-serving district staff members 
were not hostile to the Washington staff, and often accepted their clearly subordinate
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roles in positive manners. Incumbent I’s long-serving RDSM clearly embraced her 
office-bound casework roles. What was more commonly the case, however, was an 
explanation by RDSMs that the two sets o f staff were “two sides o f the same coin.” For 
example, I’s RDSM noted “most constituent services (were run) out of this office.. .the 
first contact almost always here... with some people in the Washington offices helping 
later.” Rarely did I hear Washington COS’ describe the relationship in such consensual 
terms. They tended to agree in part that the district performed significant and necessary 
functions but there nearly always seemed to be the subtle suggestion that the legislative 
effort was the primary focus of the incumbent enterprise. Incumbent A’s office would be 
an exception in this case as the district staff so regularly interacted with the COS in the 
district office that their contact with Washington was substantially more limited than in 
other offices. These district staff would need to call or email Washington only for purely 
informational reasons.
Constituents can further stoke these tensions by ignoring or downplaying the roles o f 
district staff. For instance, one of A’s constituents explained that 90% of his staff 
interactions were with Washington staff because “90% of district work is related to 
simple casework...checks, flags and stuff.” Even more blatant was a comment by one of 
B’s constituents who remarked that district staff do not have the “technical competence” 
to deal with the constituent’s legislative interests, so he called Washington directly. I 
noticed that staffers tend to pick up on these kinds o f characterizations and that these can 
exacerbate conflict amongst the staff.
One other factor that appeared to alienate district staff was the lack of authority 
situated in the district office. This inequity can further compound the normal tension that
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exists between Washington and the district, as it appeared to do in the case of C’s office. 
Over the course o f my observations it was becoming clear that C was aware o f the nature 
of the staffs discontent. It was explained to me that the situation was only allowed to 
stand because C’s COS was from the district and was a long time friend of incumbent.
To rectify the situation, the COS was going to go back to the district more (an increase 
from two visits to three or four per year) and be in more regular phone contact. They had 
also permitted the acting RDSM to pick up some of the political/surrogate tasks in an 
“unofficial way.” 1 found it telling that the COS felt the minimal increase in attention 
would be adequate. As Chapter Five will point out, it is perhaps in situations like this, 
where the incumbent and his or her key staff stay one term too long in office.
The division between the district and the Washington functions is not always a 
problem. Even if individual staff members do not realize it, the reality is that they are 
“two sides of the same coin”, or enterprise in this case. One side might be shinier and be 
given more credit but both conduct functions vital to the incumbent staying in office.
The most positive explanation of the two staff sets came from C’s RDSM. He felt that 
there had to be a “two-way relationship” between the offices so that the district staff 
could acquire the necessary issue information in return for the applied politics and results 
that the district staff could provide to the Washington staff. To put it another way, one of 
B’s caseworkers noted that the district staff “see eye to eye with the constituents, its up to 
us to win votes” whereas the Washington staff was entrusted with a broader legislative 
effort. While 1 do not believe that the relationship is that simple, 1 will, in Chapter Five, 
attempt to explain the actual impact that district staff behavior has on election outcomes. 
Many district staff members seem to feel that they are shorted because, as B’s caseworker
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suggests, they feel like they are doing more important contact with real people, while all 
the credit for the success o f the incumbent is usually given to the press secretary and the 
legislative team. The district staff then, is a complex mix of people and activities that toil 
in relative obscurity. The degree of that obscurity, and the amount of hierarchy imposed 
on their daily routines is most often determined by the personal style of the incumbent as 
well as his or her electoral/political needs.
What district staff do: The tvpoloeies from the literature 
There are three studies that begin to provide typologies that loosely define district 
staff behavior. Meller (1952) was among the pioneers who suggested that legislative 
staffing should be studied functionally; that they have different forms and carry out 
different activities. One o f the first academics to conduct functional studies of legislative 
staff. Saloma (1969) studied the average working week of U.S. Senate staff in the 
Washington offices. He foimd that these staff spent a majority o f their time on 
correspondence (41%) and constituent service (25%), while legislative support (14%) and 
education/publicity (10%) lagged farther behind. Over the past thirty years, these 
numbers have undoubtedly reversed (look no further than the disenchantment of the 
district staff above), as the staff enterprise has been bolstered to more aggressively pursue 
the latter two functions and promote the incumbent’s name recognition in the district. 
Substantial advances in technology in the form of computer databases, email, and fax 
machines have also rendered Saloma’s depiction less accurate. Despite these weaknesses 
and the fact that Saloma discusses neither inter-ofBce variation nor district staff, his focus 
on the functions of a staff work week provided a gateway for new analysis.
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Macartney (1975, 1982) applied the early functional analysis to executive and 
legislative staffing in Los Angeles County. He broadly found that these incumbents had 
four key staff needs: 1) top assistants who helped them with their strategic missions, 2) 
legislative assistants who helped craft the specifics of those visions, 3) speechwriters, and 
4) caseworkers to deal with constituent requests (p.95). Based on these four categories of 
staff. Macartney discusses very briefly the fourteen “tasks” that staffs perform in Los 
Angeles C o u n t y . F o r  his decision to look at staff outside o f Washington, Macarmey is 
a pioneer in the study of district staff. However, his exclusive focus on one county and 
the timing of his study, done just as the staff explosion and incumbency advantage had 
commenced, meant that he could not truly capture the fiill significance of what district 
staffs were doing on a daily basis to assist the incumbent enterprise. The staff activities 
that I observed are largely based on his categorizations but I seek to go further in 
illustrating these activities, the variation in how they’re performed and how some of those 
activities have an actual impact on representation and congressional election outcomes.
Capturing the notion that staff played different political roles in incumbent 
enterprises. Fox (1972) and Fox and Hammond (1977), like Saloma studied the 
individuals who worked in senate offices in Washington. They came up with a typology 
of five political roles performed by staff that I roughly incorporated into my discussion of 
staff functions and motivations. They also noted an “overlap” in the functions performed 
by these staff. The “investigators” and “supporters” were the legislative aides who did
While it may appear that Macartney has answered the question “What do staff do?” the fact that he spent 
little more than a page detailing each of the important tasks performed by district staff suggested to me that 
his categories needed to be explained in greater detail as well replicated and studied across congressional 
districts. For example, he seeks to utilize Fox and Hammond’s model o f staff hierarchy but has a small 
case set ( 19) all o f  which are fiom one very urban county. He also compares municipal, county, state and 
federal staff in his data calculations.
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the research and legwork for the incumbent’s legislative agenda. These two categories 
did not make the transition into my typology of district staff. The other three categories 
were more useful in thinking about district staff. Fox and Hammond foimd that 
'‘corresponders” handled the constituent requests for information. This category roughly 
corresponds to the large number of caseworkers that are found in district offices today, 
the largest portion of all legislative staff. The “advertisers” are press aides for the most 
part and can be found in both Washington and district offices. Finally, the “interactors” 
were often the Administrative Assistants (AA) who handled large projects, groups and 
lobbyists. As was detailed earlier in this chapter, it is necessary to divide the “interactor” 
category into at least two groups, the RDSM’s who most truly approximate Fox and 
Hammond’s definition and the field representatives who also look more like “interactors” 
than any of the other categories. As this chapter and Chapter Five will demonstrate, it 
was necessary to divide the RDSMs from the field representatives because the political 
nature of their activities tended to be quite different. Like Macartney, Fox and Hammond 
came up with a useful typology that allows us to further understand the roles and 
functions of legislative staff. Unfortunately, it’s Washington classifications were slightly 
too rigid to apply to district staff. Reviewing all of this literature on legislative staffing, 
Hammond (1984) suggested that further hypothesizing on the roles of all legislative staff 
was necessary. Following this advice 1 combined the categories fi'om Fox and Hammond 
with the functions of Macartney and Saloma.
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The Routine activities performed bv district staff 
A complex mixture of activities 
The daily routines of congressional district staff include a complex mixture of 
activities. To illustrate the complexity, one of C’s staff likened the job to being a 
“combination of a diplomat and a paralegal and...every day is different.” One of E’s 
staff suggested that the main district staff functions were: casework, information requests, 
answering phone calls, and “representing the absent member in the field.” A more 
comprehensive listing of the their daily tasks might include: answering phones, opening 
mail, doing casework, transporting the incumbent around the district, doing outreach into 
the district, taking notes, watching the district and representing the incumbent at 
functions. Because I observed variation in the types of functions and styles of 
representation that district staff conducted, I feel it important to distinguish between the 
routine types of activities that the more reactive staff offices tend to conduct as compared 
to those offices that were clearly more aggressive in their district behaviors (to be seen in 
the following two sections). The types of behaviors in the following sections are loosely 
based on, but much better explained and defined than Macartney’s list o f staff functions 
(1975,1982). The following is a fairly comprehensive discussion of the most common 
district staff functions. Given the idiosyncracies of the incumbents and staff, however, 
this is not an exhaustive list.
Provide information to the incumbent 
Perhaps the most basic and vital task o f any district office is to provide the 
incumbent with information. There are a variety of ways in which district staff offices 
are expected to keep the inctunbent informed. Every staff office observed clipped
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newspaper stories about the incumbent and important local political stories. The routine 
office, seen here in incumbent I, will occasionally rely on the clips as they feel the district 
is “too big” to understand any other way, or they simply don’t have the time or need to go 
out into it. 1 also observed that many district offices were virtual clearinghouses of 
political gossip where people would drop by or call to discuss with a ‘political’ person 
the latest local and national issues. The routine office relied on this accumulation of 
gossip or the aggregation of letters, calls, and emails sent to the office to inform the 
incumbent about the political on-goings in the district. Most of the communication 
coming into the office, however, tended to be casework requests or interest group 
generated calls about specific pieces of legislation. If an office wanted better intelligence 
about the district they would have to be more proactive.
Slightly more proactive offices would extend this intelligence function to include 
radio and television stories as well. Incumbents find it useful if the staff report political 
gossip. In the case of E, several of his field representatives kept log books of the people 
they met with and what their issues where, both as a means of more efficiently keeping 
contact with their designated officials, but also so they could more easily report to E 
when necessary. Some incumbents also have an expectation that they be briefed on the 
meetings and events that they will attend when they are at home. I would note, however, 
that this seemed to vary by individual. There were some incumbents who merely needed 
the directions and a one or two sentence description of the events. More high 
maintenance incumbents required extensive briefs that included exact times, more 
developed explanations o f the event and its history, a log of the incumbent’s interaction 
with the group, and in one case, even a seating plan with background notes on the
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individuals sitting at the incumbent’s table. An even more obvious distinction between 
the two levels of information provision is whether the staff was responsible for preparing 
the incumbent’s remarks. Again, this is a personal characteristic. Some incumbents 
prefer to make brief extemporaneous remarks entirely of their own creation, others prefer 
a set of “talking points” that will make sure to hit the high points and recognize the key 
people. Still other incumbents require fully prepared speeches for public gatherings.
Incumbents usually require that their district staff also keep the Washington staff 
informed by sending the copies of the news clips, programs, newsletters and press 
releases from local groups, and reports on the political nature of the district and 
opportunities for further legislation based on constituent problems. Another source of 
district information that incumbents usually want passed on to Washington is a tally of 
constituent opinion. Whether it is letters, phone calls, emails or conversations with 
constituents who drop-by the office, incumbents and their Washington staff usually want 
to know constituent sentiment about the matters of the day. Some incumbents utilize 
their district staff (and interns!) to tabulate surveys or responses to other mass mailings 
into their districts. While district staffs rarely work on legislation or oversight, they do 
listen to the voters, and attempt to track public opinion for the incumbent especially on 
controversial issues. This information can be of help to the incumbent and Washington 
staff as they formulate policy positions. Finally, some incumbents also request that their 
staff provide them with oral or written reports on the political nature of the district. The 
“eyes and ears”, however, tends to be a function more often pursued by the aggressive 
offices discussed below.
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Provide information to the constituents 
Each district offîce was also responsible for providing some basic information to the 
constituents. Incumbents obviously want their constituents to know that they are the 
area’s elected representatives and that there is an office nearby where the constituents can 
communicate with them. Incumbents want their constituents to know whom they are, 
what they do, and that they want to hear from them. Furthermore, incumbents want their 
constituents to know that there is an office staffed by employees who can get them flags 
flown over the capitol, help them arrange for visits to the nation’s capitol, and more 
importantly, help them resolve problems or complications with government programs and 
acquire loans or government assistance that they might not have known about. When 
inciunbents and staff are successful in providing this type of information to their 
constituents, it oAen leads to an increase in the following routine function conducted by 
district staff.
Mediate with individual constituents (aka Casework)
As was discussed in Chapter One, the creation and expansion of government 
programs over the past fifty years have resulted in both the provision of more services for 
American citizens and the increase in the number o f problems and complications that 
those same citizens encounter with the federal government. Consequently, mediating 
solutions between constituents and government bureaucracy has become one of the most 
routine of all district staff operations. All offices, both routine and aggressive, devote at 
least some resources to the resolution of these problems.
1 8 2
What is casework?
Casework or mediation is best defined as a one-to-one interaction between a 
constituent and a legislative staff member. The purpose of this interaction is generally to 
resolve a case or problem specific to that individual. For the purposes o f this dissertation 
I would distinguish between casework and projects, or separate larger cases that involve 
numerous individuals or groups. Some examples of projects would be those cases that 
involved churches, school groups, unions, or businesses larger than a family operation. 
Incumbents and their staff can, and do, conduct casework for bigger groups. I will 
discuss project work below."
Casework generally originates with a governmental problem. Most commonly these 
relate to entitlement or health care programs; a check is lost, a recipient moves or dies, a 
benefit is perceived to be too small. Interestingly, the casework request does not have to 
be of a federal nature. 1 observed constituents who brought state, municipal, county, or 
even inter-govemmental problems to the attention of district staff. There tend to be a fair 
number of the latter problems as constituents get skipped from one governmental entity 
to another when there is no clear resolution to a problem. Finally, there are a substantial 
number of personal cases that make their way into district offices. I observed cases 
involving land disputes, divorce settlements, car accidents, and many work-related suits 
as well. It seemed likely that many of these personal cases end up in congressional 
offices for two reasons: I) because a substantial function of the district staff is to listen to 
constituent’s problems and 2) because often these constituents do not have the resources
' ' These are subjective definitions. As Macartney ( 1982, p73) noted, it is often difficult to distinguish 
between a “project” and a “case” because constituents don’t demarcate their requests. D’s RDSM further 
noted it had been his experience that each office defines and counts casework using different definitions
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to retain attorneys. Incumbents who receive many requests o f this second type are wise 
to procure the assistance of volunteer attorneys to help them resolve these cases, or at 
least move them to another arena where the constituent can make some form o f legal 
progress 1 observed several staff members interacting with attorneys to assist constituent 
requests.
How does the ‘case’ come to the office?
Generally, casework comes into the office in a very routine fashion. In all of the 
offices that 1 observed, caseworkers agreed that the bulk o f the casework came in to the 
office under the constituent’s initiative, either by phone or mail. In many of these 
situations, constituents will call or write directly to the incumbent seeking help with the 
resolution of their problem. The increasing amount o f electronic communication 
suggests that constituent requests will soon come largely by email. These forms of 
arrival comply with the standard operating procedure o f the routine office; the staffs are 
there to provide a standard service to the constituents. Alternatively, the incumbent and 
staff can generate casework. Following the routine model, sometimes individuals who 
happen upon the incumbent at events in the field will explain their dilemmas. In these 
situations, incumbents, or more likely their staff, will record the relevant information and 
bring it back to the office for the caseworkers’ attention.
In more proactive settings, incumbents and staff will advertise their service abilities 
in speeches, brochures, or casual conversations. These advertisements will often generate 
casework requests from constituents who did not realize the resources and abilities of the 
district offices. In simple terms, the aggressive office is more directly soliciting
and that it would be a "challenge" to compare offices using this measure. Chapter Five will look more 
closely at both types o f  service offered by district staff and the possible political impact o f  these behaviors.
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constituents about their casework needs. Generally, staff will strictly observe the 
boundaries of congressional districts when providing information to constituents or 
carrying out their other functions. I noticed that offices had well-marked lists of phone 
prefixes and zip codes to denote the boundaries o f their constituent responsibilities.
There was, however, the occasional zealous staff member who vigorously followed up 
with individuals who made requests, even tliough they were not from the district or they 
did not have a serious case to be resolved.
What happens affer the casework gets to the office? “Investigate. Mediate. Advocate” 
Once the request arrives in the office, staffs basically describe their function as 
•‘listening” to the constituents. At this point staff members tend act on behalf of the 
incumbent. It was my observation that, with the exception of B, very few incumbents 
keep track of the meditative activities of their district staff. This is not to suggest that B 
oversaw every case, but his staff did characterize themselves as “intermediaries” for the 
congressman and “chief caseworker” and noted that B had a substantial involvement in 
ordinary cases in their office. The first task for the district staff is to discern whether they 
can actually do anything for the constituent. One of C’s staff suggested that they will 
“listen like a doctor and try to diagnose the person’s problem and then use the “rolodex” 
of people and agencies that (they) know.” A surprising number of requests are either out 
of the jurisdiction o f a federal legislative staff member or are of a personal, non­
governmental nature that are even more removed from their jurisdiction. This does not 
mean, however, that the staffs “rolodex” is useless. One staff member in another office 
suggested that constituents often “don’t know how to ask” for help, or in many cases, 
don’t know where to ask. District staffs also help to mediate for constituents with other
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levels o f government. Incumbent B detailed an example where he and his staff were 
working to help a church group buy land from a city in his district.
At this point, offices tend to demonstrate a philosophical difference in how they will 
further assist the constituent. Those offices that take a more routine view of their 
functions will simply refer the constituents to the proper office or jurisdiction. For 
example, once the “listening” was complete, another C staff member explained that their 
office dealt with casework requests in a three-stage manner: to investigate the case 
(which they did “often”), to then mediate in clear-cut disputes (which they did “usually”) 
and finally, to advocate for the constituent (which occurred only “rarely”). The vast 
majority of C’s district staff activity was intended “to put their resources and ability to 
get information from bureaucrats for the average citizen who is too intimidated by 
government to want or know how to ask.” In this sense, the most routine staff office 
belonged to C. The routine office will handle many requests that it does not have 
jurisdiction over, whether they are issues of a local, county or state nature. But in C’s 
case the usual procedure for the routine office was simply to refer the case to the relevant 
government office. C’s staff unanimously agreed that this was the main purpose of their 
job. Conversely, many offices openly embraced these tasks even though they had little 
ability to help resolve these cases. The additional actions taken by more aggressive 
offices in “cross-jurisdictional” cases will be discussed in greater depth below.
If the case is of a federal nature, most staff will pore through their “rolodexes” and 
attempt to mediate and advocate on behalf of the constituent. Even though such 
occurrences were “rare”, even C’s staff members suggested that it was their job function 
to assist constituents by rectifying their problems with the federal government when there
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was a clear call for such action. Mediating for the constituents usually involves 
collecting the proper information and filling out the proper forms. Given citizen disgust 
with bureaucracy and paperwork requirements, it should not be surprising to see that the 
simple act of filling out the proper forms often results in the mediation of cases. If a case 
cannot be resolved through mediation and the clear presentation of evidence, then 
incumbents and staff members have one final means o f assistance for the constituent.
The final step is deciding whether to advocate on behalf of the constituent.
Advocacy generally means that the staff writes a letter or makes a phone call to a 
bureaucrat expressing their support (or opposition) of the constituent. If they are firmly 
committed to the constituent’s case, the incumbent can become personally involved, 
taking the case directly to the highest levels of any bureaucratic agency (rarely done).
For example, a Chamber of Commerce director from B’s district explained how he had 
observed the incumbent’s help with the EPA on a regulatory matter. This constituent felt 
that bureaucrats take a member of congress’ involvement more seriously and tend to 
resolve issues more quickly when an incumbent is involved. I again discovered a 
philosophical difference in the attitudes of staff and incumbents about just how far the 
staff should go for the constituents. C’s staff tended towards a role that might be labeled 
more routine and informational, while B’s caseworkers had a greater emphasis on 
advocacy and resolution of the case. The difference might also have been reflected in the 
fact that B’s caseworkers had decades of experience and likely knew very quickly which 
cases could be resolved and where that resolution would take place. In short, it pays to 
hire experienced caseworkers. They know whom to call!
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Do all offices do the same amount o f casework?
No. Most of the flow of casework is self-generated and beyond the control of the 
incumbent and staff. Yet, some offices make attempts to generate more casework for 
their staff to resolve. Incumbents B and C tended to be on the routine side of this 
equation, working on cases that are virtually all self-generated. These two offices 
suggest that it not uncommon for district operations to have caseworkers (or as in case of 
C, virtually all of his staff) that do not do much more than reactive mediation with 
constituents. This is not to suggest these offices are slower or lazier than other offices. 
Rather, some of these offices will devote more attention to specific cases. Two of B’s 
staff provide excellent examples, in one case I observed an B staff member spend an 
entire morning (over three hours) on the phone dealing with just three cases, and he felt 
that was a pretty typical morning for him. Routine offices also tend to more easily get 
bogged down in new cases arriving by phone and mail. 1 observed a constituent make a 
request for a birth certificate where the caseworker had been helping previously, but the 
caseworker was too busy with newly arriving cases in the mail to even do a full referral 
for the constituent. At the other extreme was F’s district operation. She employed four 
field representatives who had relatively light casework responsibilities and two full-time 
caseworkers. The field representatives were expected to spend the majority of their 
working week out in the field, giving speeches, meeting with community groups, 
dropping in on local businesses to see if there was anything that the congressional office 
could do for them. It is hard to compare the amount of casework done by individual staff 
across offices because they tend to vary in how much time they dedicate to this activity. 
The amoimt of casework carried out by field representatives also tends to vary even for
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those staff members that have specific issues or areas to represent. One of C’s staffers 
noted that while his casework portfolio did not shift over the year, the time allocated to it 
was never consistent; it varied between 25% and 75% of his time. The above depictions 
suggest that while all staff and incumbents agree that it is their “job” to help the 
constituents, there is also unmistakably a variation in when and where the routine and 
aggressive offices will get involved in casework requests. There is also a variation in 
how far the staff will go to understand what is going on in the community.
Contacting the community/Outreach 
While the casework function tends to be a much more reactive staff function, the 
more proactive staff members usually pursue outreach. The commimity contact function 
is fulfilled when staffs represent an incumbent at an event, “listen” to group needs, or do 
some project work for that group. 1 observed that even in the most routine of offices 
there were usually one or two staff members who made an effort to connect with their 
district communities on a semi-regular basis. Nevertheless, this staff function begins to 
move even further in the direction of the aggressive office style. Routine offices like B 
and C did correspondingly less community contact. One might argue that from a 
representation and electoral standpoint, it is more efficient to deal with people in groups, 
rather than wait for them to approach the office individually. Perhaps this approach 
explains the variation in office style, where the routine office chooses a more limited 
version of representation while the more aggressive offices utilize all the advantages of 
incumbency. At any rate, both philosophical approaches suggest that the representative 
should seek some exposure in the constituency.
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Represent the incumbent in the field
The most basis outreach function is to represent the incumbent at events in the 
district. Incumbents generally receive far more invitations to events than they can 
possibly hope to attend, regardless of how often they are at home or committed they are 
to personally meeting all of their constituents. Therefore, in both routine and aggressive 
offices, staffs attend events in the name of the incumbent. These events range from 
ribbon cuttings to award ceremonies and regular group meetings. The aggressive and 
routine offices tend to vary in the degree of staff involvement with these community 
groups. For the routine office, the basic rationale for attending meetings, giving awards 
and eating a lot of rubber chicken is to cover the bases for the absent incumbent. 
Incumbent B’s RDSM and field representatives “fill in” for B when he “rarely” fails to 
cover an official invitation. The commonality amongst B’s staff was that they all 
mentioned “official” invitations. None of them felt comfortable popping in for quick or 
unofficial invitations to say a few words on his behalf. In fact, from the types of 
invitations they described, it appeared that they only represented B at what I would refer 
to as ‘safe’ appearances: ribbon-cuttings, accepting recognitions and award ceremonies.
In other words, events where they don’t have to do much besides show up. In this way, 
the routine interaction might also be characterized as a minimal political behavior; staffs 
go to events just so that people can say “Congressperson X had people at the event.”
To ensure that the incumbent is exposed to a wider range of people beyond the 
invitations, district staffs often pursue office hours out in the district. District staff will 
commonly visit a particular library or courthouse at a remote location in the district on a 
monthly basis. These visits will usually be advertised in a local paper so that constituents
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do not have to travel to the central office with their casework requests. While there is 
clearly an electoral motivation to this behavior, one of B’s staff members also suggested 
that there is a representational motive as well; “we need to be accessible (by).. .taking 
government to the people.” As has been noted repeatedly, staff from routine offices are 
much less likely spend time outside of the office. The same B staff member said that she 
spent about four days in her office doing the work she got over phone and from her one 
day per week out in the field. The interval o f the visit is likely to say a lot about the 
activity level of that particular office and staff member. While nearly all district offices 
attend events and office hours in their districts, routine offices tend to pursue fewer of 
these opportunities and when they are out in the field, the interactions tend to be 
decidedly more one-sided than the aggressive offices. One of C’s constituents noted that 
he saw the former RDSM at events that had “political auras.” He gave numerous 
examples of ribbon cuttings and award ceremonies. But he also noted her presence to be 
quite limited -  something a keen observer will notice between the routine and the 
aggressive office.
When staffs from more aggressive offices represent the incumbent at meetings or 
conduct office hours, 1 observed a tendency for the staff to fulfill wider ptuposes. As 
discussion below will show, aggressive staff are likely to use field opportunities to do 
four things: 1) to do more field work by dropping-by places they ordinarily don’t go, 2) 
to listen to constituents (the same as routine function), 3) to “listen” to what the 
constituents are saying about political matters and 4) to “tell” the constituents what the 
incumbents have been doing. In short, the aggressive staff will “listen” and “talk” more 
when they’re out in the field.
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“Listening” for the incumbent/Liaison with community groups
In addition to attending events and office hours, district staffs often seek to “listen” 
for the political benefit o f their incumbents. As was just mentioned, this style of 
“listening” tends to be more two-way communication than simply attending an event or 
office hour. When district staffs interact with community groups as liaisons, they are 
attempting to understand the group’s needs, what they are saying about the politics of the 
district, as well as attempting to tell them about what the incumbent can/is doing for 
them. There is clearly a bigger electoral reward for this style of “listening.” But it also 
requires more time and energy from the staff, as well as a commitment to a more 
aggressive style of district representation.
District staff members logically want to know what is going on more generally 
within their districts. Therefore, they visit with individual constituents or attend meetings 
to discover the constituents’ needs, motivations and politics. As one C staff member put 
it, they go to meetings “to get the feel of the community and its areas of need.” They act 
as the “front line” in dealing with groups and issues. One o f incumbent I’s staff put it in 
similar terms, attending meetings serves “two purposes.. .to represent the member and to 
keep us abreast of new issues.” Some staff members even utilize their own membership 
in constituency groups to help the incumbent get a handle on the district
The routine offices that do go out and “listen” in the district tend to do it more so 
when they are invited, and they do so largely to drive the incumbent’s schedule or 
agenda; where does he/she need to go and what does he/she need to do. For example, to 
ensure that all the relevant groups of the district are “being touched”, the RDSM met with 
the field representatives in her office weekly to go over the schedule and discuss
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“coalition reports” and where incumbent I might need to go. The motivation is to simply 
cover the bases until the incumbent or the COS can resolve any problems. I frequently 
found that staffs from routine offices suggest that they did not have the time to do any 
extra listening for their incumbent. In B’s office, one staff member who was working in 
his original hometown belonged to no community groups other than the fact that he “does 
the Rotaries” on occasion. Another of B’s staff declared that she had “no time to meet 
new people” and that she seeks out “no one really” when she goes out into the 
community. A third B staff member said that she discontinued her office hours in a 
remote county years ago, not because the district changed, but because she had become 
too busy with casework requests called in to the office. This routine attitude can also be 
seen in C’s staff, where staff only rarely conducted office hours or events out in the 
district. In fact, one C staffer said that “never, except on rare occasions” did he leave the 
office for public meetings. C’s town hall meetings were one of the few public 
interactions performed by his district enterprise.
The aggressive office tends to be more proactive in it’s “listening.” I noticed that 
staff from A and D’s offices tended to get out o f the office more frequently to “listen”, 
and once they found problems they were more proactive in working with the RDSM or 
the incumbent to resolve the problem. Additionally, the RDSM in both of these offices 
was usually the individual who rectified the problem, as opposed to it being a phone call 
or visit from incumbents B, C, G or I. I also encountered staff in the aggressive offices 
that were willing to join groups for the purpose of “listening” to the district. I am not 
suggesting that they were spying on these groups. While members of routine offices tend 
only to go to meetings that have a true personal interest for them, members o f aggressive
1 9 3
offices are more likely to go to Rotary lunches, become involved in the Junior League or 
United Way, and most clearly to get active in partisan politics, for the benefit of the 
incumbent. Consequently, the aggressive office tends to have “representation” in more 
places.
“Listening” to a group’s needs is not only politically expedient, it also serves 
legitimate democratic functions. Often times a field representative is assigned to liaison 
with large interests within the constituency so that they can relay important legislative 
changes to these groups and get their reactions. Additionally, these groups can suggest to 
the incumbent, via the field representative, the unintended impact that any previous 
legislation might have had on their group.
Where do staff go to “listen”?
There are a wide variety of groups that district staff seem to seek out. The most 
common and obvious groups are those that will tell the staff and incumbent about the 
economic health of the district. Groups that serve this function well are Rotary or Lions 
Club luncheons/breakfasts, meetings of trade associations or corporate boards, and union 
meetings. Perhaps visits to local Chambers of Commerce are the best source of 
economic information. One staff member and a chamber director suggested that 
Chambers are a good source of information because they deal with transport, commerce 
and the many “smaller issues” peculiar to a local area. Another chamber director 
suggested that they were good sources of information because they have become more 
active across the nation seeking out representation fix)m congressional incumbents and 
their staff. As was noted earlier, incumbent House members quite often have very 
homogenous districts. For those that do, it is easier for staff to understand the economic
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health of the district. In A (military bases), C (state university) and D’s (state capitol) 
districts there is clearly one substantial district employer and the staff can pursue those 
contacts. In districts such as B’s that are more geographically and economically diverse, 
it is harder for staff to find one such source of information. To determine the social 
health of the district, staff regularly met with school board or PTA members, church 
groups, and seniors associations.
The political health of the district is much trickier to measure than the first two 
indicators. Obvious sources o f information would include trips to coimty political party 
meetings and stops by the courthouse or state capitol offices. This information can be 
problematic, however, in that many of these individuals are predisposed to be fans and 
not likely to give unbiased information. For incumbents who are safely ensconced in safe 
districts, this is not a problem. For example, incumbent I’s RDSM said that she obtained 
most of her political intelligence from the Republican Women’s clubs o f the district.
Staff from more electorally vulnerable incumbents might prefer to rely on visits to local 
coffee shops, or with the aforementioned measures o f economic and social health, to 
acquire their political information about the district.
When acquiring political information about the incumbent and the district, some staff 
also tended to be mindful of the incumbent’s base or background. Again, in the case of 1, 
the fact that he was a veteran suggested to his RDSM that she was able to get more access 
and information from veteran’s groups than would other politicians. This can also be a 
trap, however, in that the RDSM said that she and the incumbent devoted substantial 
amounts of times to these groups in the district. If the demography of a district changes 
or if staffs devote too much time or resources to these supportive groups, they potentially
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run the risk of alienating groups that they have fewer connections to. In the case of I, this 
is not likely to be problematic. But it would be good advice to a more vulnerable 
incumbent to make sure that his or her staffs are not paying exclusive attention to the 
groups that have an affinity for his or her positions.
One final group that should be noted are the journalists o f  the district. As was 
mentioned above, press secretaries who are based either in Washington or the district 
have the basic responsibility of maintaining favorable relationships with the journalists of 
the district. Certainly this group of constituents is “listened” to a much greater degree 
than virtually any other group in the district.
Project work with groups
Once groups have been identified and “listened” to, some district offices will work 
with them on projects. These projects come in a variety of shapes. They ranged in size 
from A’s DD helping a constituent’s company gain access to a new street to E’s 
Economic Development Task Force, an entity that worked with local development 
agencies and capital to move new industries to his congressional district. The distinction 
between these projects and regular casework is that projects are larger in size and are 
generally part of deliberate strategies or efforts by the incumbent and his or her staff. It is 
precisely the latter part o f the definition that tends to make project work more o f an 
aggressive staff function. I found that routine offices such as B and C were much less 
likely to establish and pursue explicit relationships with constituent groups of this nature. 
This is not to suggest that B and C do not serve businesses and groups of constituents. 
Rather, their service is of an individualized and reactive nature. For example, one of B’s 
field representatives characterized her job as being 70% casework and 30% projects, but
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when I pressed her to define “project”, she stated her projects are generally for people 
who call or come in to the office firom local businesses. So the distinction was merely a 
private citizen versus a business. Given this mindset, it is not likely that a routine office 
like B or C would have an “Economic Development Task Force” that sought to recruit 
companies to their districts.
On the other hand, offices such as A ’s or D’s were much more direct and creative in 
their interactions with businesses and groups of constituents. The aggressive office is 
likely to utilize plans, programs, and “task forces” that other staff operations have foimd 
to be successful. Another distinction between the routine and the aggressive office is the 
way in which they deal with the largest groups or corporations in their districts. In the 
case of B (with his multiple technology companies) and C (with the major state 
university), district staff suggested that their major interests took care o f their own needs 
either through Washington-based associations or direct lobbying efforts to the appropriate 
executive agency or congressional committee themselves. One of B’s staff suggested 
that because B “has been there since 1980” and because he personally visits them on 
occasion, the technology companies know how to reach the incumbent and he was 
unlikely to ever consider proactive communication with them.'^ Aggressive district 
offices, on the other hand, often asserted themselves with these companies to see if there 
were any issues that they could help them with on the local level. For example, H’s 
office frequently worked with the major corporation in his district on zoning, tax, and
If Fiorina’s model o f ’rational' behavior is still applicable, I certainly found little evidence o f it in B’s 
district offices. There appeared to be no impetus or incentive amongst the district staff to contact the high 
tech companies in his district about vague legislation or any kind o f regulatory issues they might have. 
Perhaps the model/relationship applies in other districts or with Washington staff, but this case suggests 
that not all district staff act ‘rationally’ and seek out constituents who have been negatively impacted by 
government regulation.
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workplace safety issues that were commonly found in the domain of state politics. I 
observed that the aggressive offices were willing to do more of this “cross-jurisdictional” 
work to ensure the happiness of their constituents.
As will be discussed in Chapter Five, constituents and groups desire accessibility to 
their members of Congress. There is a feeling of comfort knowing where they can get 
help even if they don’t particularly need it. As one staff member remarked, many 
constituents appreciate the ability to “bend the ear” of staff. At a minimum, the routine 
office serves as a “clearinghouse” of information on government grants, regulations and 
other programs that might benefit the individual constituents and groups. Maximally, the 
aggressive office tends to be thinking about these programs, grants, and regulations and 
helping the constituents maneuver through the complexities. Once the constituent has 
been assisted, the difference between routine and aggressive offices appears again.
Advertising the incumbent
The final task of the routine office completes the circle; its basic purpose is to 
advertise not only what the incumbent has successfully accomplished through legislation 
in Washington, but also what the incumbent and staff have been able to achieve in the 
functions listed above. There is no incumbent enterprise in Washington that does not 
promote the incumbent to at least some extent. Undoubtedly, some incumbents are more 
aggressive self-promoters than others. Whether the promotion is routine or aggressive, 
advertising the incumbent enterprise and the services that they offer usually is circular 
because it invariably generates more requests for help and information and hence, more 
opportunities to help constituents. An excellent example of this circularity was found in 
the statement by one of B’s constituents who felt that B was “visible” in the district
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because his staff did a good job o f “advertising” B’s presence at local events and 
meetings with individual constituents. Another o f B’s constituents felt that district staff’s 
main function should be “to provide public information., .most don’t even know that 
congressmen have staff who work for them.” This “advertising” with constituents is 
done through a variety of means and locations. In some offices, aggressive efforts by 
incumbents and staff can contact thousands of constituents per year. These efforts should 
be considered a supplement to the massive amount o f (impersonal) contact that 
incumbents have with their constituents through mass mailings sent by the office, and the 
individualized mail, phone and email correspondence that their constituents and staff 
engage in. But because every office sends the mass mailings, it is more interesting to 
examine the supplemental behaviors that particular offices pursue.
Incumbent efforts
Incumbents themselves are active advertisers when they are in the district. The most 
common vehicle used was the town hall meeting or some derivative o f that concept. 
Various incumbents practiced “constituent meetings”, “van tours”, “office on the road”, 
and “listening sessions.” In addition to these widely practiced meetings, some 
incumbents held forums to discuss specific political or legislative issues, while others 
simply preferred to take “Main Street walks” and drop in on the journalists and elected 
officials of their district’s towns. Still others simply preferred to advertise their efforts 
largely through individual or small-scale meetings with constituents. Advertising is often 
the key to the success of incumbent events in the district. Without an effective media 
strategy to promote incumbent events, turnout, and hence the overall impact, is 
guaranteed to be dismal. A final way that incumbents can communicate a connection to
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their constituents individually is through the way they decorate their offices with the 
plaques and awards that represent their service to the area or ideological cause. Awards 
come from an endless assortment of gim owners, schools, teachers, unions, small 
businesses, clubs and associations.
Staff efforts
Every office employs a press secretary whose primary role in the enterprise is to 
obtain positive coverage for the incumbent. Virtually every office will also do large mass 
mailings to constituents on the issues and targeted direct mailing to specific constituents, 
commonly in the form of Christmas cards to thousands o f lucky constituents. The 
resolution of particularly moving cases can also lead to a media hit. For example, D’s 
staff was able to get a set o f medals replaced for a veteran constituent, which resulted in 
several positive television and print stories the next day. District staff members also 
advertise the achievements of their employers in a variety o f other ways. The routine 
offices are not very aggressive in advertising when they do go out into the district. They 
usually have long-standing set routines, places that they go to that solidify over time.
Over time they begin to do less advertising for these visits. Furthermore, as their work 
requirements begin to pile up, not only do they do less advertising, they also tend to cut 
back on time spent outside of the office. The newspaper located on the same block as B’s 
main office suggested that the district staff do not do a lot o f press but that they see a staff 
member “almost weekly” and a press release on a less than monthly basis. Clearly they 
are not in a rush to promote their incumbent.
At the other end of the continuum, aggressive office staffs attend meetings not only 
to “hear” what groups are saying about the incumbent but also to “talk” to them about
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what their incumbent is doing relative to their particular needs. For example, one of A’s 
staff who went to see a veterans groups told me after the meeting that “its good to keep 
A’s name out there (telling them what he’s doing)...they expect us to be here.” The 
advertisement can also be individual in nature. At the same meeting, the A staffer 
reminded a disaffected veteran that A had gotten him a flag from the capitol the year 
before. This individual ad was clearly effective.
Individual staff members, like incumbents, utilize a variety of methods for their 
advertisements to constituents. The routine office tends to rely more on word-of-mouth. 
Individual meetings in the office and the office hours discussed above. As the A example 
suggests, some staff rely on meetings with groups or face-to-face meetings with 
individual constituents. Staff that rely on this technique are probably more effective in 
their advertising if they focus on elite constituents with the same “Main Street” technique 
used by the incumbents. If you are only going to talk to four or five constituents in an 
afternoon, it is better to talk to the mayor, the paper editor, and a couple of business 
owners than five random constituents. This type of contact is clearly a more aggressive 
style of representation. 1 will explore this contact much more deeply in Chapter Five. 
Other interesting forms of advertising by district staff included van tours and mobile 
office hours throughout the district. Most offices do some form of satellite visits to 
outlying coimties to communicate with constituents who don’t regularly have the 
opportunity to interact with the staff or incumbent. Regardless of which form of 
advertising the district staff utilize, or whether the advertising style is routine or 
aggressive, a premium is placed on having “good community skills” according to one of 
C’s staff.
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The Routine office summarized 
The routine office provides information to the incumbent and constituents, although 
it tends to stick to basic activities like newspaper clippings and regular office hours. All 
offices conduct casework. In fact, routine offices conduct large amoimts of casework. 
But in the case of routine offices, the caseworkers do not tend to be aggressive listeners, 
nor do they tend to be proactive on the part of the complainants. All offices tend to 
conduct some form of community outreach. Routine offices, however, tend only to 
contact their communities when they are invited, and rarely do these staff act as 
surrogates for their incumbents. Furthermore, their subsequent relationships with 
constituents tend to be very reactive in nature. Only rarely do routine offices initiate 
service for interests in their districts. Finally, all offices advertise their services and the 
accomplishments of the incumbent. Routine offices, however, tend to have fewer district 
items to promote, and they tend to be less vocal in their promotion. To conclude, one o f 
B’s younger staff members had recently come to realize the routine nature of her 
colleague’s behaviors and was quite negative in her assessments. She was displeased 
with the “sitting” and the wasted time and inefficiency of the other staff. But mainly her 
problem was the virtual absence of any proactivity on the part of any staff, especially in 
light of the limited personal activities of the incumbent.
“Laving the Groundwork”/Building a Reputation 
The tasks performed above, whether they are routine or aggressive, are intended to 
serve the incumbent enterprise. Much of what district staff does can be characterized as 
building a “reputation”. That “reputation” is something that allows the individual staff 
member to more proficiently do their job over the two-year cycle as they learn more
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about the people and issues of their communities. More importantly, that “reputation” is 
also beneficial to the incumbent during election season. C ’s RDSM explicitly referred to 
much of what he did as “laying the groimdwork” for the campaign and for the next term 
in office. From the constituent’s perspective this “reputation” can be a range of things; 
from how effective the legislator has been in Washington to whether the constituent sees 
enough evidence that the incumbent and staff are around the community.
Everybody does it to some extent 
Because each incumbent needs to be reelected every 2 years, nearly all incumbents 
are concerned about their “reputation”. Long serving incumbents like Neal Smith of 
Iowa or Bob Kastenmeier of Wisconsin are often said to have stayed “one term too long” 
and wore out their “reputations.” Nearly every office seemed to have at least one staff 
member who proactively worked on the incumbent’s “reputation”, and it tended to be a 
younger staffer. For example, C’s RDSM related that he enjoys the “political nature” of 
his job and is always looking for more opportunities to reach out. Another example was 
the displeased B staffer mentioned just above, who feels that she works hard getting out 
for the incumbent. Even B himself noted that he has to have staff in some places “looking 
out for his interests” because he can’t personally take care o f everyone’s needs, and that 
to some extent his staff should be both “working on representation and reelection” 
because they are often the same thing.
High expectations
Most incumbents operate under the assumption that constituents have low 
evaluations of politicians in general, but high expectations of service and attention from 
their own incumbent. This is even more the case for relatively junior incumbents. One
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of A’s constituents likened the “reputation” to a “district connection” saying the A would 
never have the “connection” that his predecessor had. This seemed to me an unfair 
assessment but one I encountered with other constituents in the district. He simply had 
high expectations because the previous incumbent had long-serving staff that paid a lot of 
attention and took good care of the district. Whether it is A, B, C or D, all incumbents 
and staff were aware of these expectations and the need to protect the “reputation.” 
Nevertheless, they each proceeded to defend their positions in different ways.
How to build a reputation 
Some incumbents believed that their reputations were mostly built on the perceptions 
of their constituents that they “got the job done.” If staff simply worked hard by 
attending more meetings, talking to more constituents, following through on more cases, 
that constituents would understand the efforts of the incumbent enterprise. Where 1 
observed that incumbents were apparently stressing this strategy, it appeared that the staff 
worked hard to do “more.” If, on the other hand, the incumbent appeared to be doing 
“less”, than that message was subtly passed to the staff. In C’s office, for example, the 
infrequent travel home and the lack of organized efforts at constituent contact suggested 
to the staff they need not work aggressively for “more” contact. Alternatively, the 
message sent continually by A and D, and their RDSMs, was that they were trying new 
things to meet new people. Clearly the field representatives in these offices interpreted 
that to also mean that they individually needed to do “more” in their regular behaviors 
contacting the local constituents. Journalists, and other elites to let them know that the 
office was working hard on district interests.
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As opposed to doing “more”, I found that some offices seem to build their reputation 
by specializing on particular projects or issues. Some offices devoted extra staff time or 
resources to veterans, seniors, and transportation issues. Particularly in larger urban 
areas, certain offices and staff appeared to specialize in policy areas. Here I’s personal 
and staff work on veteran’s issues is a great example. His colleagues in the area 
delegation often referred cases to his office simply because of staff expertise and a 
willingness to deal with these issues. Another great illustration of this type of reputation 
building was with C’s office. Over half of the twenty interviews and observations that I 
conducted mentioned the Importance of low-income housing to C and several o f his staff. 
The consensus was that “they seem to be around on that issue.”
How does this reputation work with constituents?
I observed numerous constituents’ say that they go to particular incumbents based on 
the incumbent, or their staffs, specialties. After praising the job that C’s staff does on 
housing issues, one of his constituents noted that he “will contact the feds based on what 
they’re good at.” While the incumbent and staff specialization in this case largely drives 
the “reputation”, there are other factors that some sophisticated constituents also evaluate 
when determining whom they will contact. For example, one of C’s constituents noted 
that he works with an incumbent from another state for three reasons: 1 ) the incumbent is 
a vet so he has more interest in the subject matter; 2) he has more clout on the appropriate 
committee and is a senior member of congress; and 3) he is in the president’s party, so he 
can get things done with the Veteran’s Administration that a Republican incumbent could 
not. This constituent was afiaid of another base closing commission, so his contact with 
individual legislators was fairly important to him, and his “community.” Another C
2 0 5
constituent noted that he goes to “where the expertise and clout lies” on any particular 
Issue. That meant that this particular constituent went to his state’s senior United States 
Senator for aging and agricultural issues, to the junior senator for finance issues and to C 
for the issues that he has a national reputation on. These particular constituents all noted 
that their contact with the incumbent enterprise is largely conducted with the incumbent 
and his Washington staff. They did note, however, that in each case, the incumbents’ 
district staff tended to be “above average” in their assistance on the incumbents’ 
specialties so that they could work with the Washington staff to assist the constituents. 
Increased Name Recognition
The cynic will suggest that incumbents work on their “reputation” to solidify their 
electoral positions. Defenders o f the incumbents would more likely stress that personal 
Interests, like C on housing or I on veterans, drive their activities and staff utilization and 
that they want their “reputation” to be evaluated by the voters based on those preferences, 
not the simple fact that they are doing “more.” Whether these activities are done to 
simply be more effective or to serve a personal policy interest, it is clear that either way 
they build some leeway for incumbents by increasing name recognition and popularity. 
Incumbents are not the only ones to benefit from increased name recognition through the 
“groundwork” activities. It will be shown below that the district staffers also increase 
their “reputation” with individual constituents, journalists and the political elites o f the 
district and that they are able to put this recognition to use in a variety of fashions. What 
is clear is that some incumbents and staff are more proactive in how they “listen” to their 
constituents talk about the incumbent. C and D’s staff were aggressive in these activities, 
not merely acting like the passive “shock absorbers” identified by Macartney (1975,
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p.80). Chapters Four and Five will look more fully at why these offices take different 
approaches to district work and why proactive “listening” is so important. But first, let 
me explain how the proactive office is different from the routine.
The Aggressive or Proactive Office
The aggressive or proactive district enterprise is different from the routine office in 
three ways. First, the aggressive office tends to do “more” o f the routine tasks described 
above. “More” signifies both a quantitative and qualitative level of activity. Second, the 
aggressive office additionally performs political tasks that routine offices tend to shy 
away from. Third, the aggressive office is more often significantly involved in the 
incumbent’s reelection campaign. This section will progress from the routine toward the 
more aggressive functions. This progression is also significant in that it symbolized the 
increasing impact of district staff on representation and congressional elections. The 
most aggressive district staff, while also enhancing the representation provided by 
incumbents, can also serve to bias that service to a particular group of constituents and 
negatively affect the outcomes of congressional elections.
The aggressive activities tend to be found much more in the realm of the RDSMs and 
the field representatives. Earlier in the chapter these individuals were referred to as the 
“interactors” of the district enterprise. Virtually every district office has schedulers, 
caseworkers, office managers, and press secretaries that perform nearly identical tasks. It 
is the job performance of the “interactors” that set apart the routine from the aggressive 
offices. Therefore, the following activities are largely focused on the behaviors o f the 
RDSMs and the field representatives. There are individual staffers in what might be 
described as generally routine offices that also perform the aggressive activities below. I
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found there to be exceptionally few o f these individuals, however, as most individual 
staff conformed to the oEBce style and the pattern set by the incumbent.
Aggressive staffs do “more” of the routine activities
Not only do aggressive offices perform a larger quantity of the routine activities, 
they also tend to pursue a larger number o f approaches to the resolution o f the routine 
tasks. In short, they do more tasks and they do them more creatively. Aggressive staffs 
were observed to be more effective in informing the incumbent. For reasons that will be 
seen in the next few functions, the aggressive district staff member tends to have more, 
and more interesting, information to share with the incumbent. The aggressive staff 
member is simply put in more situations that are valuable for the incumbent. The same 
relationship holds for tlie constituent information function. Because the aggressive staff 
member generally spends more time out in the field, they interact with more constituents 
and are able to not only receive information from the constituents, but also relay to them 
things that the incumbent has done or additional ways in which they can help.
The casework function is probably where the aggressive and routine offices are most 
similar. Most constituents with problems will call, email, or fax the office without being 
solicited by the incumbent or staff. There is, nevertheless, variation at the extremes of 
the two office types. B’s staff curtailed their office hours out in the community and 
stopped appearing at new community events to advertise their casework services. In fact, 
B’s RDSM suggested that they “didn’t want the extra work.” F continued to send four 
field representatives out into her district on a weekly basis, continually interacting with 
constituents who can utilize the services that her office provides. While it is impossible
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to determine the actual amount of casework that this aggressiveness creates, clearly it 
does bring more work into F’s office.
The most apparent difference between the two office types is found in how they 
pursue the community contact function. While staff members from both offices do many 
of the same community contact functions, the number of staff out in the field during some 
part o f their routine suggests the different priorities o f each office type. Again, B and F 
seem to provide the ideal cases of each type of office. In the case of B, staff members 
rarely leave the office. They conduct the vast majority of their work by letter and phone 
in the office. The RDSM and the two younger field representatives were the only staff to 
conduct outreach. In contrast, F’s staff was highly engaged in the field. The RDSM and 
four field representatives each spent substantial portions of their working routine in the 
field generating work through their direct interaction with constituents.
Perhaps a better measure of the variance was the amount of time that the staff spent 
on outreach. When this measure is utilized it somewhat softens the extremes of the cases. 
In the case of B, the RDSM and the two field representatives spent a few hours per week 
conducting community contact functions, while F’s five “interactors” each spent at least 
two and 16 days per week in the field. Based upon my observations, 1 would suggest that 
B and F are extreme rather than ideal cases. The remaining offices tend toward one case 
or the other, but no other case seemed so entirely office-bound or aggressively field- 
engaged. Macartney’s LA staff averaged 25% of their weeks out in the field doing
Rosenthal (1971) found that the legislators who had more staff in Washington tended to produce more 
legislation. The same logic seems to apply to district staff. Incumbents such as F that employed more 
"interactors" seemed to process relatively higher levels o f casework. Comparisons of staff through 
interviews suggested that aggressive offices had more staff doing more cases on a weekly basis. I was not 
able to obtain precise numbers o f cases resolved, so I could not give an accurate comparison across all 
offices.
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community contact (1982, p71). I observed that the routine offices spent more of their 
weeks on the phone working cases, while the aggressive offices tried to spend roughly as 
much time interacting with the constituents as they were with the office work. In the 
words of one staff member, their job was “not sitting behind a desk all day” but to try and 
get out in the field for some portion of the week.
The difference in community interaction was not simply a quantitative difference, 
where the aggressive office strove to actually meet more individual constituents. Rather, 
the aggressive office is also generally more strategic about who it is they are actually 
seeing on a regular basis. In two different aggressive offices (A and E), I observed staff 
maintain lists of constituents who they came into contact with. For one of E’s long- 
serving staff members, the list served as a reminder o f the many individuals he had built 
relationships with and needed to contact on his visits to the community. The list included 
names o f elected officials, political/campaign supporters, and constituents he had worked 
on important cases with. Given that she was relatively new to the district, A’s staff 
member had a different type of constituent list. She maintained a list of individuals and 
communities that she met with and got invitations from and then made a “quarterly, 
monthly and city by city plan” to ensiure that she was “hitting at least one community” a 
day through a speech, a visit or office hours. While the E list was built more on 
maintaining contact with a set list of individuals, the A list was built to both maintain old 
names and collect new ones. In fact, the A staff member proposed that the list had four 
parts: people A needs to hear from, people other staff recommend that she see, people 
that she knows, and new people that she meets.
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Where routine staffs tend to do their outreach through scheduled meetings, 
aggressive staffs also sometimes have more informal contact with constituents through 
unannounced drop-by visits. Sometimes these drop-bys are truly random visits in the 
course of a normal day to the mayors, journalists, bankers, chambers of commerce, 
barbers, etc. At other times, when staff schedule outreach days in the outer reaches of 
their districts, they will do drop-ins to the people that might be mentioned on the lists 
above. Either way, the purpose of the visit is twofold; to get a taste of the local political, 
economic, and social life and to let them know that the incumbent’s enterprise was in the 
area that day. For the latter purpose, even when the staffs were not able to make contact 
with the people they were seeking, leaving a business card or message had the same 
effect.
Even in the drop-by visits there is room for the aggressive office to do “more.” One 
of A’s more aggressive staffers had a practice of “sticking his head in” on constituents, 
but he was much more interactive than simply leaving a business card. I observed a 
number of interactions where he would go through a “litany” of projects where A’s office 
could possibly assist. He was also very aggressive about following up with people when 
he happened to return to their area. I observed him visiting a health clinic that he’d been 
to the previous month and told them “I just wanted to check in...I don’t know o f anything 
going on with your issue” but that he was still working for them. This aggressiveness 
directly contrasts with one of C’s constituent, a city manager who noted that when he 
called with a request for information about a fairly significant grant program, they gave 
him a simple reference where to find the information, but never offered to help or 
bothered to check on his progress. Or, another o f C’s constituents, a bank president.
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characterized the staff as being “not as visible” as other legislative staff in the area, 
because no one from C’s office had ever called or stopped into his office.
Aggressive staffs also tend to prefer the drop-by visit to the more routine office 
hours. Spending three hours sitting in a library talking to a handful o f constituents, and 
on some days not even a handful, strikes some staff as tremendously less productive than 
simply spending an hour or two walking down main street or a key neighborhood and 
talking to five or six key people and getting out o f town. In the words o f one of A’s 
constituents, who remarked to a staff member sitting at an empty office visit: “you’ll get 
more votes at Rotary than sitting here by yourself.” Furthermore, aggressive staff noted 
that once you institutionalize your office hour routines and field visits you end up seeing 
many of the same people. Chapter Five will return to the issue of which of these forms of 
activity is more valuable for the incumbent.
1 observed a considerable difference between how aggressive and routine offices 
represented incumbents in the field. The typical routine staff handled a field event in 
three quick steps: 1) if the incumbent wasn’t available but wanted representation, they 
would accept an invitation, 2) and then show up for the event, without having a role and 
3) then depart without any further thought about the importance o f the event. Aggressive 
offices are much more likely to play hardball with field events at all three steps. The 
aggressive staff member is 1) likely to attend events, either with the incumbent or in their 
place, 2) have a role in the planning and execution of the event, and 3) attempt to gamer 
media coverage for the event or at least talk it up amongst area constituents. A 
prototypical routine staff member from C’s office remarked that it’s all about “just 
showing up” to “cover the bases.” But the aggressive staff tends to be thinking in more
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promotional terms before, during and after the event. This style o f aggressiveness also 
pertains to the scheduling of the incumbent. B’s scheduler accepts or declines invitations 
and then gets basic information about his role in the event. I observed staff from A and 
D’s ofïïces negotiating about who would be invited and what kind of speaking roles that 
individuals would have. The aggressive office is unlikely to settle for a mere invitation 
and not negotiate their role in the event unless the invitation includes a more senior 
member of their party, like a senator or the president. The press secretary would also be 
involved in events involving the incumbent. Before the event the press secretary’s job is 
to make sure journalists show up. If they don’t most politicians would tell you “the event 
never happened.” After the event, it is the press secretaries responsibility to work the 
journalists to ensure that the right story gets told. At all levels there is a clear difference 
in the attitudes of routine and aggressive offices.
One final way that offices are noticeably different is how they divide responsibilities 
between their caseworkers and field representatives. It seemed to be the case that more 
aggressive offices divided their caseworkers and field representatives by geography.
Both A and D tended to organize their staff in this manner. This division allowed the 
field representatives and RDSMs to more clearly focus on specific communities. This 
division also comports well with districts that have obvious communities of interest. For 
example, large college towns usually have immigration as their major casework request.
It also can be easier to divide an office this way earlier in the incumbent’s career. Along 
these lines, the slightly more aggressive staff member might meld his or her casework 
responsibilities with a particular policy responsibility. In this case, one of C’s more 
aggressive staff assistants did both housing and community finance issues. He felt that
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‘'sometimes they meld together” and that he would be able to help two different 
communities of interest. While C’s office was generally routine in nature, this staff 
member was clearly thinking of his particular responsibilities in a more aggressive 
manner.
Once patterns of casework are established, it appeared that particular staff and 
offices tend to grow into issue-specific divisions where certain staff members developed 
“reputations” for handling certain types of cases, regardless of where they live in the 
district. The fact that potential cases might not occur in the vicinity of the caseworker or 
field representative is less problematic for the routine office than for the aggressive. This 
pattern of efficiency even appeared to become inter-office in metropolitan areas. 
Incumbent I’s office devoted substantial resources to military and veteran’s issues, often 
representing constituents from adjoining districts. It appeared that they received 
assistance on other issues, most notably on transportation matters, fi-om the adjoining 
districts in return for the assistance with the veteran’s issues.
To conclude, aggressive staff members perform the same functions as routine 
offices. The difference is that they tend to do them in greater quantities and in more 
original fashions. Aggressive staff members also fulfill political tasks that routine offices 
rarely carry out.
Moving into the “gray” area: The political activities of aggressive district staff 
“Political” work defined
One of the distinctions between routine and aggressive offices that was hinted at in 
the previous section is the on-going relationships that the latter offices tend to have with 
elite constituents in their districts. Incumbents have done town hall meetings since the
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colonial era in order that they might “hear” their constituents. But because traditional 
town hall meetings are drawing fewer people than they used to, and because many o f 
those that do come are supporters (Washington Post, 1999, p. 14), incumbents need to 
communicate with their constituents in different ways. Throughout the latter part o f  the 
twentieth century, people have become busier in their daily routines and less interested in 
politics. Therefore, staff and incumbents have come to use ‘political’ or more one-on- 
one relationships in order that they might better “hear” and “help” their constituents. 
These relationships also tend to be disproportionately focused on elite constituents.
While all o f the activities in this section clearly fall within the legal and ethical guidelines 
for federal staff, some of the functions begin to shade into “grayer” interpretations o f 
what staff should be doing.
Projects
Projects are one of the most notable sources of political collaboration between 
incumbents, staff and district elites. Sometimes these projects have specified purposes 
and lengths of duration, but usually they are more informal and on-going relationships 
between incumbents, staff and elite constituents. An example o f the former would be the 
effort by A’s RDSM to procure street access for a constituent business owner. An 
example of the latter would be the regular involvement of D and her RDSM with the 
large state university located within her district. These two interactions are quite clearly 
at opposite ends of a spectrum of project relationships with elite constituents. They do 
share, however, a process that “listens” to what constituents are saying, fixes the 
problem, and then goes back to “listen” again. Ultimately it is hoped that these
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relationships will provide important political rewards. These relationships and rewards 
will be more fully described in Chapter Five.
As was noted above, virtually all of the district offices carry out some degree of 
project work. What distinguishes the routine from the aggressive, however, is the degree 
of organization, commitment and continuity that the staff have toward projects. A, D and 
E each committed substantial resources to these larger institutional efforts. In the case of 
A’s office, the RDSM was largely engaged in military staffing and procurement issues 
with the three military bases in the district. Even though the RDSM was in the office for 
three weeks per month, the DD said that he worked with the RDSM on only a few cases 
outside of military affairs. E employed one field representative who did little more than 
run his Economic Development Task Force, a forum in which the staff member worked 
with local officials and businesspeople to recruit new businesses and capital into the 
district. She traveled regularly throughout the district meeting with these elites whenever 
they had interest in new business. She also organized a yearly forum for the whole 
district that would introduce the federal grant programs that were available to assist local 
economic development. This entity was so successful that E’s successor, who was of the 
opposite party, attempted to hire her to continue the Task Force. In both A and E’s case, 
the relevant elites came to have a vested interest in the maintenance of the incumbent 
who helped them. Conversely, B and C did not have sustained “projects” or efforts 
comparable to these where elite constituents developed vested interests in defending the 
incumbents.
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Cross-Jurisdictional work
Not all of the political interactions o f district staff focus on large federal projects 
where staff can interact and “win” on behalf of the constituents. Another form of 
political staff activity takes place where the staff can’t really “win” for the constituents, 
and where it logically appears that they have no business being. Cross-jurisdictional 
issues come about when a constituent makes a request that concerns some level of 
government other than the federal government. Because there is no clear way in which 
the office can assist in the resolution of the case, staff will often suggest that they are 
involved for the benefit of the individual constituent, or the community. Given that 
aldermanic and state legislative districts fall within the constituencies of the federal 
legislator, it should be no surprise that incumbents direct their staff to assist their 
constituents. It was notable, however, that some offices (A and D) were much more 
likely to pursue cross-jurisdictional cases than were the others (B and C).
The importance of the local issue is often obscured. While most academic and 
political observers would focus on an incumbent’s legislative and oversight activities on 
behalf of a major district employer, an equally important interaction occurs at the local 
level. An example: While H’s Washington staff managed the budget, legislative and 
oversight activities for the largest district employer, a national airline company, the 
district staff and RDSM were especially attentive to the municipal, county and state 
issues that involved that company. There were issues such as zoning, access, parking, 
health care, and local taxation. The literature tends to overlook the importance of zoning.
We might also broaden this definition to include constituents who make personal or business requests 
that do not involve any level o f  government, for ultimately, these individuals are asking the staff and 
incumbent to intervene with an executive, judicial or legislative body in order to rectify their personal 
problem. Examples might include property disputes, divorces, or intellectual property.
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parking, access, and employee concerns but that is what district staff can help out with to 
ensure that the large employers remain in the district and remain profitable. And also so 
they remain interested in supporting the incumbent! Routine offices and staff often do 
not pursue cross-jurisdictional cases because of the simple presumption that a federal 
legislative office cannot assist in non-federal cases. Constituents who do not think that 
federal staff can help drive this presumption as do routine staff who do not think it is their 
responsibility to intervene. Local economic elites usually stressed that the bulk of their 
governmental work was not federal in nature. In fact, a number o f different chamber 
officials characterized their levels of government involvement as: 70% local, 30% state, 
and 0% federal. One of C’s supporters, a prominent attorney involved in a chamber, 
noted that on the Legislative Affairs Committee, he did mostly “state issues” like 
transportation and that there was “very little federal stuff.” A chamber official from B’s 
district who been on the job for six months in her hometown and had been to the state 
capitol repeatedly, had still not yet been to her local federal office. “All politics and 
economics is local,” she informed me. Furthermore, this chamber official and others will 
suggest that even their “local” development work sometimes goes through Washington 
staff if they are good. This presumption also came fi’om state legislative officials. A staff 
member from a state senator in B’s district suggested that all o f their interactions were 
one-sided, with the federal staff calling them. This state staff member felt that they 
“almost never” contact the federal representatives, and if  a “bigger issue” came up, the 
state legislators nright contact the federal incumbent directly. These characterizations 
might lead one to give up on the importance o f staff interaction on nonfederal matters. It 
was notable, then, that economic elites and chamber officials still interacted with district
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staff despite these depictions! Clearly there are other factors driving these interactions 
that must be considered.
The routine office generally confirms the lack of importance o f cross-jurisdictional 
issues, as they will usually refer cases over which they have no jurisdiction to the 
appropriate municipal, coimty or state contact. The more aggressive office will often 
work with the other governmental levels to seek solutions and monitor the progress of 
cases for the constituents. All offices did some cross-jurisdictional work. There were 
small bits of it even in C’s office, despite his philosophical conservatism about casework. 
In fact, these types of cases even play to B’s ideology; “I’m a local guy, problems are all 
the same from my court experience to the state senate to congress.” This style of work 
suited his personal nature. The difference is that while B personally pursues some cross- 
jurisdictional cases, his staff did not do them to the extent of A or D’s offices.
What the routine office often underplays is that there is, in fact, an actual opportunity 
for federal district staff to help on these issues. If for no other reason, federal district 
staffs tend to interact on a daily basis with staff from different levels of government who 
undoubtedly can help the constituents. For example, one of A’s field representatives 
noted that she dealt with 42 agencies in the 6 counties she represented. And one of C’s 
staff noted that he does “coordination with other levels of govenunent and the private 
sector” on housing and economic development issues at meetings three to four times per 
month. Even though B and C did not have staff that utilized these agencies, both of their 
states have “Councils of Government” where state, local, and county programs 
cooperatively pooled their ideas and resources. Only one staff member from each of B
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and C’s staff mentioned any level o f interaction with these types of agencies, and neither 
suggested that they were proactively involved on behalf of their constituents.
While elites may be puzzled at federal involvement in these issues, it is often quite 
logical when the staff member is a “community person” like an individual from A’s 
office. Because of her daily casework assignments and interactions with staff from 
different levels of government, she can act as crucible of contact where people and 
problems congregate. She is able to put people together. It might even be suggested that 
this is new type of “iron triangle” where the incumbent and staff interact with 
constituents who have problems and then with other levels of government as the third leg. 
The logic for contact is made all the stronger by the fact that district offices are quite 
often located in the very same federal office buildings where constituents will have their 
issue difficulties. The motivation for contact is often likely to be stronger for the federal 
staff than for staff at other levels. I argue this because the local courthouse people, for 
example, deal at the small end with the people and the problems and they may tire of 
trying to find solutions, while the federal staff has access to grants, programs, and ideas 
that have been tried at all levels of government across the country. In short, the federal 
district staffs not only have the contacts, but they also have the motivation to want to 
rectify complex situations. These contacts are especially useful in homogenous districts 
where similar people work in similar jobs and have similar problems. For A’s staff 
member, her homogenous group of constituents is the military. She regularly confronts 
veterans, retirees, surplus property, etc and is able to rely on both her community contacts 
and her federal resources. Alternatively, a staff member who handles grants programs 
such as one of C’s staff, know federal, state and local sources of grant money. This is
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extremely helpful in C’s district, where a large metropolitan area is comprised of four 
large cities between three coimties and two states all govemmentally intermeshed. This 
situation presents an interesting opportunity for such an individual to help break down 
boundaries, as opposed to the routine staff that will merely refer out problems that arise 
because of jurisdictional complexities. It is also logical that district staffs interact with 
different levels of govenunent when one considers the “power and presence” that a 
federal legislator and his or her staff can bring to a situation. For example, a local 
government official in B’s district talked about how B’s “power and presence” was a key 
factor in making EPA officials expedite a municipal issue.
The desire and ability to interact is also extremely important in relatively poorer 
districts. In F’s district and in one of A’s towns, district field representatives were an 
important community resomce because there were relatively fewer businesses or 
community organizations with resources or information to assist in community 
development. As the examples above demonstrated, in wealthier districts staff can serve 
as a clearinghouse or organizing point for the many individuals and groups with 
resources. Poorer communities are more reliant upon staff to take leadership roles on 
these issues.
The basic motivation for getting involved in cross-jurisdictional cases for both 
routine and aggressive offices might be to make “things to go smoothly,” as one staffer 
put it. Even staffs in routine offices like B’s tend to be involved in governmental boards 
like the state’s “coimcil of government.” She felt that “things go smoother if we have a 
relationship, and we do.” But for the aggressive office, helping out on these types of 
issues is done because it does more for the incumbent. Here there is clearly a perception
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on the part of staff that it is important to help out constituents even if  their problems are 
beyond the staffs jurisdiction. Some staff made clear that their efforts were driven by a 
sense that many constituents cannot distinguish between levels of government and that 
some are more likely to “call their congressman” for problems as small as the potholes in 
their streets. Whether it is out of a sense of fear that they will be blamed for not helping 
or because they will be able to take credit for trying is less important than the fact that 
staff from aggressive offices actually attempt to resolve these cases. The perception 
appears to be well founded, for in both examples cited above, A’s veterans and B’s local 
government officials were grateful for the service. If nothing else, cross-jurisdictional 
issues provide an opportunity for staff to keep the lines of communication open with 
down-ballot office holders (state legislators, local office holders, judges, etc). While 
even routine offices are likely to intervene and monitor for elite constituents on occasion, 
the aggressive offices seemed to make more concerted efforts on behalf o f these 
constituents. As Chapter Five will demonstrate, providing access to the incumbent and 
the offer of assistance on casework or other projects can pay more substantial political 
dividends.
Advisories
Another aggressive political tactic is to involve individual constituents and groups 
within the rubric o f the congressional office. Some offices accomplish this through 
advisory panels. The most common examples of these panels included financial, health 
care, military and agricultural committees. The format of these panels varied. Some are 
public (open to constituents and journalists) while others are more suited to simply advise 
the incumbent and staff. The leadership o f the panels varies as well. Some are lead by
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the incumbent, others by staff or constituents. They also range in size. H has nearly 800 
people in his advisory committee database. This list has been accumulating throughout 
his tenure. He is a good case to show how the district operation evolves and grows more 
powerful over time. His RDSM said that when it first started that “certain key advisers” 
were invited to noon lunches. Now, years later it is “not so much by invitation” as by 
announcement, and they draw an average of 80 people to each of the four or five yearly 
advisory sessions.
The routine offices generally do not even do advisories or they use them solely to 
support the incumbent’s legislative behavior. For example, G disbanded (or more likely 
just stopped calling) his veteran’s advisory committee when he left that subcommittee. 
Incumbent 1 did “agency seminars” often in cooperation with other metropolitan offices. 
The topics were usually items of general interest like taxation and immigration. These 
“seminars” were “open to the public” but they found that it was mostly friends of the 
office that showed up. For 0  and I, advisories were largely informational for constituents 
and for their own staff to a lesser extent.
Several other examples are illustrative o f other purposes that advisories serve in the 
incumbent enterprise. In the case of B’s Saturday brunches, he was clearly using the 
forums with different guests for his own informational purposes. They weren’t 
advertised, nor did they include members of the general public. H’s forums, conversely, 
were large public events that were organized and led with the intention of informing 
constituents and keeping numerous elites involved in his enterprise through the honor of 
being selected a participant on a panel. Finally, A’s veteran’s forum was a third style of 
organization. In this case, several elite veteran constituents were in charge and they
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conducted private meetings with relevant veterans and officials, operating tacitly in the 
name o f A, usually without his presence. While this wasn’t a public event, it was an 
event that served to assist A’s enterprise in the veteran’s community. All three of these 
forums involved an outreach to constituents but each had distinct motives. It is also 
possible that there is a mixture of motives in advisories. One of G’s staff stated that their 
advisory bodies have “some people we know who are our friends and some who are 
major players” who they would like to know better. From one point of view, the 
argument can be made that these individuals are an extension of the enterprise and serve 
as a legitimate tool of representation of district interests. From another point of view 
these advisories are means by which incumbents can either “honor” or “payback” district 
elites -  either way, they are including them in the “enterprise” and making them want to 
ensure that the incumbent stays in office. Incumbent-staff-elite interaction facilitates the 
positive evaluation of the enterprise.
Interaction with elite constituents -  elected officials
As noted in the discussion of drop-by visits and cross-jurisdictional requests, district 
staffs interact with elite constituents. It appeared that staff members made special efforts 
to interact with the elected officials of their districts. These interactions tended to be 
almost exclusively with their own partisans, however. Comments from elected officials 
of the other party tended to be overwhelmingly unfavorable, or the officials suggested 
that they only sought assistance through officials frrom their own party. For example, one 
of the mayors from C’s district, who was elected as a nonpartisan but was clearly 
Democratic, suggested that she goes to the U.S. Senator of her own party and did not 
even know the names of the local staff for C or the Republican senator. Generally
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elected officiais are willing to maintain close relationships with district staff because they 
recognize the nature of politics and the important role that staff members play in some 
enterprises. Not having empowered district staff, however, can damage that relationship, 
as seen in the case of one of C’s state senators. While she noted that she regularly refers 
casework directly to his district staff, on legislative or more “political” issues she will call 
the COS or C directly in Washington. In A and D’s office, the RDSMs regularly 
interacted with officials like this state senator. I would speculate, however, that local 
officials in A and D’s districts would be much more apt to take legislative and “political” 
issues through the district staff before calling Washington. What this suggests is that 
some elites, especially elected officials, are likely to perceive the ‘power’ hierarchy in the 
office and make their inquiries accordingly. This has important ramifications for a junior 
incumbent in a competitive electoral situation that will be examined in Chapters Five and 
Six. 1 would also note that elite constituents and elected officials were often pragmatic in 
their relationships with incumbents and district staff. Some of the examples above 
indicated that elite constituents recognized and sought out incumbents who were likely to 
be in helpful positions (i.e. had seniority, were on the right committee or had pull with 
the presidential administration). Occasionally, elites and elected officials who admitted 
these relationships would also make efforts to contact district staff and make themselves 
known. 1 found this especially to be the case in A’s district.
Surveillance
One of the subtle purposes of carrying out ‘political’ interaction with constituents is 
to provide the staff and incumbent with information about the district This information 
ranges from simple items such as people’s general disposition toward the incumbent to
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the economic or legislative needs o f a community, to the political rumblings of local 
elections and potential challengers to the incumbent One of C’s staffers called herself 
the “eyes and ears” of the incumbent. Interacting with elite constituents is perhaps the 
best way for district staff to pursue the surveillance function. Macartney (1975, 1982) 
briefly noted that surveillance was one of the fourteen tasks performed by district staff in 
LA County. My observations clearly concur. While he suggested that the staff were 
useful in “taking the pulse” o f the district (see my comments above about providing 
information to the incumbent) and in cultivating contacts (see comments on community 
outreach), 1 do not think that he appreciated the degree to which incumbents have come 
to rely on this staff function, nor how aggressively some staff operations pursue these 
kinds of activities. Furthermore, Macartney did not begin to discuss the impact that such 
interactions have on incumbents, constituents and competitive elections. 1 will return to 
examine this topic in great depth in Chapters Five and Six.
The purely political behavior: campaign activities of district staff 
Up until this point, the behaviors described in this chapter might strike the reader as 
being obvious and non-controversial. However, the political activity carried out by 
district staff is often “gray” in shade as it lies between the clearly ethical and the 
problematic. The previous section is aptly referred to as a collection of “gray” activities 
because some of the aggressive activities are harder to examine than the routine and the 
staff members who perform them are usually less willing to discuss these acti vities in 
interviews, let alone in questionnaires. In this section, 1 will draw upon observations 
from my campaign experiences to supplement what information I was able to extract 
from federal staff that were more reluctant to talk about their campaign responsibilities.
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The “gray” area
The amount o f time and money spent on election campaigns over the past thirty 
years has increasingly required incumbents to have “permanent” staff for their 
“permanent” campaigns. At the same time there was a continual expansion in the 
number of federal staff that incumbents employed to keep up with their constituent’s 
growing demands for casework, project assistance and the passage of new legislation. 
Rather than allocating funds for two entirely different sets o f staff or trying to get 
taxpayers to directly pay for their campaign staff, it was more logical to allow a few of 
the individuals to coordinate the activities of both parts o f the incumbent enterprise.'^ On 
the Senate side these individuals came to be known as “political designees.” These 
individuals (three per Senate office and no limit per House office) are permitted to deal 
with overt campaign matters ranging from the scheduling of campaign events, to the 
ordering of yard signs, right up to, and including, the solicitation of hard money 
contributions. The only restrictions imposed on the designees are those that logically 
follow from the enforcement of federal ethics laws. These prevent federal employees 
from conducting campaign work on office time or from using office resources.'^ Their 
salaries must also reflect the source of their work. If they are going to take a paid 
position in the campaign, their federal salary and responsibilities must be 
commensurately reduced. These provisions were not always followed. State and federal 
staff both admitted to me, or were observed conducting fundraising activities in their 
public offices, or were using lists developed from their constituency work to supplement 
fund-raising or voter databases. The one obvious permissible exception to the ethical
Be careful here. “Coordination” is a word that makes campaigners and designees quite nervous, as it is 
one o f the increasingly few campaign activities that the PEG still prohibits.
2 2 7
separation is scheduling the incumbent’s activities. Because it would be problematic to 
cleave the incumbent into two separate individuals for scheduling purposes, schedulers 
are tacitly allowed to conduct campaign scheduling from their federal offices. In addition 
to the scheduler, in the aggressive offices, most of the “interactor” staff had some 
political roles to play. But the campaign and fund-raising roles were most especially 
undertaken by the RDSMs.
Given public cynicism about politicians and the current state o f campaign finance, 
see especially people’s reaction to Gore’s defense about “no controlling legal authority, it 
is perhaps surprising to find out how much more “gray” the area between federal and 
campaign activities used to be. Prior to the passage of campaign finance laws in 1971, 
1974 and 1976, there were virtually no limits on the solicitation and expenditure of 
campaign funds, nor was there any means of disclosure. Even more surprising was that 
campaign contributions could also be utilized to fund federal office budgets, or develop 
“slush funds” to privately finance district office operations. Often times in-kind 
contributions came in the form of office gifts, free printing, reduced rent and “private 
funding” of special office projects (Macartney, 1975, pp.68-70, 122). It is difficult to 
conclude which system is more ethically challenged. The relatively smaller office and 
campaign expenditures from thirty years ago, however, suggest that the contemporary 
situation is more problematic.
Working on the “relationship” during the lull
In the words of one RDSM, the political designees will take care of “relationship 
stuff’ during the periods between elections. At the most elemental level this means 
staying in contact with elected and partisan officials to make sure the campaign
Federal employees are exempted from Hatch Act provisions barring campaign activity.
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mechanism can be brought back to life for the election. The RDSM will need to wear 
both hats when dealing with these individuals on their professional, political and personal 
issues. Also during this period, some designees are assigned whatever “campaign” 
activities might arise, usually making a speech or driving the incumbent to a party event. 
Transportation is actually a tricky issue because incumbents cannot use federal vehicles 
to travel to political events. Nor can their travel from Washington to the district be 
publicly financed if they start any trip home with a “non-federal event”, a designation 
that leads many an incumbent to the creation of imaginative events. It also tells you why 
Presidents and visiting elected officials or cabinet secretaries go directly to schools or 
neighborhood associations before they head to fundraisers when they arrive in a state.
More commonly these campaign events will be fundraisers. If the candidate is 
vulnerable it will mean that other party officials are coming in to help that individual. I 
didn’t observe any of these cases for the dissertation but have seen numerous examples in 
campaign settings. If the candidate is electoraliy comfortable, they will often take to the 
road to assist the previous category of incumbents. Incumbent A was o f the latter type. 
This level of profile also involves the incumbent’s staff. In A’s case, at the time of the 
interview, his DD had traveled with him fifty of the previous fifty-eight weekends, some 
in the state, some out, some federal events, some campaign. Wearing both hats at that 
pace can be a dizzying act. Fundraising for House members is a never-ending project, 
and the designees tend to be involved in these activities throughout the cycle. For these 
staff members, the campaign cycle truly is “permanent.” But as the election approaches, 
it appears that designees from the more aggressive offices become more heavily involved 
in solicitation, spending larger portions of their days on the phone to ensure that flmd-
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raising events are well attended or that well-known special guests can be procured to 
enhance turnout. As noted earlier. House staff can wear both hats as long as they do it on 
personal time or on unpaid leave, and they do not do it with government resources.
Given this very permeable transition and the fact that constituents are generally unaware 
of these distinctions suggests a troubling gray area. In fact, the gray area is not always 
gray. While 1 did not directly observe staff breaking ethics restrictions, off the record 
comments, second-hand stories and my personal political experiences all encountered 
such abuses. Not all “gray” activity is “gray”. Some of it is illegal: staffs are known to 
raise money and plan campaign events from their federal offices. In other settings 
affiliated interest groups share polls or media strategies in coordination with the 
incumbent’s campaigns. Some of it is simply very gray: Campaign supporters seek 
meetings with incumbents and staff to discuss legislative priorities after making financial 
contributions. In each o f these scenarios, taxpayer-financed legislative staff assist in 
subverting fair and open congressional elections.
The highly aggressive offices, often the ones confronting viable election opponents, 
tend to supplement their designees with professional campaign assistance. In the case of 
A and D, both RDSMs operated alongside of professional campaign workers who helped 
with media and fieldwork activities. In both cases, however, the designees served in 
significant fund-raising and strategic advisor roles. Ultimately, A’s designee shifted over 
to his campaign.
The last six months: How staffs assist come election time
It does not always logically follow that the aggressive office will be the one where 
staffs shift from the federal office to the campaign. In the four primary cases, the
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designees for A and C shifted, while D’s stayed in the federal office and B had a separate 
campaign staff. I should note, however, that C’s designee did not operate in the same 
capacity as those from A and D’s offices. Up to this point “more” activity in a category 
implied that an office was of the more aggressive type. But because we are now talking 
about a different type of activity (i.e. the campaign) 1 do not feel that the “more” 
categorization applies. For example, there might be an office that is exclusively routine 
in all o f the above functions but come the last six months of the cycle, every staff 
member rolls out to the campaign headquarters nightly to stuff envelopes. While I would 
suggest that this is not a likely occurrence, 1 would also suggest that this type o f office is 
probably not permeating into the “gray” activities like the examples of A and D above. 
Federal employees are fully allowed, and usually encouraged, to help out on their 
employers’ campaigns. After reading so far that staff are so active for their incumbent 
enterprise, it might be interesting to learn that more often than not federal staff do not 
regularly volunteer for campaigns. Except for the strategic and fund-raising roles that are 
played by the more senior employees, however, most of these activities performed by 
federal volunteers are found in the realm o f phone calls, lit drops and data entry. It would 
be more productive to focus here on the roles of senior staff that bridge between the 
campaign and federal worlds.
Some RDSMs will ultimately become campaign managers. In the case o f A’s office 
above, the transition was nothing more than a subtle shift over time, where the designee 
moved from doing some campaign activities to substantially more travel and fund-raising 
and ultimately running the campaign for the final four months. Given his RDSM’s 
activities, C’s designee operated in a much more black and white world than in A and D’s
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offices. For C, there was no subtle transition. Rather, the RDSM wore his federal hat 
almost exclusively until a point five months before the election when he shifted to run the 
campaign full-time. In Chapters Five and Six I will return to this issue and discuss the 
consequences of these staff transitions.
From the routine functions of providing information to the incumbent all the way up 
to managing an incumbent’s campaign for re-election, it has been shown that district staff 
enterprises approach their missions in different fashions. Up to this point, this chapter has 
focused on the staffs functions in the context of the incumbent enterprise. Some staffs, 
however, operate with a mixed set of motives.
Motives of individual district staffers 
Mixture of motives
As the literature has found that individual legislators have different motives, I 
observed that staffs seek different ends through their employment in district offices.
While some studies conclude that legislators have one overriding motive, usually to be 
reelected, district staffs are motivated by a variety of factors. In a study of the motives of 
committee staff. Price (1971) identified three role orientations: “professionals”, 
“entrepreneurs” and “mixed” motives. While Price examined how these roles impact 
policy innovation in Congress, I will mold his typology to look at what staff members 
hope to achieve while in the enterprise and with other long-term goals.
“Professionals”
The first type of staff has a bottom line motivation to do a good job. Yet “doing a 
good job” meant two very different things. For some “professional” staffers, working for 
a federal legislator allowed them to do a good job for other people through the services
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they could offer. For other “professionals” the basic motivation derived from personal 
satisfaction with the tasks they could accomplish.
The Humanitarian
The “professional” who is motivated to serve others might even be referred to as a 
humanitarian. This was a commonly found motivation amongst caseworkers and some 
field representatives. One of A’s field representatives was an excellent illustration of this 
role type. She claimed that she had “a desire to help people.” The interview and 
observations suggested very little in the way of partisan or political motive in her actions 
or what elites said of her. She suggested that her job was: “75% is public service, 5% is 
politics and 20% a mix of other things.” When the “professional” staffer was asked why 
they stayed in this job, the common response was that “they’re there to help people.” 
District staff also revealed their “helping” motive in how they depicted their job 
responsibilities as compared to staff with divergent motives. For example, the 
humanitarian staffer sees the advisory forum as a way to inform constituents, where other 
types of staff suggest that forums are an effective way to reach a lot of educated elites 
and help voter’s perception of the incumbent while providing some information. The 
humanitarian motivation is especially believable given the low pay and lack of respect 
given to caseworkers and field representatives. Given this dual blow, one senator’s staff 
member suggested that “there are lots of compassionate staff’ who do the job solely to 
help people. Constituents echoed that sentiment. The low pay already established, one 
constituent noted that a field representative didn’t do a lot of “advertising” for B. This 
could only lead her to conclude that the staff did the work because of “their personal 
interest” in helping people.
2 3 3
One way to verify the “humanitarian” credentials was to inquire about extra­
curricular activities. Often staff would supplement their job descriptions by talking about 
the kinds of groups they belonged to outside of the office. There intuitively seems to be 
lesser electoral value for the incumbent if  the staff belongs to the Red Cross or Women’s 
Shelter groups as opposed to those staff who belong to Chamber or Rotary groups. The 
former type of group membership goes to the heart o f staff interest in helping others. The 
more routine offices tended to carry more o f these “humanitarian” membership cards 
while the aggressive offices could usually be foimd attending business club luncheons or 
after hours.
1 would note that some offices fit into this category because of the ideological 
limitations that the incumbent placed upon their functions. C’s staff saw an inherent 
conservative mission to have a limited and reactive role with constituents. Their job was 
simply to help constituents who brought problems into the office. In fact, one o f the staff 
had a “mission statement” that she’d written years earlier, that repeatedly emphasized her 
“service to the people.” Observations and elite interviews confirmed the staff directives. 
C’s staff was “humanitarian” by job description.
The Careerist
The other type of “professional” staff has the simple motivation of excelling in the 
staff career that they have chosen. The clearest expression of this motivation was found 
in C’s RDSM. This individual referred to his fondness for the “psychology o f the job.” 
He so thoroughly enjoyed the five years that he had spent in the office that he was going 
on for a master’s degree in organizational theory while he continued to work in the office. 
Other “professionals” might not be dedicated so much to the exact staff position they
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were holding at the time, as much as they enjoyed working in a government job. Here 
one of B ’s staff that had Hill experience had moved back home to do a master’s degree, 
in the eventual hope of becoming a city manager. So the job with B was the right time in 
the right place, and provided him good training for his eventual career in city 
government. Finally, there are the “professional” staffers who enjoy the interpersonal 
challenges presented by this style o f work. One of A’s staff suggested that her job 
“sharpens her communication skills and personal development.” As she noted above, the 
job requires good “community skills.” Being a field representative was definitely a good 
career move for someone who hoped to sharpen her set of skills. Whether the motivation 
is to serve others or do a good job, either way the “professional” staffs are motivated by 
the means of the job. Other staff members were motivated more by the ends generated 
by their job responsibilities.
“Entrepreneurs”
The ‘rational’ incumbent has been well studied by the literature; he or she should 
utilize multiple resources to first, and foremost, attain reelection. According to Salsibury 
& Shepsle (1981), the majority of Washington staff share this primary goal of advancing 
the incumbent’s career. I found that these same conclusions applied to many of the 
district staff. The “entrepreneurial” district staff tends to be motivated to help their 
employer’s political position.
B’s personal assistant said it best, “my main job is to get B reelected.” Some 
“entrepreneurs” are more overt in this behavior and statements than others, even though 
virtually all district staff to some extent acted in this fashion (or else they’d be fired?). 
Numerous other staff explained that their behaviors were largely driven by the need to
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keep the incumbent’s name “out there”, to represent the incumbent, or to build the 
incumbent’s “reputation.” All of these observed behaviors and explanations testify to the 
primacy of the reelection goal in the minds of district staff.
Clearly not all incumbents are driven solely by the electoral motivation. Personal 
and policy interests can often have just as large an impact on individual incumbents as 
the drive to be re-elected. So it should follow that staff will also be able to remove the 
primacy of reelection. Indeed, one of C’s constituents stated; “staff members are a 
reflection of their boss.” In the case of C, they tend to be “cerebral” and out working on 
the types o f issues that C deems important and worthwhile. Observations suggested that 
this was, in fact, the case. C’s staff was the least election-oriented of the case studies. It 
also follows then that incumbents who are in more uncertain electoral situations and are 
working hard to attain reelection (A and D), will have more “entrepreneurial” staff who 
are busily occupied attempting to build the “reputation” of the incumbent with 
constituents in the field. Observations confirmed that the majority of A and D’s district 
staff conformed to the incumbent’s motivations.
Some other staff had completely different motives that defied classification. These 
staffers generally wanted to do something different in their life and took the job because 
they enjoyed interacting with others. One of B’s staff depicted this motivation in his 
explanation that he took the job for “longevity.” He had been married for 50 years, had 
long since retired, and has fun with the job. In his own words, he’d “fought a war, ran a 
drugstore and this is something completely different.” Another of B’s staff had a similar 
motive. She had been a schoolteacher who helped out on B’s first congressional race and 
then took a year leave to “do something different” and she hasn’t looked back for twenty
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years. So far I have depicted staff with “professional”, “entrepreneurial” and ‘other’ 
motivations. These categories did not appear to be mutually exclusive, however, and 1 
would suggest that most staff have a mixture of motivations. For example, B’s personal 
assistant was motivated to both enjoy the job and to get B reelected.
“Mixed” motives?
It appeared to me that most staff had multiple motivations that derived from three 
distinct sources; the constituent that needs help, the incumbent that needs reelection and 
the various personal motives of the individual staff member. The “professional” and the 
“entrepreneur” appear to be ideal classifications that most staff members only tend 
towards. Using Price’s classifications, Burks and Cole (1978) found that most 
Washington aides saw themselves as a mixture of the “professional” and “entrepreneur”, 
where the “entrepreneurs” tended to be younger. I generally observed the same pattern 
for district staff that Burks and Cole found in Washington simply by walking in the front 
door and meeting the first few staff. Observations confirmed a cohort difference in staff 
attitudes. The offices of A, C, and D were substantially younger than B. In the district, 
young staff more often mentioned their own careers or the desire to make policy or work 
hard to ensure the incumbent’s reelection, while older staff tended to mention their role in 
helping the incumbent assist constituents. Some staff resisted classification as either one 
type or the other. One clear hybrid case was one of A ’s staff, who defined her role in 
helping a particular constituent with a medical problem for his child as both “building the 
community and helping the incumbent.”
Amongst younger staff, I regularly observed individuals with another set o f motives 
who enjoyed both helping people as well as the political nature of their jobs. I suggest
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that this category is not really a hybrid or “mix” of Price’s two categories. Rather, this 
category is based on a larger recognition o f the staffs own motives. My observations 
suggest that some staff need to be recognized as rational self-actors, with motives above 
and beyond the “enterprise” or the need to do humanitarian “service.” One of the best 
examples o f this type of was one of B’s field representatives, who while clearly working 
for B, was driven by her love for the political interaction and discourse that came with 
her job. She derived tremendous satisfaction fi’om her role in the community and the fact 
that she did “work” when people see her out in the community, at a restaurant etc. For 
her the “work” was a reflection of her position in the community. So she was doing the 
job almost as much for herself as for B, not that she’s ever thinking of running for office. 
This is not to suggest that all the staff that have rational self-motivations are less valuable 
elements o f the incumbent enterprise. In fact, it was precisely this love for the politics of 
the job that lead B to hire this individual years ago when he suggested that “she knows 
where the bodies are buried.” Another staff member who fit this categorization was an 
individual fi'om C’s office who liked a job with a “different set of responsibilities” that 
would allow him to do the politics he clearly enjoyed while still working in his pre­
politics business profession. Both of these cases suggest that staff can have their own 
rational self-motivations and still be dedicated to the incumbent.
Becoming an institution impacts motives
It was not uncommon for staff in some offices to become personally institutionalized 
in their localities. One of C’s long serving staff worked out o f an office that numerous 
constituents suggested was “her office.” This same characterization was also applied to 
C’s former RDSM and to one of the U.S. Senator’s representatives in C’s district.
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Pursuing the aggressive behaviors described above institutionalizes a staffer, they 
organize activities for their incumbent, they are active in outreach, they interact with elite 
constituents, etc. While this does not suggest that the staff member ever becomes an 
equal of the incumbent, it does suggest that many elites come to see district staff as 
autonomous political actors. They have their own contacts, sources of information, and 
occasionally even their own agendas. In this sense the incumbent’s enterprise can be 
comprised of multiple people with conflicting agendas. The literature tends to assume 
that incumbent enterprises are entirely subsumed within, and devoted to, the incumbent. 
Having witnessed the damage that empowered and autonomous staff can do to an 
incumbent’s reputation, it should come as no surprise that most incumbents generally like 
to anchor their staff to the main motivation of the office; the promotion of the boss’s 
electoral career.
A staff member becoming an “institution” is not always negative for the incumbent’s 
enterprise. For example the incumbents just mentioned clearly benefited from the 
positions of the three staff members in their communities, if for no other reason than they 
were able to collect valuable political information. At the most beneficial level, these 
efforts might also improve people’s perceptions of the incumbent. Furthermore, it is very 
hard to replace these individuals. Testifying to the importance of the RDSM is the 
difficulty that results in having to replace one of these individuals when they depart the 
incumbent’s enterprise. Many staff and constituents recognized the degree to which 
these individual staff could become institutionalized over a long period of time. One of 
the best examples was a staff member from the senior U.S. Senator from incumbent C’s 
state. In this case, the senator’s district director was mentioned prominently by a
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substantial number of the staff and elites when I asked them about whom they interacted 
with. To several constituents, the retirement of this staffer member practically implied 
that the senator’s office had closed up and left town. Indeed, one of the constituents 
suggested that she was not even going to C’s office because her expectation of service 
was so high. I also wimessed the departure o f E’s RDSM in the run-up to his campaign 
for higher office. The intervening period between the ElDSM’s departure and the 
conclusion of the campaign were marked by organizational drift and a lack of purpose 
that likely would not have occurred had the RDSM been able to retain his position.
Given the timing of the departure, his absence was filled by an only slightly expanded 
presence of the Washington COS through phone conferences, a pale substitute to in­
district leadership. In simple terms, staff members are able to develop their own name 
recognition over time. When two of the three staff mentioned above left their offices, 
there were clear voids to fill. Constituents mentioned both staff members by name (in 
one case two years after the staffer departed) and said they were more likely to start their 
search for assistance in offices with other staff. In one of the offices, the departure of 
several qualified staff that had “reputations” caused a larger scale loss o f confidence 
within the elite community. One of C’s staffers said that he had replaced a competent 
staff with “a bunch of people (my) age”. The end result of this was that he no longer had 
any confidence in the district office and now called Washington directly to deal with the 
COS on most substantive district issues.
The risk to incumbents comes from the staff member who decides to capitalize on 
the institutionalization and begins to work the job for his or her own political career. A 
number of constituents in E’s district were under the impression that his RDSM was
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frequently maneuvering himself to replace the incumbent once he moved up to higher 
office. The ‘maneuvering’ staff is not necessarily a problem for the incumbent. Just as 
with the three staff above, the ‘maneuvering’ staff member is connected to the incumbent 
and by completing the aggressive representation throughout the district, both the 
Incumbent and the staff member can benefit. The risk, however, is that the staff member 
damages an incumbent’s reputation, alienates constituents through their actions, or in the 
case of a primary, can be put the incumbent in an awkward situation of appearing to 
coronate his successor.
Ambition in the Service o f Ambition
As could be deduced from the previous section, there is a set of staff for whom 
politics and/or political power are the driving motivations. It really should not be 
surprising to learn that a driven group of people (incumbents) often surround themselves 
with other similarly driven individuals (staff). When Macartney conducted his 
examination of district staff, he found that sixty of the one hundred and twenty-five 
legislative staffers expressed an attachment to exercising political power (1975, p.91 ). 
Parker (1992) suggested that incumbents stay in Congress not because of their salaries 
but because of the power they exercise and the potential o f future options. I would 
speculate that similar motivations are at play in the minds o f many staff. Some seemed to 
arrive this way (yoimg and hungry) while for others it was a process that occurred as they 
became institutionalized figures in their local political scenes. The motivation driving the 
young staff was frequently a simple desire to be close to or to exercise political power. 
This ranges from the newly hired staff member who wants to be in the presence of the 
incumbent as frequently as possible to the individual who wants to ‘make things happen.’
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I would speculate that a significant factor in the high turnover o f legislative staff, 
both in Washington and the district, stems from the disappointment of young staff that do 
not become institutionalized as rapidly as they had hoped. It was apparent from my 
observations that the younger staff members were disproportionately eager to acquire 
more political power. A’s DD and C’s RDSM were two individuals who seemed to 
express such attitudes during the interviews and both individuals departed the offices 
within the next year, despite their high positions in the offices. In both cases, the 
individuals expressed a frustration with the hierarchy and management style and the 
infiibition it placed on their ability to “get things done.” Another of C’s staff clearly 
desired to move on Washington where he could work on “real policy issues” and only 
half-jokingly laughed at my inquiry of whether he wanted a future political career. His 
colleague in the office also wanted “a political career in Washington, maybe in the White 
House eventually.” Staff members who were hired at a later point in life seemed more 
content to ride the political waves of the district. It seemed that they were content to ride 
the political waves of the smaller pool and be closer to their homes and families than 
were younger staff.
For some staff the ambition is an even more naked desire for power; these staff 
members desire an eventual run of their own for office. There is a growing body of 
literature about legislative staff that use their positions as “launching pads” for 
campaigns. In their study of Washington Senate staff. Fox and Hammond (1972) found 
that roughly 2/3 of all staff retain their home state residence. Clearly their employers are 
glad to have their confidence and votes. But later research has confirmed that many staff 
probably keep their home residences in case they decide to return to run for office.
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Macartney (1975, pp.246, 266) confirmed that this “launching pad” also existed with 
staff in Los Angeles, where twenty percent of top staff aides expressed a desire to run for 
office, and that those were typically the younger, white-male staff members. In general, 
Malbin (1980) found that many Washington staff had “progressive ambition” and that 
their career goals tended to shape their behavior. It impacted how and with what groups 
they interacted. I found this also to be the case with those district staff that seemed more 
likely to be positioning themselves to run for office. In the case o f C’s RDSM, while he 
was not expressing an interest in running for office, his activities as a federal and 
campaign staff member demonstrated the practical side of Malbin’s finding. This 
particular individual was doing the right things if  he had political ambition. He was 
described as being an “excellent campaigner and contact” by a chamber official from his 
district and that it would be “helpful” for the constituent to have had a chance to contact 
him on the issues during the campaign. One might interpret this to mean that it would 
ultimately be “helpful” for the staff member as well.
Recent literature on legislative staff (see especially Hemnson, 1994) suggests that 
staff are highly successful candidates for Congress because of their experience on the 
issues, their contact with fundraising sources, and their poise to run at the right time. 
Hemnson calculated that while former staff comprise only 4% of the candidate pool, they 
ultimately comprise 15% of Congress. In short, former staff members are collectively the 
best group of candidates that parties can recruit to run. Yet, this discussion suggests that 
little recruitment is necessary, former staff members are largely self-recruited to run in 
the right place at the right time.
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Some staff seemed to grow into their ambitions. The best example of this was E’s 
RDSM. A number of constituents and one E staffer said he was interacting with 
constituents “as much for himself’ as he was for E. He was going to the right meetings, 
interacting with the major constituency groups (the military and the state university) and 
the important people knew him. A number o f conversations with elites suggested that 
they simply assumed that he would step into the seat if the incumbent were to leave for 
other opportunities such as a job in the presidential administration, or a run for higher 
office.
Staff can build their own reputations by working on projects or issues for the 
incumbent and are often well placed to take over when the incumbent steps aside 
because: 1 ) they have spent long periods of time relating to the types of issues that the 
previous incumbents have (un)successfully spoken to; 2) they have interacted extensively 
with the relevant individuals in the district who know and care about those issues and; 3) 
they have connections to people who are important at the local level, like elected 
officials, interest group leaders and campaign contributors. Even the staff that do not 
desire to run often realize that this process is occurring. One of B’s staff suggested, “to 
most working in district office is a stepping stone...there’s a lot more name id that comes 
with it. Also it’s a good thing (we) do nm ...if I did for example, I already know the 
people and issues and have a wealth of knowledge... being a staff member is like 
training.” Although she expressed no desire to nm, she indicated that a friend was a 
mayor o f one the cities in the area, and that she could easily do the job based on her 
contacts, training and willingness to work.
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There was a mixture o f each of these types of individuals within each of the offices 
that I observed. I would note, however, that the aggressive offices did tend to have 
younger staffers that were both more “entrepreneurial” for the incumbent and more 
politically motivated, as compared to the older and routine offices. I would conclude, 
however, that in the end, the incumbent enterprise was virtually always the primary 
motive. While staff may have had different medium and long-term goals, they were 
generally united in their short-term commitment to their employers. One hears only in 
the most rare case of a senior staff member who actually unseats their employer. The 
wise but ambitious will be better served to sit and wait for the open seat. To reiterate, 
this mixture of motives is not necessarily bad for the incumbent enterprise: bringing in a 
group of young, brash, aggressive staff and mixing them with older more service-oriented 
and loyal employees can often result in an efficient completion of work. But it can also 
result in individual staff discontent, as seen in both B and C’s offices. This mixture of 
staff types also serves to reinforce the contradictory impacts o f congressional district 
staff. While some of their motives serve to enhance representation, the more ambitious 
and “entrepreneurial” goals bias the pool o f constituents that receive service and serve to 
restrict the ability of constituents to select their representatives through free and fair 
elections.
Whv individual staff are hired 
Balutis (1975) and Hammond (1975) concluded that the job types of Washington staff 
are influenced by their different career backgrounds. Yet, neither speculated about how 
these variant backgrounds affected the type o f people hired for legislative offices or the 
impact that the backgrounds had on staff norms or motivations. These studies lead one to
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want to know more about why members o f Congress hire the staff that they do, both in 
Washington and in the district.
Some staff know the candidates before their first election 
One of the most notable differences between visiting a Washington and a district 
office is the people you’ll meet. Washington offices visitors usually encounter a young 
staff member who was recently hired, is often not from the district, and will likely be 
promoted or resigned within a couple months. In the district you’ll more likely to 
encounter a long-serving staff aide who is a long-time resident o f the area and is not 
likely to be leaving the staff any time soon. Many of the district staff enterprises that I 
observed were “closely knit... like a family.” The closeness o f these relationships is 
solidified by the significant number o f staff in district offices that have ties to the 
incumbent that predate the run for office. One of G’s field representatives had evolved 
from his secretary for ten years before his run into the second in charge of the district 
operation. B’s RDSM was his personal secretary in his law practice and state senate for 
twenty years before coming to Congress, as was I’s RDSM. I would hypothesize that 
many incumbents bring along personal assistants to fill key roles in their congressional 
enterprises because they are familiar with the incumbent-to-be. They know their friends, 
issues and style, and will provide a comfortable fit for the incumbent-to-be in the new 
setting. Ultimately these personal assistants can become firmly entrenched as key figures 
in the enterprise, simply through their longevity with the incumbent. While Macartney 
found that eighty percent of top staff aides in Los Angeles County were hired directly 
into their positions, I would suggest that there is more variation in staff recruitment and 
advancement that is worth examining (1975, p.246).
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Friends can also aspire to integral positions within enterprises. C selected a 
childhood friend, and someone who was intimately familiar with the home district to be 
his COS, rather than a yoimg, aggressive, Washingtonian. The same held true for another 
incumbent, whose RDSM was the wife of one of his lifelong friends from the district. 
Both cases help to explain the weak district office that each member maintained. By 
hiring an assistant who knew the district was a long-time acquaintance, the incumbent 
could trust that the enterprise was in good hands.
Another variant of the personal connection is a familiarity with the job that the staff 
has performed. A new incumbent often keeps staff on from the previous incumbent if 
they are from the same party. K. kept J’s staff largely intact when he first assumed office, 
as did B when he was elected to Congress. While K moved to replace several staff after 
the first term, B kept on, and still retains twenty years later, staff that had been working 
for over ten years for the previous incumbent. In this case B was a ‘friend’ of the office 
who knew that he could trust the staff that had already been doing their job for years. 
Often times, newly elected incumbents will have to make a decision about whether to 
hire people that they know and have worked for them in pre-politics. Or they can follow 
B’s routine and hire people who had been working for the previous incumbent.
The “Circle o f People” with campaign or political connections 
Many staff are hired because they have a campaign or political connection to the 
incumbent. One of staffers from a senator’s ofiice in C’s district suggested that he got 
the job because he was in the “circle of people” that got political jobs. He’d been 
volunteering and working on campaigns for the past ten years and ultimately hoped to be 
working for an elected official. This was the same biography as another senate staff
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member who suggested that she had been “doing lots of local races” for the state 
Republican Party before she eventually settled down for her current job years ago. As 
these two cases sugge^, there is a “circle” or pool o f individuals who have ambitions to 
work in federal offices. This “circle” of potential staff is always shifting. My campaign 
experience confirms this pool o f potential employees. However, I would also note that 
there are a limited number of people in the right place at the right time with the 
willingness to take low-paying legislative staff jobs. Often times, the “circle” is rather 
shallow. And sometimes staff who come from the “circle” never really leave; they 
continue to attend political meetings and work on campaigns outside of the incumbent’s 
enterprise. The other side of this coin is that with the substantial expansion of legislative 
staff jobs in the districts, thousands of people who would have been content volunteering 
for campaigns now have gainful employment.
Usually individuals who worked on the incumbent’s campaigns, or the campaign of a 
fellow partisan official in the area, have an inside track amongst the “circle” applicants. I 
observed that Macarmey’s findings about the top staff aide seemed to apply to a fairly 
wide “circle” o f all eventual district staff; that they volimteered on the initial campaign, 
tended to be a government or party staff member, and that they resided in the district 
(1975, pp.253-255). For example, from C’s office, four of the eight young staff members 
had at some point either worked on a campaign in the area or had been active in College 
Republicans and volunteered on a number of campaigns. This experience started with the 
RDSM and worked down to the scheduler. I would note that even safe incumbents will 
occasionally face stiff challenges, so it is useful for them to keep people aroimd who can 
be plugged into their campaign enterprises. And because politics is a competitive
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business, there is usually an incentive for staff to be involved in the campaign, even if  it 
is a safe election. Here the promotion of C’s campaign manager to acting RDSM 
suggests that loyalty to the enterprise is rewarded behavior. There is even greater reward 
for being in the first “circle.” Campaign workers and volimteers who were there in the 
beginning, for the first successful run for Congress, are heavily represented amongst the 
ranks o f the new incumbent’s staff. Newly elected members seem willing to keep people 
around them who shared in that first joy, when it did not seem like they really could make 
it Congress. While some incumbents, such as 0 , conducted aggressive interviews for 
staff hires for that first office, most incumbents rely on the ranks of people who were in 
the campaign “circle”. This is less the case in subsequent elections because the 
incumbents tend to have fewer staff openings after they are elected the first time.
There also tend to be fewer senior staff positions open with subsequent elections 
because people in the original circle work their way up to bigger jobs, like COS or press 
secretary or DD. For example, over time B’s current RDSM worked her way up the 
hierarchy of his district operation, moving from personal assistant all the way up to his 
chief district aide. But this progression also means that even the long-serving safe 
incumbent will have a continual need for new staff for entry-level positions. These are 
usually the jobs that the “circle” of people that come from the ranks of the campaign 
employees or federal office interns tend to fill. Campaign employees seem to provide a 
healthy pool for the incumbent because these are people who have proven to be willing to 
dedicate large amounts o f time and hard work for low salaries, which is a situation not 
unlike the one they will find in the federal office after the election.
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When the potential staff hire doesn’t have a campaign connection, the individuals 
tend to at least have an ideological connection with the incumbent. My findings 
confirmed Fox and Hammond’s (1977) finding that staff ideology is similar to the 
Incumbent’s. 1 only found one district staff member who expressed even mild 
disagreement with the voting record o f the incumbent. All were usually quick to tow the 
line nearly completely. When discussing ideal employees, there was some division on 
the importance of an ideological litmus test. While there were some RDSM’s who were 
more likely to stress the importance o f ideological affinity with the incumbent, it seemed 
that slightly more RDSM’s were concerned about the potential staffers’ connections to 
the local community and how they would fit in.
A final issue was the individual’s degree of stylistic connection to the incumbent. It 
helps to “look like” the incumbent. The next chapter will focus on the individual styles 
of incumbents, but for now, it seemed that staff members often ‘looked like’ their 
incumbents in how they approached their jobs. Three quick examples provide the 
evidence. For B, district staff who were content and were sticking around for the 
duration were older staff, who had a more routine style of representation. They worked 
hard for the incumbent but without a lot o f publicity. C’s staff did their constituent work 
in compliance with C’s ideological precepts that they work in relative obscurity, never 
seeking to do extra work for the constituents. One constituent remarked that they were 
“cerebral thinkers like C.” And finally there were references to staff that worked for a 
senator firom C’s state and a fellow House member from B’s state. It was commonly said 
about these two legislators that you should not “get between them and a camera.” 
Constituents suggested that their staff were equally aggressive in obtaining press credit
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for their employers. These observations led me to speculate that staff have to be 
stylistically like the incumbent or after a short period of time they will find themselves 
uncomfortably on the outside of the enterprise. The two young staffers from B’s office 
were quite familiar with this exclusion.
Some staff hired because they have useful contacts for the incumbents 
Community Contacts
Incumbents seem anxious to hire the staff from the above categories of 
'‘professional” or service-oriented motives. These types of staff have contacts with their 
communities that predate their involvement in the incumbent’s enterprise. It is precisely 
these contacts, and the willingness to bring that service-oriented mentality to the job that 
makes these desirable employees for the incumbents. One G staffer put it quite directly; 
“There is a reason for my activism. (It) is to help find community needs.” Even the staff 
member who is active in what might not be considered electorally productive groups or 
areas is a valuable asset to the incumbent because they bring an attitude to their job that 
emphasizes service to others. For example, one of B’s staff members was active in a 
group called People Attempting to Help (PATH), a program created to give vouchers to 
the needy of the community. Even if this staff member chose to highlight her connection 
to B, it would not likely win many votes in the poorest community. Instead, these 
staffers, and their employers, believe it is “needed” work. Incumbents like these types of 
people because they know that they are conscientious and will work hard to do their jobs 
(i.e. be “professional”).
On a more electorally pragmatic level, incumbents might believe that such staff will 
build the incumbent’s reputation as a beneficial part of the community. Here one sees the
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G staff member just mentioned, who in addition to her work with the needy (Red Cross 
and Women’s Shelters), was also active in the United Way and the NAACP. We might 
label her as a pure activist. As these staff become institutionalized in their political/social 
circles, the activism can benefit the incumbent. Newly elected incumbents clearly seek 
out these types of staff. The staff member who works A’s distant district office, a part of 
the district where he had few community or political connections, had a military 
background and a community activism that “looked like” the area where she was hired. 
Unlike the rest of the original staff hires, she had not worked in the campaign, nor had 
she met any of the staff imtil after the election. It plainly appeared that the incumbent was 
moving to fill a need with a staff member who had ready-made community contacts that 
would allow him to build his reputation in the area quickly. In this case she was not only 
a community activist, but she also was interested in groups that A needed to reach out to. 
At the most cynical level, these types of staff might be recruited simply to underline the 
incumbent’s enterprise. For example, A tried to hire Es’ Economic Development staff 
member. Regardless of the fact that the staff member worked for an incumbent of the 
opposing party, her community activism was perceived to be a clear electoral benefit to 
incumbent A.'^
The fact that incumbents value staff with community contacts is proven by the fact 
that a majority of the staff observed had some extracurricular involvement in community 
organizations. When incumbents cannot hire staff with a proven record of activism, it 
appears that they do not discourage their staff from getting “dragged in.” As one of C’s
The clear electoral benefit is based on the assumption that perfonning economic assistance and grant 
work for elite constituents has a higher likelihood in resulting o f some form o f payback, whether it be 
positive word o f mouth discussion, a vote or contribution, or a more active role in the incumbent’s 
campaign. I will examine this relationship thoroughly in Chapter Five.
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staff members suggested, “the longer you’re here, the more you’re dragged in.” It was 
difficult to conclude whether civic involvement was always a matter o f personal 
commitment to community, orders from the incumbent, or the recognition that they could 
help once they became staff. I would suggest that cynicism about staff involvement in 
the community is probably misplaced as most staff who are community activists seem to 
derive from the personal commitment group.
Partisan contacts
In addition to hiring staff from their own campaigns and the ranks o f community 
activists, incumbents can ofren find staff from amongst the “political hacks” of the 
district. These are people who are active in the local government offices, political parties 
or other campaign structures. B hired one staff member who had worked for the two 
previous incumbents, partly for her on-the-job expertise but also for here political savvy. 
According to B “she knew where the bodies were buried” in the part of the district he 
wasn’t from. Newly elected incumbents also have the need to develop access to their 
communities. In two cases (G and H) new incumbents hired locally elected part-time 
officials to run their district offices. When G was setting up his district operation, he 
found in the adjoining district that H’s RDSM had been a mayor for 25 years. He quickly 
realized that he “needed one of those.” In case of H (and G) this hire provides 25 years 
worth of contacts that he didn’t have. The hires did not necessarily need to be victorious 
incumbents. C hired an individual who had nm for the state senate in 1985 and then went 
to work for C after she lost. She needed a job and he needed to fill a position. But more 
importantly, her political activism for a number years leading up to, and including, her 
candidacy, gave her political contacts that would likely be useful for the incumbent.
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Sometimes the contacts don’t need to have 25 years o f experience. Instead, youthful 
vigor and a foot in the door may provide an apt substitute. After a redistricting, H needed 
to hire someone for a new and large county that previously wasn’t part o f his district. 
Consequently, he hired a student who had just founded the Young Republican chapter for 
the county. From the staffer’s viewpoint, H needed “someone to find the movers and 
shakers” in that county and she had the political entrée to fill that need. C also hired two 
individuals who were active in College Republican chapters in his district and another 
staff member who worked for a presidential campaign in 1996 and then needed a job. All 
of these staff demonstrated the youthful vigor and came to the office with a foot in the 
door and a desire to work hard for an incumbent they respected. These staff are also 
useful for senior incumbents who have positions to fill, keeping in mind the previous 
discussion about youthful ambition and the low pay offered in congressional offices.
Both the experienced officials and the young partisan hires permit the incumbent a 
measure of “leeway” to focus on things besides district politics. They are well suited to 
interact with the elite constituents o f the district.
They look like their districts.
Macartney foimd a tendency for district staff to be “women, minorities, lawyers, 
social scientists, and P.R. specialists” but that the top aide was, on average, a white male, 
age 37, with five years on the job (1975, p.248). While I would echo Macartney’s 
findings that there were more women and minorities amongst the receptionist, 
scheduling, and casework positions, there clearly were substantially fewer amongst the 
ranks of the more interactive staff; the field representatives and the RDSMs. Instead, I 
found that the more interactive members of the staff, with a  few exceptions, were usually
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demographic reflections of the incumbent, as opposed to the constituents. As in the 
corporate world, the glass ceiling still appears to exist in the political world.
Having noted that, I would also suggest that most of the cases that I observed tended 
to have staff that somewhat looked like the district. Macartney found that political 
incumbents in Los Angeles “can and do field teams that are like the incumbent” (1975, 
p.8) in terms of their background and ethnicity. One would not expect to necessarily find 
minority staff working in a district office where less than five percent of the district 
population were minorities. On the other hand, in the one minority-majority office 
observed (F), a large number of the staff members were Afiican-American, clearly 
representing the district. And in the two other offices with substantial non-white 
populations (A and M) there was definite representation on the staff of these non-white 
constituents. It appeared likely to me that representation in both A and M’s office was 
symbolic in nature. While the non-white staff members in both offices had in-the-field 
interactive positions, neither was a senior member of the district staff. Also, as noted 
above by the C staffer, not only must staff look like their districts but it also helps for 
them to have “good community skills.” They should be able to fimction socially, talk and 
“listen” well with concerned activists, supporters and opponents of the district.
Looking to another demographic, B represented a large district with numerous small 
towns and an aging population, although the average district age was kept low by a 
portion of his district being inundated with younger people living near a metropolitan 
area. Five of his seven staff were significantly over the age of forty, the other two being 
new college graduates. A case might be made that he kept these staff because they were 
reflections of the older communities that they worked in. But as the district changes he is
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feeling pressured to hire a “new face” for his office, or perhaps retire from the old district 
that he remembers. I would also note that there was no clear differentiation of staff 
importance by age group. While Fox and Hammond (1977) found a clear progression in 
age as one moves up the hierarchy of Washington staff, seniority was clearly not tied to 
age in the district. There were significant examples of young staff in positions o f 
authority (C, A) and older staff continuing to work in the casework positions that they’d 
been in for decades (B and 1). It appears that while age might be a demographic to 
determine who gets hired, it does not appear to have an impact on office hierarchy.
Laying the groimdwork for themselves 
Finally, certain staff are hired because they have the right credentials and they 
present themselves for the right job at the right time. These staff are “laying the 
groundwork” for themselves. They seek employment on district staff because they want 
to run themselves or bolster their own political positions in the district. Incumbents who 
are considering retirement might also seek a potential replacement through the 
employment of politically ambitious individuals.
Conclusion
While there are commonalities in the different types of staff that serve in district 
offices of incumbent members of the U.S. House of Representatives, there are differences 
in how those offices are structured. Following on previous literature on the fimctions of 
legislative staff, I found that all offices carried out similar routine levels of activity such 
as information gathering, casework and basic outreach. There were, however, certain 
offices that were much more aggressive in their interactions with constituents. These 
offices conducted the same fimctions as the routine offices but also did other, more
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‘political’ tasks and even assisted the incumbents’ campaigns. The aggressive staff often 
work right up into the “gray” areas of the law in the name of the incumbent. While 
loyalty to the incumbent enterprise is central to all staff, this chapter also showed that 
some staff have clearly different long-term goals that impact why they were hired and 
what they plan to do after their job as a district staff member.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine congressional district staff and 
understand the ways in which they are allocated and utilized to assist in the reelection of 
incumbent members of the U.S. House of Representatives. This chapter provided a 
profile of the individuals and fimctions of district staff. While I initially expected to find 
more universality in district staff operations, my observations suggested that there is not 
one ideal type of office structure utilized by incumbents. Consequently, the next chapter 
will switch gears and offer some hypotheses about the existing variations in district staff 
utilization and allocation.
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Chapter Four
Variation in district staff allocation: Potential variables for future exploration
Incumbent members o f the United States House of Representatives utilize their 
district staff in a variety of fashions. Chapter Three demonstrated that the district 
enterprise ranges between a routine level of activism and a more aggressive posture. This 
dissertation argues that the latter staff model has an impact on the act o f representation 
and the outcomes of congressional elections. District staff offices stand apart from the 
literature’s understanding of the functions and motivations of legislative staff based in 
Washington. As the previous chapter demonstrated, there also exists substantial variation 
between the perceptions, functions and types o f people who work in the district offices 
themselves. Based on a number o f field observations, this chapter shift gears from the 
contextual focus and suggests some variables for future exploration that might explain the 
varying patterns by which incumbents allocate and utilize their district staff.
The previous chapter identified a number o f distinct differences in the functions of 
district staff offices. A basic difference was the total number of staff members that are 
allocated to the district. This difference was much less consequential, however, than the 
differences in the basic functions of those staff. Here, notable differences between 
routine and aggressive offices were observed, where the number of staff members who 
were proactive (i.e. aggressive) clearly varied. While there were few district offices that 
matched the ideal types set out by this continuum, there did appear to be a clear tendency 
to vary to one side or the other on most factors. Variation in task was not confined to the
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staff alone. My observations appeared to confirm the work of previous literature that 
concludes that individual incumbents have different attitudes and district “home styles.” 
Chapter Three also suggested that incumbents rely in varying degrees on the assistance 
and advice o f political friends, surrogates, and “kitchen cabinets.”
What literature savs about incumbents, variation and the district enterprise
Personality
There is a substantial amount of literature on the variables that impact incumbent 
behavior. Unfortunately, much of it ignores their political behavior in the home district. 
A common area of study of incumbent behavior tends to focus on their personal attitudes 
and motivations. In one of the earliest studies of legislative staff, Matthews (1960) wrote 
that Washington-based Senate offices were organized like “personal Rohrschach tests” 
where the staff functions were determined by “problems, preoccupations and how (the 
incumbent) defined his role (p.83).” Fox and Hammond (1975, 1977) also foimd that 
Washington staff offices tend to vary by member “backgroimd.” They too hypothesized, 
but didn’t study in particular depth, that members’ perceptions, ambitions and goals may 
affect the number of staff and the organization of the Washington office. Studying 
eighteen incumbents in-depth, Fenno (1978, p.50) concluded that a mixture o f personal 
and constituency factors, such as their goals and family life and distance from 
Washington influenced their “home styles. Davidson (1969) found that incumbent 
personal attitudes had an impact when he classified them as trustees and delegates.
Parker (1986) surveyed constituents as to the preferred legislative behavior o f their 
incumbents and found that they prefer incumbents who are delegates to their wishes 
while incumbents tend to prefer to be trustees. Based on a 1977 study, Parker found that
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sixty percent of incumbents said they vote their own consciences over constituents and 
seek independence except when the votes were unusually visible.
It may not always be the case that staff allocations are elements of overt incumbent 
choice. Instead, Clausen (1973, p i32) found that representation is an “involuntary” form 
of service where “constituency orientations are an integral part o f (the incumbent’s) 
being... some of which become intertwined with (their) politics.” Mason (1987), on the 
other hand, suggests that ‘constituency orientations’ probably tend to be of a more 
‘voluntary’ nature:
The number of caseworkers on a congressional staff will depend to a large 
extent on the member’s philosophy about casework. If a member insists 
that his staff give first priority to responding to the demands and requests 
of constituents, and that they do not leave a case unattended until it has 
been successfully resolved there will likely be more staffers involved in 
casework (p.26).
In order that they might be able to get beyond 435 individual types of district orientations based 
on personality, the literature does address other more generalizeable variables.
Political factors: Seniority 
Perhaps the most common focus of the literature on incumbent behavior centers on 
the career. In general, this body of literature suggests that there are “life cycles” or stages 
in an incumbent’s career. The most notable of these works was Fenno’s (1978) 
identification of the “expansionist” and “protectionist” parts of a career, where the former 
typology tends to occur earlier in the incumbent’s career. Because of the demands that 
accrue with an enduring career, Fenno notes that senior incumbents go home much less 
often and are much more likely to depend on their staff than are junior members for much 
of their district behavior. In regards to their district behavior, most of the literature 
suggests that as the career lengthens, incumbents pay less attention, and devote fewer
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resources to their districts. Instead, as Cavanaugh (1981) and Hibbing (1991) found, 
increases in seniority are highly correlated to increased legislative focus at the expense of 
district activity.
While there is general consensus that some aspects o f incumbent’s careers and styles 
change, the differences are notable. Fenno speculated that over the course o f the career, 
changes in the incumbent’s behaviors were brought about by contextual changes to the 
district, strategic changes in the attitudes and nature of the district voters, or by personal 
changes on the part of the incumbent. However, Parker (1980, 1986) found that none of 
Fenno’s three factors resulted in changes to the amount of time spent in the district by the 
incumbent. Parker’s earlier research suggested that increased tenure in office had little 
impact on changes in travel home. Instead, he found that an influx of a new cohort of 
members and the increase in travel allocation had an impact on the “district 
attentiveness” of incumbents, whereas seniority seemed to have no effect. Finally, while 
Hibbing (1991) agreed that certain elements of a congressional career do “cycle”, he 
found their “district careers” to be largely constant.
The literature is not unified on the impact of seniority on the allocation of resources. 
Macartney (1975, p i04) and Bom (1982) found that variation in perquisite use was a 
function of seniority; more senior members were generally “less aggressive” in allocating 
resources back to the district (p.357). Alternatively, Bond (1985) suggested that a more 
efficient allocation of resources on the part of the incumbent resulted in less time being 
spent in the district. Schiff and Smith (1983) help to rationalize these seemingly 
divergent conclusions with their suggestion that as senior members acquire additional 
staff, usually through their committees, they are able to delegate other tasks back to the
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district and accomplish both district and Washington goals simultaneously. These 
findings share in common a decreased personal attention to the district on the part of 
senior incumbents.
One area of consensus in the literature appears to be the expectations of the constituents. 
Macarmey (1982) discovered that seniority results in greater volumes of office mail and 
congratulatory messages being sent to constituents (p.70). From the other side of the coin 
Polsby (1969) concluded that constituents believe senior incumbents are capable o f 
providing more for their constituents than are junior members.' And a similar notion was 
found in Ripley’s (1969) hypothesis that the power of a senator’s staff is largely 
determined by the power of the senator. In each of these cases, constituents appear to 
expect more of senior incumbents.
An alternative theory of seniority focuses on the cohorts of incumbents. Tip O’Neal 
was quoted in the early 1970s as saying that “twenty years from now there won’t be any 
home offices -  all o f (the younger incumbents) will be doing only what they’re paid for 
(i.e., legislating)” (Peters, 1977). Analyses of district allocations tend to find differences 
between successive cohorts of legislators. Fiorina (1977), Parker, (1980) and Parker and 
Parker (1985) found a “new breed” of incumbents elected after 1964 were more 
aggressive in their utilization of staff resources. Smith (1995) had an interesting finding 
in that older incumbents allocated more of their resources to Washington as the 
legislative budgets expanded. When they were first elected (pre-1970) incumbents didn’t 
have as many staff, so they just added more to their Washington offices as the budgets
' Not only do constituents expect high levels o f  service from their incumbents, they also appear to believe 
that the positions o f seniority that they attain can be passed to their successors. Exit polling data from the 
defeat o f former House Speaker Tom Foley (D-Washington) suggested that a substantial portion o f his 
opponent’s supporters believed that his opponent would inherit the Speakership.
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expanded and never sent substantial numbers of staff or resources back to the district 
(Smith, 1995, p. 104). Smith foimd that younger cohorts clearly reject Tip’s depiction 
and, in fact, go home more often and devote significantly greater levels of resources to 
their district enterprises. Tip may not have been wrong that the younger cohorts would 
have increasingly Washington-based attentions. What he could not have foreseen, 
however, was that later cohorts would find other resources that would allow them to 
make politics a “local” affair while devoting more attention to the legislative process. In 
short, there are now more to the “home offices” than was the case thirty years ago.
With the exception of Hibbing and Parker, the bulk of this literature seems to imply 
that district representation suffers as incumbents acquire tenure in office. The general 
view amongst academics and journalists is that politicians have a tendency to catch 
“Potomac fever” and lose interest in the politics of their home districts. My observations 
suggest that this is clearly not the case for all incumbents and staff as some district 
enterprises actually get more active and representative as time goes by. Furthermore, the 
bulk of this literature is limited to aggregate analyses of staff numbers and budgets and 
does not consider the variation in the types of tasks that district offices conduct. 
Therefore, the literature on seniority does not adequately capture the changing nature of 
district enterprises over time.
Political factors: Electoral vulnerability
The literature also suggests that the electoral environment has an impact on 
incumbent behavior. Perhaps the clearest statement of this connection is Davidson’s 
(1969) belief that incumbents who perceive that they are occupying marginal districts 
tend to be more “district-oriented” than those who feel electorally “safe.” Where
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Davidson’s findings focus mainly on legislative behavior, some literature has expanded 
to look at the impact of the electoral environment on the district enterprise. In crude 
terms Kingdon captured this finding in the words of one incumbent; ‘*I have to run the 
cocktail circuit and go back to the district every two or three weekends just to stay in 
office” (1973, p.6l). Fenno (1978) observed that incumbents structure their time and 
optimize their efforts in the district to increase their saliency and evaluations but that 
these efforts vary according to the individual incumbents’ feelings o f electoral 
vulnerability. Parker (1989) reached a similar conclusion; “Congressmen and senators 
who are politically atypical o f their constituencies are most inclined to expand their voter 
coalitions. The focus, diversity and breadth of that attention may differ depending on 
whether the aim is to build or maintain (their) electoral coalition” (p.88). In addition to 
the incumbent’s perceptions of their homes and constituents, the actual geography or 
nature of the home district is also foimd to have an impact on incumbent behavior.
Geography
Several works find clear variation amongst incumbents based on the geography of 
their districts. Jacobson (1997) emphasized that congressional research should always 
take note of the idiosyncractic nature of each House district.* Some literature, however, 
attempts to find commonalities based on their geographic characteristics. In terms of 
simple staff numbers, Omstein (1975) found that junior, northern liberal Democrats who 
represented urban districts tended to have the largest number o f staff. Omstein’s results 
were confirmed in numerous studies o f southern political culture, the most notable being 
the seminal study by Key (1949). Fenno (1978), echoing Key, found a distinct southern
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‘home style’ where urban, southern and border state incumbents tended to have more 
“personal” styles and utilized smaller staff than their northeastern counterparts. 
Interestingly, Fenno (1978) and Cavanaugh (1981) foimd that seniority, electoral margin, 
family residence and distance from Washington did not make a difference in the overall 
allocation of resources to the district. Fenno’s two key variables were the region that 
incumbents came from and the influence o f their state delegations.^ Given these uniform 
conclusions about the nature of southern and northern political cultures, it seems that the 
ideological disposition of both the incumbents and their electorates have an impact on 
staff utilization.
Other relevant literature about staff 
As was noted in Chapter One, there is a substantial amount o f literature on the 
functions and impact of Washington staff. For example, both Omstein (1975) and Fox 
and Hammond (1977) found a correlation between staff size and the level of legislative or 
committee activity. Additionally, Hammond (1975) and Fox and Hammond (1977) 
found there to be variation in staff function based on partisanship and seniority in 
Washington offices. Yet, Hammond (1984) concluded that further study on the variation 
of Washington offices remained necessary. These citations and the previous several 
pages of literature frequently recognize the growing size and impact of Washington staff. 
Nevertheless, this literature remains overwhelming Washingtonian in nature.
’ Jacobson (pp. 14-16) suggests that some o f the most notable individual district differences are; size, 
population, political habits, economic base and income, communications patterns (number o f media 
markets), etlmicity and age.
 ^ It seems ironic that despite the qualitative nature o f his study o f "Home Style’ Fenno would categorize 
incumbents based on an aggregate measurement o f staff budgets as opposed to a more personal or 
individual category o f behavior.
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There are a few studies based on the incumbents’ home enterprises. Works such as 
Fiorina (1977), Fenno (1978), and Parker (1980) noted the increase in the number of 
district staff in the 1960s and 1970s. One o f the other notable examples here is Johannes 
and MacAdams’ (1987) finding of variation in the amount o f casework performed by 
each district office. Like much of the previous literature, however, their hypotheses and 
investigations of variation are only weakly developed. Johannes and MacAdams offer no 
real rationale for the variation other than its existence. Similarly, Hammond (1981) notes 
that the distribution of staff resources tends to be based on the “collegial nature” o f the 
House but also on the individual legislators’ strength of ties back to the district, which 
seems to suggest that all incumbents would do it the same but that they do it differently. 
Smith (1995, p. 105) hypothesized that constituents, interest groups and other incumbents, 
especially the dean of each state’s congressional delegation, have an impact on staffing 
decisions in both the Washington and the district offices. Surprisingly, Macartney (1975 
p.264-265) found the demographic profile of staff offices to be roughly the same for 
Democratic and Republican officials. While they may look the same, Zupan (1989) (in 
Jacobson 1990) discovered that Republican incumbents have slightly smaller total 
numbers of staff (13.9 to 14.5) and fewer staff in the district (41% of Republican staff 
versus 46% for Democrats). Consequently, Zupan offered the hypothesis that 
Republicans are less active “cultivators” o f their district interests. With the exception of 
Fenno and Macartney, the findings in this paragraph were completed without solid 
contextual analysis or confirmation. Each of these studies are in dire need of contextual 
support.
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Macartney (1975,1982) provides the literature on congressional staff with its one 
few pieces of contextual analysis of district staff. Macartney was a trailblazer in 
providing a description of the fourteen basic roles of staff as well as the motivations of 
individual staff members who work outside o f the main legislative institution. 
Furthermore, he deserves praise for his cross-institutional comparison of state, local and 
federal staff and the fact that he recognized variation in the size of district enterprises and 
suggested that there was variation in their functions. In his dissertation. Macartney put 
forth numerous “tentative” propositions on variables including: party, length of 
incumbency, electoral margin, urban nature, institutional change, and incumbent 
ambition. He was able to weakly conclude that incumbents who were junior, electorally 
vulnerable. Republican, and without committee staff were more likely to have “stronger” 
district offices (p.308). While I agree with his “speculation” that these “operative 
variables pull against each other” (p. 150-153), this dissertation seeks to go further by 
comparing offices in different geographical settings in greater depth than Macarmey 
achieved. He did not allow for much variation in his methodology given that all of his 
cases came from one extremely unique urban county and that he relied on one relatively 
brief interview per district office. An example of the need for further research was found 
in his speculation that northern, urban, less senior and more electorally vulnerable 
incumbents will have “more extensive field operations” (1982 p.67).'* Given that his case 
set was Los Angeles Coimty, this seems like an unwieldy assumption. Furthermore, he 
never elaborated on what “more extensive field operations” would entail and was 
generally quite vague about what a “stronger” district office implied. While Macartney
■* This finding is somewhat odd given his maintenance of the literature’s status quo with the suggestion in 
1975 that “staff roles do not vary significantly between regions” (pp.95-96).
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was indeed a trailblazer, his definitions often proved to be quite sparse. What is missing 
from the literature is a wider (geographical) comparison between district offices and a 
deeper contextual investigation of how and why incumbents allocate district staff.
Potential avenues for future exploration of district staff differences 
Chapter Three uncovered substantial variation in the functions and behaviors of 
congressional district staff. Based on a number of field observations, this chapter will 
offer some conclusions about varying patterns of district staff utilization. Following from 
the literature review above, 1 will propose several independent variables that, based on 
my observations, appeared to have an impact on the dependent variable; the routine or 
aggressive nature of the district enterprise.^ While Chapter Two promoted the value of 
contextual analysis of individual cases, 1 admit that 1 am guilty o f making generalizations 
in this chapter. Because of the impact o f district staff on representation and election 
outcomes that will be detailed in the following chapters, I suggest that there is a need for 
further research on this topic. Therefore, in this chapter presents a starting point for 
future research and comparison of district staff.
A potential model of district staff differences 
In this chapter I will propose a number of variables that explain differences in district 
staff functions. Some of the variables are placed in charts with the dependent variable 
resulting in four ideal case types. In most cases 1 relied on contrasts between the four
 ^Alternatively, I thought about a research design based on “most similar” cases. Given the literature’s 
presumption that congressional district enterprises are identical in nature, this research design would 
effectively serve to highlight the differences that existed between offices. However, with Przeworski and 
Teune’s (1970) advice that this research design leads to over-determined dependent variables, I utilized a 
research design that was guided by a “most different” case design where the routine and the aggressive 
offices were compared using a series o f independent variables. I would accept, however, for this to truly be
2 6 8
primary cases from my research, but where appropriate I inserted secondary cases when 
the impact of the independent variables appeared to be in evidence. There is a need for 
future replication o f this study so that these variables might receive systematic 
comparison in a larger data pool. Future research on district staff might measure the 
routine and the aggressive offices against the personal, career, and demographic variables 
mentioned below. Finally, future testing would allow for more systematic analysis of the 
causation and correlation of these variables.
The dependent variable 
Inciunbents have substantial discretion when deciding how to allocate their 
Washington and district resources. Unlike the pre-1970’s cohorts, no incumbents today 
choose a wholesale neglect of their district staff operations. Instead it is, as was shown in 
Chapter Three, a question of degree, where some district staff offices tend towards 
aggressive styles while others are more routine in their numbers and functions. 
Throughout this chapter the dependent variable will be the extent to which each district 
staff operation is aggressive or proactive. The aggressive operation tends to spend more 
time on outreach functions, doing project work and interacting with constituents, while 
the routine office tends to be more office-boimd and reliant upon well-established routine 
behaviors. While there are individual aggressive staff members in every office, these 
hypotheses will be based largely on the overall output of the entire office as opposed to 
individual staff members. Based on my limited number of cases I will hypothesize where 
independent (and intervening) variables appeared to have an impact on the utilization of 
district staff resources.
a "most different” design I would need to take more highly diverse cases and look for commonalities that 
exist between them.
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Incumbent’s disposition 
The literature above noted that incumbent’s personal attitudes and motivations have 
an impact on their legislative behaviors. The first independent variable looks at how the 
general attitudes and perceptions of incumbents are related to the nature of their district 
enterprises. As one of C’s staff suggested, district staff have similar characteristics but 
“it is up to the individual member to determine who they employ and what they do”, B’s 
RDSM noted that incumbents construct their offices by “personality” and a senate staffer 
suggested that the “boss defines the tenor of the operation.” A comparison of two 
incumbents who held the same seat and employed a number of the same staff (J and K) 
suggested that the individual preferences of the legislators were probably key to the 
differences that existed in the number of staff who performed aggressive behaviors, and 
the authority that the individual staff wielded when they acted as surrogates for the absent 
incumbent.® J maintained a very decentralized and personal staff. Local constituents felt 
very comfortable and familiar with his staff in the area. One constituent remarked “you 
knew you were talking to (J) when you were talking to his staff” Incumbent K, on the 
other hand, refocused the staff’s activities to suit his personal needs. While he retained 
three of J’s five district staff, they conducted their jobs in a much different fashion, with 
what the staff felt to be higher levels of “micromanagement” by K than had been the case 
by J. This perception also worked its way into the staffs relationships with elite 
constituents, who seemed to notice the change in the staff enterprise. One way to 
operationalize this variable might be to look at the statements and behaviors of individual 
incumbents and determine whether they tend to act more as trustees or delegates in their
" Given that J and K. were from the same party and represented the same district, these two variables are 
largely controlled in this instance. Therefore, their individual differences seem a logical place to start
2 7 0
legislative behavior. A delegate would be defined as a legislator who is relatively more 
attentive to district preferences than a trustee. This distinction is clearly notable in their 
voting behavior but it might also be observed in their attention to district affairs.
Individual motivations vary 
Hypothesis 1 : There are personal motivations other than being a trustee or a delegate that 
govern the allocation of district staff.
My observations suggested that the trustee-delegate distinction that is so often used 
by the discipline is of little help in comparing the nature of incumbent’s home 
enterprises. Figure 4.1 implies that both delegates and trustees are found to employ 
routine district operations. Within the categories of trustee and delegate 1 observed four 
types of incumbents who utilized their staff in different manners. Instead of the 
traditional trustee-delegate dichotomy, my observations painted a portrait o f four 
different motivational styles at work in congressional district enterprises. The partisan, 
personal, policy and electoral incumbents each utilized district staff in different fashions 
and with a variety of motives.
(Figure 4.1)
Independent Variable Routine Aggressive
Partisan -  H, 1 Electoral -  A, D or F
Delegate Personal -  B, G
Trustee Policy -  C No observations?
Partisan
Incumbents G and H represented adjoining urban districts with nearly identical 
constituencies in the same county. Yet they had notably different district staff
2 7 1
enterprises. While they also share similar political ideologies, their tactical dispositions 
and attitudes about their constituents appeared markedly different. H most clearly 
portrayed what might be called a partisan model of staff allocation. While his behavior 
might be less delegate-like than others listed in Figure 4.1, his behaviors still suggest that 
he tends toward that side of the continuum. Occupying a homogenous district, especially 
in partisan terms, affords H the luxury o f interacting with the constituents of his choice.
A substantial number o f incumbents likely share this setting; they occupy safe seats and 
have homogenous social, political and economic interests to represent. In these situations 
it would be highly irregular for the incumbent not to be considered a delegate of 
constituent interests simply because of the fact that their ideological positions are heavily 
consistent with their constituents’ beliefs. If it is true that most incumbents share this 
partisan orientation and lack of involvement in their district enterprise, then it gives 
further impetus to the need to study and understand their representatives at home.
At any rate, H and his staff provided an excellent illustration of how a district staff 
operates according to the partisan model, which tends to be routine in nature. Given that 
incumbents who practice this model are probably electorally secure, there is little need to 
reach out to new groups or issues within their districts. A staff member noted their 
relaxed approach in regard to the large employers in the district. She remarked fiankly 
that they “do not pursue them so much anymore. H used to seek out and court the large 
employers and see if they had problems. Now we are entrenched in the district and are so 
well known that he turns what there is over to the staff.” The experience of H suggests 
that increased seniority and the loss of area through redistricting (see below) inevitably 
result in the routinization o f district behavior. O f all the district enterprises, H’s office
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was perhaps the most sterile, issue-oriented, reactive group of staff observed. Their 
behaviors were almost entirely office-bound with few efforts to employ new tactics or 
ideas to reach new faces in the district. Many of the old tactics that they employed 
became institutionalized as virtual non-political events. The most notable example here 
might be the advisory system structure that H had long practiced. The advisories were 
once a system where H and his staff interacted with key district constituents in intimate 
settings. These intimate settings were once part informational for the incumbent, but also 
partisan or electoral in the sense that the incumbent would hope to recruit these elite 
constituents into his enterprise. One staff member noted that in the beginning they 
invited “certain key people...who then recommended five more each...(but it then) grew 
until there was not so much invitation or activity.” By the time of my observations, the 
advisories were large public forums that featured notable guests from the community and 
drew crowds that averaged about eighty constituents. The advisories had become less 
about personal interaction with key constituents and more about advertising basic 
partisan positions to roughly the same group of constituents on a regular basis. One staff 
noted that these meetings only occasionally draw “some outreach where constituents will 
develop a relationship and ask for help.” Usually the regular participants are the same 
supportive types, usually “bankers and elected officials.”
As noted in Chapter Three, the ways in which staff members come to an office have 
an impact on how they do their jobs. With the exception of two individuals, H’s district 
staff began their involvement with his enterprise as campaign volunteers or employees. 
The fact that H’s staff appeared more partisan in their activities, contacts and remarks 
appears to logically follow from the fact that so many of them have a partisan connection
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to H. His RDSM, main field representative and press secretary all had ongoing and 
active contacts with his campaign and other Republican campaigns in the area. These 
connections were especially notable in the highly partisan attitude of his press secretary. 
While these activities might be considered aggressive based on the description firom 
Chapter Three of offices that also do political and campaign work, the contacts and 
activities of the partisan staff seem to be largely concentrated on the same group of elites 
and supporters. In other words, they take a routine tack to their campaign and political 
activities. I would speculate that incumbents such as H likely employ the routine partisan 
staff enterprises not only because they have staff with campaign experience but also 
because they have fewer electoral demands to be proactive.
Ironicially, the staff enterprise might also function in a partisan manner when the 
incumbent has progressive ambition. Macartney (1975, p. 104) vaguely suggested this 
when he offered that district staff members send heavier volumes of congratulatory 
mailings to constituents when the incumbent has progressive ambition. This finding runs 
against the bulk o f the literature which suggests that increased tenure in office results in 
diminished district attention. In the case of H, his RDSM noted that H is “heavy into 
(state) politics...and is pondering a Senate campaign.” To fulfill this ambition, H spends 
a great deal of his personal time in other districts throughout his state and encourages his 
staff to help constituents and other legislative offices ‘outside’ the district. H’s extra­
district commitments also meant that he was more reliant upon his staff to ensure that his 
current constituency stayed loyal and satisfied. As one o f his staff noted, “99% of his 
time is scheduled” with fairly routine-style meetings when he is back in the district, so 
virtually all of the proactive contact and surveillance with the community needs to be
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done by the staff/ His two key staff members divided the district geographically. One of 
the district representatives was hired directly out o f college where she had worked on H’s 
campaign and had formed a coimtywide political organization. Because this was shortly 
after a reapportionment, H had few political contacts in that part of the district and 
needed a party contact. The RDSM was an old acquaintance of the incumbent, who was 
also a small business owner. Republican activist and formerly a mayor of one of the 
towns in H’s district. This staff member came from the other part o f the district than the 
field representative. Together, these two staff members provided access for the partisan 
friends that they established over the years as H himself has less personal time to devote 
to constituents. Regardless of the direction of the incumbent’s ambition, the partisan 
model suggests a staff that is largely devoted to maintaining the incumbent’s loyal core of 
supporters.
Personal
The personal model is not unlike the partisan model in that neither type of incumbent 
seems to confront pressing threats at the ballot box. The difference between the two lies 
in the personal attention of the incumbent. The personal incumbent, here best seen in B 
and G, takes a more active role in district affairs as compared to other incumbents. The 
personal incumbent goes home more, and when they are at home, they attend more 
meetings and deal with more individual constituent issues. Some personal incumbents, 
with B as a clear example, even assist their staff with individual casework requests.
’ The progressive ambition of the “partisan” style probably drives offices that are regularly routine in nature 
to become more aggressive in support o f their employer’s electoral motivations. In contrast to H’s staff, I’s 
enterprise would also be considered a “partisan” operation and because he was extremely content in his 
office, his staff members were not under the extra-district pressures seen in H’s office.
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Incumbent B demonstrated a clear personal commitment to his district enterprise. 
Despite his advancing age and apparent slowness, there was a consensus of opinion about 
his active involvement in the district. His staff and constituents, as well as his own 
observations, noted his commitment to Saturday morning meetings in his district office 
and his travel around the district on Mondays and Fridays when Congress was session. “I 
go see them or tell them to come see me on Saturday mornings. 1 take every invitation 
that 1 can squeeze in.” Incumbent G had a similar drive to meet with constituents 
individually in his solo weekend drives aroimd his district. He also spent many of his 
district work periods engaged in individual meetings with constituents throughout his 
district, with no staff to be seen. G and his staff seemed to more embody the personal 
commitment to the district than any other office. They spoke of his frequent interaction 
in the community with his family and staff and how that personal interaction made him a 
better representative of his district. B had a similar style. The editor of his hometown 
newspaper noted that it was B’s style to “do it all” from meetings, to travel around the 
district, to casework to legislation that helps individual constituents, even including 
assistance on cases of individual Social Security checks for senior citizens. This 
constituent expressed that B’s staff are “a reflection of himself but (that) they really 
aren’t out there doing politics - - he is.” Another journalist on the other side of the 
district reflected that it was B’s “work” that was largely responsible for his consistent 
reelection. “Work” here was a reference to his travel and personal attention to meetings 
and individual constituent cases. B’s behavior was further confirmed by a Chamber of 
Commerce employee in a medium-sized city at the far end of his district. This 
constituent noted that B had public meetings at least monthly at that end of the district.
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and because these were publicly announced meetings it was likely that B was in town on 
a much more regular basis. Finally, even B’s staff noted his personal commitment to 
office activities and that fact that he regularly attended meetings and worked with 
constituents by himself. One field representative conceded that virtually all meetings, 
contacts, outreach and speeches were “done pretty much by B himself. They call him 
and he’ll either get the answer to their question or come and speak to their group.
Incumbent B’s behavior was notably different from what I observed in other offices. 
Despite the multiple and competing pressures from family, political parties, congressional 
committees, constituents, and personal interest, the ‘personal’ incumbent is likely to 
dedicate a larger portion of their own personal time to district affairs. Other incumbents 
appeared more likely to focus their time and energies elsewhere, as was the case with H 
and the partisan interests of his district above, or with C and the policy interests of his 
district. The ‘personal’ incumbent perhaps derives a sense of achievement from 
participation in the actual maintenance o f the community.* In this sense, B was much 
more active than any of his counterparts with his involvement in numerous local 
institutions. Numerous constituents noted his participation in groups ranging from a 
Water Resource Board, to the Methodist Man and the YMCA Board to the Masons and 
the usual gamut of Chamber and Rotary gatherings. Again, I did not observe that other 
incumbents were as continually engaged in their district communities, as was B. Because 
of their personal involvement, incumbents like B and G are able to keep routine district 
operations that help them carry out their participation in the governance of the
* B’s case also suggests that the personal incumbent’s district and policy interests are driven by their 
personal lives. B took an interest in a major state hospital within his district not so much because it was a 
major employer but because he and his grandson were inflicted with serious disease in the same summer.
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community. The personal incumbent might actually feel that proactive staff would be 
interfering with his or her district activities.
It is difhcult in the case of G to completely disaggregate the inciunbent’s personality 
from the types of people employed on the staff. It seems that both G and his staff have a 
desire similar to B’s to be engaged in the maintenance of their community. G’s staff was 
more involved at the community-level than were other staff enterprises. Because of G’s 
personal disposition, his individual activism and interaction in the community, it is 
difficult imagining that he would not employ a staff o f similarly involved individuals.
The difference between G’s personal staff members and other district staff is that G’s 
staffs’ extra-curricular involvements appeared to be much more communitarian and less 
politically motivated. Their activism was distinctly less political in nature than other 
district enterprises given that the bulk of their involvement was with charitable groups 
and, in most cases, predated their employment with G.
The personal incumbent operates with a staff “as needed” rationale. B’s staff 
members, like H’s above were clearly reactive in their daily routines. One constituent 
noted the staffs reactive, or routine, style in suggesting that other offices she had worked 
with were more “proactive”. B’s staff generally waited to be asked to get involved in 
district projects. His staff themselves recognized this extremely reactive mission. One 
field representative noted that they did not regularly contact the large corporations of the 
district because the groups have a “long established” relationship and can call 
Washington or B directly when they need help. Because B visits them regularly, she felt 
that her role was simply to be available to assist B “as needed”. A district journalist
Both he and his staff noted a subsequent increase in the amount o f attention that he paid to medicai issues 
and this particular hospital.
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noted that B’s staff did a good job o f packaging and announcing B’s personal 
appearances throughout the district but that they were not as aggressive as other staff in 
creating stories or coverage, especially as compared to the two United States Senators’ 
staff that he regularly interacted with. The personal staff enterprise tends to highlight the 
activities of the incumbent to the virtual exclusion of the staff themselves.
Yet, constituents seemed to largely approve of B’s personal style. He seemed to be 
more likely to respond to them personally through meetings, calls, drop-bys to the 
courthouse, personal notes of appreciation or contact than I noticed in other offices. One 
constituent compared positively his personal style with meetings and attention to emails 
with quick phone calls, to the relative lack of personal attention he received from other 
politicians. An executive for one of the large corporations in the district noted B’s 
personal attention in responding to his calls and letters, giving an example of a two page 
thoughtful response where a form letter would have done for other incumbents. Finally, a 
journalist noted his close personal relationship with another incumbent from an adjoining 
district where he and that incumbent took regular trips to baseball games to relax and chat 
about politics on a regular basis. The journalist suggested that B had a similar personal 
style, but wasn’t quite the personal friend that he was with the other incumbent, where he 
would be able to blow off an afternoon and head to a ballgame. While one might suggest 
that personal contact with the incumbent leads constituents to believe that the incumbent 
has personal style, I would suggest that that was not the case with this incumbent. I 
found all this constituent praise to be notable especially given that this was a routine 
office and that B’s personal activities were more limited in time, nature and number than
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those performed by staff in other offices. In short, he alone cannot do as much as an 
aggressive district staff. But the constituent perception may be a whole other issue.
Constituents from other types of offices occasionally made fond references to 
incumbents who were more personal than their current representative. For example, one 
of A’s constituents compared him to another incumbent that he had worked previously 
with who fit the personal profile. For the other incumbent, his staff had very little 
responsibility to “get things done.” This constituent gave an example of the personal 
differences between A and the other incumbent at town hall meetings. The other 
incumbent had a much more personal style where he interacted with the constituents “on 
his own”, with one staff member “at the back of the room” leaning against the wall. A’s 
excursions to public forums, on the other hand, were replete with multiple staff members, 
overheads, and books o f facts and information to rely upon. The personal style suggests 
an incumbent like B or G who tend to get after district affairs imder their own power with 
minimal staff assistance. They leave the routine affairs and follow-up for the district 
staff. The personal style is not limited to older incumbents. G appeared to have clear 
tendency toward personal activities in his staff-free weekend drives across his district, 
usually accompanied only by his daughter. In fact, a yoimger incumbent such as a G 
might even be a more logical fit as a personal incumbent because of their greater stamina 
and ability to plough through challenging weekend schedules. An active personal 
incumbent can imdoubtedly have a greater impact with constituents than a multitude of 
routine staff members. Many constituents seemed to derive a greater level of fulfillment 
and pleasure from interactions with the incumbent than with the staff. As Chapter Five 
will demonstrate, however, this is not the case for all constituents.
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Most incumbents pursue some activities in their home districts. The previous section 
does not necessarily imply that all incumbents who are active at home tend toward the 
routine or personal style. Nor does it imply that the personal incumbent who is 
personally active at home has an aggressive district enterprise. To the contrary, I would 
hypothesize that most personal incumbents have highly routine operations but that 
personal dispositions do not always determine how the staff are employed in the district. 
As Figure 4.2 demonstrates, D is an exception to this assumption. Like B, she has an 
active home presence compared to other cases I observed. Unlike B, she maintains a 
more aggressive staff enterprise.
(Figure 4.2)
Dependent variable 
Independent Variable Routine Aggressive
Active incumbent 
Absent incumbent
B D
C A
Policv
“Some (incumbents) really need to rethink why they are in politics and others need 
to rethink how to get elected. I work for a guy who is more policy-oriented, while there 
are more and more ‘milk-the-money’ types in office.” Some incumbents seemed to be 
more driven by policy interests, with C being the most obvious incarnation o f this 
incumbent personality. As the comment from his RDSM suggested, the issues and 
projects that he and his staff pursued in the district were tailored more to his personal 
policy interests than to any need for personal attention, ego fulfillment, electoral 
promotion, or partisan attention as was the case for the other three types o f incumbents.
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For example, Incumbent C had significant interest in low-income housing and 
heating issues that resulted in the allocation o f significant personal and staff resources to 
the issue. One of C’s staff members pursued community development but specialized in 
housing issues. Despite his personal interests and membership in local economic 
development groups, the majority of project work that the staff member pursued was of 
the low-income variety. His efforts seemed largely directed by the incumbent’s personal 
interest in a policy issue rather than personal or electoral gain that he might have 
procured working on grants and project development for elite constituents.
Consequently, he attended many meetings and did substantial amounts of cross- 
jurisdictional work devoted to low-income housing access, a clear reflection o f the 
incumbent’s personal interest. One of C’s constituents emphasized the commitment to 
the very same “human service” types of issues that the staff member mentioned were 
pursued on a daily basis. A number of C’s constituents confirmed that his staffers were 
“around” on the issue of “public housing for the poor and elderly.” 1 did not witness any 
other incumbent with policy projects of interest that had staff resources devoted to this 
degree. Furthermore, C’s office seemed to largely avoid more common, and electorally 
valuable issues such as transportation projects or military spending. A mayor and a 
chamber member from one of the larger cities in C’s district both noted that C 
occasionally provided support on transportation issues but that it was done rarely and 
only in cases of “visible” public need, that it always late in the process, and that his 
solutions were legislative in nature, not involving staff or extra-legislative arm-twisting.
Another example of a personal interest driving staff use was an incumbent from a 
district adjacent to C. This incumbent, a veteran, who served on the Armed Services
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Committee, clearly had a personal interest in veteran’s issues. Like C’s housing staff 
member this incumbent also employed a local staff member with particular expertise to 
help deal with these issues. Additionally, his other staff members in Washington and in 
the district were cognizant of his desire that they serve this group of constituents. 
Incumbents who develop a reputation for service on a particular type of issue can often 
drain the resources of their staff by generating requests for assistance from outside their 
districts. One of C’s constituents noted that he regularly contacted the other incumbent 
on military and veteran’s issues, even though he was not from that incumbent’s district, 
or even state for that matter. Given the fact that they continue these activities suggests 
that the policy interests of incumbents can outweigh rational electoral calculations.
In the case of C, the interest in certain types of policy issues also meshed with a 
perceived “philosophy” about the appropriate role for district staff. As one of his staff 
members noted, C often uncovered problems through his own interactions with 
constituents and then “answers the questions himself.” One of C’s constituents suggested 
that he had a more “top-down” style of operation as compared to another incumbent that 
she had worked with whose orientation was more “bottom-up.” The distinction implied 
that C is deliberate and that he thinks and acts “for himself’ with staff playing a largely 
supportive role. The “bottom-up” style is more in line with the next type of incumbent, 
the “electoral” style, where the staffs preparations for the incumbent are more aggressive 
and seek to establish a “better feel for the district.”’ C’s “philosophy” suggests that his 
staff should only take the appropriate measures to resolve those problems. His replies.
’ Both o f types of incumbent rated favorably with this constituent, as compared to the “bottom-up’s” 
predecessor. That incumbent was labeled, appropriately, a “party guy” who went to meetings and helped 
his core constituency but was not as ‘Thorou^ly” involved as the two inciunbents described here. I believe 
that “thoroughly” was meant to imply a level of appropriate representation.
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plus those of his constituents and staff suggest that C is rarely involved in government 
assistance cases for his constituents. Only one constituent suggested that C was highly 
active in the district on issues of concern to him, and this was logically explained by the 
fact his profession was directly affected by a major committee chaired by C. More 
commonly, one constituent noted C’s “intellectual interest” in higher education issues but 
also noted that staff members were involved only to support or follow-up with initiatives 
that he uncovered in conversations. Another constituent, agreeing with this depiction 
suggested that the main purpose of C’s staff seemed to be preparatory, as compared to 
other staff members who were more interactive with constituents. This “philosophy” will 
be explained more comprehensively below.
The policy incumbent rarely seeks to capitalize on the assistance that his or her staff 
members provide to constituents. One of C’s constituents noted that C and his staff took 
a distinctly less “high brow” approach to responding to constituents and taking credit for 
their work than did the two United States Senators from the state. Similarly, another 
constituent mentioned that C and his staff were “less public” than the previous legislator 
who represented the district before reapportionment. This was further reflected in the 
comments o f a leader from another community who suggested that constituents in his 
community were upset with C precisely because he “was not out front” on a highway 
project.
While incumbents that allocate their staff based on the “policy” needs of the district 
most likely run routine style enterprises, this does not always have to be the case. If an 
incumbent took a policy interest in an issue that was of common importance to his or her 
constituents, one can imagine the staff being sent out in aggressive fashions to deal with
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the issues. For example, an incumbent from a poor district might direct staff to 
aggressively target community groups to assist with welfare or housing issues, while an 
incumbent from a district with a military base might have his or her staff members spend 
substantial time dealing with veteran’s issues. In either case, the policy interest might be 
driven by needs of constituents who make up the bulk of the district’s electorate. In any 
event, 1 would draw a distinction between the policy and the electoral incumbent based 
on the record, stated intentions and the behavior o f their staff. The examples above of 
incumbents representing policy interests of constituents outside of their own districts 
confirm the personal motivation of the policy incumbent.
As the example of C’s staff member who dealt with housing issues demonstrates, 
staff members usually come to reflect a policy disposition if the incumbent has such 
interests. I would hypothesize that this occurs either because the staff are hired with such 
interests and a desire to be like the incumbent, or because the incumbent demands that the 
staff play limited supporting roles and work on issues of personal importance to them.
The final incumbent type acts more in the latter fashion.
Electoral
The fourth personality type is the electoral incumbent. The electoral incumbent was 
observed, on occasion, to have some elements of the previous three types of personality. 
For example, D had a policy interest in senior health care issues, A completed partisan 
travel with his DD throughout the country for other candidates of his party, and A also 
worked as a youth minister to improve the community. The main motivation o f the 
electoral incumbent, however, is a clear desire to contact more constituents out o f an 
overwhelming concern to do a ‘good’ job. One o f A’s constituents noted that he and his
2 8 5
staff members seemed inordinately more concerned about “image” than the other federal 
legislators with whom he’d worked. This constituent also picked up on the fact that the 
staffs were primarily working to advance the cause of the incumbent and any assistance 
that could be given to constituents was of an almost secondary importance. In short, the 
electoral incumbent had the strongest desire to return to office and seemed to be 
commonly found in electorally vulnerable settings.
The frenetic activity of the electoral model was most clearly seen in F’s district 
where her staff was among the most aggressive in their style of operation. However, her 
staff activities lacked the policy or personal direction foimd in the examples above. 
Rather, F’s field staff were mainly procuring work and putting out the incumbent’s name 
for the sake of incumbent promotion. A and D’s district enterprises also tended to the 
more frenetic side o f the continuum, albeit in different fashions. For D, a freshman 
incumbent, came the recognition that she would have to “make a mark” with constituents 
in order to attain reelection. Her RDSM suggested that there was an awareness of this 
vulnerability. Consequently they selected an issue, health care, and decided to make this 
issue the legislative and district centerpiece of the incumbent’s first term. While this 
might be considered a personal interest o f the incumbent, the motivations for its selection 
and highlight in her first term were clearly different than those say of C and his interest in 
low-income housing issues. In short, they were more electorally driven.
For D this approach meant offering legislation and being vocal in Washington. But 
it also meant that she would be required to devote personal attention to rallies, press 
conferences and visits to hospitals and senior centers to underline her legislative efforts 
with district connections and publicity. The incumbent’s efforts were to be underlined by
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the staff. Throughout the first two years the RDSM and the field representatives assisted 
this effort through outreach to groups in the health community. For the RDSM that 
meant visits with hospital administration and attention to funding for hospitals and 
programs. The field representatives were each given geographic responsibilities and 
instructions to hold office hours in the main communities in their areas. Ten o f the dozen 
locations where the field staff regularly held their office hours were in senior centers, 
largely on the direction of the RDSM. And all staff clearly recognized that their presence 
in these centers to maintain contact with an active voting bloc of constituents and to 
emphasize where possible D’s legislative efforts on health care issues.
While both A and D appear to have an electoral motivation to their staff allocation, 
A ’s staff members were more aggressive in their individual interactions with constituents. 
As noted in Chapter Three, A’s enterprise was unique in the fact that his COS spent the 
majority of his time at home. Observations and interviews suggested that that COS’ most 
important function was to serve as the incumbent’s liaison with the multiple military 
bases within the d is tr ic t .T h e  COS described his responsibilities as being 40% 
legislative, 40% constituency (largely military) and 20% partisan; a ratio that was much 
more heavily devoted to constituency matters than any o f the other COS’s I observed.
The DD supplemented the incumbent and COS in his responsibility for outreach with 
partisan supporters and the business community within the district. The DD noted that he 
spent, on average, almost two days per week out in the field interacting with constituents. 
A’s field representatives were amongst the most aggressive in their office hours, drop-bys
The COS suggested that he was at home for three reasons; 1) because o f A’s personality and his choice to 
have his key advisers (COS and DD) both at home every weekend, 2) an ideological desire to have 
government "closer to the people” and 3) because the military bases in the district demanded a lot of 
attention that is easier to grant from the district than from Washington.
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and outreach into the community. Because of their more geographic and individualized 
nature, A’s field representatives and DD had more aggressive after-hours schedules than 
D’s staff. While D’s staff had specific requirements with the individual groups that they 
interacted with, and could schedule these meetings, A’s field representatives and DD 
worked aggressively over geographic areas engaging multiple constituent groups, fi-om 
agriculture to business and education, and even partisan groups. A quick flip of the 
calendar suggested that A’s staff had the distinction of being the “busiest” group. Even 
his caseworkers had a distinctly aggressive posture in that they occasionally traveled with 
the field representatives out into the community. This was in part to more quickly serve 
and resolve cases, and also in part to make all o f the staff members feel like an equal part 
of the enterprise.
In the case of each of the three “electoral” examples above, incumbent’s district 
activity proved to be significantly more reliant on staff assistance than any of the other 
three personality types mentioned above. Especially in the case o f the “personal” and the 
“policy” incumbents, the staff seemed largely restrained to supportive roles that 
emphasized their limited informational or preparative activities. The “electoral” offices, 
and those few aggressive staff in the “partisan” offices are likely the few district staff 
members who have what might truly be considered representational roles in the 
incumbents’ enterprises. Ironically, I would also note that the extracurricular calendars 
of the “electoral” staff are more dominated by the demands of their employers. These 
demands are obvious in that the staff members are required to go to partisan and 
community meetings to surveil the landscape. Less obvious but clearly observed was the 
fact that the “electoral” incumbents had much greater staff support demands on the
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weekends and work periods when they were home. From strategy meetings, to fund­
raisers, to parades, to simple constituent meetings, the “electoral” incumbents seemed to 
place a greater emphasis on being staffed than did the “personal” or “policy” incumbents. 
I would suggest that this stems in part from the political necessities o f staff support but 
also in part from the personality differences between the types of incumbents. To 
conclude on the “electoral” incumbents, unlike D and A, F had no apparent concerns 
about electoral defeat, having handily won a number of primary and general election 
contests. Perhaps it is their perception of the situation and responsibilities, then, that 
groups D, A and F into a similar group of incumbents who allocate resources in order to 
avoid becoming marginal.
Conclusion
These cases suggest that there is indeed a relationship between the incumbent’s 
political motivation and the means by which they allocate their district staff. District 
staff were either compelled or restrained in their behaviors based on what the incumbent 
desired. It was also demonstrated that the delegate/trustee distinction is not a productive 
way to think about the tasks performed by district staff. I would suggest that future 
research on district staff pay close attention to the personality and motivations of the 
incumbent. This research might be able to examine the extent to which incumbent 
personality is causative or correlative to staff behavior. Research might also dwell on the 
degree to which incumbent’s “personalities” are shaped by their districts. Or, do 
incumbents project their beliefs and attitudes without regard to the nature of the district? 
For now, we should not simply follow Fiorina’s assumption that all incumbent (and staff) 
behavior is driven by electorally rational desires. The partisan, personal, and policy
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incumbents described above each demonstrated behavior that is not entirely rational in an 
electoral sense. In detailing the personality of each incumbent, it also became clear that 
many, but by no means all incumbents had a philosophy of representation that determined 
what they demanded of their staff.
Incumbent’s district philosophy
For some incumbents, allocation of staff resources was more deliberate than staff 
interpretations of the incumbents’ personal interests and dispositions. Rather, some 
incumbents had active philosophies about how their district staff should function. 
Hypothesis 2 -  Incumbents have philosophical interpretations of what functions are 
appropriate for their staff to conduct.
The different philosophical orientations were perhaps best captured by one of B’s 
constituents who noted that B and his staff were more “finishers” than “door openers”. 
The implication o f this statement is that B’s staff members were more likely to involve 
themselves in cases that came into their office than proactively engaging themselves in 
the community. The “finisher” tends to focus on the constituent problem as an end in 
itself. The goal is to resolve the problem or question and then other motivations can enter 
the equation. The “door opener” is more likely to be proactive or aggressive in seeking 
out new “doors” o f opportunity that might be pursued on behalf of the incumbent. In this 
sense, the individual constituent or problem often becomes a means to an end. The “end” 
being that the “door opener” will much more likely seek out situations that are likely to 
result in favorable resolution and maybe even media coverage for the incumbent. From
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the case studies, B and C were more clearly “finishers” while A and D could be described 
as “door openers.”* *
As the “finisher” and “door opener” categorizations imply, the different philosophies 
appear to be highly correlated to the routine and the aggressive office styles described in 
Chapter Three. Furthermore, interviews with incumbents suggest that the correlation is 
somewhat driven by the philosophical framework for their district staff members (i.e., C 
as a “conservative” and D as a “liberal”.) The incumbents who stated that it was perhaps 
an ideological or “constitutional” responsibility of the staff to merely handle constituent 
requests tended to have more routine offices. Incumbents who took more broadly defined 
views of their roles as elected representatives tended to free up their district staff to 
pursue more aggressive behaviors. Figure 4.3 demonstrates this correlation.
(Figure 4.3)
Dependent variable 
Independent Variable Routine Aggressive
Liberal Philosophy
Conservative Philosophy 3  c
A
B,C D
This correlation seemed to be much more clearly defined with staff than with the 
incumbent’s use of their personal time. As noted above, the personal incumbent such as 
B who has a routine office can spend relatively larger portions of his or her time engaged 
in tasks of representation in the office, while the electoral incumbent might defer many of 
his or her district tasks to empowered staff members. It appeared that in most cases.
" The “opener-finisher” contrast is clearly one of ideal types and does not imply that the “door opening” 
office does not follow through on constituent requests presented to their office. Rather, they are more 
likely to make proactive allocations o f  resources in order that they might generate more opportunities to
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incumbents hired staff that reflected their philosophical orientations on the appropriate 
role o f district staff. Here, one o f C’s staffers clearly noted the differences in 
philosophical orientation between the staff from the two United States Senate enterprises 
in his state. Where the office o f the senior senator was staffed by older individuals who 
were from their areas and reflected the “aw-shucks, down-home” approach of their boss, 
the office of the junior, more aggressive senator was full of younger, more aggressive 
staff that seemed to be “all about business and more aggressive in trying to help out.” To 
use the phrase above, the senior senator and his staff were more “finishers” and the junior 
senator and staff were “door openers.” Staff resumes and daily routines seemed to reflect 
their employer’s philosophies about how they should do their jobs as elected 
representatives, and how they should be recognized by constituents for that work. While 
A. his staff, and several constituents suggested that he had an ideological disposition to 
employ a routine district operation, the evidence of his staff behavior was contrary to this 
limited philosophy. This finding suggests that the philosophies of incumbents need to be 
observed in practice and not simply taken at their word.
Incumbent C’s RDSM characterized his employer’s limited philosophy as almost 
desiring a “part-time, semi-professional” district operation. This key staff member 
suggested that C is vastly distinct from the stereotypical Tip O’Neal version of a “local” 
politician. C does not view it as his, or his staffs responsibility to aggressively court the 
multitude of district interests. Rather, for C the emphasis is placed on a much more 
reactive and limited set of services. When asked how his use o f staff are different from 
other incumbents, an elite constituent suggested that C used them “less so, it is more o f a
help constituents. The two U.S. Senators from C’s states most cleanly approximated this “opener-finisher” 
contrast, and their constituents held both in high esteem.
292
personal touch.” One of his field representatives suggested the C is not motivated to use 
his staff “politically, to make sure they’re not out there cooking up work” by soliciting or 
advertising their services to constituent groups or organized forums. As was quoted in 
Chapter Three, C’s staff members do a lot o f “referrals” and merely try to “diagnose” and 
move along the “patients”. In fact, one of the field representatives suggested that he 
“advocates” on the part o f aggrieved constituents in only the most rare and obvious 
examples. To further the medical metaphor, C’s style appears to be much more the 
country generalist who helps everyone get along with little problems, whereas the 
aggressive office is much more like the specialist who advertises their unique abilities to 
the general public, hoping to help them out in more exclusive and rewarding manners.*^ 
C’s staff members did not “aggressively” represent the incumbent in the field. 1 do not 
believe that they would feel comfortable or be authorized to operate in such a fashion. 
Constituents noted that when C’s long-time district representative from his home city 
represented him at functions, she rarely did anything besides read a prepared set of 
remarks from C himself. One final indicator of the “part-time, semi-professional” 
manner of C ’s district staff enterprise lay in the two vacancies that existed in his 
hometown office for nearly a whole session of Congress. For an incumbent with a 
‘limited’ philosophy such as C, staff vacancies appear to be less vexing than for 
incumbents with greater levels of district anxiety.
One constituent provided an exceUent contrast between these two styles in the form 
of C and the junior U.S. Senator firom C’s state. In two separate cases, the senator’s 
office mailed letters to constituents notifying them first of assistance programs that were 
available through the federal government, and second, of a law enforcement grant that the
'* As Chapter Six will argue, such “specialized” assistance also imposes costs on the rest o f they system.
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senator had procured for the city. While this constituent noted that the senator “got the 
bail rolling" on both projects, he implied that C was also involved but in a manner more 
appropriate to his limited style. One of C’s mayors echoed this comparison in a 
discussion of the two officials’ work on transportation and river issues. From the 
mayor’s perspective, the senator was initially active on many projects and C only became 
involved at the later stages, and on “legitimate’’ projects when his seniority and influence 
might prevail. On most transportation issues, however, C and his staff took on nothing 
more than an “informational” role. These examples show C to be a “finisher” and the 
senator to be a “door opener.” Another illustration of this minimal philosophy came from 
one o f the city managers in C’s district, who had little interaction with the incumbent’s 
enterprise. In the one instance where he did call about information on a government 
program, he received the basic information, but no follow-up or offer of further 
assistance. Follow-up assistance or pushing for constituent interests would have not 
complied with the “philosophical” direction of C’s staff. With the exception o f the city 
manager, who seemed to prefer an incumbent with more interest and “clout”, C’s 
constituents seemed aware of and, for the most part, appreciative of C’s philosophical 
position and the fact that his staff were rarely seen. Of the primary cases, C was the 
incumbent most universally respected by his constituents. Virtually all the observations 
and interviews praised him as an “intellect”, “thinker” or a “cerebral” member with 
“integrity and compassion”. Others even gave him higher praise as being “intellectual 
and not partisan” or a member of “substance, not a glad hander.” In fact, the main issue 
raised by his opponent in two previous campaigns was the fact that C produced an 
inadequate amount of highway funding and other pork for the district. In turning back
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this challenger, one constituent noted that she felt the voters were “connected” to C’s 
philosophy. In sum, C’s routine office often seeks old fiiendly faces and sticks with 
long-established practices of representation and his “philosophy” of limited government 
and reactive staff seemed to play well with his constituents. To wit, one constituent 
noted that C is a “long standing positive fixture (in his state) and he doesn’t need 
surrogates (to do his job)”.
Other incumbents, however, do utilize surrogates more aggressively. Recalling 
Chapter Three, the aggressive philosophy is based on more proactive tasks on the part o f 
the incumbent and/or the district staff. They drop-by more, they go to more meetings, 
they contact more constituents, etc. This philosophy seems to be built on the assumption 
that the exercise of power on the behalf of constituents is justified on a number of levels. 
Intellectually, the aggressive incumbent justifies proactive staff functions as being more 
representative of constituent interests. One aggressive staff member firom C’s office 
seemed puzzled as to how representation of district interests might occur if he did not 
regularly drop in on constituents to find out their perceptions and problems. Some staff, 
particularly Democrats, also suggest that this activity is more ideologically 
representative. F’s RDSM noted the one of the major purposes of her office is to expose 
constituents to the many programs that they may not have known existed. I did not 
always find this to be a Democratic versus Republican distinction, however, as the 
section on partisanship below will demonstrate. Finally, the exercise o f staff power was 
electorally justified because staff universally recognized that their works benefited the 
level of name recognition and approval for their employers.
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Conclusion
The functions o f district staff are impacted by the philosophical interpretations of 
incumbents. The political philosophy of the incumbent, however, is not deterministic of 
the district staff behavior. While conservatives are more likely to have routine offices 
and liberals’ aggressive offices, there are clearly exceptions to this rule. Philosophical 
conservatives like A can be driven by electoral or partisan motivations that cause them to 
utilize aggressive district staff. On the other hand, a very senior liberal Democrat from a 
large urban area who was ideologically disposed to supporting increased government 
funding employed a similarly aged group of routine staff who did not aggressively peddle 
these programs to the constituents. As will be seen below, the philosophical distinction 
between incumbents is not necessarily an ideological dispute between visions o f more or 
less government. Of the four primary case studies, a Democrat and a Republican could 
each be classified as routine and aggressive in their philosophical interpretations.
There has been exhaustive research conducted on legislators’ perceptions o f their 
responsibilities in terms of how they should vote or represent their constituents. There 
has been very little examination of how this specifically translates into what they do with 
their time at home and in what capacity they want their district staff to act as 
representatives. Consequently, future research might build on this variable and seek out 
incumbent comment on what they perceive to be both their role as representatives as well 
as what they think is appropriate for their staff members. One might also examine what 
written and training manuals exist from office to office to provide guidance for newly 
hired staff.
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Political factors
The literature often focuses on two political factors as having a substantial impact on 
legislative behavior: the incumbent’s tenure in office and their electoral vulnerability.
My observations suggest that these variables also have an impact on how incumbents 
allocate their district staff.
Seniority
Hypothesis 3: Senior incumbents tend to allocate routine functions to their district staff 
enterprises more so than junior incumbents.
Of the four primary case studies, B and C are easily considered senior incumbents as 
each has served at least ten terms. Incumbents A and D were observed in their first and 
second terms respectively. Figure 4.4 captures this hypothetical relationship. It might 
also be logical to present Figure 4.4 as a continuum that hypothesized that seniority was 
correlated highly to routine office functions. As will be shown below, however, this 
correlation does not always exist!
(Figure 4.4)
Dependent variable
Independent Variable Routine__________ Aggressive
More Senior 
More Junior
B, C,E F
G D, A
Evidence for routinization
A direct contrast of the two senior case studies with the two junior case studies 
seems to uphold Hypothesis Three. The senior incumbents’ staff members seemed to: 
venture out into the district less, do fewer office hours, do fewer unannounced drop-by 
visits to local elites. In short, the senior offices did less. E’s office was typical o f the
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district enterprise. He employed one field representative and one RDSM who did the 
necessary proactive tasks. The other five staff members were largely limited to casework 
functions or other informational activities.
In the typical office important outreach functions often “fall by the wayside” as the 
RDSM, COS, and incumbent become too busy with legislative priorities. C’s RDSM 
noted that issues of substantial importance often sat on his desk with only the most 
cursory attention. He believed that issues of such importance would have received more 
attention from the incumbent and COS earlier in C’s career, but now those individuals 
had more pressing legislative tasks to perform and the RDSM himself had to supervise 
the activities of the routine office. B and C’s staff members made the argument that they 
were largely “too busy” with casework requests that came into the office to go out into 
the field and do the aggressive staff functions. One of H’s constituents noted that the 
field representative for his part of the district was “overburdened” with responsibilities 
and rarely went out into the community. The staff members do not have to go ‘out’ into 
the communities to become overburdened. The community and its problems will often 
come to the office. As one of C’s field representatives noted, “the longer you’re here, the 
more you’re dragged in.” Properly rationing time increasingly becomes an important part 
of the district staff member’s job. Even when they do find time to go into the field, staff 
for the senior incumbent is often just trying to get by. The activities and attitude of E’s 
lone field representative fiuther belie the diminished importance o f meeting new 
constituents over time. He felt that “maintaining contact with the many communities of 
the district; their leaders and the voters” was key to his job as he was the only person on
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staff to regularly fulfill this task for much of the district. Staff members from the more 
routine offices simply seem to get bogged down as time goes by.
Routinization can result from the dissipation of interest, as the case o f C seems to 
suggest, or it can result from an actual instruction to reprioritize staff behavior. In the 
latter case, B’s staff members were each initially required to spend at least one day per 
week in the field interacting with constituents. Over the years that outreach was scaled 
back to two part-days per month in the more remote parts of the district. Further 
evidence of the changing demands over time was reflected in the fact that both B and C 
transplanted their COS from the district offices to Washington to assist with legislative 
efforts after the first couple o f terms. The transfer of the COS occurred as the 
incumbents began to travel home less frequently.'^ It seems quite logical that as the 
incumbent’s career lengthens, so do the competing demands on their time. They are 
confronted with committee and constituency groups interested in legislative efforts, 
multiplying district groups and individual constituents that become familiar with the 
incumbent’s record, not to mention the time pressures o f staff, family and constituents 
that the incumbent must balance when he or she can return home. One must also 
consider that given the simple fact that the incumbent is re-elected, their popularity or 
name recognition is likely increasing throughout the first few election cycles. This 
publicity likely leads to an increased amount of communication and demand from the 
constituents. It can also lead to difficult situations where incumbents and staff confront 
demands from “old friends who are hard to turn down” and constituents who are new to
C’s scheduler noted, with an amazing degree o f honesty, that he came home on average once per month 
because o f his legislative responsibilities. A constituent from a nearby city recalled that C seemed to visit 
there once or twice per year, but definitely ”fewef" times than used to be the case. Even more honestly
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the district and want to interact with the incumbent. Given these demands, it is not 
surprising that B and C’s staff members increasingly became overwhelmed with the 
routine measures of district representation and were no longer able to get out and perform 
the proactive community outreach that A and D’s staff performed.
The younger incumbents, on the other hand, tended to be personally engaged in their 
districts as well as devoting substantial staff resources to building district name 
recognition. For example, A and D’s staff had considerably more effort devoted to ofRce 
hours and group outreach in their first t e r m s . T h e  total efforts of these incumbent 
enterprise make the term “permanent campaign” understandable. In their first term, A’s 
staff conducted outreach and office hours in areas of perceived electoral weakness, even 
when these trips produced few visitors or casework requests. According to the RDSM, 
what was important was that they were putting forth the effort to build the incumbent’s 
name recognition in the area. Notably, they did office hours in hometown of the 
challenger from the first election on a bi-weekly basis for the full two years of the first 
term. These efforts built towards the goal o f increasing the visibility or presence of A. 
From constituent remarks in later visits, these efforts seem to have paid off. One 
constituent, not particularly a supporter o f A, noted that the staff members “seemed to be 
more relaxed, campaigning less, but definitely around more” as the term wore on. 
Ironically, firom the staff perspective, the first two years were notable in that they felt like 
they continued to “campaign” even harder for A, while from the constituent perspective 
the aggressive outreach began to increasingly feel like proper representation. An
another senior incumbent’s RDSM told me that while the boss used to come home for the whole summer in 
the 1960s, that he had not even come home for the entire current summer.
'■* It is also interesting to note that A’s staff altered their behaviors after the first term and D’s staff all 
mentioned plans to “look at” what they were doing after the election.
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interesting paradox indeed! Even incumbents disposed to more routine styles feel 
pressure early in their careers to commit time and resources to learning the district. 
Inciunbent I’s RDSM highlighted the number of invitations that poured in during his first 
term from groups who wanted to familiarize themselves with their new representative. 
Ultimately the fact that I’s staff viewed these interactions as a dilemma while A and D 
were more likely to embrace each invitation as an opportunity, confirms that some types 
of incumbents are quicker to routinize their staff behaviors.
Increased expectations often a iustification
One of the contributing factors to junior incumbents conducting vigorous district 
operations lies in the fact that constituents have high expectations when a senior 
incumbent departs office. This situation is actually quite ironic when one considers that 
newly elected representatives must work hard to provide constituent services that in many 
cases the senior incumbent stopped providing years before. Nevertheless, these 
expectations were prevalent amongst G’s staff. One of his staff members noted they had 
“tried to sustain the perceived level o f service... it is a challenge more than an opportunity 
to replace a prominent member.” She felt that it was a “challenge” because the 
constituent’s perceptions o f the service provided by the prominent incumbent tended to 
be inflated. Consequently, G hired more staff than the predecessor had in the district, 
opened an additional office and hired staff that were more involved in community groups 
to compensate for these inflated perceptions. Over time these expectations seemed to 
lessen, according to the perception of staff members. And because o f the diminished 
expectations, the incumbent cut back on the number of advisories and town hall meetings 
that he and his staff were involved in, focusing instead on the more personal forms of
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interaction that suited his style. As Chapter Six vvill note, the ‘relaxed’ incumbent can 
also grow dangerously comfortable with the same set o f elite constituents.
Comments about high expectations were also prevalent in interviews with A’s 
constituents. A was observed in a relatively junior and electorally marginal setting. His 
COS suggested that the first two years were dominated by a “siege mentality” brought on 
by the fact that they had 1) only marginally won their first election and that they were 2) 
living with high expectations of constituents who compared A to the previous incumbent 
and 3) that they faced the constant presence of a challenger who had announced just 
weeks after A’s first election to Congress.*^ One constituent who saw A as a “rising star” 
nevertheless suggested that he wasn’t as “committed” to the district as was his 
predecessor (E). To this constituent. Incumbent E “didn’t have to be told about district 
issues to take action, he and his staff knew, and they helped and rewarded themselves for 
such actions.” A number of the constituents did not think that A would ever have the 
level of “district connection” that E had because of his different style, purpose and 
ability. Another constituent who was also a supporter of both E and A noted that “it’s 
hard to think of anyone who would meet the requirements” of what E and his staff did for 
the district. These comments reflect the difficulties in fulfilling the high expectations of 
constituents. Consequently, A’s early district behavior was directed not only by what the 
Republican leadership and other legislators ftom his state delegation suggested would
From this point o f view, the actions o f first term district enterprises can probably not be put into tidy 
boxes. Because things happen so quickly and there are so many competing influences on the incumbent in 
structuring the district enterprise, perhaps it is the case that for the first term, the enterprise is simply 
expanding where it can, when it has the resources. As was observed with A and D and as comments ftom 
other staff suggest, the first session is often a learning experience for incumbents and their staff. Ideas 
proposed during this term often don’t survive the re-election. For example, A’s Medicare task force was 
formed in response to a substantial first term issue that dissipated after his reelection. Along those same 
lines, staff who are not cut out for the enterprise won’t return for the second term. One constituent noted
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work, but also by a need to conduct the familiar activities of E and his staff and respond 
to the challenges of the next opponent. Visits to A’s district in his second term suggested 
that he and his staff members were growing into their responsibilities and that the 
constituents were becoming more comfortable with the job they were doing. In fact, 
several constituents, in noting A ’s national position in the Republican Party, suggested 
that he was already on par or above E in his service to the district, or that he was at least 
overcoming “growing pains.” This relatively rapid turnaround seems to confirm both the 
high expectations confronted by new incumbents, but also the secure positions that 
incumbents come to enjoy very quickly in their careers in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. As a sign o f the inevitable transformation to come, one of A’s field 
representatives stated that because of all the extra work generated by A’s state and 
national visibility, that there simply “wasn’t enough time” to do the same activities that 
he had done earlier in A’s career.
An E.xception
In allowing for the increased “routinization” of offices as an incumbent increases his 
or her tenure in office, 1 would also note an exception that might confound the utility of 
this variable. The literature on “life cycles” of incumbents largely presumes that as 
seniority is acquired, the district career invariably suffers, representation declines, the 
incumbent focuses more heavily on Washington behaviors, and their “resources” are 
more committed to Washington. What is often not explained, however, is that the 
“resource” equation begins to shift largely because increased seniority brings new staff to
this as the probable reason for A’s slow development; “(he) hasn’t had time to weed out the greener 
people.”
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the personal office and committees in Washington. More importantly, the presumption is 
made without an analysis of district staff behavior.
The first part o f the exception is a familiar one; that some incumbents continue their 
personal devotion to their district activities regardless o f their increased tenure in office.
B is the familiar example here. He enjoys going home and “pounding out a street on a 
Saturday morning.” While he admittedly moves slower than other incumbents and does a 
smaller mixture of activities, he also does things in his district that other incumbents do 
not do. Furthermore, B has a style that doesn’t seem to have altered over the course of 
his career. In his own words, his routine “hasn’t changed at all.” I would speculate that 
B’s behavior is explained largely because o f his personal nature and partly because of his 
electoral security and lengthy electoral experience in the area.
The second part of the exception lies with the district staff. The presumption of the 
“life cycles” literature ignores the fact that simply because the motivations and behavior 
of the incumbent change as they acquire seniority, it does not logically follow that the 
behaviors of the district staff must also change dramatically. 1 would accept that 
increased seniority does have some impact on district staff behavior. The examples of B 
and C suggest that the longer one serves in office, the more work is automatically 
generated through mail and phone calls to the office. But I would also note that B and C 
were initially disposed to have less aggressive offices than either A or D and that F’s 
office continued to operate in an aggressive fashion even though she was going into her 
fourth third term in office. Therefore, it is possible that the activities of the RDSM and 
other district staff could actually become more aggressive as the incumbent’s time in 
office expands and his or her personal focus shifts to legislative matters.
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Hypothesis 4: On occasion, staff for senior incumbents can actually increase or m aintain 
aggressive outreach behavior for the incumbents who are often absent from the district.
Some incumbents seemed quite willing to allow the same individuals to stay on their 
district payroll indefinitely regardless of their proactivity. For example, three of five 
district staff from a senior urban incumbent had worked for him for over twenty years 
and they rarely left their office. These long-serving district staff members demonstrate 
that tenure alone is not a sufficient explanation for aggressive behavior. Instead, E’s 
RDSM serves as a notable illustration of this hypothesis. Largely because of the fact that 
E was heavily invested in the legislative process and rarely returned home, his RDSM 
was entrusted to run the district operation with the aggressive assistance of only one field 
representative. The experience of E’s staff suggests that while the numbers and 
responsibilities of district staff appear to become more limited as the career progresses, in 
actuality, power can be consolidated and expanded into one or two key staff members 
provided that the incumbent empowers those individuals and they desire the exercise of 
that authority. The accumulation of power in key district staff is perhaps most likely to 
occur in well-regarded incumbents of “substance”. E’s field representative suggested that 
his boss was “full of substance, so all (they) really have to do is make a presence.” This 
status was also reflected in the expectations of the constituents. One local businessman 
remarked, “I’m a Democrat because E’s a Democrat.” The staff member later noted that 
this was precisely the type o f substance that gave him the credibility to carry out his tasks 
as the lone field representative. This credibility extended to an even greater degree to the 
RDSM. One constituent noted that when they saw the RDSM, “they saw the incumbent.” 
It might even be argued that as incumbents begin to learn about their districts and
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constituents, they consequently need to perform less district activity and can have staff 
fill the holes that they discover. Here again, one can see E’s RDSM growing more 
important as the surrogate incumbent with each successive term that E became more 
ingrained into the Washington community. Further evidence was provided by one of A’s 
constituents who noted that A, in his second term, had “better access, less credit-claiming 
and more personal help” because of his knowledge and the use of his staff.
The conclusion to be drawn is that we should not automatically assume that seniority 
diminishes the district efforts of the incumbent. Some junior incumbents were less 
inclined to be aggressive and some senior incumbents maintained very active “home 
styles.” To follow the stereotype eliminates the possibility that some incumbents and 
staff maintain, or even increase, the aggressive activities of the early career. Assuming 
that staff behavior directly mimics incumbent behavior also ignores the findings from 
Chapter Three that staff themselves are rational political actors, sometimes acting as 
much for their own political careers as for their employers. It is difficult to classify staff 
behavior simply based on the incumbent’s tenure in office. One needs to look at the 
context of each incumbent’s place and time in office. Seniority must be considered with 
the personal factors and goals mentioned above as well as with their current electoral 
status, future career ambitions and staff motivations.
Electoral status
Hypothesis 5: Incumbents that perceive themselves to be more electorally secure are 
likely to have more routine allocations of district staff.
The observations largely suggested a correlation between the incumbent’s perception 
of his or her electoral status and the aggressiveness o f their staff allocation. B and C
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were long-serving incumbents who generally won their reelection with comfortable 
margins. A and D are younger incumbents who had not yet established that comfort. 
Although with two elections behind him, A’s style suggested that he was moving toward 
a more comfortable attitude about his reelection prospects. Figure 4.5 suggests how we 
might think about district staff and their electoral status.
(Figure 4.5)
Dependent variable 
Independent Variable Routine Aggressive
Electorally Vulnerable 
Electorally Secure
D, A
B,C F
Evidence of the “safe” incumbent
In the case of electoral marginality, my observations confirmed what the literature 
suggests about incumbent behavior. Most particularly, Fenno (1978) found the personal 
behaviors of junior members to be more electorally vulnerable and have “expansionist” 
(aggressive) behaviors while senior members were more “protectionist” (routine) by 
nature. Other literature suggests that such behavior is performed to secure one’s position 
against national “tides” that might sweep an otherwise “safe” incumbent into a 
competitive election. In either event, the important factor here is the impact of that 
perception on the incumbent’s allocation of district staff. As Fenno and others correctly 
identify, it is not the actual margin of victory that is crucial to incumbent calculations so 
much as it is the feeling of uncertainty about the next election. To gauge those 
perceptions, I asked and observed each incumbent what they, and their staff, needed to do 
to stay in office. My findings echoed the literature’s understanding of widespread 
electoral anxiety.
See Chapter Two for a review o f this literature.
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The staff members of “safe” incumbents, most notably B and C, generally were the 
most routine in their behaviors. The previous section suggested that these staff explained 
their routine natures as a consequence of an accumulation of work and contacts that 
naturally came over the progression of a congressional career. This variable suggests that 
the “routinization” o f an office might also be arrived at by the choice of individual staff 
members; that as the incumbent becomes less likely to be defeated, it is less important for 
the staff to be aggressively engaging their communities. “Routinization” becomes self- 
fulfilling. This process is primarily reflected in the incumbent’s behavior. B was an 
excellent example of the routine and “safe” incumbent. He closely resembled Fenno’s 
(1978) portrait of a “protectionist” incumbent, comfortable with his reelection 
constituency and motivated by a desire to maintain that particular group of supporters. B 
explained that after he’d survived a few elections, there was a “slippage” as he grew more 
comfortable spending a portion of his weekend time in the district with his family, as 
opposed to meeting with groups of constituents. When in the district, B noted that he 
attended meetings by “invitation only”, had no town hall meetings and very rarely 
traveled to “new places.” One typical weekend saw B conduct a number o f visits to 
familiar groups of constituents in his home and in local businesses, attend celebrations 
(e.g. anniversary and Eagle Scout commemoration) and speak before a group meeting 
(annual Rotary award dinner). This tendency to avoid “new places” was explained best 
by another incumbent’s staff member; “when you are a freshman, you get invited to 
everything in the district and must prioritize where to go.” Eventually, accepting or 
prioritizing these invitations leaves the routine incumbents and staff with a set o f familiar 
individuals and groups.
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B’s staff members also demonstrated the extent to which the attitudes and behavior 
o f the staff become routinized over time. His staff and constituents recognized that the 
staff members, most o f whom who’d been with B for his entire House career, “don’t 
seem to be going to new things and trying to visit with new people.” One staff member 
suggested that they “have no time to meet new people... we attend other meetings by 
invitation only.” B’s staff, spread throughout the district in four small offices, appeared 
to be actively engaged in keeping up appearances, but not reaching out to new 
constituents. Even though B has an increasingly “new district” with new suburban faces, 
his personal schedule, as well as the daily activities of his staff, reflect a preoccupation 
with providing access to traditional supporters. Perhaps B himself summed it up best; 
“It’s hard to turn down old friends.”
The “marginal” staff is proactive
Staff for A and D. on the other hand, were much more aggressive in their behaviors. 
These incumbents perceived higher levels of campaign competition than did either B or C 
and their staff. It is possible that the vulnerability of the incumbent could cause a direct 
response from the incumbent or a voluntary increase in the aggressive nature o f staff 
themselves. In the more direct situation, an incumbent«or a COS might instruct the staff 
toward the more aggressive style of behavior to compensate for weaknesses. A s office 
was a better example o f the former description. For A’s staff, their purpose was clearly 
laid out by the COS and the DD. All staff indicated a frank understanding o f their role as 
aides in the incumbent’s electoral enterprise. Furthermore, this attitude could be seen in 
their regular behavior. For the COS, it was the wide range in individual interactions he
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had with the military bases of the district. For the DD, it was the substantial amount of 
time devoted to business and community leaders. In fact, the DD spent one morning per 
week conducting “office hours” and “making the roimds” of the local officials in the 
hometown of A’s first campaign opponent. When the DD was in the field he frequently 
informed constituents of the staffs availability and the services that they could perform. 
A trip to a large firm in the district provided an illustration for this advertisement; the DD 
asked if there was “anything from a governmental side of things that caused this 
(problem)? What about anything from the legislative point of view? Let us know if we 
can do anything.” This type of comment was not distinctive to A’s COS or DD. It was 
the anthem of his field staff as well.
Even for A’s field representatives there was a clear “aggressiveness” about the 
nature of their outreach and the necessity to prove to constituents that their boss was 
working hard to represent his constituents. The staff were simply “out there” more often 
than staff in most other offices, making sure that they were listening to constituents and 
offering all the possible connections and assistance that their office could provide. One 
of the clearest examples o f this attitude was the staff member who had a time formula 
that ensured that she was meeting a mix of old and new constituents on a weekly, 
monthly, and quarterly basis. In fact, she is an excellent case for comparison. A staff 
member for A’s predecessor, E, also utilized lists to chart his outreach activities. The 
difference between the two staff members was that the E staffer’s list merely mentioned 
the names of individuals with whom he had come in contact over his many visits to the 
communities of his geographic area. There was no plan for re-contact of these 
individuals, or the suggestion that new names were added on a regular basis, clearly what
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Fenno would refer to as “protectionist” behavior. Furthermore, while A’s staff member 
had goals to create and build relationships, the underlying justification for E’s staff 
member was to “maintain”; “dropping a note or a card, so as not to pick up any work, is 
just as good as putting in your face.” While the visits by A’s staff are highly time- 
consuming, they represent an important element of the aggressive staff enterprise; 
advertising their hard work and willingness to serve on behalf of the absent incumbent. 
Observations of A’s DD and field representatives revealed a qualitatively different 
approach to meeting people in the district than with E. Characteristically, one of the local 
elites remarked on the assertiveness o f the staffer, “I’m truly surprised you’re here, is it 
election time?” Evidently this area or constituent had not been on E’s list o f  familiar 
faces. This was the most notable distinction between the two offices. E’s staff member 
suggested that there was a definite increase in office activity in the months before an 
election. In A’s office their statements coupled with my observations indicated that they 
performed consistently high levels of service throughout the first few years in office, 
regardless of proximity to election day. Finally, observations of A’s staff also suggest 
that they would be unwilling to grant the type of credit to local officials that B’s staff had 
farmed out to state and city legislators for projects or cases resolved. Rather, requests for 
local jobs and projects are deemed to be highly important objects to attain in the name of 
A alone.
The other possibility is an incumbent’s office that is aggressive in a more voluntary 
nature. In the case o f D’s enterprise, the behaviors were similar to those observed in A’s 
office, but the rationales were not as explicitly political in nature. Rather, I would 
suggest that the staff in this case was instructed early in the term and came to imderstand
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the political importance of the jobs they were to carry out. Additionally, much of the 
more politically sensitive work was confined to the RDSM, while for A the political work 
was spread out amongst a number o f district staff. So any urgency expressed by the 
incumbent would be confined to the RDSM.
The most political work, the campaign, also suggests a distinction between marginal 
and safe incumbents that I observed in these district staff offices. With the exception of 
C’s RDSM, who left the federal office to work on the campaign, A and D’s staff were 
much more involved in the election campaigns than the routine offices. This clearly 
becomes the case when one examines the political nature o f the activities performed by 
their RDSMs throughout the two years of their election cycles. For A and D’s top staff 
aides, their job responsibilities extended to fund-raising, candidate recruitment, and in 
some cases even recruitment, supervision or management of the actual campaign. Their 
activities were much more aggressive and proactive than the limited campaign activities 
of H’s staff discussed earlier in this chapter. Where the phase of the calendar appears to 
make a difference to routine offices, it does not appear to have a huge impact on the more 
aggressive offices. Incumbents who view the election process as a “permanent 
campaign” are almost certainly devoting federal staff resources to explicitly campaign- 
related activities, as was described in Chapter Three.
Exceptions?
It does not always hold that junior incumbents are more aggressive than senior 
incumbents. There are differences between B/C and A/D that do not appear to be 
determined solely by their tenure in office. For example, C and D have similarly sized 
districts. While C who is the more secure o f the two incumbents, he has four offices
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dispersed throughout his district. D has only one ofBce in the middle of her district. To 
use Fenno’s terminology, such a disposition of resources might suggest that C is acting in 
an “expansive” fashion seeking to represent constituents even in areas where his electoral 
performance is not strong while D is much more clearly “protectionist” allocating her 
staff office to the center of the city with her re-election core. These two examples 
struggle against the hypothesis in some part because one would expect that the senior 
incumbent would want to consolidate his presence in the known and supported areas of 
the district while the junior incumbent would want to expand her efforts throughout the 
district, and geographically, these offices are not performing in such a manner.
A second exception to this hypothesis was observed in F’s office. She had the most 
aggressive of any district operation, yet she had handily won each of her three election 
campaigns. F’s case suggests that the simple act of acquiring seniority and general 
election security are not sufficient in explaining aggressive staff behavior. F was not a 
primary case so I was unable to acquire substantive information about her motivations 
and behavior but I speculate that because the district is highly ethnic in nature and 
dominated by one party, that she might actually be vulnerable to a primary challenge. 
Hence the notion of “senior” and “junior” needs to be specified to take account of 
districts such as F’s where the electoral security o f seniority takes much longer to 
establish, if it ever can truly be made so. Related to this exception would also be the time 
and behavior o f personal incumbents like B or G who are individually aggressive in their 
activities in the district but have largely routine staff enterprises.
A final exception to this hypothesis is the potential impact of a senior incumbent on a 
junior incumbent who share a city or region. In one mid-sized city that was largely in B’s
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district but also contained several thousand constituents o f a newly elected incumbent, 
representation appeared to be entirely handled by B and his staff. While it would not 
have been logical to place a district office there, there was no evidence that eighteen 
months into the initial term that the new incumbent had staff who did office hours, 
stopped by or even made phone calls to the Chamber o f Commerce, county courthouse or 
local newspaper. In short, the junior incumbent seemed to be entirely deferring to the 
senior incumbent. This case suggests that junior incumbents are not always the 
‘‘expansionists” that the literature suggests. Perhaps it is the case that because the senior 
incumbent has represented this area for a considerable period, the junior incumbent has 
calculated that expending efforts to become known in the area would not be worth his or 
his staffs time. This suggests an interesting future topic o f inquiry; the extent to which 
offices defer to their neighboring senior incumbents. '
Conclusion
Seniority and electoral status are likely to be important factors in determining how 
incumbents allocate their district staff. Whether the aggressive allocations were 
specifically directed by the incumbent or were understood by the field representatives, 
the fact remains that the junior and more electorally vulnerable incumbents tended to 
have more proactive staff enterprises. As incumbents became more senior and/or 
electorally secure, their staff usually fell into routinized patterns of behavior. Therefore, 
future staff research should investigate both the place in career of the incumbent as well 
as how they perceive their electoral situation. One other area o f future investigation 
might be how candidates with progressive ambition utilize their district staff to assist in 
their possible promotion to another higher office. While I tangentially encountered
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incumbents making this transition (E) or pondering a run for higher office (C and H), I 
did not think to include questions about the impact of these calculations on staff behavior.
Partisanship
Hypothesis 6: The incumbent’s party affiliation has little impact on the manner in which 
they allocate their district staff.
While partisanship is a commonly used variable in measurements o f the variation in 
incumbents’ behavior, I would suggest that it had only a minimal impact on the allocation 
of staff resources in the district. In fact, I would suggest that this is one of the more 
notable findings o f this dissertation. Of the four primary cases, a Democrat and a 
Republican could each be found amongst the ranks of the routine and the aggressive 
enterprises. Furthermore, there were no clear patterns amongst the secondary cases when 
divided by party. To the extent that there were partisan differences amongst the cases, 
they were found in the ideological orientations of incumbents. As conservatives, one 
might rationalize that C,H and even B would allocate small and reactive staff to remain 
consistent with their political philosophies. In fact, C’s staff consistently suggested that 
his approach to representation was the main reason behind their reactive daily 
functions.’’ Further evidence was found in a contrast of G and H. While the two 
incumbents shared almost overlapping constituencies, their staff members performed 
different functions. While G’s staff utilized more personal contacts with groups in the 
district, H’s staff tended to rely on strict contacts with identified supporters and party 
contacts. Perhaps the difference in the level of assistance offered by each office was
C serves as perhaps an exceptional case here. He and his staff were the only observed case to be so 
steadfast in their commitment to limited government. This position also was reflected in his lack o f pursuit 
o f district spending and the refusal of PAC contributions to his campaign.
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determined by their philosophical direction. The fact that F and D were amongst the 
most liberal of the cases and had aggressive enterprises further substantiates political 
philosophy as a variable.
In general, it appeared that Republicans, as conservatives, tended to have more 
routine district enterprises. Just as with the above variables, however, there appear to be 
exceptions that confoimd philosophy. Most notably, the aggressive outreach efforts of A 
and his staff suggest that not all conservatives will apply their philosophical directives of 
limited government to the size and functions o f their district staff. Furthermore, while C 
would be considered a conservative relative to F or D, his ideological interest group 
ratings place him squarely in the middle of all incumbents.
The same relationship probably applies to the majority or minority status o f each 
incumbent. It does not seem likely that the incumbent’s electoral status and philosophical 
interpretation of staff functions would be affected by their party’s place in institutional 
power. 1 would accept, however, that there might be clear incentives to utilize staff 
differently at the highest levels of party officeholders. The discussion of institutional 
leadership does lead to one final comment about partisanship and district staff. Speaker 
Gingrich made a notable effort in 1994 to reinvigorate the legislative Republican Party by 
centralizing its power in Washington. This effort had a clear impact on district staff. The 
year 1994 usually invokes memories of the Contract with America, but that year the 
Republican leadership also suggested to their fireshmen members the utility of a staff 
model whereby the COS remained in the home district. More than forty o f the seventy- 
three freshmen adopted this model on the selling point that it would help with their 
reelection efforts. For the Speaker it had the additional incentive of leaving junior party
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members with less key advice in dealing with institutional leadership, and hence, more 
malleable to his direction.
As compared to the seniority and electoral status o f the incumbent, partisanship is a 
weak determinant of district staff allocations. Nevertheless, future investigations of 
district staff should continue to look at distinctions between Democrats and Republicans, 
conservatives and liberals, and the majority and minority parties.
Geoeraphv
Urban-Rural
Hypothesis 7: Urban staff enterprises are more aggressive in their orientations than are 
rural enterprises.
Urban offices generally tended to be “busier” than rural offices. This functions at the 
obvious level where one would expect a greater population to generate more work for the 
office. But it also functions at a more subtle level where urban staff appeared to be more 
aggressive in their office functions even beyond the normal “business” associated with 
their office. In Figure 4.6, the case studies are ordered from most to least urban and from 
routine to aggressive. The figure suggests, however, that there is no more than a loose 
correlation between the nature of the district and their with their level of aggressiveness.
Figure 4.6
Nature of District Rural 
*_____________
Mixed 
_______*___
Urban 
________________ *
J,K B,L A,E,C D,G,H I,F M
Style o f office Routine 
*____________
Aggressive 
_______________ *
C B,I,J,K E,G,H AD,L,M F
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The evidence is mixed
The evidence that drove this hypothesis was the stark contrast between a perceived 
ideal type urban (F) and rural office (B). The disparity was further driven by my initial 
impression that an urban office was more likely to: 1) confront a greater number of 
constituents on any given day and 2) that those constituents would have problems with a 
greater number of federal programs on which federal staff could assist. Furthermore, the 
cynical campaign pundit might suggest that an incumbent in a larger urban area, F for 
instance, is going to get less press coverage than an incumbent who is the only House 
member representing numerous small and mid-sized cities, say B or C. Consequently, 
the argument would be made that the urban incumbent needs to develop more individual- 
level connections with the proactive assistance of their staff to ensure that their coverage 
competes with the numerous other incumbents in the area. While observations suggested 
a slight tendency for urban offices to be more aggressive, the routine nature of several of 
these urban offices, especially C and I, suggest that Hypothesis #8 is a very weak 
proposition when compared to other variables and probably does not merit future study. 
The experiences of C and I suggest that simply occupying an urban office will not result 
in an incumbent utilizing an aggressive district enterprise.
An exception: A rural philosonhv?
Some constituents actually suggested a disparity between urban and rural legislators 
that ran in the other direction. These constituents argued that rural incumbents were 
more active than were urban incumbents, a disparity that might be called the Southern 
Paradox.** The paradox has been discussed repeatedly in this dissertation in the form of
'* Omstein (1975) and Fenno (1978) both concluded that northern members employed more staff than 
southern legislators in their total enterprises. Both also referred to the fact that southern legislators were
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B and G’s personal activities in their districts. The personal incumbents mentioned above 
are philosophically more disposed to conduct greater amounts o f district work. A state 
senator’s staff member from B’s district made this case most eloquently. Based on this 
individual’s interaction with numerous state and federal legislators, it was his experience 
that rural legislators were much more likely to personally, or through their staff, handle 
requests that came to the office, while legislators from urban areas tended to more 
quickly refer cases to the appropriate state or local offices. Perhaps it is also possible that 
the personal incumbents are more likely to represent southern rural districts, whereas 
northern and urban incumbents, be they Democrat or Republican, are much more likely 
to have their staff simply dispose of casework requests. While this strikes me as an 
interesting question for future research, I would conclude that this “paradox” observed by 
a number of constituents is probably overstated. At any rate, while the personal style 
might happen to generate a slightly higher level of casework based on the fact that the 
incumbents are out in the field generating a few more cases per week, their efforts do not 
compare with the more aggressive field operations o f incumbents A or F in terms of the 
numbers of constituents that would be contacted in a given week.
Size of district
Hypothesis #8: Small urban districts are likely to have more aggressive staff while larger 
districts have more routine enterprises because they are harder to represent.
How does an incumbent overcome the geographical dilemma o f having a dispersed 
district? Do they have more offices and more staff? Do they allocate more personal time 
to the district? Do they take more aggressive tracks of elite contact? These are critical
more reliant upon “personal” interaction with their constituents. As such, they tended to eschew the 
intervention o f surrogates or the use o f substantial office perquisites. This contrast seemed particularly apt
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questions for incumbents from large districts. Hypothesis #8 seems more o f a corollary 
to #7 than a brand new variable. At first this variable seemed quite intuitive. Early 
observations suggested that it might be the case that the overall size of the district had a 
greater impact than whether the district was purely urban or rural. It seemed intuitive that 
an incumbent from a larger geographical area would have a harder time interacting with 
the constituents and communities of his or her district. Fenno (1978) referred to large 
geographical districts as being “segmented” and that contact with the incumbent could be 
sparse. My observations confirmed that feeling of isolation. One of B’s constituents, 
who through business dealings had worked closely with a number of incumbents in the 
past, noted that one incumbent had a district so large that he rarely even came to this 
particular constituent’s portion of the district. Furthermore, this incumbent never called 
or interacted with elite constituents in the area. In the case o f this incumbent a 
calculation appears to have been made that this was not an essential part o f his district, 
and then the incumbent and staff consistently limited service there. Another explanation 
for why incumbents from larger districts avoid portions of their district was offered 
earlier in this chapter. The case of the newly elected incumbent who only represented a 
small portion of a city held largely by B suggests that incumbents from larger districts 
might also defer to senior incumbents who border their districts. The moral to both of 
these lessons appears to be that incumbents often go where people know, and like, them. 
Furthermore, they appear to use their staff to largely reinforce these relationships rather 
than to strike out and act as surrogate incumbents to the constituents who do not regularly 
interact with the actual incumbent. Both of the aforementioned constituents noted that 
staff were just as absent as the incumbents.
in comparing the personal stances, office routines and campaign styles o f B and G with those o f C.
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G and H’s staff, in evaluating each other’s operations, suggested that the size o f the 
district does have some impact. Individuals from both staff noted that G’s district was 
larger and that his staff had more “geographical” responsibilities, as opposed to H’s 
“issue-based” office. Despite the fact that the larger rural districts appeared likely to 
have routine styles, this variable still seems to be confounded by the activities o f routine 
urban offices such as C, H and I. Clearly the size and nature o f  the district have an 
impact on the style o f representation. Larger districts are more likely to have multiple 
offices with staff dispersed between them. Yet, the size and nature of the district 
probably acts more as an intervening variable causing minor alterations in the 
incumbent’s personal style and philosophy about district activities. Further examination 
o f similar sized district enterprises is necessary to more fully gauge the impact o f area on 
representation. It would also be interesting to more fully compare enterprises with 
multiple offices with those operating out of one central office.
Nature of district
Hypothesis 9 -  Homogenous districts make it easier for aggressive representation while 
incumbents from heterogeneous districts will probably rely on routine staff.
Some congressional districts tend to have a dominant community of interests. In 
most cases it will be a driving economic interest. A state capitol, large university, military 
base, or an international airport provide some common examples. The community of 
interests might also be social or cultural in nature. For example, a rural district that is 
dominated by small towns of a particular ethnic heritage or a shared political or religious 
identity will influence staff behavior. An incumbent who represents such a homogenous 
community of interests will have an easier time allocating an aggressive staff because
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they are less likely to miss important issues in the district or fail to identify important 
community leaders that are willing to work with the incumbent. Incumbents, constituents 
and staff members all noted that there are “areas” within districts that are more or less 
favorable to the incumbent. Combined with the communities o f interests, one can see 
how the homogenous district is easier for the staff to navigate, while the more 
heterogenous districts provide representational dilemmas for staff and incumbents. It 
might also be possible that homogenous districts produce more aggressive offices 
because of an extraordinary need for service in a district that is commonly shared by a 
large number of constituents. This could range from welfare, housing or health 
assistance in a poor urban district to veteran’s benefits in a district with military bases to 
government research grants in a district with a large state imiversity. In each case the 
aggressive office has a large community of interest to target. This focus might seem 
ironic to the extent that an incumbent from a more heterogeneous district should logically 
be expected to be more proactive in interacting with the multiple communities within his 
or her district. Indeed, Fenno implied that incumbents with a “poorer sense of fit” will 
“need to spend time at home cultivating constituencies” (1978, pl27). This would seem 
intuitive given that the “poor sense of fit” also comports with an electoral challenge to the 
incumbent. My observations suggested the opposite; that having a natural community 
allowed the incumbent to be proactive, while having a greater number of groups to 
interact with resulted in most incumbents and staff doing their jobs in a much more 
conservative maimer. This is not to suggest that incumbents firom heterogenous districts 
are not active. Rather, based on my limited number of observations, incumbents and staff 
who had more homogenous district interests appeared to engage and solicit those
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communities much harder than the enterprises from heterogenous districts. Perhaps this 
is best explained by the fact that incumbents from heterogenous districts were well 
established and less electorally vulnerable. Hence, the very fact that the district 
contained multiple interests served to protect these incumbents because even the 
incumbent with a number of district staff cannot adequately address the needs of all the 
important commimities of a heterogenous district. Without the assistance o f staff, the 
potential challenger faces an incredibly daunting task in taking his or her message to the 
all of these different communities.
The primary case studies appear at first glance to reflect tfiis hypothesis. A and D’s 
districts were centered on military bases and a state capitol and large state university 
respectively, while B and C represented districts that had much greater economic, social 
and political diversity. A and D tended to utilize their staff “aggressively” in courting 
these dominant constituency groups. For A’s staff a “pretty big chunk” o f their time was 
devoted to military casework and projects, but I would also note that A utilized his staff 
courting the small communities throughout the district. In fact. A, as a younger 
incumbent, seemed to fully grasp the changing communities of the district, or at least his 
changing perceptions of the communities during the first term in office. The office 
switched its organization from an issue-based division of responsibilities to a fiilly 
geographic-based organization after eighteen months because some parts o f the district 
had “dramatically different” sets o f issues and it “made more sense” for them to resolve 
things in a geographic fashion. In this case each of A’s field representatives was able to 
focus on the parts of the district that weren’t from the homogenous core. This was
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notably different from E’s office where staff were basically subservient to the demands of 
the military bases and the substantial amounts of casework that they generated.
The routine nature o f B and C might also be explained by the fact that older 
incumbents have set styles and that older, more routine enterprises have a hard time 
dealing with changing communities. B was demonstrably frustrated with the growing 
parts of his district. “These aren’t the people I grew up with.. .half of them wouldn’t 
even know me on the street anymore.” *^  Neither he nor his staff seemed engaged in new 
constituent groups or interests. He spoke constantly about how he was nearing the end of 
his career and that while he generally enjoyed most aspects o f the jobs, the changing 
nature of the district would be a factor in his final decision to retire. Changed 
communities after redistricting also impact district enterprises. After the 1990 
reapportionment, H closed two of his four offices as a number of his counties were drawn 
into other districts. Note that the offices closed after reapportionment, in advance o f the 
actual redistricting, so that they could focus on a district that would become “more 
heavily urban and familiar.” Consequently they “used to be out a lot more than (they 
were) now.” A similar impact also occurred in both C and G’s offices. The number of 
towns and counties in each district was reduced and the casework responsibilities for 
each staff member were tightened. In a way then, the process of redistricting serves to 
reinforce the “routinization” that seems to accrue with seniority.
Just as the urban nature and the size of the district appear to be problematic, so to 
does the “community interest” variable; not all homogenous districts are represented by 
aggressive enterprises. Here G, H and I come to mind. Perhaps it is the case that
An amusing comment. Most incumbents spend hundreds o f thousands o f dollars in their campaigns and 
still would not be recognized by more than 10% of their constituents on the street
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geography contributes to the incumbent’s personal style and philosophy of staff 
allocation. In this, C provides an excellent case study: he divides his staff to some degree 
based on the interests of the communities where the staff members are located. For some 
staff this is a large state university, for others it is a mixture of ag-related industry or 
farms and small manufacturers. But for other staff the assignments are determined by 
factors such as their job skills or personal backgrounds (8/6 p2).‘° C can be considered a 
routine office in part because of the relatively heterogeneous nature of his district, but 
also because he hires specific staff to fill specific needs in his district. Nevertheless, I 
would suggest that the “community interests” of a district merit further examination. If 
nothing else, an understanding of this variable puts context on the jobs and perceptions of 
incumbents and their staff.
Region and Party Strength 
Because my case set did not include east or west coast samples, I do not feel 
comfortable offering a hypothesis on the impact of region. Based on the stylistic and 
philosophical differences observed between north and south, I would suggest that region 
is a variable worth inclusion in a study of district staff. The personal incumbent style 
seemed much more prevalent in southern districts. Note the incumbents who drove 
themselves around the districts, attended meetings without staff, and focused staff 
resources largely on routine casework functions. In contrast, northern incumbents 
seemed more comfortable with surrogates and aggressive staff functions. I would note, 
however, that this was not universally the case. There were exceptions.
Here the veteran dealing with military issues and the economist dealing with community housing issues 
jump readily to mind.
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Distance from Washington likely has an impact on district staff. As my case studies 
were roughly equidistant from Washington, I was unable to determine the impact of 
distance. Comparing a Maryland or Virginia staff enterprise with a California office 
would likely provide a very interesting set o f data. How often is the incumbent at home? 
Do staff members function as surrogates more often in districts farther from Washington? 
Does distance clearly relate to whether an office is routine or aggressive? Previous 
research has studied aggregate allocation of incumbent resources to the district based on 
geography and the strength of political parties by region.^* These studies should be 
complemented with contextual examinations of the district enterprises across these 
different settings. As compared to the individual personalities and philosophies of the 
incumbents, however, the demographic variables seem more likely to function as 
intervening variables imposing slight alterations on the style of incumbents.
Demoeraphv of incumbent 
In looking at the incumbents as individuals, three variables for future research clearly 
present themselves. Age, race and gender are commonly used variables in the literature’s 
examination of congressional behavior. Once again, my limited data set precludes me 
from offering anything beyond basic hypotheses about the impact of these demographic 
variables on the allocation of district staff. Nevertheless my observations suggest that 
these variables are relevant to the study of district staff.
Age/Generational factors 
Hypothesis 10: Younger incumbents likely allocate more aggressive staff enterprises than 
older incumbents.
See Fenno ( 1978) and Parker (1985)
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The incumbents cohorts are the one demographic variable where I feel comfortable 
offering a hypothesis. Macartney (1975) and Smith (1995) found that older generations 
of incumbents (those elected before 1970) were likely to use virtually all of their 
increases in staff resources to augment their Washington offices when perquisite 
increases came in the 1970s. Both suggested that this was the case because older 
incumbents did not have resources to staff both district and Washington offices. 
Consequently, allocations to the home district would have come directly at the expense of 
their Washington offices. Post-1970 cohorts, on the other hand, did not face such zero- 
sum choices. This finding seems logically supported by my observations. To wit, B and 
C, while not elected before 1970, but more clearly part o f an older congressional cohort, 
seemed more familiar with their districts and more confident of their electoral status, and 
perhaps consequently, had routine district enterprises. Younger incumbents, on the other 
hand, were much more likely to devote important staff resources to the district. The fact 
that A left his COS in the district and that D’s RDSM was an important figure in her 
overall hierarchy suggest the aggressive district orientation of the younger cohort. My 
observations suggest that it was more likely seniority than age that driving the variation 
between the primary case studies.
Furthermore, the basic impact of age and generational factors were observed in the 
types of people that each incumbent hired. With the exception of C (and to some extent 
M), the other incumbents hired staff that looked relatively like themselves in terms of 
age. Given that staff members are proportionally younger than incumbents, I observed 
that the junior members tended to have a much higher proportion of recent college 
graduates in their office than the senior members. Long-serving incumbents, most
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notably B, had offices that were occupied by staff members with decades of service. 
Future research should continue to look at the impact o f generational cohorts on district 
staff utilization.
Race
Like distance from Washington, race is a variable that merits inclusion. My case set 
included two African-American incumbents. While one of the districts was more urban 
in nature, both incumbents clearly embraced the more aggressive staff style. Further 
study is needed to shed light on whether there are geographic or stylistic similarities 
amongst Afncan-American, Hispanic and Asian incumbents.
Gender
Gender is another demographic variable that is important in the literature and 
certainly is deserving of future study for district staff. As with race, it would be 
informative to determine whether female incumbents more commonly utilize aggressive 
or routine staff and whether they are more or less likely to rely on surrogates in their 
district enterprises. Given that 1 had only two female case studies no hypotheses are 
warranted. All three o f these demographic variables merit further study.
The staff themselves
To imderstand patterns of district staff utilization one needs to appreciate the district 
staff members themselves, especially given the powers o f representation that are often 
vested to these staff and the extent to which incumbents are absent. As was noted in 
Chapter One, the literature on district staff is sparse. Yet, as Chapter Three 
demonstrated, district staff members are vital components of the incumbents’ enterprises.
3 2 8
For that reason, individual staff members should be considered an intervening variable in 
the equation of district staff allocation.
Hypothesis 11 : Some district staff members are “rational actors”, seeking political power 
and/or utilizing their positions as “launching pads” for future careers regardless o f the 
routine or aggressive philosophies of their employers. Consequently, they shape the 
routine or aggressive nature o f the district enterprise.
As Chapter Three demonstrated, the reasons that staff members are hired and the 
motivations they bring to their jobs have an impact on the functions they perform at 
work. They approached their jobs in quite different ways; “the personality of each staffer 
is different. I do my job here (from the office) while others spend more time out looking 
at things... wasting their time.” Most staff would probably disagree with C’s field 
representative on this issue, but her attitude is indicative of potential variation. 
Furthermore, if staff motivations are at odds with the functions intended by incumbents, 
than the personality or philosophy of the incumbent diminishes in importance in leading 
the staff enterprise. Future study of district staff needs to consider the goals and 
motivations of the individual staff, in addition to those of the incumbents.
The most notable example of this hypothesis was found in E’s RDSM. On the 
continuum o f district style, E’s office largely tended toward the routine side. However, 
the activities o f his RDSM clearly moved this office toward the middle of the range, if 
not even more to the more aggressive side. Numerous constituents remarked favorably 
about E’s district operation as compared to his successor. A, largely because of the 
community outreach efforts o f the RDSM. E’s constituents and staff made note o f the 
RDSM’s central role in managing all significant projects in the district. The constituents
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were likely to seek him out to inform him of a dilemma or involve him in the project and 
the staff members were unwilling to proceed without his understanding or involvement.
In short, he was a key political actor in the district. Recalling Chapter Three, E’s RDSM 
was widely felt to be “doing activities as much for himself as for E.” H’s RDSM was 
similar in that he mentioned on several occasions his desire for a promotion to one of the 
ranking positions should H be elevated to a seat in the Senate. In the case o f both 
staffers, then, individual motivations can be observed. And in both cases the RDSMs 
tended to be aggressive while the rest of the staff and the incumbent’s desire seemed 
largely for the staff to be “routine.” Based on these individuals one might speculate that 
district staff hang on to jobs with senior and/or powerful incumbents because of the 
perquisites that come from representing such an individual. These two individuals 
demonstrate that district staff can accumulate their own particular benefits from their jobs 
as district staff members. For example, for E’s RDSM the benefits were personal to his 
potential bid for future elective office, while for H’s RDSM, his position provided a 
vicarious connection to district politics, a feeling that he was among the key decision­
makers of the area. While it is impossible to completely disaggregate individual staff 
motives from their job responsibilities, 1 would suggest that this is a hypothesis worthy of 
future study.
At the other end of the spectrum from the aggressive RDSMs, the disenchantment of 
C’s staff ensured that they would remain compliant with his desire to operate in a routine 
fashion. While this example does not demonstrate how staff can act “rationally” opposite 
of the incumbent, it does show that staff morale and motivations are interrelated. C’s 
staff was notable for its relatively high level of turnover. This turnover was probably
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driven by staff desires for greater levels of autonomy and achievement. If the incumbent 
did not impose such a limited philosophy on how his or her staff should function, then 
C’s office would confront some serious organizational difficulties. As Chapter Three 
noted, staff frequently become “institutionalized” within their communities and the loss 
o f such key employees can severely restrict the incumbent’s enterprise, especially if an 
incumbent is counting on that staff member to perform aggressive representation. 
Fortunately for C, the regular loss o f “institutionalized” staff is not a problem because 1) 
his long tenure and name recognition grant him a large degree of electoral security and 2) 
his philosophy rejects an active staff enterprise.
Based on B and C, it might be the case that an incumbent who desire an aggressive 
office might be frustrated if they did not have a group of staff that were equally as 
motivated or talented. This is pure speculation, as 1 did not wimess an aggressive 
incumbent without an aggressive staff. In fact, incumbents seemed most often to hire 
individuals with resumes, personalities, and extra-curricular activities that would comport 
with their job responsibilities. For example, there were the part-time mayors from H and 
G’s office intended to keep a low-profile and personal contact with the elite decision 
makers of their district, as opposed to the young idealists who usually supported C’s 
limited mission, and A’s dedicated campaign workers who carried their aggressive 
campaign experiences right into their federal staff jobs. In these offices I also wimessed 
that older, less technologically savvy staff members tend to be of less use to incumbents 
in the aggressive sense. C’s RDSM felt that the older staff proved to be “an 
organizational difficulty.” I would hypothesize that this problem was even more
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common in B’s office, where his main caseworker still held out steadfastly against 
computers.
A corollary to this hypothesis is found in district staff such as E’s RDSM. The 
corollary would suggest that it is possible that one, or a few, key district staff members 
accrue power over time when an incumbent develops a “Washington” focus and 
increasingly has a tenuous personal connection with the district. This corollary is in part 
suggested in literature that finds that resources to the district might diminish over time 
(Schiff and Smith, 1983) but also that the position of staff are reflected by the status of 
the incumbent (Ripley, 1969). In the case of E, his RDSM clearly became empowered 
as the terms accumulated and he began to exercise in a more aggressive capacity. He did 
this while E’s attentions and resources were increasingly committed to a legislative 
career, but ironically was assisted because of E’s esteemed status in the district. This 
corollary might be justified or explained as filling the shoes o f the absent incumbent. As 
in the case of E, there is a need to fill as a senior incumbent is around less and the more 
senior’ staff member can often step into that void. This staff member suggested that it 
was his job to “fill in for the boss, who’s not around very much.” The district staff 
member’s position is heavily reliant on their personal relationship with the incumbent. It 
is hard to imagine a scenario whereby an incumbent would invest the kind of trust and 
authority that E did with his RDSM, without counting the staff member as a long-time 
confidant.^ Yet, these relationships do occur and they are inadequately appreciated by 
the literature, leaving a selection of representational activities and the possibility of
~  Fenno notes the suspicion o f some incumbents as a reason for their purposeful limitation o f district staff 
( 1978, p30). While I did not observe this finding in my limited number o f cases, I have seen instances in 
my professional and campaign experiences o f  incumbents who come to mistrust the motivations o f their 
subordinates. So to that extent, I would affirm Fenno’s suspicions.
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individual staff motivations unstudied. The void also exists in the reality o f the absent 
incumbent, especially in terms of the incumbent enterprise’s contact with elite 
constituents, which will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter.
Other potential variables 
There are a number of other potential variables that I encountered briefly that would 
seem to merit further study in future research on district staff.
Institutional/Office experience 
As noted above, A’s district enterprise underwent a transformation roughly eighteen 
months into his first term. His staff members perceived that certain parts of the district 
were not adequately engaged by the enterprise. Consequently they shifted the staff from 
a model based on issue responsibilities to a model where each of the staff had largely 
geographic responsibilities. This transformation allowed the staff members to more 
directly engage their local communities of interest. Because most of my observations 
were collected at one point in time, it was difficult to accurately assess how the staff 
enterprises changed over time. While I did ask this question of all offices, I think that a 
longitudinal study would provide better analysis o f staff transformations. The pattern of 
geographic versus issue-based representation is one such variable that would profit from 
a study with multiple observations.
“Collegiality” of the House 
Hammond (1975) found that House members often follow a norm of “collegiality” in 
organizing their Washington offices and overall management styles and Fenno (1978, 
p46) suggested the incumbents “probably” structure their district staff operations based 
on conversations with other delegation members and state tradition. The “collegiality” of
3 3 3
their home state delegations was found to be especially important in making these 
decisions. Based on limited observations in this study, incumbents and staff noted the 
staff utilization of other incumbents in nearby districts. It seemed that their experiences 
were also shaded more heavily by incumbents from their own party, even sometimes to 
the exclusion of the predecessors in their particular seats. For example, when D assumed 
office, she followed a Republican incumbent whose staff provided virtually no advice, 
manuals, casework history, or even furniture to get started. Instead, she and her staff 
looked to other Democratic incumbents from her state. Coming from the same state 
delegation, staff from B, G and H all referred to similarities in how incumbents from their 
state set up and ran their district enterprises. Ranging from the number of staff to the 
types o f activities they performed, there did appear to be some degree of uniformity 
between them. In addition to partisanship and state delegations, B’s experience also 
suggests that seniority has an impact on collegiality. Studies o f incumbent behavior 
suggest that they look to senior legislators for voting cues. Anecdotal evidence provided 
by one of B’s staff members suggested that junior incumbents and their staff did the same 
thing in regard to questions about staff utilization. Based on the experiences of B and D 
and the comments of other incumbents and staff, I would suggest that “collegiality” has 
some impact on staff utilization, but that most incumbents appeared to leave themselves 
the ability to modify their staff allocation patterns to their own personal desires and 
electoral situations. Nevertheless, future study might investigate the varying degree to 
which enterprises within one state look to each other for organizational design or ideas 
about new means of representation. In fact, comparisons of district enterprises within 
states would seem to be highly suitable subjects for most similar case designs.
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House versus Senate
To add to the bulk of literature comparing the House and the Senate, there were clear 
differences in how district and state staff functioned. One o f A’s constituents noted it 
best in his comment that the Senate is “often thinking about big prominent issues and 
don’t take the time to focus on all local issues like House members and their staff do.” I 
also witnessed this statement in the efforts of G and H to work with an extremely large 
district employer (an international airport) on more local issues such as zoning, and 
health and wage laws. In the terminology suggested by A ’s constituent. House staff 
members are more “local”. What they lack in the “clout” to “get things done”. House 
staff are more likely to be around and engaged in community issues. Since there are 
relatively more House staff and they are “locally” based, they have the time (and the 
electoral interest) to involve themselves with these types o f problems and assist 
constituents. This is not to suggest that Senate state staff do not do the same types of 
constituent work. Rather, simply because there are fewer of them (especially in larger 
states where there are fewer than 1 senate staff members per congressional district) and 
because they are not as “local”, I observed them to have different priorities. As E’s field 
representative speculated, there are undoubtedly Senate staff who do little more than 
“politick” throughout the state, never involving themselves in the daily grind of 
casework. Based on my observations and experiences, however, I would suggest that 
there would not likely be more than one or two such individuals in a Senate office simply 
because Senators too are forced to allocate substantial resources to the routine tasks of 
scheduling, casework and press. The distinction is fiirther driven by the fact that the 
staffs bosses, the senators, often have more national issue interests and are less able to
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utilize personal time to deal with constituent issues. Future study of House and Senate 
staff would provide greater detail and clarity to the basic differences that I have 
identified.
Constituents matter
The demands of constituents are one final variable that merit inclusion in future 
study of district staff. What kinds of access do individual constituents and interest groups 
have with the incumbents and their district staff? I observed notable variation in the 
extent to which individual incumbents received (and courted) constituents in their 
districts. This partly seemed to be a reflection of the incumbent’s personal style. Here B 
rationalized much of what he did as an incumbent with a justification for why he attended 
a small oil producer’s luncheon, and why he empathized with them as a fellow small 
businessman. He suggested that because he “makes payroll” at the two banks that he 
owns with his sons, he empathizes with small business issues and takes care of them 
almost as much out of personal connection as because of the fact that they are 
constituents. Two of C’s constituents suggested to me that the stylistic differences 
between C and an incumbent from a nearby district were largely explained by the 
different socio-economic natures of their constituencies. While these views are probably 
overstated, they do suggest that constituents matter to a much greater degree than 
previous literature has given them credit. The extent to which incumbents deal with and 
respond to constituents must also consider the demands o f others, a factor that Fenno and 
the literature seem to not consider in their exclusive focus on the behavior o f the 
individual legislator. In this case, the demands of A’s elite constituents were notable.
One particular elite expressed that A’s COS was spending too much time at home, and
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wanted him to shift resources to Washington to more adequately protect district interests. 
This transformation began to occur in A’s second and third terms, largely in response to 
the perceived demands of the constituents.
This might also be an explanation for why incumbents generally devote more time 
and resources to Washington as their career progresses; because their constituents 
demand better or “more” representation. Future research on incumbents and district staff 
might more adequately address the question of whether “home style” is defined by the 
trust and access to locals rather than the incumbent’s interest in national issues. At any 
rate, the next chapter will begin to examine the means and rationale by which staff 
members interact with these “elite” constituents at the local level.
Conclusion
This chapter introduced a number of variables that begin to explain the variation in 
district staff utilization that was detailed in Chapter Three. To start, incumbents appear to 
have four basic orientations that result in different modes of function for district staff. 
While it is likely that there are more than these four orientations in effect, or that some 
incumbents possess shades of each of the types, I would hypothesize that these 
orientations provide an excellent starting point for appreciating the manner in which 
incumbents think about district staff utilization. The orientation o f the incumbent appears 
to be determined in part by their individual motivations and psychological make-up and 
in part by a number of other variables. Some incumbents had more fully developed 
“philosophies” about the appropriate role for their district staff. My observations also 
suggested that increased tenure and the margin o f electoral victory were likely to induce 
incumbents to “routinize” their district operations. Numerous exceptions, however.
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suggest that other variables must be considered in determining how incumbents utilize 
their district staff. Additional variables that appeared in some cases included 
partisanship, the urban nature and size of the district, and the communities within the 
district. Because of my limited number o f cases, I was only able to offer hypotheses 
about the possible impact o f region and the demographic variables of the incumbents 
themselves. Finally, the motives of the individual staff members themselves likely act as 
an intervening variable in the staff equation. While the personality and philosophy of the 
incumbent and the individual staff members have a noticeable impact on staff allocation,
I would suggest that further research on political, demographic, and a number of other 
variables remains necessary to understand why district staff do what they do. This 
dissertation examines the functions and variation of congressional district staff and how 
that impacts representation and incumbent election efforts. In the next chapter. I'll lay 
out the one function where district staff members have the most notable impact on 
election outcomes.
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Chapter Five
Protecting the incumbent: Incumbent-staff-elite interaction
This dissertation is about the varying ways in which district staff are allocated and 
utilized. This chapter will focus on a specific and very important function of district 
staff; the manner in which they interact with elite constituents. The literature recognizes 
the value of service and its impact on name recognition but as previous chapters have 
shown the overall utility of district staff are usually neglected in those studies. The 
argument of this chapter, and one central to this entire dissertation, is that the behavior 
and electoral advantage of incumbents are best understood with an appreciation of district 
staff. The numbers of staff allocated and the functions that they perform appear to 
increase the likelihood that incumbents will be reelected. This is the case partly because 
constituents are served, happy and content, partly because of the resultant increase in 
incumbent name recognition, and partly because constituency service has an impact on 
which challengers choose to run. In sum, a significant part of incumbency advantage can 
be traced to service to elites, which engenders future support and decreased opposition at 
the polls.
This chapter will first explain the rationale for a focus on incumbents, which in large 
part is explained by the fact that elites provide a ‘cheap’ but effective form of interaction. 
Next, the chapter will discuss the motivations of incumbents, staff and elite constituents, 
and how those motivations impact elite service. Finally, it will then explain four ways in 
which the incumbent/staffi'elite constituent interaction is useful to the incumbent’s 
enterprise. Once the staff members have identified district elites, they recruit them into
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the enterprise where they assist the incumbent with their resources and then, later, allow 
the incumbent to focus on other activities outside o f the district.
Literature on constituency service 
Incumbency advantage 
There is a broad collection of literature that deals with incumbency advantage. As 
Chapter One detailed, incumbents enjoy high rates of name recognition and even higher 
rates of reelection. Several decades ago, as voters became “dissatisfied with party cues, 
they turned to inciunbents” (Mayhew, 1974, p.33). They had turned to incumbents who 
were more acutely aware of their electoral status than had been their predecessors. 
Moreover, the incumbents had increased the resources available to help them serve their 
constituents and nm for reelection. Additional evidence of these resources and their 
impact is seen in the fact that incumbents began to draw party defectors at a much higher 
rate than challengers (Smith, 1995, p63). In 1958, incumbents outpolled challengers 
amongst this group by only 9% (16 to 7%). That number had grown to 35% by 1984 (46 
to 9%). One might speculate that the margin grew because of increased contact with the 
incumbent enterprise over these decades.
Personal vote/constituency service 
The literature has long done a good job of demonstrating how the perceptions of 
incumbents have led them to allocate resources to cotmteract their perceived 
vulnerabilities. It was. speculated that these efforts “generated positive evaluations” from 
their constituents (Mayhew, 1974; Bumham, 1975; Cover, 1977; Cover and Mayhew, 
1977; Mann and Wolfinger, 1980). The most cited example of this literature is Fiorina’s 
(1977) suggestion of a  definite electoral connection between constituency service and
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reelection prospects. In fact, he hypothesized that members o f Congress did more service 
to attain electoral security. Later work went on to show that this service actually 
produces a reputation upon which an incumbent can procure a “personal vote” from 
constituents who have contact with the incumbent enterprise. Here, Cain, Ferejohn and 
Fiorina (1987) found that with the decline o f partisanship as a voting cue, incumbents 
pursued a “personal vote” which they believed could be can be attained through increased 
levels of constituency service.
Debate about value of service
While the literature largely recognizes that incumbents and their staff perform 
service, and largely agree that it has some impact, there is a contentious debate in the 
literature as to the actual value of constituency service and how much of a “personal 
vote” accrues from such service.
No real impact
Some argue that most service is simple, routine behavior and has no real impact on 
voter’s impressions o f the incumbent. Johannes (1984) was the first to argue with the 
growing body of service literature with his finding that voters are essentially ungrateful. 
He further argued that even if they were grateful that relatively few voters ever made 
formal requests for service to their incumbents. This position was supplemented Bond’s 
(1985) conclusion that staff enterprises conduct stable long-term patterns o f casework, 
not impacted by factors such as electoral status. Johannes and Macadams (1987) restated 
the early finding and concluded that staff members are not much more than “agents of 
constituents displeasure”; constituents have come to expect service. They further found 
that service is largely confined to the ranks o f incumbents’ supporters. In other words.
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the staff did not aggressively advertise their services and opposition constituents did not 
often request service. Finally, Mason (1987) concluded that even constituents who 
received casework assistance placed little value on their interactions.
Mixed evidence
There is another body of literature that suggests perquisite use by incumbents is of 
mixed value (Fenno, 1978; Cover and Brumber, 1982; Bond, Covington and Fleisher, 
1985; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1989). Specifically, Fenno argues that while some 
incumbents have more active “home styles”, that overall the value o f perquisite use is of 
mixed electoral value. Cover and Brumberg reinforce that finding with their study on the 
mixed impact o f pamphlets mailed to constituents.
Service clearlv helps incumbent
Other literature more firmly supports the contention that constituent service is a 
valuable electoral supplement for incumbents. The basic conclusion is that those who 
receive service are “grateful” and offer higher evaluations for incumbents (Yiannakis, 
1981; Epstein and Frankovic, 1982; Fiorina, 1989; King, 1991; Serra and Cover, 1992; 
Kean, 1993; Jacobson, 1997). In fact, this body o f literature suggests that incumbents 
perceive this value and aggressively utilize their resources to procure constituent 
satisfaction. Epstein and Frankovic (1982) foimd that marginal incumbents have more 
district staff doing casework. All o f this literature agrees that constituency service helps 
with the voters. More particularly, some research has focused on who is best served and 
whether it creates an obligation on the part of voters. While Jacobson (1997, p49) 
suggests that service is a “non-partisan” behavior that helps with “independent voters and
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others”. King (1991) concluded that constituency service is a “partisan vote-getting 
opportunity.”
Ansolabehere, Snyder & Stewart (2000) concur with Jacobson’s finding that 
incumbent service appeals to defectors, independents and elites. Over the course of the 
past century, these authors suggest that the value of the “personal vote” has risen to now 
constitute between one-half and two-thirds of the overall incumbent advantage. As 
opposed to challenger quality, they speculate that the value of service has grown from 1% 
in 1900 to 4% in 2000. Yiannakis (1981) and Serra and Cover (1992) speculated that it 
would most electorally productive to focus on elites o f the opposing party. Serra and 
Cover found that of all voters receiving service, 96% o f the incumbent’s party voted for 
the incumbent, as do 56% of service recipients fi’om the opposition party. This finding 
suggests that there are many votes to be gained through serving a few thousand 
constituents per election cycle, especially by seeking out and serving the opposition 
party. Finally, Cialdini (1985) and Regan (1971) suggest the voters repay favors quickly 
as they find it disagreeable to owe politicians.
On balance, the weight of the evidence seems to suggest that constituent service has 
at least some impact on voting behavior. But perhaps more importantly, some authors 
(and my observations) found that incumbents perceive vulnerability and allocate 
resources regardless of their actual impact on voter evaluations. Furthermore, my 
observations suggest that opposition elites do not seem to experience the kind of 
dissonance that Johannes and McAdams discussed. In fact, I observed a great deal of 
interaction between incumbents and staff with elites who were either non-partisan or 
were even elected officials/supporters o f  the opposing party. The incumbents appeared to
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be especially interested in recruiting elites from the opposition party into their own 
circles of support. Therefore, Cialdini and Regan’s findings seem to be more relevant; 
even opposition elites need service, and they are likely to repay their favors if they think 
the incumbent is going to be in office for a long period of time.
Elite focus
While 1 agree with the findings o f the bulk of the literature on the value o f casework, 
1 would reiterate that past literature focuses almost exclusively on aggregations of 
casework and under-appreciates the magnitude of staff-elite interaction. While not 
disputing these findings, one must realize that this data relies on large surveys with 
relatively small and dispersed populations of actual casework recipients. This 
dissertation presumes that it would be more instructive to identify actual individuals who 
have interacted with district offices or would have reason to. Rather than relying on the 
one or two service recipients per Congressional district, this dissertation goes out into the 
field and examines interactions with business owners, journalists, and elected officials. It 
uncovered a variety of types of activities ranging from personal interaction to advisories, 
town hall meetings and large project assistance, types of interaction not previously 
examined. Given the relatively higher levels of interaction with congressional district 
staff that 1 observed, 1 argue that it is important to focus on the elites that are likely 
underrepresented in large-n surveys. In fact, my observations suggest that the more 
aggressive elite interactions provide a far better mechanism to serve, commimicate and 
derive campaign resources from than do routine casework service or mass mailings.
This dissertation underlines the important finding by Fowler and McClure (1990) 
who suggest that “unseen” (non) candidates have an important impact on the outcomes
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of congressional elections. I further argue that the interactions o f “unseen” staff with 
“unseen” elites need to be examined. My observations suggest that incumbents, staff and 
elite constituents have regular interaction in virtually all congressional districts, although 
they differ in the extent and the type of activity that they pursue. As Chapters Three and 
Four noted, some offices are more aggressive in promoting the incumbent than others. 
Furthermore, I observed that elites have important resources that affect the outcomes of 
congressional elections. The contributions, endorsements, and volimteer support by elite 
constituents are crucial for incumbents in tight election races. My finding also parallels 
Jacobson (1983) or Fowler and McClure in that “unseen” candidates are also extremely 
reliant upon elite constituents if they are to make anything more than token runs at 
incumbents. In sum, this chapter will argue that the actual impact o f elite constituents is 
underrepresented by the literature; that well “hidden” staff and elite constituents have an 
important impact on the outcomes of congressional elections.
Elite service is perhaps the most notable staff function because it is cheap and 
because it is effective. It is cheap because it provides incumbents and staff with a quick 
means of interacting with large numbers o f  constituents and it is effective because there 
are multiple payoffs that come with elite interaction. The remainder o f this chapter will 
detail the cheap and effective practice o f incumbent/stafïïelite interaction.
The rationale for elite interaction
My observations indicated that some incumbents allocate considerable amounts of 
staff time and resources to their interactions with elite constituents. Before 1 turn to a 
description of those interactions it is necessary to briefly touch on the nature o f elites 
again. This section will provide a rationale for elite interaction based on the answers to
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three questions: Who are elites? Why do incumbent enterprises focus on them? And why 
are some offices more aggressive with elites than with other constituents?
Who are elites? Again 
The elite constituents came firom a variety of occupations and backgroimds. Elite 
constituents come from both the public and private sectors. They are both rich and poor. 
Others recognize elites in their community. While I would also suggest that the bulk of 
the elites that I observed and interviewed came from relatively higher socio-economic 
status, it is not a precondition o f the definition of what makes an elite constituent. The 
most shared characteristic of elite constituent tended to be their involvement with the 
commimity. In either their job or in the spare time, elite constituents are notably more 
engaged in the social, political and economic affairs of their communities. It was 
performing this community involvement that I mostly encountered elite constituents. 
Remember from Chapter Two that I accumulated my data from three settings; incumbent 
and staff interviews, observations o f incumbents and staff interacting with each other and 
with elite constituents, and finally fi-om roughly twenty interviews with elites in each of 
the four primary case studies. I collected the data in each of the three different settings so 
that I might inquire about each o f the actor’s behaviors and motivations. It occurred to 
me that I would properly need to understand elite motivations in order to more fully grasp 
the relevance of district staff behavior.
Incumbents and staff interact with different types of elites-
The most common group of elites that I observed staff and incumbents interact with 
tended to be political elites.^ And the most obvious group of district elites were elected
' This list is not intended to be a comprehensive listing o f all possible elite groupings. It is, rather, a 
reflection o f the most commonly observed staff-elite constituent interactions.
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officiais. Generally, but not always, these individuals were from the same party as the 
incumbent. Down-ballot elected officials were usually amongst the incumbents biggest 
fans or supporters in the area. Incumbents and staff sought out political elites for more 
than greetings and sentimental support. A visit to a mayor or a state legislator also 
provides important information about constituents and their issues. Remember, the 
inciunbent (and staff member) owes his or her job to the same constituents as the mayor 
or state legislator. These visits were not limited to partisan elected officials. My 
observations suggested that “non-partisan” office-holders were also important targets of 
staff. The “non-partisan” official was a target either because they were truly non­
partisan, and hence a non-biased source of political information, or that the office was 
non-partisan in name only.
The political elites were by no means limited to office holders. In each city/area, 
incumbents and staff seemed to place more emphasis on their interactions with personal 
political supporters (or donors) as opposed to traditional partisan activists. As the 
discipline has long acknowledged, political parties in the United States today are largely 
supplemental to, or supportive of the candidates themselves. My observations o f staff 
interactions at the local level provide further confirmation of the party decline thesis. 
Incumbents and staff were much more likely to call or stop by and see their personal 
supporters and donors than party officials. Rarely these two circles would overlap. 
Interactions to the personal supporters varied from visit to visit. Some were truly social 
interactions with old personal fidends. Other interactions with personal political
* As was mentioned in Chapter Two, in some cases these elites were partisan and less useful data sources. 
However, in many cases, it should be noted that elites who are politirâl contributors are open-minded to the 
game o f politics, are well informed about people and events, and tend to offer Airly objective criticisms 
and advice.
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supporters were more business-like, especially if  that particular constituent was 
designated as an important source of surveillance for a city/area. This could especially be 
the case if it was an area where the incumbent didn’t perform well or the elected officials 
were hostile. On occasion, the staff and incumbents would seek out the partisan officials 
in the area. 1 would suggest that this was more often the case for incumbents with greater 
electoral concerns and for all incumbents as the election date loomed; most incumbents 
and staff expressed a concern with keeping party activists content.
A second group of elite constituents were those who were politically active 
concerning specific community issues. Some of the notable issues o f community 
activism in my case studies included the military, higher education, and agriculture. The 
list of possible sources o f political activism is clearly not limited to these three examples. 
Nevertheless, these examples provided an excellent illustration of the types o f politically 
elite constituents and the causes that they pursued. Staff and incumbents interacted with 
these types o f constituents for numerous reasons that will be detailed below. Suffice it to 
say here that this group o f elite constituents is important for both their information and 
the electoral support that they can provide.
A more ‘average’ set o f elite constituents were those who were more generally active 
for the overall economic benefit o f the community, as opposed to a particular political 
issue. These elites were usually to be found in Rotary/Kiwanis meetings, involvement 
with the Chamber of Commerce, or with local government/community development 
groups. Business elites are not necessarily politically active in partisan circles. In fact, it 
was my observation that this type of elite was usually much less partisan, or even much 
less politically interested than the first two groups o f elites. Nevertheless, this group was
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equally important for incumbent and staff interaction. Staff members were quite often 
found to be in attendance at meetings of these types of individuals regardless of their 
ability or boss’s inclination to help. Like the political activists, this group of elites is also 
important because of the information that they can provide about the community and the 
resources that they can provide to an incumbent’s reelection campaign. In fact, 
incumbents and their fund-raisers would prefer this group of constituents because they 
focus on substantially less contentious issues than do the more political elites. What 
incumbent opposed the economic development of their district’s communities? Here you 
will find many business owners, attorneys, newspaper publishers, etc., who over time 
develop personal and campaign connections with the incumbent, often with little to do 
with partisan background.
Amongst the ranks of the community activists, attorneys are a distinct sub-category. 
They are a relevant group of elites for staff interaction for a variety of reasons. First, they 
are commonly found in virtually every city and township. Second, because of the 
interactions with private and public entities, they are usually some of the best sources to 
take a political or economic pulse of a city or neighborhood. This was the case for both 
the large firm and the sole practice. With the large firms, that tend to have a mixture of 
Democrats and Republicans, because “it sort of works out that way,” the community is 
represented in aggregate. The solo attorney in a small town might be seen to function in 
the same fashion, representing the entire community. Third, attorneys tended to be elite in 
their socio-economic status. And fourth, they are the single most politically active 
profession, especially when measured in terms of campaign contributions.
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Like attorneys, journalists are found throughout the district and are generally in-step 
with the political and economic affairs o f the constituency. They are obviously different 
in that they usually tend to be non-partisan in nature and because they are much more 
clearly a two-step loudspeaker to the average constituent than is an attorney or a business 
owner. Consequently, staff members generally have a different type o f relationship with 
journalists. The press secretary more commonly does interaction here over the phone, 
fax, or e-mail message. I did, however, observe some staff members interact with 
journalists in fashions similar to how they would interact with other elite constituents that 
they were hoping to co-opt into the incumbent enterprise. They would drop-in and give 
an update about the incumbent and inquire about news and editorial positions in the same 
fashion that they might ask a barber or a mayor about the community.
Employees and officers o f the corporate citizens of a district also are a source of 
staff-elite interaction. Corporations have a clear interest in the economic and social 
health of their communities. And because they are most commonly interested in 
maintaining the status quo, they generally support incumbents. This is especially the case 
for the local corporate officers, as opposed to the national or associational corporate types 
who are much more Republican-leaning with the political support and campaign 
contributions. At any rate, local corporate officers provide another potential source of 
information and support for the incumbent enterprise.
Finally, social volunteers provide a source o f elite-staff interaction. This group of 
elites can be found amongst the ranks of religious, environmental, or gun-owning 
activists. Like the previous groups, social volunteers are a source of both information 
and resources for the enterprising staff member. They provide information about the
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relevant social issues in a constituency (and whether an incumbent needs to be involved 
or wary of such issues). If  an incumbent chooses to become involved in such issues, 
these elites can often become individual volunteer or contributor resources in the 
campaigns of the incumbents. My political experiences also suggest that these 
individuals are increasingly the rank-and-file volimteers on which both Democratic and 
Republican candidates will rely to complete what were previously the tasks of partisan 
organizations.
How do thev differ from regular constituents?
In addition to their generally higher socio-economic status, elite constituents 
appeared to share three common traits as individuals. Elite constituents had more 
knowledge about the incumbents, staff and the political process. They are more involved 
in their communities and they have a lot more access/contact to incumbents and staff. 
Greater knowledge of political process
My finding that elites possess greater knowledge o f the political process is not 
entirely a new finding. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) clearly identified 
elite-mass differences in the measure and content of political attitudes. While Nye,
Verba and Petrocik (1976) suggested that the previous work underestimated the 
sophistication of the masses, the debate remains contemporaneous. Neumann (1986) 
suggested that American society was contoured in an “s” curve of “stratified pluralism” 
with 5% of elites directing opinions, 20% acting indifferent to politics, and the remaining 
75% in the middle relying on cues provided by elected officials and elites. Finally, 
Stimson (1991) and Page and Shapiro (1992) show that masses generally acquiesce to 
elites but in certain “moods” will pay greater attention to candidates and the process. The
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sum of the literature seems to suggest that elites possess greater command of the 
personalities and political process and matter at least as a cue for average constituents, 
although it would disagree on the extent to which elites direct opinions.
The observations o f this dissertation confirm that general finding. Based on the 
perceptions and behaviors o f incumbents, staff and elite constituents, there was an 
Interaction that seemed to be based on the assumption that talking to and helping elite 
constituents had an impact on average constituents because of the manner in which elite 
constituents shape local politics. In short, elites are held to be opinion leaders in their 
communities. Katz and Lazerfeld (1955) found that opinion leaders and primary groups 
structure opinions for the masses in a “two-step flow” of communication. My 
observations of incumbents, staff and elite constituents suggest that these actors’ 
behaviors are driven by the assumptions of the “two-step” model; that average voters 
often look to opinion leaders for personal influence on their political attitudes and voting 
behavior. For these actors it seems that academic disputes about the existence of the two- 
step flow are meaningless, for they largely perceive it to be a functioning concept.
Herein lies a key difference between the elite and average constituent, the elite 
understands and utilizes the process, while average constituents are more likely to 
interact as a last resort without understanding how the process can assist their interests. 
The difference between elites and masses here is multi-dimensional. First, the elites are 
aware of the fact that incumbents employ staff in district offices, while average 
constituents often had very fuzzy ideas, not only about government in general, but about 
the specifics of what a member of congress and their staff do. As one of B’s elite 
constituents stated, “most constituents don’t even know that congressmen have staff who
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work for them.” C’s RDSM noted that the “misconception of people and joimialists is 
due to a lack of knowledge about government. Most people just don’t ask or care to find 
things out.” I had minimal interactions with elites who did not have above average grasp 
of the political system. Of these less interested elites, one of C’s constituents, a small 
town business owner, suggested “he had a lack of interest in government and can track a 
bill but anything else is confusing.” Second, elites more clearly recognize officials that 
can assist them. I commonly interacted with elite constituents who suggested that they 
sought out incumbents and staff based on their “expertise” or “clout.” For example, 
several constituents pursued senators from the president’s party, members of 
Appropriations sub-committees, or chairs of specific constituency committees such as 
banking, agriculture, or veteran’s issues to facilitate their issues. Sometimes these were 
officials from their states, other times the elite constituents would utilize contacts within 
the incumbent’s enterprise to reach out to an out-of-state official. Third elite constituents 
more commonly knew at least the names of the district staff members. Finally, at the 
most sophisticated level of political understanding, are the elites who know and 
understand the specific abilities of both the incumbent and the district staff. As a 
Chamber official from C’s district noted, she checks her rolodex to assess which staff to 
call about issues and coordinates with the senators and representative’s offices to make 
sure that her issues are handled efficiently.
Higher level of community involvement
Not only are elite constituents more knowledgeable, they were also found to be more 
proactive with their knowledge of the process in order to protect the interests o f their
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communities.^ Comprehension o f the process means that elites were generally more 
proactive in defending their interests while average constituents will more commonly sit 
back and wait to be negatively affected by the initiation of government policies.
The literature cited above and my observations concur that not only do elites know 
more about the process, they tend to also be more interested and active on political issues. 
While Parker (1986) found that more than 8 in 10 constituents felt that incumbents can 
help them in some way, a contextual examination of his sample would have shown that 
perhaps 6 or 7 of those 8 would not have known who to call or write or what that official 
would be able to do for them. In short, I foimd that it was that 1 or 2 of the 8 who knew 
where to call or write that did, and did so with regularity! Furthermore, this 1 or 2 of the 
8 much more commonly voted for the incumbent, and contributed or volunteered on their 
campaign. This 1 or 2 of the 8 was also more likely to belong to one of the elite groups 
mentioned above; lawyers, issue activists. Chamber members, journalists, etc. Chapter 
Six will deal with the larger consequences of staff interaction with the 1 or 2 of 8 
constituents. This chapter will continue to examine the manner in which they do interact 
with those few constituents.
Enjoy greater level of access/contact
Elite constituents enjoy greater levels of access to incumbents and staff for a variety 
of reasons. As was put forward in the previous pages, these constituents enjoy better 
access largely because of their knowledge and interest in the process. They also enjoy 
this access because they often inhabit the same social circles. Therefore incumbents and 
staff will “bump into” them on a more frequent basis. This contributes to the distinction
 ^This is not always the case, however. The Chamber example reflects an individual constituent who is 
acting on behalf of the general community. Unfortunately, most elites that possess this knowledge o f the
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between elite and mass constituents then in that the elites enjoy substantially more 
informal contact with incumbents and staff. As a result, they have fewer needs that ever 
fully become formal requests, projects, cases, etc. Several interactions and accounts 
suggested that some elites will call district or Washington staff for project assistance or 
they even “feel free to approach (the incumbent).” Elite interaction with staff often 
resolves issues proactively and are many times expedited by way of favor; the incumbent 
or staff member notes the problem and has the district or Washington staff “resolve” the 
issue before a paper trail has ever begim. There was a perception amongst some elite 
constituents that their involvement and attitudes were more important to incumbents and 
staff than were those of average constituents. One of A’s constituents noted that his input 
on policy issues was worth ten “tallies” to one for an average constituent. This 
perception derived from his greater levels o f interest, knowledge and contact with A and 
his staff. The degree to which the staff sought out this constituent would seem to confirm 
his perception.
1 commonly found elites who knew not only who staff members were and where to 
get a hold of them, but also how to use those staff to get directly in communication with 
the inciunbent. Whether it was a phone number, meeting site or e-mail address, they 
commonly “will find (the incumbent) if they need him.” I am not suggesting that elites 
have untrammeled access to incumbents. Instead, elite constituents simply have a 
comparatively easier time communicating with incumbents and staff than do average 
constituents because they know how and where to call, largely because they do it more 
often. Given elites’ knowledge, interest and proximity, and their probable influence as
system will probably be acting much more in the self-interest of a specific company or interest group.
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opinion leaders, it is no surprise that staff choose to emphasize elite interaction as an 
efficient means of doing their job.
Multiple arenas of elites
Chapter Four suggested that one o f the variables that impact how incumbents utilize 
their district staff is the heterogeneity of interests within their districts. Specifically, 
districts that were more homogenous were found to be ‘easier’ to represent in the sense 
that there were fewer groups and interests that needed to be addressed. Nevertheless, the 
average congressional district has a multiplicity of economic, political, social, gender, 
race, occupational, cultural, and religous groups within its boundaries. In the words of 
Katz and Lazerfeld (1955) there are different arenas in an individual community, not one 
common setting from which everyone derives their information.
Despite the fact the elites share common traits of knowledge, involvement and 
access, these groups are by no means part of a cozy elite power structure.'* For the most 
part they compete for the resources and attentions of the inhabitants o f their communities, 
and that includes those of the incumbent and his/her staff. Because there are so many 
competing elite interests and because their time in the district is limited, incumbents are 
reliant upon staff to interact in a wide variety of arenas to make sure that different 
groups’ interests are represented. As Chapters Three and Four noted, district enterprises 
are widely variant in the extent to which they pursue this representation. A few 
incumbents, here best seen in B, rely on tl:eir own social interactions with these elite
'* I did notice, however, that in small, relatively homogenous communities there was a tendency for some 
elites to speak more forthrightly about that they felt themselves to be part o f a small number o f town 
leaders who spoke for the interests of all. Even in those small towns, divergent interests could be identified 
with only slight effort. It is my contention that 'his" exists in very few places. And incumbents/staff who 
rely solely on the advice o f "us” in those communities put themselves in risk o f failing to identify important 
constituency groups or interests. My observations suggested that the aggressive offices were much less 
likely to rely on interactions with "us” and seek out those other sources.
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constituents to carry out the representative function. My observations suggest that this 
style is inadequate for less senior and more marginal incumbents. The presence o f 
multiple staff members in the district makes it easier for the staff enterprise to reach out 
to the varying types, personas, times, places, and styles of groups that exist. From formal 
meetings to conventions, after-hours socials and morning coffees, staff can provide 
representation for the absent (or otherwise occupied) incumbent. In all forms the staff 
seemed to be operating on the premise o f the two-step flow of communication; they 
interact with the elites on behalf of the incumbent and the necessary message would then 
be relayed to that community’s members that the incumbent is aware of their issue and 
dutifully working to assist them.
Why elites? An elite focus in five steps.
With this background in mind, a pattern emerges that begins to explain why some 
incumbents and staff prefer to emphasize interactions with elite constituents as opposed 
to more routine methods of representation such as town hall meetings, office hours and 
casework. There are five simple answers to the question of why staff interact with elites. 
Too manv people
Throughout this dissertation 1 have highlighted two important perceptions o f 
Incumbents: first, that uncertainty about the next election governs many of their 
behaviors, and second, that they perceive their constituent demands to be fickle and ever 
changing. Given these perceptions and the fact that each incumbent represents over half a 
million people, there are simply too many constituents to serve. One of E’s field 
representatives noted: “You want to have an open, good relationship with everyone like 
you do with (local officials) but you can’t. There are five hundred thousand people in the
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district.. .(it is) too much for me to cover. So you focus on the opinion-makers.” While 
not all incumbent enterprises share this focus on elites, those that do seemed to inevitably 
cite the fact that there were simply too many constituents to interact with on a regular 
basis. And as will be shown below, interacting with the smaller group o f elites has 
benefits at a number of levels for incumbents, elites and staff alike.
‘Cheaper’ to interact with elites
Consequently, many offices appeared to find ‘cheaper’ ways to interact with a select 
group o f constituents. Their activities are ‘cheaper’ in the sense that they find ways to 
spend their time and resources by focusing on a smaller subset of constituents that they 
know and regularly interact with who can link them to larger portions of their entire 
constituency. Given the fact that congressional district offices usually employ between 
five and seven staff, the logic of finding a ‘cheaper’ style of representation is clear. A 
handful o f proactive district staff members are able to substantially multiply the presence 
of the incumbent throughout the district. Nevertheless, there are limits to what even the 
most aggressive two or three staff members can accomplish. Rather than attempting to 
interact with massive quantities of groups and individual constituents, my observations 
suggested that the aggressive enterprises focused on people they perceived to be ‘opinion 
leaders’, thereby further multiplying the efforts o f the incumbent. These behaviors are 
‘cheap’ because the incumbents and staff regularly find themselves in contact with the 
easy-to-find elite constituents.
Elites are community leaders and are easy to find
Whether the elites are public or private officials, they are generally found in obvious 
settings for the incumbents and staff to engage them. Public officials are the easiest to
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find. They have offices in advertised and central locations and are supposed to be 
available to their public constituencies. That makes them an obvious and easy target for 
interaction. A Chamber official from H’s district referred to himself as the “intervener” 
for the community. In this position, members of the community viewed him as the focal 
point for all community development issues, be they local, state or federal. Because of 
his central position in the community, it was his impression that H’s staff, and those from 
another nearby incumbent’s office regularly called or visit to assess the status o f the 
community.
Private citizens can be just as valuable sources o f interaction for the district 
enterprise. C’s key contact at a major state university in his district was one of the 
school’s vice presidents. This constituent suggested that he was “a player in an important 
institution, (and C) seeks me out.” This constituent and C probably sought each other 
initially because of their mutual dependence; C is motivated to represent the needs o f the 
major employer in his district and the constituent needs help procuring federal assistance 
for his institution. In any case, the vice president was in an obvious place for C and his 
staff to seek out a source of information. Other elites are easy to find less because o f 
their institutional presence than because of the fact that they are well known, or come 
from prestigious local families. An example o f the latter was a small business owner 
from A’s district whose family were “pioneers to the area” and whose father was a 
former mayor. He has continued the family activism and is recognized by other elites as 
a community leader. Then there was a member of G’s “network”, a newly retired 
businessman who kept busy with membership on nearly a dozen community boards. In 
each of these three cases the constituent’s position and political activism in the
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community were beneficial as long as they were willing to act as part o f incumbents’ 
extended enterprises.
Incumbents interact with elites formally and informally
Incumbent’s formal behaviors during their periods at home emphasized elite 
interaction. Observations of their town hall meetings, forums, meetings in their offices 
and drop-by visits all had a distinct elite edge to them. Their scheduled behaviors and 
unannounced drop-bys or phone calls were much more commonly with elite constituents. 
A and his staff made deliberate changes in their district strategy towards the end of his 
first term so that they would be in greater proximity to the “opinion leaders.” His COS 
suggested three groups in particular (oil, military, and religious communities) that they 
didn't seem to have open communication with initially. Consequently, A spent more 
time penetrating the leadership of these three groups so that he could grasp their issues 
and they could see his efforts to represent their interests.
But 1 also observed incumbents interacting with elites in their informal and campaign 
activities during their home visits. As was just noted, incumbents live in the same social 
world as the elite constituents so they bump into them in their ordinary routines. This 
was clearly the case in that incumbents come home for the political purpose of “running 
the cocktail circuit.” Other incumbents sat on community groups’ boards, were involved 
in church groups, and yes, were even soccer moms and dads. These activities brought 
incumbents into direct contact with significant numbers of elites, who in many cases were 
not shy about bringing up bills, budget items or other policy issues seeking the 
incumbent’s opinion and/or support. In short, the incumbent’s formal and personal 
district activities will bring them into contact with elite constituents. For the aggressive
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incumbent this is obvious electoral benefit. For the more senior or routine incumbent, 
these interactions seemed to be more bothersome, except in the case of a personal 
incumbent like B who relied on his own personal interaction with constituents to get the 
pulse of the community.
Staff interact with elites as well
Staff activities, both formal and informal, seemed to be equally devoted to elite 
interaction. There was surprisingly little difference between the types of elites that 
incumbents and their staff would interact with. While heads of major corporations or 
community groups were more guarded with their time, the vast majority of district elites 
appeared to be as willing to meet with members o f the district enterprise as with the 
incumbent him/herself. Staff members usually accompany the incumbents to their tours, 
meetings, forums, and town hall events. This gives them an obvious later entrée with 
these local officials, community and business elites that I observed staff to utilize in later 
follow-up visits. Additionally, efforts by the incumbent to penetrate community groups 
resulted in the increased access for staff members. There seemed to be sort of a spillover 
access for them. The instance of A interacting with church communities was directly 
followed up by numerous staff trips and calls to church groups on the issue of impact aid 
to the poor. A generated the issue and the interest and his staff moved in to capitalize on 
the open access.
Like incumbents, the personal activities of staff often bring them into contact with 
elite constituents. In fact, as Chapter Three demonstrated, staff members often find 
themselves increasingly engaged in the elite interests of a community after they start 
working for incumbents. One of C’s district staff members noted that her community
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involvement increased over the two years she had worked for him; party by her own 
choice, partly because it was useful for her to go to meetings with groups that she worked 
with, and partly because she simply felt “dragged in” over time. Like the staff from G’s 
office or this particular C staffer, their extracurricular activities bring them into contact 
with elite constituents. Several staff noted that whether they were at dinner or at 
meetings o f these groups that they were often approached by elite constituents for 
information about the incumbent’s position on an issue or how he/she might assist their 
group’s needs. This constituent, like one of A’s note then that they have never made a 
formal request for service because they have “no need to contact them” since they see 
staff in informal social settings on a very regular basis. And to conclude, staffers are 
people too. They have fnends and personal relationships. As in the case of an 
accountant/chamber member from C’s state, she was a personal friend of one of the US 
Senator’s state staff. She emails and calls him regularly on a variety o f issues. This is 
not to suggest that staff members don’t have friends who are average constituents.
Rather, all o f these examples suggest that elites are easy to find and are often in close 
proximity to the incumbents and their staff. Elites often appeared to be as comfortable in 
these relationships with staff as they were with incumbents.
Elites are comfortable with staff
As the previous sections seem to suggest, the incumbent/staffrelite relationship is 
also logical because elites generally seem to have a higher comfort level with staff than 
do average constituents. Elites are a class of people who know and are almost 
exclusively comfortable dealing with staff because they understand how the system 
works. A county judge’s assistant from B’s district suggested that there are three reasons
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why elite constituents are comfortable with staff: they provide a way for elites to 1) 
communicate with the incumbent, 2) get service from the incumbent’s office and 3) 
acquire other political information. My other observations seemed to confirm his logic. 
Staff provide a way to talk to the incumbent
One of the obvious differences between elite and average constituents was that elites 
tended to understand the fact that incumbents work with very busy and odd congressional 
work schedules and are not regularly in the district. The most basic distinction was 
whether the constituent grasped the Tuesday-Thursday work schedule of Congress. A 
small business owner from B’s district expressed an attitude that I did not conunonly 
encoimter amongst other elites; “if I had issues I’d just go over there and see (B) 
personally.” Most elites, on the other hand, tended to be aware of the presence and job 
responsibilities of district staff members. Consequently, they seemed to grasp that they 
needed to pursue 'access’ to the incumbent through the staff members in the district 
office. One of H’s constituents put it most succinctly; “(the staffer) is not (the 
incumbent), be we value the favorable report” that she delivers to the incumbent.
Because they value that “report” to the incumbent, elite constituents work with district to 
staff to ensure that they have access to their community. A Chamber of Commerce 
official from A ’s district allowed his staff to utilize their facility for their weekly office 
hours suggesting that she appreciated their “accessibility” and that they “valued bending 
his ear.” Another example of this was the aforementioned case of an accountant who 
would first email or phone her contact in a Senator’s office; “I go there first when 1 have 
a question or problem.” She gave different types of examples ranging from particular tax 
questions to community development issues for the chamber. In all cases she used her
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channel o f influence through the staff member that she knew to procure an answer or 
assistance from the incumbent enterprise. Then there was C’s university official who 
utilized a “mixture of calls” to the district ofBce (which he did “quite often”),
Washington office and “directly” to C when necessary. This individual, perhaps even 
more sophisticated than most elite constituents, had a clear grasp of who district staff 
were and the hierarchy within their office. In sum, elites more commonly understood that 
they could get matters accomplished and maintain a close relationship with the incumbent 
through the staff members. The aggressive staff seemed to have a much better grasp on 
the rationale behind these relationships and the fact that they act as “communications 
links” to Congress as a whole.
Staff are a way to get service and information
Not only do elites understand that the incumbent is busy and that access is best 
procured through the staff, they also more likely have an understanding that quite often 
the staff members themselves are able to resolve their issues without any involvement 
from the incumbent. A less sophisticated view is built on the impression that incumbents 
are personally engaged on virtually all constituent matters, personally going to bat for 
every constituent that calls or writes the office. One of A’s elite constituents put it best: 
“for me it doesn’t matter as long as I know what 1 need to get done gets done. For the 
average joe, (the more personal style of the incumbent) is better because it seems more 
involved, more hands-on.” This particular constituent had a clear understanding of the 
powers and responsibilities of district staff and “how they are good for him.” The elite 
constituent was usually less concerned about gaining the attention of the incumbent than 
simply resolving the issue at hand. Elite constituents were observed to build relationships
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with individual staff members that appeared to be more valued than contact with the 
incumbent. One particular example of a constituent who worked with a military issues 
staffer referred to him as the best asset and “political person in the delegation”, even 
ranking him ahead of the actual incumbents. While “average joes” were clearly 
impressed by the numbers and professionalism of many district enterprises, the elite 
constituents demonstrated a greater understanding of how to utilize the staff as 
intermediaries to the incumbents. Service to elites might then be explained by the fact 
that elites are simply more willing, or more informed as to how to contact the 
incumbent’s office. In other words, elites are served better because they know how the 
system works. For incumbents, the value o f utilizing district staff appears to be justified 
in both the cases of elites and “average joes.”
Staff are “good political libraries” for the area.
The finale rationale for why elites are comfortable with staff lies in the political 
value o f the staff independent of their work for the incumbent. The argument here is 
that because district staff members spend so much time interacting with different 
community leaders (political, economic, social, etc,) that they know what is going on in 
all parts of the district. This is especially the case for staff members who have longer 
tenures in office. Both B and one of his constituents referred to the value of one of his 
long-time field representatives as being that “she knows where the bodies are buried.” 
She was extremely familiar with all the relevant issues and personalities firom her part of 
B’s district. Because elites comprehend that staff exist, are valuable means o f access and 
service from the incumbent, and finally because they are valuable resources for the
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community in general, incumbents are likely to be comfortable interacting with district 
staff.
But some elites are prickly
1 should note, however, that not all elites were comfortable dealing exclusively with 
district staff As Chapter Four noted, some constituents make greater demands for actual 
contact with the incumbent. I would speculate that some personal incumbents even had a 
tendency to spoil their constituents with an abundance of personal contact, while some 
absent incumbents were able to empower staff members over time who could be seen as 
surrogates. B and E’s RDSM provide an excellent contrast of this point. A journalist 
from B’s district noted that “people around here I think take all that contact for granted 
but they’re for him for sure.” While they may be “for him”, one group demonstrated 
considerable disappointment at his failure to show up and deliver a speech to their annual 
award dinner. A surrogate for his campaign (not even a staff member) delivered his 
prepared remarks in his absence. E’s constituents, on the other hand, were long use to the 
presence of surrogates or staff members delivering remarks, cutting ribbons and inquiring 
about the status o f their communities. Incumbents who rely upon their own personal 
interaction with incumbents best be careful about changing this interaction over time.
Another group of elites are prickly in the sense that they prefer interacting with 
Washington staff. A banker from C’s district typified this attitude; “the district staff are 
competent but they don’t do my issues.” As did one of B’s constituents who noted that 
district staff “don’t have the level o f competence” to discuss their “legislative issues.” I 
foimd these types of remarks most commonly amongst the most sophisticated ranks of 
district elites, with individuals who enjoyed considerable personal access to the
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incumbent and represented important political or economic interests. These remarks 
were also more common in districts where the incumbent kept a very routine style of 
district operation. Elite constituents from B and C’s districts had very little to interact 
with district staff about, seeing that these two incumbents kept the activities of their staff 
very circumscribed.
One other group of elites who more commonly would call Washington directly were 
constituents of the ‘large association’ or ‘large-issue’ types. These district elites are 
actually going to be more interested in dealing with staff members who deal directly with 
legislative or budgetary issues. As was just noted, the more routine style incumbents 
(especially B and C) probably encourage this kind of behavior through their personal 
efforts and their focus on the legislative efforts of their Washington staff. An example 
here was one of A’s constituent who stated that he relied on Washington staff “90% of 
the time” because 90% of district staff work is related to “simple casework. Not that I 
don’t use local people but the kinds of issues we pursue, we need the knowledge of 
current legislative issues and inside information. We don’t need intermediaries to find 
out this info.” This is an example of an elite constituent who fails to imderstand the 
important role that some district staff have on local/state/cross-jurisdictional types issues 
described in Chapter Three. This final group appeared to be a very select group of 
constituents, however. Most elite constituents appreciated the local office and 
understood the importance of building access and relationships through those staff 
members. While elites differed in the extent to which they called the Washington or the 
district staff, they shared a sense of appreciation when incumbents and staff contacted 
them.
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Elites like to be called on
Incumbents and staff also focus on elites and opinion leaders because these 
constituents “like to be called on.” Staff will often placate these individuals in order to 
meet staff goals and to ensure the future o f the relationship.
Partly because incumbents and staff can help
Elites largely appeared to enjoy their interactions because of the fact that incumbents 
and staff were able to assist them. When staff members dropped by local elites their 
purpose was part to demonstrate that the incumbent enterprise was working hard and part 
to inquire as to whether there was anything that they could do to help the constituent. In 
a typical interaction, one o f E’s field representatives inquired of a car dealer “how many 
cars are you selling?” This interaction meandered around topics o f specifically how 
many cars he was selling, what the local economy was like, and what, if anything, E’s 
office could do to help the local economy. At the conclusion of the interaction, both 
actors could walk away feeling that they had gained from the interaction; the car dealer 
expressed a concern about the local economy and the district staffer emphasized that the 
incumbent was in touch with these concerns. A’s constituents appeared to “appreciate 
the access” whether they had a particular issue or not. On one occasion, a staff member 
made a surprise drop-by visit during a community meeting to discuss funding for a 
hospital expansion. The staff member was able to suggest several federal programs that 
they would not otherwise have thought to apply for. Constituents generally appeared to 
feel that the “incumbent’s help was a positive influence” in resolving issues. Because of 
this assistance they genuinely desired staff visits to the their communities and in one case
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even fought to make sure that H did not close a local office and move his staff member to 
a more populated area.
Partly because they enjoy the interaction
Some elite constituents had more social motivations for their interactions with staff 
and incumbents. Hosting an incumbent, attending a meeting or giving a plant tom- 
appeared to be highly anticipated and valued events. While interacting with the 
incumbent was a valued social event, meeting with staff also seemed to carry some social 
benefit. Most elites were generally appreciative of staff efforts and were interested in 
spending time interacting with these individuals. As compared to regular constituents 
who largely did not recognize or care about the staff, or even the incumbents for that 
matter, elite constituents generally seemed to enjoy these interactions.
Maybe even expect the interaction
For some elites, the interaction was actually more of an expectation than an 
enjoyable social occurrence. This seemed to be especially the case with a newly elected 
incumbent. One of G’s staff reflected that it was “more a challenge than an opportunity” 
to replace a high profile leader as they had done three terms earlier. As comments in 
Chapter Pom suggested, A’s district enterprise struggled early to incorporate the relevant 
communities and elites that had been active during E’s tenme. By the second term, it 
seemed that the ‘right’ people were on board but there were still mumblings of discontent 
from some elites who felt that they had not yet had sufficient personal attention from the 
incumbent and staff or that they weren’t “filling the shoes” of the previous incumbent and 
staff.
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Ironically, one constituent disliked the fact that the RDSM spent so much time at 
hom e/ This situation meant that he “looks to Washington staff or maybe even other 
places for information. It can be a problem when he needs to take them along on the 
importance of an issue.” He went on to express that “groups can be received and courted 
from DC” and that the RDSM doesn’t need to be in district to perform this service. 
Evidence of the expectations on new incumbents is also found in the fact that district 
enterprises often try to keep popular functions going from the previous incumbent. 
Incumbents from the same party may try to keep staff (J and K). In the case of A they 
even tried to lure a staff member from E’s office to continue the development of a 
program that was popular with district elites. The motivation here was quite transparent; 
try to effectively serve the business community, a particular group of elites whose 
loyalties are most malleable and based on successful contact with the incumbent. The 
successful continuation of this program might have meant that A could have used his 
district resources for other purposes. Because they were unable to lure the staff member 
and keep the program running, A was forced to devote valuable personal time to courting 
these elites who might assist his enterprise.
Elites are the right people
The argiunent “why elites” has centered to this point largely on the fact that elites 
desire and enjoy attention from incumbents. The final component to this argument is that 
elites are the right people for incumbents to pursue because they have valuable resources. 
They are the constituents that have the greatest impact on the incumbent’s success in the
 ^Maybe incumbents allocate their staff based on the impression it helps with elite issues. But the most 
sophisticated elites actually don’t like the idea as it detracts from what the enterprise can accomplish in 
Washington. It would be interesting to further examine how many elites have this attitude? Do incumbents 
realize this as well?
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district and the likelihood that they will be returned to office. As was noted above, elite 
constituents are more knowledgeable about the political process, more active in their 
communities, and more likely to vote, volunteer or contribute to campaigns.
Furthermore, staff and inciunbent behavior was clearly driven by a perception that a two- 
step flow of communication between elite and average constituents remains in effect.
This perspective is not new to the discipline. Mayhew suggested “Congress serves the 
vocal, organized and active” (1974, pp30-31). One need not be as cynical in their 
conclusions to recognize that incumbents will serve those constituents that they are most 
likely to interact with, who have the resources to assist their campaigns (endorsements, 
media, contributions, volunteers) and the ability to influence public opinion (through two 
step cues to their neighbors, followers, friends and family members). Remember, 
incumbents don’t have time or resources to hear everybody, so they have to make 
decisions in how they utilize their staff resources.
So what is the value of service?
Literature says incumbents are uncertain and contact helps
The literature reviewed in Chapter One and at the beginning of this chapter suggests 
“the central motif in discussion about campaign strategy is uncertainty” (Jacobson, 1997 
p66). Furthermore, the literature generally agrees to some value of a “personal vote” 
found in contact with a district’s voters. Parker (1989, p85) perhaps identified the most 
important value that service provides to ease incumbents’ uncertainty: “Thus by 
maintaining extensive contact with voters, incumbents are able to enhance their support 
among their constituents and thereby weaken the opposition they fact at the next 
election.” I would note that the opposite also likely holds, that incumbent enterprises that
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do not perform elite interaction, or perform it poorly, risk misidentifying or alienating 
elite constituencies.
Because it satisfies the needs of all three actors
Perhaps the best explanation of the value of elite interaction can be found in the fact 
that it satisfies the needs of all three actors. It is a boundary-spanning behavior where 
output by the incumbent and staff is indirectly exchanged for inputs that are beneficial to 
the incumbent enterprise. The elite satisfaction is most obvious, interaction (output) with 
incumbents and staff satisfies their material, purposive and social goals (to be detailed 
later).
Assuming that satisfied elites reciprocate by passing along reinforcing messages to 
their “followers” through a two-step communication, incumbent satisfaction is derived 
from higher levels o f name recognition and job approval that ultimately will pay the 
incumbent back on election day. At a more minimal level, the incumbent enterprise is 
simply enhanced because it brings an important class o f constituents into their fold. In 
this case the incumbent receives input in the form of votes, support and campaign 
contributions to assist them in their uncertain electoral environments. At an even more 
complex level, elite involvement in the extended incumbent enterprise allows the 
incumbent leeway to focus on other activities beyond the pale of district representation. 
The “leeway” will be detailed later in this chapter.
Staff satisfaction is the most complex of the three actors, but no less relevant. For 
the individual staff member, elite interaction is a cheap and effective way for them to 
advertise the services of the incumbent. But staff satisfaction can go beyond work goals 
to also include personal staff motivations. As was discussed in Chapter Three, some staff
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members are motivated by the desire to be personally involved in district political issues 
or even entertain possible bids for future runs at elective office. Either way, interactions 
with elite constituents would be beneficial to individual staff goals.
Value by the numbers
Some staff actually placed a numeric value on the service that they performed. At 
the aggregate casework level, one of B’s younger staff members suggested that with five 
field representatives each generating five new cases per day, each staffer ultimately 
assists about twelve hundred constituents per year. That translates into roughly six 
thousand constituents per year. Given that five per day is a high average and that a 
significant portion of those cases are likely to be repeats, six thousand is probably high. 
Yet, even half that total would mean that the incumbent enterprise is reaching out to six 
thousand constituents and their families every election cycle. If there is a “personal vote” 
to be had, this casework is surely significant in a low turnout congressional election. 
Focusing instead on elite interaction, one o f E’s field representatives suggested that 
interacting with one opinion leader had the impact of directly touching three people and 
that by the end of the week between fifteen and fifty other members of that community 
would have heard about the incumbent/staff assistance. I would suggest that the latter 
evaluation is probably more accurate, as well as more valuable to the incumbent 
enterprise. Service to the opinion leader seems much more likely to generate political 
support, whether it be allegiance, a vote or a contribution.
Value by perception
Again, the actual value of the interaction is hard to measure. What is more relevant 
is that incumbents and staff perceive such service to be of value to the enterprise. They
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think that service has an electoral payoff. F’s RDSM knew that casework and service 
were useful at election time but had a hard time assigning an actual value. Elite service 
was even “less tangibly measured” than was casework, yet she had allocated more than 
four staff to aggressive field interaction and only two to casework. Furthermore, staff 
members seemed to largely believe that if you touch a lot of elites, much of the 
enterprise’s ‘advertising’ will be done automatically through word o f mouth. From this 
perspective doing the math like E’s field representative did suggests that the actual output 
or resolution of cases is much less important than simply interacting with the elite 
constituents. The simple effort is what is rewarded. This staffer went on to suggest that 
“if word gets out that elite x or y says that the incumbent was involved, it has a positive 
impact on other’s evaluations” of the incumbent. The logic of this perception is also 
upheld in the cross-jurisdictional work performed by district staff, where there is usually 
little that federal staff can do to help resolve local or state issues. My observations and 
discussions with elite constituents seemed to affirm these perceptions. Elite constituents 
were largely appreciative of the simple efforts put forth by staff members in their drop-by 
visits, office hours, or forums held in their communities. This contact was largely 
rewarded with positive evaluations o f the incumbent, and frequently supported by a 
desire to ‘do something’ for the incumbent at election time, whether it be a vote, a 
contribution or volunteering some time. More importantly, interaction with staff 
functionally made many elites a distant extension of the incumbent enterprise.
Contact important because some incumbents do lose
Elite interaction also holds a value in a negative sense. These activities are notable 
in that they can play a role in the demise o f an incumbent’s career. On rare occasions
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candidates who seem to emerge from nowhere shock veteran incumbents. In 1992 Bob 
Kastenmeier lost to local news anchor Scott Klug and in 1994 Neal Smith suffered defeat 
at the hands of surgeon Greg Ganske. While both Klug and Ganske went on to well- 
respected positions in the legislature, both would have been regarded as only semi-quality 
challengers. 1 speculate that Kastenmeier and Smith’s district efforts should be the focal 
point of explanations of their losses. Perhaps it is the case that a veteran incumbent and 
their staff do a poor job with elite interaction and begin to establish a poor reputation. Or 
perhaps the aging incumbent and staff continue to serve the same circles of elite 
constituents, excluding important voices in their districts and never really knowing it 
until election night. Additionally, the inunigration of new elites into a district can cause 
tension within an enterprise about when it should ‘expand’ and when it should ‘protect’. 
Do they continue to serve the old reliable circles of support? Or do they turn to 
incorporate new faces into the district enterprise?^ Witness the comments by B in 
Chapter Four about his lack of familiarity with his new constituents or the relatively high 
level of turnover in C’s district enterprise over the previous several years. This was a 
trend that had not gone unnoticed by his constituents.
Perhaps these are the types of things that lead elites to note that an incumbent is 
‘losing touch’ and so they slowly fade out of contact with the incumbent At some point 
the enterprise has lost ties to its old core of supporters or hasn’t reached out to the new 
circles o f support in the district. Are B and C falling into this cycle of neglect? Perhaps 
C felt this type of defeat approaching in 1998 when he moved his press secretary back to
 ^These are important allocative decisions for the district enterprise. Can a routine staff in an increasingly 
unfamiliar district staff be asked to be more proactive given that they do not expend a great deal o f 
resources interacting with the community? And if they were out doing “more” what kinds o f things would 
they be sacrificing in their normal routines?
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the district after a hard fought election in 1996. This might be called the ‘slipping senior 
incumbent’ theory, a temporary decision to reallocate resources to their district enterprise 
to avoid defeat at the polls. The cases of Kastenmeier and Smith probably have elements 
of all these failings. In the end, infrequent travel home, inactive district staff, the 
development of a bad district reputation and the isolation of electoral support will 
probably result in the creation of decent electoral challenges (as seen in Ganske and 
Klug). While 1 am not maintaining that elite interaction is the be-all, end-all determinant 
of congressional election outcomes, it is an important increment in determining the final 
vote total. And in a low-turaout mid-term election with strong national tides, like say 
1994, the lack o f a solid district reputation and a supportive core of elite constituents can 
spell electoral defeat. In the election of 1994, the Republican majority was built on 
fifteen marginal seats that were cumulatively won with less than 20,000 total votes. And 
in that election 52 Democrats and 52 Republicans each received 55% or less o f the vote. 
Electorally speaking, the parties would be wise to test the electoral strength o f aging 
inciunbents in changing districts, regardless of poll tests taken months before the election.
It is easily overlooked that many o f these perceptions o f inciunbents and their 
connections to the district are built on activities that are largely performed by the district 
staff. This is the case especially for active enterprises but even for B as a ‘personal’ 
incumbent. While B might have a well-developed reputation, it is solid largely because 
of his staff’s longstanding contacts, service over time, and professionalism that clears the 
high number of cases that allow him to interact with individual constituents. In short, the 
district staff enterprise is the foundation of his reputation and an important “increment” in 
his election victories.
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T h e  “ s l i c e ”  m o d e l
Increments and margins
This chapter has argued that district staff enterprises interact with a select ‘slice’ o f 
elite constituents for two basic reasons. First, the staff members are limited in their 
ability to interact with more than a small fraction of the district’s constituents over a two- 
year period. Second, those constituents that they interact with are commonly found to be 
individuals with the resources to impact the reelection prospects o f the incumbent. The 
idea of a ‘slice’ is derived from Miller and Stokes (1963) suggestion that incumbents win 
by focusing on “increments and margins.” In today’s congressional elections. Miller and 
Stokes would argue that “increments and margins” are collectively provided in 
incumbent home styles, campaign finance and advertising, the role of the media, quality 
challengers, redistricting, etc. 1 argue that elite interaction provides incumbents with 
another “increment” to protect themselves at the polls. Furthermore, this interaction has 
a ‘spillover’ effect onto several of the other “increments” just mentioned. The select 
slice’ of elite constituents that staff and incumbents interact with can perhaps best be 
depicted by slightly modifying Fenno’s (1978) analysis of the four circles of constituents 
in a congressional district. Figure 5.1 illustrates Fenno’s circles with the added ‘slice’ of 
elite interaction.
Figure 5.1 The “slice” of the constituency
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Four circles and a ‘slice’
Personal
The personal constituency is the core of an incumbent’s support. It is very small and 
is filled with the most loyal supporters. These individuals know the incumbent well and 
are willing to make personal sacrifices for the incumbent. One example here was an 
individual who stated that “he would quit his job” to help E in an anticipated statewide 
race. Often these individuals have the best access to the incumbent because they know 
him or her personally. They are counted as the incumbents’ informal advisers about 
issues, personalities and politics. Or the incumbent counts on them as informal advisers 
and ‘kitchen cabinet’ membeis. As this tends to be a small and personal coalition, 
incumbents probably tend to keep the personal circle static in its membership with 
limited staff interaction.
Primary
The primary constituency is o f greater electoral significance to the incumbent. This 
group is considerably larger than the personal constituency as it entails the incumbent’s 
political support base beyond his or her personal fiiends and advisers. An example of a 
primary constituent was a business owner who I observed talking to one o f E’s staff 
about a project that he had just worked with “E and his (Washington) staff”, as well as his 
long-standing political support of E. The primary supporters are the constituents who can 
be counted on to vote, vohmteer and contribute to the incumbent’s campaigns. They are 
what might best be defined as the incumbent’s base. They may be loyal partisans who 
have never met the incumbent or they may be intimately involved with office or
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campaign functions and know the incumbent quite well. There is a substantial range in 
access in the primary constituency. Some of these constituents will have higher levels of 
interaction with the incumbent, district and Washington staff than do most of the other 
primary constituents. Staff enterprises clearly have a role to play with the incumbent’s 
base. If the staff do not maintain contact with the incumbent’s personal and partisan 
base, it is likely to be less energetically involved in future campaigns. Especially given 
that elite constituents like to be contacted.
Re-election
Perhaps an even more relevant constituency is the reelection constituency. This is 
the incumbent’s broader baseline of political support; they control his or her electoral 
fortunes in the general election. Because most incumbents do not face primary 
challengers, it is this broader constituency that is usually tested. It is also from this group 
that the inciunbent most fears electoral or issue opposition. Bullock and Brady (1983) 
found a distinction between the impact of reelection and geographic constituencies on the 
roll call votes of senators from the same states. Their conclusion was that senators’ votes 
on policy issues were more influenced by the reelection constituency than the geographic. 
This would reflect the incumbent concern with being in tune with the constituency most 
responsible for keeping him or her in ofSce. This is also the sensitive area where the 
incumbent enterprise must choose how aggressive it will be with elite constituents. It 
was plainly the case that focusing on a broader, newer group or reelection constituents 
would take away time and resources from a focus on the base/primary constituents. At 
least with elite interaction, the staff enterprise could somewhat minimize that tradeoff by 
interacting with elites from both constituencies. Nevertheless, the tradeoff remains.
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Another dilemma confronts the incumbent whose popularity results in election victories 
of sixty or maybe even seventy percent. E provides an excellent example then of an 
incumbent who confronts a reelection constituency that is virtually the entire district.
This is perhaps the only imaginable instance of where an incumbent who receives less 
than 55% of the vote has an advantage; they know who their base is and can more easily 
serve, interact and keep them happy. The popular incumbent must either struggle to 
gauge the depth of his or her support or take it for granted and risk the collapse that 
Kastenmeier and Smith suffered.
Geographic
Finally, the “geographic” constituency is the broadest outside circle. It includes both 
non-voters and those opponents of the incumbent that will not likely offer support under 
any circumstances. One field representative revealed that staff from even the most 
popular incumbents realize they can’t get everybody; “some people love E, some people 
hate him, you just live with it.” Generally speaking, this outer circle is not actively 
pursued, except for two situations. First, the incumbent whose reelection constituency is 
less than fifty-five percent is likely to make aggressive allocations of personal and staff 
time to interact with a larger chunk of constituents and push their election total slightly 
higher. The second type o f interaction in this constituency is the targeting of specific 
elites who are either independent or previously opposed to the incumbent. Staff members 
were observed interacting with these types of elites with the goal of incorporating them 
into the incumbent’s district enterprise. My observations generally suggested, however, 
that this final constituency was the most neglected.
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T h e  ‘ s l i c e ’
As can been seen from the Figure 5.3, district staff hope to elicit a ‘slice’ of voters in 
support of the incumbent. This ‘slicing’ is performed on the assumption that it will bring 
valuable votes and resources to the incumbent. The ‘slice’ widens to contact a larger 
group of elites in the outer circles in order that the staff might communicate their services 
to elites not ordinarily in their circles. As will be shown below, the goal is to target a 
pool of elites to co-opt into the district enterprise. To reiterate, the ‘slice’ is a group of 
elite constituents in the reelection and general constituencies that the staff hope to draw 
into the incumbent’s base; the primary constituency. By interacting with elites outside of 
the incumbent’s base, district staff members possibly hope to elicit a spillover from the 
two outer constituencies for two purposes. The arrows on Figure 5.3 reflect this desired 
spillover into the outer constituencies that ordinarily aren’t vital elements of the 
incumbent enterprise. First, they interact to assist with resources for their reelection 
campaigns. And second, they hope to buy ‘leeway’ for the incumbent so that they can 
focus on other personal goals. The ideal goal appeared to me to be that they establish a 
comfortable “slice” where they are in touch with as many elite circles as possible, as was 
noted above. They hope to be in touch with these different elite circles so that they 1) 
know everything that is going on in the district and 2) that they are comfortably 
supported by as many elite circles as necessary to maintain their election and deter any 
serious electoral threat. These behaviors and the purchase of “leeway” will be discussed 
later in this chapter.
In most offices, staff members were relatively open about the volume and purpose of 
their interactions with elite constituents. When asked to provide a job description, it was
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usually apparent if, and to what extent, staff interacted with elite constituents as they 
walked me through a typical week of their employment. While widening the ‘slice’ may 
not be a deliberate electoral strategy (i.e. serve elites as another “increment” on the way 
to victory) for all district staff members, this behavior has definite political impact. The 
value of the ‘slice’ relies to some degree on a two-step flow of communication between 
the elites and the rest of the voters. Whether or not this link truly exists is less important 
than the fact that staff attitudes demonstrate that they perceive that elites have such an 
influence; “through the elites, you meet more people, it’s better than cold calling.” 
Another staff member felt that courting these elites definitely had a payback both with the 
immediate word of mouth recognition throughout the community and with more delayed 
gratification at election time. A third staff member remarked that if “word gets out that 
(elite X or Y) says the incumbent did a good job” that it has a “positive impact on the 
incumbent’s evaluation” by the rest of the citizens. Furthermore, constituents value the 
“presence” o f staff and incumbents and appeared to repay their gratitude with support 
long after the interaction was rendered. The majority of my cases suggested that staff 
pursue the elites with the intention of multiplying or at least maintaining the incumbent’s 
vote totals. Yet, as Chapters Three and Four noted, there is substantial variation in the 
amount of aggressive elite interaction performed from office to office. A quick 
examination o f the motives of each of the three actors in this equation would be helpful in 
attempting to gain an understanding of this behavior.
Why do offices vary in their elite interaction? Individual motivations 
This dissertation has continually noted variation in the functions o f district staff.
This is particularly true with the quality and effectiveness of elite interaction. As with
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many of their behaviors, the variation in elite interaction seems to be due in large part to 
the motivations of each of the interactors. Because incumbents represent roughly similar 
constituencies (in that they represent roughly five hundred thousand people, some of 
which are invariably elite constituents) and have the resources and potential to perform 
elite interaction, it is hypothesized that variation in this behavior is largely due to their 
motivations and philosophies about the proper role for district staff.
Incumbent
The obvious -  electoral pressure
Incumbent motivations are partly obvious in that they are electoral, but they also 
appeared to be highly impacted by the style discussed in Chapter Four. The most obvious 
explanation of incumbent behavior and the differences in their elite interaction might be 
attributed to the different levels of electoral pressure that they confront. References to 
my observations and the literature throughout this dissertation suggest that incumbents 
are often motivated by a perception of electoral uncertainty and vulnerability.
It appeared that the more electorally marginal incumbents had staff members who 
were more aggressive in their ‘slicing’ of elite constituents. Furthermore, they more 
commonly targeted members o f the opposition party if their reelection percentage was 
marginal. The “aggressiveness” also appeared to roughly correspond to the incumbent’s 
length of tenure in office, with the staff enterprises of the junior incumbents doing more 
‘slicing’ to build up their extended enterprises. My observations confiim Fenno’s (1978) 
finding that these junior members are more “expansionist” in their behaviors, while 
senior incumbents tend to discourage such proactive behavior by their staff in favor of 
maintaining their base. The differing means by which A and E’s staff engaged the elites
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of their district was instructive on this difference. A’s staff sought out new issues and 
personalities to interact with throughout their first two terms. The “expansive” nature o f 
their behavior could be seen from the top to the bottom of the organization; from A’s 
comments, to the COS’s rationale for staff existence, to the routines by which the field 
staff guided their weekly behaviors, meeting “new faces” or new “opinion leaders” was 
the priority. One of A’s staff spent her first eighteen months “introducing herself and 
being consistent” with people and groups. She had a “time formula” to deal with those 
groups that she know from the community as well as introducing new groups each week 
or month so that she “didn’t see the same old faces all the time.” Basically she would 
speak to any group that “gave her the opportunity.” At those meetings she talked largely 
about what things A’s office could do for those groups but also to some extent what A 
was doing (used talking points) because she was “an extension o f the congressman.” E’s 
staff, on the other hand, was almost exclusively focused on the maintenance of their base. 
While their guidebooks for different communities contained substantial lists of people 
that they had interacted with over the years, by the time that 1 observed them, the 
interactions were limited to a few comfortable faces in each city. In their minds, 
seniority allowed them to establish an efficient mechanism whereby they could quickly 
move through a community and gauge its disposition. It is likely that at some point, as 
with E’s staff, A’s books, routines and rationale will become too cumbersome and the 
enterprise will shift to a more “protectionist” stance, seeking to interact with only a few 
trusted faces in each community.
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The personality/philosophy
The other obvious explanation for the variation in time and “aggressiveness” devoted 
to elite interaction was attributable to the personality types identified in Chapter Four.
The personal and policy incumbents had staff members who did substantially less elite 
interaction than did the electoral or partisan enterprises.
Staff from the former two types o f incumbents tended to focus mainly on activities 
that were purely supportive of the incumbent. This was the case especially with the 
personal incumbent who does much of the elite interaction him/herself. Because B 
traveled home regularly and spent so much of his time in the field meeting with 
individual constituents, he generated a substantial amount of casework to occupy his 
staffs’ time. While B’s field staff did some outreach to constituents, by and large they 
waited to see what the incumbent would turn up himself, or the constituents brought to 
the office. The policy incumbent such as C may have staff act in aggressive fashions on 
certain issues (low income housing in the case of C). But as the previous chapter 
discussed, policy incumbents see service as an end in itself, not a means to improve their 
own electoral positions. When 1 asked C’s staff whether they perceived that service to 
constituents was valuable to the inciunbent, their response was, in the words o f  one field 
representative: “we’re too busy to be juicing up for re-election.” For the most part, 
policy staff members are reactive or “preparatory” as are the personal staff members. As 
a common example, neither type of office paid much attention to cross-jurisdictional 
work. If a constituent approached the district enterprise with an issue that was more local 
or state in nature, these offices would quickly refer that case to the ‘appropriate’ source, 
rarely even following up to see if the constituent’s issue was resolved. Conversely, the
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electoral and partisan enterprises more commonly took steps to assist, and even take 
credit for whatever help other governmental units could render. To borrow a metaphor 
from the previous chapter, the personal and policy enterprises tend to as more as the 
generalist physician, diagnosing the patient’s illness and passing them along. The 
electoral and partisan enterprises are the specialists who aggressively advertise their 
curative powers and will pull in consults with other ‘physicians’ to ensure that the patient 
gets the best possible care.
The electoral and partisan staff seemed to be much more aggressive in their elite 
interaction. In fact, these types of incumbents seemed to defer much o f their elite 
Interaction to staff, although I would note two exceptions here. First, the electoral 
incumbent by definition is going to be the more engaged in community interests. Like 
the personal incumbent, the electoral incumbent spends a sizeable portion of their time 
doing community outreach, going to forums, town hall meetings, even dealing with 
Individual constituents. The difference, however, is that the electoral enterprise also 
utilitizes staff resources to court additional elites and more “aggressively” follow-up with 
the elite constituents that the incumbent interacts with. Or, as described in Chapter Four, 
the electoral office tends to be a better “door opener”, surveilling the district and 
exposing its constituents to the wide-range of potential services that they have to offer, 
while the personal office is the “finisher”, with the staff waiting for constituent requests 
to come into the office where they can use their resources to resolve the case.’ This is a 
qualitatively and quantitatively more aggressive elite outreach than is performed by the 
personal incumbent.
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The second difference between the electoral and the partisan enterprise is the target 
of their affections. While the partisan incumbents tend to come from more homogenous 
districts and focus their efforts on the base and ideological supporters, the electoral 
enterprises tend to interact with constituencies not clearly supportive of the incumbent. 
This also suggested a difference in the urgency of elite interaction. While the partisan 
office is much more likely to be sought out by its base, or to “bump into” them at 
extracurricular functions, the electoral constituency will have to look a little bit harder. 
This could clearly be seen with D’s staff aggressive interaction with groups throughout 
her district and in A’s courting of individual “opinion leaders.” With both types of 
offices, however, there was more elite interaction observed relative to the personal and 
policy offices.
The nature of the district
One other factor that contributes to aggressive elite interaction is the nature of the 
district. It was an ironic finding that a homogenous district provided an easier setting for 
an aggressive outreach because of the familiarity with most of the relevant groups of the 
district. The electoral imperative would seem to suggest that the marginal incumbent 
from the larger or more heterogenous district would expect to be interactive with elite 
constituents. My observations suggested this was usually not the case. It was perhaps 
safer for the incumbent from the mixed district to confront its interests bit by bit. Here, A 
was an instructive example, initially dividing his staff by issue area, letting them slowly 
interact with the relevant interests of the district. Criticisms of elites who felt that the
 ^ I am not completely comfortable with this metaphor here, however, because as Chapter Four also pointed 
out the “door opened characterization suggests an office that is more slip-shod in its follow-up. I am not
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enterprise was slow to reach out to them were confirmed by the revelation from A’s staff 
when they were forced to switch from issue to geographic representation as the end of the 
first term approached. This switch in style allowed the staff to better serve A by 
providing him more surveillance about their immediate areas and groups that had not 
been previously engaged by the enterprise. While there are clearly other inciunbent 
motivations at work, these three seemed to be variables most commonly shared by all 
cases.
Elite motivations
Some have higher demands for access
Understanding that the elites are also rational political actors will help us to further 
understand the variation in district staff functions. Elites interact with incumbents in 
widely different amounts and for widely divergent reasons. Fenno’s (1978, p916) 
question, “what do various constituencies get in return for their support?” was simply too 
broad. Elites in different circles have different demands. Some enterprises are forced to 
conduct more aggressive levels of interaction because they are confronted with elite 
constituents who demand service and/or attention. One particular constituency within 
C’s district, a large state university, demanded and received substantial personal attention 
from the incumbent. C’s elite contact at the school was in almost daily contact with 
either C, a district staffer or a legislative assistant in Washington. Elites who represent 
interests as large as this particular example seemed to have no trouble interacting with 
their own district enterprise, or those even from nearby districts for that matter. Another 
example of this was found in the community surrounding a military base in A’s district. 
This very homogenous constituency was politically active as a whole, seeking interaction
sure that that is a fully accurate depiction of the "door opener” style.
3 8 7
with government officials at all levels. This was notably one o f the groups that caused A 
to shift his operation to a more geographic nature, allowing his staff to aggressively 
interact with their local communities. Alternatively, individuals with very specific issue 
concerns can sometimes demand attention from a district enterprise from different states. 
If an incumbent is identified as a leader on a particular issue such as veteran’s affairs, or a 
particular agricultural issue, their staff might field calls from constituents across the 
country. These cases show that one must consider the motivations and behavior of the 
constituents if one is to understand staff and incumbent behavior. And it is the elite 
constituents who represent imiversities, or military bases, or a particular agricultural issue 
that are most likely demanding attention from the district enterprise. We might also 
understand the variation in elite demands by looking at three possible motivations for 
their behavior; purposive, material, and solidary.
Purposive
Because of a specific issue. The most basic motivation for elite interaction with 
incumbents stems from issues. Elites, like other constituents, have issues that they want 
to pursue, from specific pieces of legislation that affect their livelihoods, to issues of local 
concern and major policy issues of the day such as gun control or abortion. Some elites 
became contributing elements of the extended incumbent enterprise because of a policy 
issue that initially brought them into contact with the office. For example, the individual 
who head’s A’s informal advisory group on military issues was a veteran who had no 
previous exposure to political ofBceholders. He simply decided late in life that it was 
appropriate for him to become involved and because he wanted to impact the 
incumbent’s viewpoint on military affairs. This constituent was a Democrat and a
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supporter o f one of A’s potential opponents in his first election bid. Consequently, his 
interaction with A was built on a give-and-take relationship built over time after the 
election. By A’s second term, this constituent’s purposive motivation had led him to 
become a staunch supporter o f the incumbent. While not wealthy, this constituent could 
be considered elite because of his leadership role in one of A’s more sizeable 
communities of interest.
Thev share a common interest with incumbent. Many elite constituents find themselves 
interacting with the incumbent enterprise because they share a common partisan or 
philosophical interest. This motivation explains the easy supporters: the hard-core 
partisans, and the interest groups that comprise the base of the parties today. For 
example, trial lawyers are as reliably Democratic supporters as Chamber of Commerce 
officers are Republican. Individuals from base groups such as these can be expected to 
interact with, and support the incumbent enterprise to advance their general policy or 
partisan interests. Sometimes, these constituents might even come from the same 
occupation or social background and hence share a common outlook on a wide range of 
social and political issues, as did one of B’s “personal constituency” members. He had 
not met this constituent before being elected to Congress, but soon after they began a 
relationship that has lasted throughout his tenure in office and is largely based on their 
shared occupation. As opposed to this banker or the veteran in the previous example, 
these constituents are likely to have broader policy interests and require less maintenance 
in the development of their relationships. I also observed that incumbents who developed 
specializations or chaired committees for key groups (bankers, military, education, etc.)
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also drew requests for interaction from outside of their districts.* The same thing could 
happen with individual staff members who developed specializations with certain issues 
or governmental bureaucracies. These staff could become valuable assets to the elite 
community. It is not always to be assumed that these types of base groups will always 
oppose an incumbent hostile to their interests. I frequently observed teachers and trial 
lawyers who supported entrenched Republicans and corporate attorneys and Chamber 
officers who were the biggest supporters to Democrats. So clearly there are motivations 
beyond simple philosophical or partisan agreement.
Some elites are driven bv national interests. A sub-category of elite constituent who 
interact with incumbent enterprises are those who seemed to be motivated more by their 
affiliation with national organizations. This group of elites captures a wide swath of 
people who might be considered economic or community elites but have very little 
interest in politics. In fact, my observations suggest that this characterizes a substantial 
portion of individuals who might otherwise be considered elite constituents. It is only 
through the pressure from national organizations that these elites are motivated into 
political activity. Journalists have tabbed this new style of lobbying “Astroturf’, as 
opposed to the traditional grass-roots mobilization. With “Astroturf’ lobbying, national 
associations and interest groups seek to mobilize a relatively few decision-leaders in a 
community to pressure an individual incumbent. An example of this type of constituent 
was found in a Chamber official in B’s district, where he mentioned his lobbying effort in 
favor of NAFTA. The national association provided all the relevant material, contact
'  These offices seemed to accept or decline these desires to interact largely on the basis o f the incumbent’s 
district “personality”. Those offices that were less aggressive with their own constituents were likely to be 
as distant to individuals seeking interaction even on the incumbent’s main legislative issues. While offices 
that were more aggressive had fewer geographical qualms about who was, and who was not a constituent
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information and ‘talking points’ with the hope that notable elite constituents would 
pressure the incumbent to support the association’s viewpoint. Then there was a banker 
from C’s district who made frequent trips to Washington and calls to C’s legislative staff. 
All o f his political activity was “done through the association.” This increasingly 
common lobbying technique appears to be built on what I observed to be a surprisingly 
similar level of political apathy amongst elites as exists among average constituents. The 
elite constituent merely joins an organization ranging from the NRA to NARAL to the 
Chamber of Commerce and waits for his or her email account or fax machine to send 
them the appropriate material and they will log the appropriate phone call.
Other district elites suggested that they interact with incumbents based on whether 
they were “inside” or “outside” on issues o f importance to them. Incumbents who were 
“inside” implied that they were on the right committee and can do something for their 
interests. If the home incumbent had an “inside” position on issues of concern to national 
associations then that constituent would be prompted to be highly involved with the 
incumbent enterprise. If the home incumbent was merely an “outside” member on that 
particular issue, the lobbying was applied minimally to perhaps gain an additional vote 
cushion so the association could get things passed in conunittee or on the floor, or to put 
pressure on the party leadership to move a bill along. One example was a company 
president from B’s district did not think that it was very productive to work on outside 
members and their staff and so he rarely interacted with them. Amongst these more 
‘national’ elite constituents, there was a greater sense of apathy about their general 
relationship with the inciunbent and staff.
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While it initially appeared to me that this style of elite interaction was antithetical to 
the enterprise coming to understand the nature of constituent interests, I realized that this 
was not always the case. In return for dancing with these minimal, direct and simplified 
expressions o f constituent preference, thereby pleasing large national associations, some 
incumbent enterprises could reap the substantial campaign resources that these 
organizations would direct to incumbents who supported the ‘pleas’ of the ‘nationalized’ 
constituents. These resources can be directed through national PAC contributions, soft 
money contributions to the home state political parties on behalf of the incumbents, or 
even bundled conduit checks that they national association will pressure the 
‘nationalized’ constituents to give to their home incumbent. In short, “Astroturf” 
lobbying saves them the trouble of interacting with portions of their constituencies. Not 
all elites, however, are reliant upon national associations to tell them when to be active 
and defend their interests. More savvy elites understand that building a relationship with 
the incumbent enterprise will result in better access to the incumbent (through the staff) 
and perhaps even an impact on the incumbent’s decision-making process. A prominent 
attorney from C’s district suggested that he had both personal and “national” political 
interests and that his information and motivation for each came from different sources. It 
was evident that his local contacts facilitated his national interests. Staff members figure 
in to this equation because they can develop those relationships and help constituents 
gain access to the member’s schedule and inner sanctum.
Material
A personal material incentive. A second group o f elites appeared to be active because of 
personal material incentives. The most extreme of these examples was a rare case where
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a constituent expanded his relationship with the incumbent to the most personal level 
where they were cooperating on an investment opportunity that would reward them both. 
The constituent had hoped to use his capital and the incumbent’s knowledge of 
government assistance programs to procure funds from a quasi-public government- 
assisted housing project. Ultimately the project did not materialize, but the constituent 
had clearly become an integral part of the enterprise as a result of his personal 
interactions with A. This type of situation, where a constituent seeks to capitalize on the 
knowledge and position of the incumbent enterprise, is most likely exceedingly rare. I 
saw no other examples approaching this level o f personal interaction. While certainly 
elites entertain notions of profiting from incumbents’ positions, ethics restrictions place 
conflict-of-interest boundaries firmly around many such joint ventures. This is not to 
say, however, that constituents do not seek to profit from their relationships with 
incumbents.
A more likely example was a constituent o f  B who became engaged in his enterprise 
because of B’s support of the constituent’s efforts to make the flower he grew the 
“national” flower. A combination of efforts by the local association and guidance by B 
and his local staff culminated in a national push and success on the part o f this 
constituent, who had previously been politically inactive. Clearly he gained materially as 
a result o f efforts by B and his staff. Consequently, this constituent became a key 
element o f the enterprise. Another example was a constituent who was an active 
supporter of E because of his involvement in oil and trust issues. While he disagreed 
with many of E’s political stances, his larger motivation was simple; “why would I want 
to replace him? He’s been so good to me.” This constituent continued his pragmatic
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(and integral) relationship with A. Elite contact with the incumbent’s enterprise also 
cycled around the ebb and flow of their legislative interests. G’s office noted that elites 
in their district stepped up their interaction with both incumbent and staff months in 
advance of a telecommunications bill that would have a tremendous impact on their 
livelihoods.
Materially guided constituents such as these are only marginally more common than 
the constituent who sought to use the personal position of the incumbent for gain. The 
ethics limitations provide part of the explanation, but I also believe that incumbents and 
staff do not generally want to have too many “integral” relationships with elite 
constituents. One might imagine an incumbent enterprise that includes the incumbent, a 
few key federal staff and campaign employees and then twenty or more “integral” 
constituents who demand access to the incumbent. This type of enterprise could become 
unwieldy. Fortimately for incumbents, not many elites seek out relationships of this 
depth, probably because there is simply not much that a single member of the US House 
of Representatives can do for them as compared to the impact that a number o f state 
legislators can have on their community or business interests, especially when one 
considers the more “bang for the buck” that contributions can have in substantially 
cheaper state legislative races.
Or communitv material incentives- the ‘locals’. A different type o f material incentive was 
found in elites who supported the incumbent not so much for “self-preservation” or their 
own company’s bottom line but more for the development of the larger community. The 
‘local’ elites are the community builders that incumbents often willingly parmer with, 
some out of an electoral motive, others for the good of the community. Elites will
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interact as ‘locals’ for varying sets of rationales, but usually because o f a desire to 
improve the local area. They comprise the membership of community boards, charitable 
organizations, and private-public cooperative ventures. I observed considerable variation 
in the degree to which community economic elites worked together to improve the area’s 
fortunes.
What the community elites tended to share with the more ‘national’ elites was a 
desire to keep the incumbent in office, so that increased tenure could bring the protection, 
perquisites and budgetary power of a senior legislator. What set the ‘local’ and the 
‘national’ elites apart was that the more ‘local’ elites seemed to place a higher value on 
interactions with incumbents and their staff. Consequently, elites o f this type seemed to 
express a concern for competent district staff that hears and understands their concerns. 
One of A’s constituents suggested most o f his interaction with staff and incumbent is to 
“lobby” for local community. As a travel agent, what benefits the community is 
indirectly good for him. Similarly motivated constituencies were found in the several 
military communities found within A’s district or in inner city districts, like F’s, that were 
similarly reliant on federal program dollars. There was sentiment within A’s military 
community that it was important to keep the incumbent in their “hip pocket.” 
Furthermore, 1 found that in communities that were represented by more routine 
enterprises with limited interest in pursuing cross-jurisdictional issues, the ‘local’ 
constituents tended to emphasize their relationships with state and local officials who 
could frankly do more for their communities. More aggressive district enterprises, on the 
other hand, were often the crucibles o f community activism and development, even 
though there was a limit to what these federal staff could actually provide. The ‘local’
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elite constituents seemed to feel that the district staff enterprise was an equal and 
essential part of the community. For example, a company president from B’s district 
compared his ‘loan’ of an engineer to the city for a year for a community project to the 
potential ‘loans’ that incumbents regularly make with their staff resources.
‘Local’ elites welcomed the involvement o f incumbents and staff in their community 
organizations. Here C’s large state university made sure that C was an integral part of the 
community’s social and athletic functions, not just those events that had to do with 
federal funding. With many elites the involvement of staff in community organizations 
was “reassuring” and if the staff member was felt to be an empowered surrogate o f the 
incumbent then their participation was “as good as talking to (the incumbent).” The 
involvement of the incumbent enterprise has a two-fold benefit. Perhaps more cynically 
it gives the community a toehold into the world of federal funding and regulatory 
assistance, especially on the assumption that incumbents hope to procure assistance for 
their constituents to make them happy. Here is where staff efforts can figure largely into 
elite service. District enterprises plainly valued such opportunities to assist their 
constituents. “Business Forums”, “District Economic Taskforces”, even “Job Fairs” were 
commonly found housed in congressional offices where field representatives worked with 
local government and capital to lure jobs, sometimes public, sometimes private, into the 
community.
The secondary benefit is that involvement o f such a high profile figure brings 
credibility and visibility. While some constituents dismissed this as largely symbolic, the 
majority sentiment was that it was greatly appreciated and of real value. Elites regularly
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suggested that incumbents and their staff could help with recruitment of “new interested 
companies” to the district and that it was “good for the community.”
Just as the incumbent who received policy support or personal financial gain fi'om 
the incumbent’s efforts, the ‘local’ elites also were drawn into the incumbent enterprise 
because of services rendered. A typical example was one of B’s constituent who worked 
with B during his first years in office to get federal fimding for a dilapidated college in 
the district. B and this constituent worked closely together on an ad hoc board and 
helped to identify sources o f private and public funds to keep the institution on its feet. 
The relationship continues, many years later, with the constituent now an element of the 
district enterprise.
The risk of not supporting incumbents. “We like to know and keep our member of 
Congress.” “We try to be apolitical, but we will support the current incumbent.” The 
opposite side of the equation is a district that gathers around an incumbent and treats him 
or her as a valuable community resource. In this scenario, supporting a challenger is a 
risky proposition. For starters, incumbents rarely lose, so challenging incumbents risks 
alienating a political force that can be an asset to a community. This chapter earlier 
established that the district enterprise is a useful tool to elite constituents, providing it 
with information, access and a ‘political library’ of knowledge in the staff themselves. 
More importantly, the status as an asset grows over time. Elite constituents firequently 
expressed their desire to support seniority. For some, the actual person occupying the 
seat was distinctly secondary in importance to the seniority that they were acquiring.
This is especially the case with districts that are heavily reliant upon federal funding. 
Communities such as A’s military interests go to great lengths in the home states and in
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Washington to protect their interests by ail means possible. For those elites with a 
partisan or philosophical attachment to the incumbent, there is also a risk in not 
supporting the incumbent. An incumbent House member can become an important figure 
for an area’s political environment; shaping and recruiting state legislators and other local 
candidates, providing a leadership figure. Their demise would have an impact on the 
"local’ shade of politics.
Limits to how far elites will go. Despite the advantages that can accrue to a community 
or individual constituent from supporting an incumbent, many elites suggested that 
federal officeholders have a truly limited ‘local’ impact. Consequently, many elite 
constituents, especially those motivated mostly by material issues are likely to be more 
active in state politics. The first reason for a more ‘local’ political attention derives from 
the fact that funds for transportation, education and community development projects are 
much more commonly found at the state level than the federal. And in terms of private 
businesses, unless the constituent represents the interest of a major corporation, state 
regulations and grant programs are also going to be paramount. The second reason that 
many elite constituents are more active locally is that campaign finance laws favor their 
presence there. With much higher contribution limits and smaller spending on individual 
legislative races, an individual constituent or company can have a substantial impact on a 
single candidate. Given the cost of congressional campaigns and the direct limitations 
imposed by campaign finance laws, it is difficult to generate a comparable level o f 
leverage. As I just stated, playing at the state level gives an elite constituent more “bang 
for their buck.” And yet individual constituents do continue to incorporate themselves 
with incumbent enterprises, not so much because o f either purposive or material reasons.
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For some, involvement in federal politics provides a more socially desirable form of 
participation.
Solidary
Some elites feel a social compulsion to become active components of the incumbent 
enterprise. It appeared to me that there were two different groups of constituents who felt 
this solidary pressure to interact with politicians. The first group was the more obvious 
partisan-types. This is a group not wholly unlike those elites mentioned above who were 
driven to interact with incumbent and staff because of policy agreement. The solidary 
elites’ involvement stems more from a sense of belonging; belonging to the local party or 
to the incumbent’s campaign enterprise, or being the local “opinion leader”. Elites with 
these motivations present themselves as natural targets for staff and incumbents who 
come to the town or neighborhood. The fact that certain elites present themselves to the 
staff to act as their connection to the community should probably give staff some pause, 
as it may be hard to reliably determine whether this constituent is actually someone who 
can serve as a conduit to the people or is simply the local political ‘hack’ that leads the 
“opinions” of no one. It should also not be forgotten that incumbents are human beings 
too; they have personal firiends just like anyone else. And these personal fiiends also feel 
a social motivation to be part o f the incumbent’s enterprise. One elite constituent 
attributed his participation in B’s enterprise to a fiiendship that came partly from politics 
and partly from his personality. The partisan activist, local “opinion leader” and personal 
fiiend comprise the most loyal core of a politician’s base.
A second, and more unique set o f solidary elites, are a group that might be referred 
to as political players. Some o f the elites that I observed had a desire for access and
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attention that seemed to derive much more substantially from personal ego needs than for 
any purpose or material satisfaction. This class of elites was driven, as one put it, by a 
desire to be “part of the team” or the “inner circle” as another elite put it. The fact that 
this group are largely much more advanced in terms of socio-economic status perhaps 
frees them from the constraints of having to worry so much about material and purposive 
issues; they are safe in their position and can move on to other interests.^ One of these 
political players suggested to me that “if somebody gives you a dollar, you’ve got their 
vote, if they give a thousand dollars, you’re not so sure.” This latter half of solidary elites 
is quite different from the former in that purposive and material differences with the 
incumbent are less likely to cause dissonance. In particular, I observed trial lawyers and 
bankers who were long-time financial patrons of Democratic causes interact with A. 
Confronted with the prospect of an entrenched incumbent from the opposite party, the 
political player has to search for other avenues to alleviate their social needs. 
Alternatively, this behavior raises some serious questions about political participation if 
some elites are willing to subordinate the other motivations to their need to be part of the 
game. 1 will return to this question in Chapter Six.
Like the incumbents and staff themselves, elites varied in the extent that they utilized 
interactive relationships. As was discussed in Chapter Three, elites, like staff, will be 
active for personal, solidary or community reasons and some will be more aggressive and 
frequent in their interactions than others (in ofBce visits, calls to Washington, emails to
 ^ I should also not dismiss the probability that "players’ like this seek access that will be utilized at later 
dates and on very specific issues that will suit their material or purposive interests substantially. In the 
short term, they may mask those desires to develop the relationship and guarantee access for the time that 
they will most need assistance.
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the incumbent). One common factor, however, seemed to be that elites shared a greater 
level of comfort about contacting the enterprise than did average constituents.
Staff motivations
Offices are the same to the extent that they all must serve
The basic purpose o f the district staff enterprise is to serve the needs of the 
constituency. To the extent that elite interaction takes place in most congressional district 
offices, it is utilized as an efficient means to interact with constituents on a variety of 
issues. One should also not forget that district staff members interact with constituents, 
elite or otherwise, to a much greater degree than do incumbents. Some of these issues 
that staff work on include transportation, health and military issues, not to mention other 
political matters. As one of E’s staff suggested, his basic role is to act as a “trouble­
shooting mediator” and help constituents resolve these issues. Observations suggest that 
district staff do more than this simple depiction. While district staff have similar jobs by 
definition, they pursue them in different ways and for different motives.
But staff motives vary
Incumbents have different demands. The most basic impulse driving elite interaction 
seemed to be whether the incumbent desired that the activity was performed. Chapter 
Three revealed that some incumbents have more aggressive or proactive enterprises. 
While virtually all o f the ranking district staff members (RDSM) conducted some elite 
interaction, they clearly were not equal in the amount that they were aggressive or out in 
the field. The disparity was even more notable amongst district directors (DD) and field 
representatives, not to mention the friends and volunteers who serve as surrogates for the 
incumbent. Some incumbents have greater demands for elite interaction. Where
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incumbents expressed this desire, staff appeared happy to comply. Although I did 
observe some frustrated staff in the more routine offices who truly wanted to be more 
proactive with the constituency groups in their area, for the most part even they complied 
with their employers’ demands and limited their interactions to minimal levels in order to 
concentrate on the routine activities. Staff motivations for elite interaction are driven in 
large part to comply with the demands of their employers. There are, however, other 
motivations at play.
Extracurricular activitv. Some district enterprises had greater level of elite interaction 
because the staff members put themselves in situations where they “bump into” elite 
constituents. Like the incumbents, staff members are involved on community boards, 
public-private partnerships, and they run the “cocktail circuit” as well. In short, staff 
members can live in the same social world as the incum ben t.S om e district staff 
members had greater levels of extracurricular activity in their communities. Yet, there 
were different motivations driving this activism. For some, membership in organizations 
was a result of stronger communitarian impulses, they want to be involved for the sake of 
civic good. For others, attending civic or social functions was a way to represent the 
incumbent or put themselves in situations where they could interact with elite 
constituents. Some of these staff suggested that the incumbent wanted them to “find out 
what was going on” with particular groups or communities. Still others were active in the 
community for their own personal reasons. What is certain is that the motivations of the
While I would note that the similarity is usually confined to those staff members at the top o f the office 
hierarchy, there were clearly exceptions to this rule. It is not only the RDSMs who “bump into” elite 
constituents in the social settings. I observed field representatives and caseworkers interacting with these 
constituents in settings ranging from meals in restaurants, to a basketball game, to business social 
functions.
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individual staff members’ themselves, had an impact on how “aggressively” they 
interacted with elite constituents.
Because staff are ‘rational’ actors. To imderstand the roles and functions of the district 
staff, one must not simply assume that the entirety of staff behavior is driven by ‘rational’ 
incumbents solely out o f a desire to be re-elected. They too are ‘rational’ political actors 
with their own goals and motivations. Some staff appeared to be interacting with elite 
constituents out of a dual purpose; for their employers and for themselves. Malbin 
(1980) showed that staff members develop close relationships with interest groups in 
Washington in order to facilitate their own careers by improving their incumbent’s 
legislative success. This same principle applies to the district staff and their courting of 
the elite constituents. By interacting with elite constituents, they perceive that their 
behavior is communicating a helpful image for the incumbent and boosting his or her 
approval throughout the district. This interaction not only allows them to maintain their 
employment but it also satisfies personal desires to exercise power by developing 
ongoing relationships with elected officials, business leaders and directors of community 
organizations. In some cases the motivation could be even be driven by a desire for 
future political office. This is the case especially for those staff at the top of the office 
hierarchy, the position and access allow the individual to become something o f a “semi­
incumbent.” This access provides them with a “launching pad” (Macartney, 1975) for 
future political careers o f their own. For instance, one o f E’s field representatives 
remarked that the RDSM of that office performed tasks “as much for himself as for the 
incumbent.” His interaction with elite constituents allowed him to form his own personal 
coalitions and leave him well placed should the incumbent step aside. Elites in the district
4 0 3
confirmed that they would not have been surprised if the staff member assumed E’s place 
in Congress at some point in the future. In congress today, there are a significant number 
of members who came to the House directly from staff positions. 1 would argue that 
these aggressive district staff are well-suited to replace the incumbent because they: 1) 
have spent considerable time relating to the issues that the previous incumbent had 
successfully spoken to, 2) interacted extensively with the relevant individuals in the 
district who know and care about those issues, and 3) they have connections to people 
who are important at the local levels, like elected officials, interest group leaders and 
campaign contributors.
This is not to suggest that all district staff have political ambitions. Others may have 
simple progressive ambition within the office. Or, they may have desires to go to 
Washington in the future. One staff member mentioned a case o f “Potomac fever” which 
meant a journey to Washington if the “offer was right and other family concerns could be 
worked out.” It is also possible that this ambition can be altruistic. One staff member 
related that if the incumbent moved up to a statewide office that she would “like the 
opportunity to work for the whole state.” There are a variety o f ambitions present in 
district staffers. One should expect to find this when considering that district staff 
members work for a class of people who are, in large numbers, driven by “progressive 
ambition” themselves. It would be surprising if  some of this did not rub off on their 
staffs.
The previous pages have demonstrated that the variation in elite interaction that takes 
place between offices is largely rooted in the motivations of incumbents, staff and elite 
constituents themselves. It would now be instructive to sketch out a potential model of
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incumbent/stafïïelite constituent interaction. Once that model has been described, I will 
discuss the specifics of elite interaction.
A model of incumbent/stafïïelite constituent interaction 
As was noted in Chapter One, there is a substantial body of literature that deals with 
incumbency advantage. I would suggest, however, that the most two common themes of 
this work focus on the perceptions and behavior o f the incumbent as a lone political 
figure or the aggregate impact of campaign contributions and advertising. Literature that 
details factors such as the non-campaign resources of the incumbent and the factors 
promoting or deterring quality challengers are practically “hidden” from view. 1 would 
argue that an overwhelming portion of the literature on congressional elections is 
comfortably presented within the confines o f Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2 The traditional interpretation
Incumbent More/better media
1) perception of -> 2) Allocation -> 3) More campaign receipts > 4) Reelection
vulnerability of resources Lower quality challengers
( 1 ) Incumbents behavior is largely driven by a perception of electoral vulnerability. 
Some of the literature even suggests that this can be the sole motivation. (2) Based on the 
uncertainty, incumbents allocate resources to secure their electoral positions. Resources 
such as travel home, office budgets, the amoimt of legislation passed, and the amount of 
casework performed, all qualify as “allocation of resources.” Because of their 
uncertainty and a desire to increase name recognition, incumbents have allocated 
increasing levels of resources over the past three decades. Yet, these allocations are
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much less central to most explanations of incumbency advantage than are the factors of 
step three. (3) Because of their increased name recognition and active campaign behavior, 
incumbents receive favorable media, raise more funds, and face lower quality 
challengers. Some studies assert that one, or a combination of these factors, are the 
overwhelming causative factor of step four. (4) Ultimately, the perception that drives 
incumbent behavior tends to result overwhelmingly in their victories at the ballot box.
While I don’t fundamentally disagree with Figure 5.2, this dissertation suggests that 
more specific analysis of the resources that incumbents allocate, and their independent 
impact on the outcomes in necessary. I would suggest that it is not one of the above 
factors, or even a combination of the above factors, so much as it is all of the factors 
working in unison. Many of the assumptions from 5.2 focus on the period of time just 
before the election. The initial eighteen months of a congressional term are taken for 
granted, serving only to take some initial positions and begin to raise campaign 
contributions. This dissertation holds that important determinants of the election 
outcomes are determined during this early period, and they are heavily influenced by the 
interaction of incumbents and staff with elite constituents. Susan Webb Hammond 
(1984, p.281) speculated that legislative staff are an “intervening variable” and that we 
need to see their effect in helping incumbents win elections. Here is just such a model.
Figure 5.3 The impact o f district staff
2) Campaign activities ______^  6) Re-election
1 ) Perceptions /  Elite interaction Low quality
of Behavior results in challengers
t h e ' ^  3) o f District 4) contribute ^  5) run against 6) Re-election 
Incumbents Staff co-opt or deter incumbents ^ 7 )  leads to...
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Figure 5.3 demonstrates how an active incumbent and staff can have an impact on 
the final outcome at a much lower cost than the traditional model. When I say cost, I am 
comparing the relative impact o f tens of thousands of dollars in federal staff salaries as 
opposed to htmdreds of thousands of dollars in campaign advertisements. Figure 5.3 
shows that elite service, high name recognition and lesser quality challengers are all 
interrelated and impact reelection. Most importantly, they are all affected by the elite 
interaction of staff. (1 ) This model starts with the same assumption as Figure 5.2. (2) 
And it certainly agrees that one cannot ignore the campaign activities, the ads, finances 
and other campaign efforts. However, these factors are largely confined to six months of 
a two-year term and there are other significant activities that take place during that first 
eighteen months that will impact step two. (3) The fundamental distinction of that 
eighteen- month period is whether the district staff enterprise takes an aggressive or 
routine stance in regard to their district functions, especially the nature in which they 
engage elites. Engaging the ‘right’ people in the enterprise early in the term helps to 
ensure that these individuals will be aroimd to assist with the campaign activities. 
Alternatively, not interacting with these individuals might make them more likely to be 
involved in an opponent’s campaign. One should also not forget the role o f district staff 
in the campaigns (nor their potential desires to nm for office). Interacting with local 
elected officials, journalists, and party figures helps to set the stage for later campaign 
efforts. (4) aggressive elite interaction by staff contributes to the likelihood that elite 
constituents will either be co-opted into the incumbent’s enterprise, or be deterred from
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running against the incumbent or supporting a potential opponent. (5) The real 
consequence is that these behaviors help to lower the quality of challengers. In addition 
to the fact that incumbents are able to raise far more resources for their campaigns and 
are able to get far more favorable “free media” attention for the activities, incumbents 
have the staff resources to effectively begin their campaign to elite constituents nearly 
two years before the election takes place. Because of these benefits, many would-be 
quality challengers simply opt not to run or cannot generate any financial or media 
interest in their candidacies and then they withdraw. In sum, more staff and more 
aggressive staff result in lower quality challengers. This serves to reinforce the financial 
disparity of the traditional campaign variables in Step Two. (6) The end result is as the 
literature already identifies; incumbents get reelected frequently and by wide margins.
(7) Finally, their re-election margins have subsequent feedback effects. They have an 
impact on the incumbent’s perception heading into the next term. They have an impact 
on how staff members are utilized and the attitudes that they have about their jobs. They 
have an impact on the desire o f elites to be part of subsequent election campaigns. And 
finally, they have an impact on the decisions of potential challengers and their patrons at 
tlie local and national level.
While I am not arguing that district staff are the main causative factor in this model, 
my observations suggest that their interaction with elite constituents are an integral 
element in the re-election of incumbents. This interaction is an integral element of the 
incumbent enterprise because it brings fbui key benefits: 1) surveillance o f the district, 
2) support o f constituents that “matter”, 3) vital campaign resources and 4) the on-going 
support in future terms that allows incumbents to focus on other activities. Chapters
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Three and Four demonstrated that some incumbents and staff members perceive a greater 
political value in these activities. Consequently they perform them more often and more 
effectively. I now turn to those four benefits.
What it brines 1 : Surveillance of the district 
The function of elite interaction is an overtly political activity for some field staff, 
especially when they are conducting surveillance for opposition and issues while on 
“Main Street.” The first benefit of district staff is that they provide surveillance o f the 
district for the incumbent. Two of the fourteen district staff functions identified by 
Macartney (1982) were to “organize and surveil” the district. Yet Macartney’s work 
failed to fully grasp the significance of this function, and he limited his discussion of 
these important tasks to only one page of his dissertation. As opposed to simply 
collecting the specifics o f issues and concerns of their constituents, I suggest that the 
surveillance function is the most basic of district staff. For the aggressive staff, 
surveillance is a function that tends to occupy a greater percentage of their time. They 
are out of the office more frequently, attending more meetings, dropping by on 
constituents more often. And for aggressive staff, the surveillance function actually tends 
to be more of a proactive activity with staff conununicating to constituents as much as 
they are listening. In either case, because the average incumbent spends thirty to forty 
weeks per year in Washington, he or she is reliant upon staff for information about the 
district.
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Incumbents rarely at home, so reliant upon staff for information 
Staff are the “pines to the faucet”
“We have to be the eyes and ears throughout the entire district, because C is not here 
frequently.” During a tour of a faucet plant in A ’s district, his field representative 
remarked to me that he felt as though he was the “pipe to A’s faucet.” The tour provided 
an inspired analogy, suggesting that he takes tours, phone calls, and visits with individual 
constituents as a way of providing A with a view of the ‘plumbing’ of the district. A then 
is able to determine when and where he will direct his staff and legislative efforts to assist 
his constituents; to “turn on the faucet” if you will. Staff members have to listen to the 
issues and talk to the decision-makers in their district’s communities. Incumbents often 
want to know the impact of federal legislation on their constituents, and the district staff 
members are the quickest way to accomplish this task, although Chapter Three suggests 
that some incumbents value this information more than others and use their offices more 
“aggressively” to interact with constituents. For the aggressive offices, acquiring 
information about the state of the district was a relatively straightforward proposition.
Yet, every district enterprise had at least some intelligence-gathering function to assist 
the incumbent. As was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, elites provide district 
staff with a ‘cheaper’ way of interacting with their district’s communities. While the 
staff are expected to be the “eyes and ears” for the rarely home incumbent, the elite 
constituents should also be considered part o f this surveillance function. With a less 
aggressive enterprise such as B’s or C’s, where staff members are rarely out on “Main 
Street”, it is vital that local elites communicate with incumbent and/or staff. One o f B’s
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constituents noted that his district operation was very reliant upon this type of 
information because his staff members were so infrequently out in the community. ‘ * A 
field representative from C’s office confirmed their dependency on district elites with her 
discussion of a university official and a local reporter who acted as “receivers to convey 
information to C” about important activities in their areas.
Thev watch for issues
At the most basic level, the purpose of elite interaction is to surveil for significant 
issues. These may be issues that are coming up for votes in Congress. When staff and 
incumbents interacted with incumbents, the discussion would quite frequently center on 
discussions of current hot political issues and how they would affect their communities. 
For example, one business owner echoed a common question in asking: “I’m worried 
about health care, what’s going to happen?” The staff member involved here suggested 
that his travels into the district helped him listen to constituents and identify issues where 
he and E should be focusing their attention. Assuming that this interaction was more than 
passing conversation, staff would usually follow-up with constituents with either a quick 
letter or maybe a phone call from the incumbent. In more organized offices, that 
incumbent’s name would be flagged as an individual who was concerned about an 
important issue in case the office wanted to mobilize concerned citizens or seek their 
input.
District staff members interact with elite constituents for the purpose o f uncovering 
issues that could potentially lead to new legislation. In the case of one o f A ’s 
constituents, district staff worked to understand how he was affected by the RTC, and
' ' B suggested that his staff keep him in touch with district issues with a regular unsophisticated "poll" that 
he has them take through random calls to constituents. While this is a cute form o f community interaction.
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whether there was any way that they could change the system for individuals with similar 
problems in the future. Finally, district staff members were even seen inquiring about 
issues where there was very little federal jurisdiction. As noted in Chapter Three, some 
staff members assist with cross-jurisdictional issues and even purely local issues. In 
these cases, they may perhaps be a federal grant or regulation that was overlooked. This 
is a supplemental element of the ‘eyes and ears’ function; elite surveillance helps to bring 
the community together. As noted above, elites like to build their communities. They 
may even realize that the incumbent may not be the appropriate individual decision­
maker to help resolve an issue but they can act like the crucible to bring everyone 
together, especially in a district with homogenous communities of interest. More likely, 
however, district staff members are interacting with elite constituents here so that they 
can keep the incumbent apprised of the local environment.
Thev even look for tidbits of information
Surveillance is not necessarily focused entirely on major substantive issues in the 
district. In one instance, one of E’s field representatives had a conversation with a local 
newspaper publisher about the high school team winning the state basketball 
championship. He mentioned that he would have someone tell the incumbent and a 
congratulatory note would be sent to print in the paper. These little tidbits o f information 
are used by the incumbent enterprise to ‘congratulate’ their constituents and they are also 
passed along to the incumbent so that he or she can utilize them when next in that 
commimity.
it is certainly less aggressive and useful than walking “Main Street”
4 1 2
But mainly thev are looking for people, especially elites
While some district members staff suggest that elite surveillance is nothing more 
than “maintaining contact with the voters” of the district, the more aggressive staff will 
utilize elite interaction to identify key individuals in relevant communities and build 
relationships with them. The difference between these two perspectives is attributable to 
their motives. While the former seeks to merely represent points-of-view within the 
district, the latter staff member is seeking to both identify issues in the community as well 
as expand the incumbent’s enterprise by ‘slicing’ elites from new constituency groups or 
communities where the incumbent previously had no contact. The aggressive enterprise 
will seek out local government officials, journalists, business leaders and community 
activists who will help them fulfill the need for contact and information. These types of 
individuals can provide intelligence to the staff and incumbent about the social and 
economic status of their community, as well as other valuable political information. One 
of A’s constituents regularly met with staff, as he did previously with E. They have 
lunch a couple of times per month and he “requests or suggests information.. .without 
even knowing it.” He acts in some ways as a “hearing post” for the staff member and 
tells her the impact o f things and what people are feeling.
The aggressive offices were more likely to be concerned about the types o f people 
with which the incumbent and staff were interacting. While a more routine office such as 
E or B relied on one long-standing contact in a community, the aggressive enterprise was 
more likely to have multiple contacts and was continually working to identify new groups 
and issues within communities. A more aggressive office, such as H’s, were more active 
in their surveillance with their “key people” so that they could identify problems and
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assist as much as possible. I would suggest that the incumbent and staff must think about 
whom they are spending time with. It is not profitable to meet only with people who tell 
you that you are doing a good job or going to meetings where your partisan opponents 
scream at you. Consequently, it puts the onus on staff to identify and interact with real 
people or elites who can be honest. Staff members are also under pressure to find and 
interact with the “right” person, a constituent who is both well placed and well respected 
within an institution and can be a useful element of the district enterprise. This 
realization was seen most clearly in A’s transformation away from an operation based 
around highly publicized Town Hall meetings toward smaller, private interactions by 
“Walking Main Street”. His COS offered that this transformation took place because 
they were “interacting with people who were their fans” and that they “weren’t meeting 
new people...but were getting screamed at by left-wingers.”
Ultimately though, the hope is that the elite constituents will become contributing 
elements of the incumbent enterprise, providing surveillance, campaign resources and 
‘leeway’ for the incumbent. These contributions will be further described below.
Thev’re “conduits” back to voters...
Interacting with elite constituents is a form of two-way communication. Not only 
does this function assist the enterprise in gathering surveillance about the district and 
bringing elites into the enterprise, district staff members also use their interactions with 
elite constituents to pass the surveillance in the other direction. The more aggressive 
staff will think of elite constituents as “conduits” that allow them to reach out to a wider 
group of constituents. One of A’s staff members provided an anecdote about an activist 
who worked in a large nursing home in her area. This constituent would drop by the
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office every few weeks where he would share his stories about what was going on there, 
what kinds of issues the seniors were talking about and how legislation was affecting 
them. In return, she would relay information about A’s efforts for the constituent to take 
back to the residents. Hence, this constituent becomes part of the enterprise, acting as a 
conduit by relaying information about A back to a wider community. Elite constituents 
are not just information sources, they are also amplifiers that staff can use to promote the 
incumbent.
But there are limits -  not all offices do this
As noted in Chapters Three and Four, B, C and to some extent E, had very routine 
district operations that conducted very little elite interaction. With B and C, even cases 
where elite constituents contacted the district staff with issues from the district, were 
invariably “headed o ff’ and sent to the appropriate government office. Staff in these 
offices did not treat these constituents as sources o f information, and especially did not 
utilize them as conduits back to a wider pool o f voters. The more aggressive offices, 
however, were much more likely to take advantage of these types o f interaction because 
of their potential value to the incumbent enterprise.
Laying the groundwork 
The value of elite interaction lies mainly in the fact that it helps to “lay the 
groundwork” in the words o f one staff member. The aggressive staff makes contact early 
in the term with the ‘right’ constituents. This contact spins off three usefid functions that 
allow staff to do their jobs more effectively. It gives them: things to do in the name of 
the incumbent, things to do when the incumbent is home and things to “lay the 
groundwork” for the next campaign.
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The initial function is the work that is provided through elite interaction. One of E’s 
staff members “put his face in” by dropping by on elite constituents throughout the 
district. He suggested that these visits sometimes headed off constituent requests that 
were headed his way, but for the most part these visits usually created work. From thank 
you letters, to inquiries and legislative requests, to having the incumbent place a phone 
call, district staff members demonstrate to the constituents that representation is taking 
place. This service function is more than simply ribbon cutting and casework. It is also 
an important political interaction with elites about substantive and major issues that can 
potentially earn their gratitude.
The second spin-off is material generated for the incumbent’s visit home. The 
routine office is reliant upon formal invitations and the personal activities of the 
incumbent to interact with constituents. Undoubtedly these two sources will not provide 
an adequate representation of district interests, especially as the incumbent’s tenure in 
office lengthens and the face o f the district begins to change. The more aggressive 
enterprise, by the nature o f their elite interaction, will uncover more things for the 
incumbent to do, ranging from plant tours, to meetings with community groups to 
attending social events. Clearly incumbents receive these kinds o f invitations, but the 
aggressive staff will solicit more of them, providing the incumbent with a more complete 
picture of the district and a more thorough range of options for how they wish to spend 
their district time. Aggressive staff will also work hard when to “set up” an incumbent 
when they are in public settings by screening individual constituents to find out their 
name, issue and an ice-breaking connection between the constituent and the incumbent. 
Additionally, elite interaction by the staff provides the incumbent with more details about
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who the event is for, why it is important, whether their participation would be 
appreciated, etc. Without district staff, incumbents would have a hard time figuring out 
where to go, who to see, and what to say when they visit home.
More politically, spin-off helps the incumbent enterprise prepare for the next election 
campaign. In one sense, the interaction lays the groundwork by building the incumbent’s 
reputation as discussed in Chapter Three. The work by C’s staff on housing issues, D’s 
embrace of district groups and A’s one-to-one interaction all established with constituents 
impressions that the incumbents were working hard to represent district interests. Staff 
felt that these activities “laid the groundwork” because they got the staff efforts “known 
by the right people.” The “right people” are then both useful and willing to help when 
election time rolls around. Regularly talking to elite constituents helps the incumbent 
enterprise to evaluate the issues that are resonating in the district. While virtually all 
incumbent campaigns today will formally begin their campaigns with expensive baseline 
polls that comprehensively measure district attitudes, elite interaction over the first 
eighteen months of the term is an effective supplement to that polling. It also can be used 
to identify highly different community interests within the constituency. Furthermore, 
elite interaction helps the enterprise to gauge feelings of support or opposition based on 
their record. Staff members frequently had discussions with constituents about these 
political concerns: “what have you heard?”; “I’ve been hear a few years and heard 
nothing”; and “no worries here.” They will also simply ask whether the “incumbent is 
doing anything wrong?” The surveillance ultimately helps them to look for specific 
challengers. One staff member said that “these (elites) will be the first to hear about a 
challenge...and say, hey look there’s noise in town” whether they are ardent backers or
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not. In some cases, elite interaction might be used to identify potential contributors, 
votes, and volunteer supporters.
Staff members were tmwilling to divulge the degree to which they utilized their 
constituent files for campaign activities, but second-hand reports confirm that some 
offices more “aggressively” utilize these materials. For example, a district staff member 
might help the campaign to assemble a group of “farmers for congressman X” or find a 
group of teachers who have had problems with legislation sponsored by the opposing 
party, or senior citizens who have had difficulty with their HMO’s. There are many other 
obvious examples, but what they all share is that the incumbent enterprise can plug 
people into the campaign based on their interaction with staff prior to the campaign. 
Having built the “groundwork” for campaign over the first eighteen months, district staff 
can spend their campaign time roimding up the money, resources, endorsements and 
finally the votes of constituents with whom they have interacted. The old campaign 
slogan “find 'em and vote 'em” takes on new significance when one considers the 
potential lists of constituents that staff can accumulate over a two-year term.
The breakdown in communication between communities and their incumbent 
perhaps helps to explain the defeats of incumbents such as Kastenmeier and Smith; their 
staff and surrogates become isolated and the incumbents are no longer touching good 
arteries of information, all the while confronting a rapid influx of new population and 
issues. It also can be seen in the attitudes of supporting constituents who become 
overconfident in the incumbent’s position in the district. As an example, one o f C’s 
constituents suggested that he would be active as the “eyes and ears”, but he hadn’t been 
in years because C didn’t need it in his area. His ofBce on the whole functioned with less
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surveillance than any other office observed. From this perspective, it is perhaps not 
surprising that a long-serving incumbent, who was held in high regard by virtually every 
constituent I interviewed and observed, continually gets re-elected with unimpressive 
electoral margins.
Elected officials agreed that it was important that they be informed about and active 
in district issues. There were exceptions, however. One final benefit that surveillance 
brings to the incumbent enterprise is that it puts a buffer around the incumbent. Staff 
members and surrogates of the incumbent are exposed first to the dirty laimdry and 
dispute resolution in a district so that the incumbents are not prematurely drawn into 
conflicts or constituent’s expectations are raised unreasonably high. In one example, a D 
staff member attended several meetings about a very divisive local power issue. 
Unfortunately, it was a local issue where D clearly could do little to help. In that instance 
that staff member suggested that is was simply her responsibility to let the constituents 
know that D “is aware and concerned.” After evaluating whether assistance or resolution 
can be procured, the staff member makes a cost/benefit calculation to determine whether 
the enterprise should be involved, and then either slips out of issue or pushes for 
resolution. If the latter approach is taken, the incumbent usually becomes involved at the 
end of the process to accept credit for the enterprise’s effort. Most of the staff efforts do 
not fully mature into a final stage where credit can be accepted. Moreover, 1 do not mean 
to imply that in each aggressive office there are five or six staff members doing nothing 
more than evaluating when and where the incumbent can claim credit for some dispute 
resolution in the district. But when they do succeed, they are seen as important events 
and significant opportunities to build name recognition in the district. Realistically, staff
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surveillance here is more protective. It keeps incumbents out o f issues where there is 
nothing that they can do to help and their involvement would only serve to disappoint 
constituent expectations. This is perhaps the one danger of interacting with local elites. 
District staff members are tasked to watch local elites and their swirling alliances and 
issues so that the incumbent does not get caught on the wrong side of issues. In one case, 
B’s district staff had to delicately deal with an Afncan-American County Commissioner 
whose alliance with local Republicans was problematic for others in the community. 
Ultimately, the staff did what they could to keep B distant from anything involving this 
particular official. While protecting the incumbent from these types of situations and 
individuals is largely a positive, an overprotective staff can also be doing a disservice if 
they do not completely investigate the details and implications and pass them along to the 
incumbent. Getting caught on no side of an issue is potentially as embarrassing as being 
on the wrong side, especially with elite constituents who are active in community issues.
What it brines 2: Elite Cooptation 
The aggressive enterprise not only wants to avoid alienating these key constituents, 
they want to make them part of the incumbent’s team. Going beyond the collection of 
information, the second benefit or goal o f elite interaction is that it co-opts certain 
constituents who can be of value to the incumbent enterprise. The aggressive staff 
members are tasked with the responsibility of expanding the incumbent enterprise to 
include reliable constituent supporters. Clearly not all district enterprises engage in this 
activity.
Who are the targets?
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Some staff visualize their constituencies using the same concepts as the campaigner. 
Looking out at the district, the incumbent confronts a ‘base’ of constituents who are 
firmly supportive, as well as a group who are firmly in the opposing party’s base. The 
latter are constituents that they “are just not going to get.” In most districts, there is also 
a broad middle constituency to which each party appeals. The goal of the incumbent 
enterprise is to enlarge and firm up the base, make appeals to those in the middle and 
mellow the opposition. These perceptions also shape the types o f behaviors that staff 
members perform. While this terminology largely refers to the campaign behanors of 
incumbents, the more aggressive enterprises used their district staff to fulfill these goals 
in the early part of their term in office. I echo Serra and Cover’s (1992) assessment that 
service is perhaps best done for those initially not disposed to support the incumbent. 
They found that amongst casework recipients, 56% would vote for their public servant 
even if from the opposite party. 96% of recipients affirmed their support for the 
incumbent if from the same party. My observations of elite interaction confirmed that 
gratitude was not limited to casework recipients and that it did, in fact, target constituents 
from outside of their ‘base’.
The real ‘permanent campaign’
The real ‘permanent campaign’ of the incumbent enterprise is not the fundraising 
and image management that journalists and much of the discipline generally presume. 
The real ‘permanent campaign’ are the efforts o f  the incumbent enterprise to identify and 
reach out to constituents through the activities o f their federal district staff. The 
overwhelming rationale behind Figure 5.2 lies in the fact that the literature tends to focus 
on congressional campaigns as a six month exercise broken up by eighteen months of
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down time, with little more than fund-raising going on that has an impact on the next 
reelection. Fenno (1990, pl07) noted the impatience of several campaign aides with an 
incumbent whom they felt to be a “lousy campaigner.” This difference stemmed from 
the fact that they preferred the large crowds at the “Safeway over the few on Main 
Street.” This impatience is the same one that is reflected amongst journalists and much 
of the discipline. The problem here is a campaign focus. The staff members (and some 
inciunbents) were working ‘Main Street’ for the previous eighteen months. They were 
not doing these relatively late efforts to put their face in front o f large numbers of 
constituents at the “Safeway” or in town hall meetings or even in television ads. Rather, 
federal district staff members are continually interacting with elite constituents co-opting 
them into the inciunbent’s enterprise. These are the real “permanent” campaigns.
The literature often reduces the notion of the ‘permanent campaign’ to campaign 
finance and the resultant campaign advertising. The staff enterprise are discussed only to 
the extent that they are part of that ‘permanent campaign.’ Macartney (1975, 1982), for 
instance, talks about the public staff of the incumbents as being the “nucleus” of political 
campaigns. 1 would agree that the campaign is permanent and that the public/federal 
staff members are actively involved in these campaigns. My experience with state 
legislative races suggests that his observation still applies at that level, where publicly 
financed staff members spend considerable amoimts of time engaged in direct campaign 
activities, often serving as the only staff on the campaign. At the federal level, however,
1 would maintain that because campaigns today are so large and specialized, and much 
more complex and expensive than they were in 1982, that they are usually separate entire 
arms o f the district enterprise. Additionally, the passage o f ethics and campaign finance
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reforms since 1975 has heightened the distinctions between the two sets o f staff. I would 
accept that in some instances a key staff member, such as C’s RDSM or A’s DD, 
switches over to the campaign operation prior to the election. And it is quite common for 
press secretaries and schedulers to freely make the switch back and forth over time. 
However, the bulk of campaign and federal staff remain in separate arms o f the district 
enterprise. This dissertation seeks to highlight the efforts of those staff that are more 
commonly rooted on the federal district staff. But it also looks at those “designees” who 
live in the ‘gray’ area described in Chapter Three. In each ofRce, two staff members are 
permitted to participate in both the campaign and the federal sides of the enterprise. Not 
coincidentally, these staff members are also the ones most involved in elite interaction.
My argument is that the impact o f staff is more sophisticated than Macartney 
describes. More commonly, the key staff members can do more good working in their 
jobs in other political ways over the 18 months before the campaign season commences. 
In fact, some federal staff that might appear to be ‘lazy’ and uninvolved with the 
campaign are actually working fifry to sixty hours per week in the months leading up to 
the election. They are putting in these long hours by attending meetings with constituent 
groups after work or on the weekends. In short, the aggressive staff member is putting in 
campaign hours long before the campaign begins. I speculate that staff members today 
are busier than those thirty years ago because there is more government and more for 
them to do for constituents, not to mention that there are more extracurricular needs in the 
community that need to be addressed. If the aggressive staff members have performed 
these activities, they have fulfilled their campaign roles. Some will then simply fit into in 
minor voluntary or advisory capacities.
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The ‘real permanent campaign’ is especially important because these staff members 
are resources that challengers largely do not have. Challengers do not have caseworkers, 
field representatives and press secretaries who will spend two years providing service to 
constituents, doing casework, cutting ribbons, making appearances at awards dinners, and 
then advertising that service in the media. Challengers do not have staff that will spend 
two years interacting with elite constituents, surveying their needs, identifying issues that 
are important to them, and possibly even co-opting them into the incumbent’s enterprise. 
Finally, challengers also do not have the designees who are able to freely make the 
transition from the district staff world to the political campaign.
I should also quickly note that the campaign employees serve as extensions of the 
enterprise. For the purposes o f elite interaction, they tend to be “very reactive” like E’s 
chief fundraiser. They often work in offices close to the federal staff and associate with 
them socially, but for the most part, the “networking” that they do is done separately 
from the district staff. There are strict rules that govern the boundaries. Though there is 
a formal barrier between the staff and the campaigner, there seems to be a strong 
relationship between the two elements. The reason that the campaigner is noted here is 
that in some cases this individual may conduct interaction with elite constituents for 
much the same purpose as the field representative; to win votes for the incumbent.
Albeit, for the campaign people, the primary focus is on raising funds, not serving 
constituents in the manner of the other staff. The observations also suggested that 
incumbents have different interpretations of the ‘gray’ area. For example, when C’s 
RDSM ventured to and from the campaign setting, he saw a completely “other side” of 
the constituency, with entirely new groups of people and issues. This was a very ethical
4 2 4
approach. For other offices, it was more common for the campaign and federal staff to be 
the same people, just using different phones in different offices. For the offices that have 
been more aggressive in their elite interaction over the previous two years, the “other 
side” is usually much more familiar to them. The political activities of D and A’s 
RDSMs prepared them for this transition. And once C’s staff member had been to the 
“other side” he saw many constituents in a “different light.” It came to affect his 
relationship with them in subsequent business as things were more “openly about 
politics.”
How they do co-opt elites?
Once the elites and issues have been identified, the aggressive staff will work over 
the duration of the term to recruit elite constituents into the fabric of the district 
enterprise. 1 observed staff enterprises to use a variety of techniques to reach out to key 
constituents, from service, to political discussions, to the actual use of a constituent as a 
resource. Depending on the sense of urgency and the demands of the incumbents, some 
staff enterprises will more “aggressively” seek to co-opt elites than other offices. 
Furthermore, in most offices there was a clear distinction in the types of attention 
accorded to elite and average constituents.
Service
Service to constituents is usually defined as “casework.” It is held to be a routine 
function that is largely generated by constituents who write or call the office. Yet, 
service takes place at all levels of the enterprise. In fact, direct service to elite 
constituents is probably the most aggressive o f staff behaviors. Studies that merely 
aggregate allocation of staff time or function blur the variation amongst individuals and
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offices. Many o f the district staff, especially those individuals carrying out the 
aggressive activities, may not account for large quantities of total staff time or personnel, 
as compared to those who do basic casework. Chapter One identified these types o f staff 
as the “interactors.” Consequently, aggregate coding will under-represent their true 
importance. My observations suggest that the tasks performed by these small numbers o f 
district staffers are as electorally valuable as the typical “service” activities performed by 
more numerous caseworkers. These individuals are responsible for identifying 
community interests and assisting in their development in the name o f the member. Their 
service ranges from regular phone conversations with important constituents to formal or 
informal meetings and trips into the constituency, to assistance or cooperation with 
constituents on significant grants or programs. My contention is that we best not judge 
the effectiveness of service on volume of activity by an office. Rather, we should 
emphasize the value of a few “interactors” and the service that they conduct on behalf of 
the incumbent.
While not an exhaustive list, I observed staff in three different service settings with 
elite constituents. First, staff served elites by taking political requests about a bill or 
budget item and finding something out for constituents. This service is largely 
informational in nature. It provides the elite constituents with information about when 
the bill will pass, what it will look like, how much it will cost, what it will do to their 
small business, etc. While all constituents are able to receive this kind o f information 
from the incumbents, a request from an elite constituent usually prompted the staff to go 
a little farther in obtaining suitable information. For example, they called the
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Congressional Research Service, relevant committee staff or even asked the incumbent 
for information to assist elite constituents.
The second elite service was an intervention with a federal bureaucracy on behalf of 
a requesting constituent. Typically, district offices were observed representing the 
interests of small businesses within their districts to the Department of Transportation, 
1RS, Small Business Administration (SBA), or Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). By 
definition, average constituents also receive this kind of assistance from the staff. 1 did 
not observe any staff that seemed to purposefully delay, ignore or mishandle requests 
from constituents. But again, the difference is a question of degree. Elite constituents 
with federal problems seemed to be a higher priority amongst aggressive district staff, 
they were willing to make more calls and be more persistent with federal regulators. 1 
also observed aggressive staff working with the incumbent’s Washington staff to further 
push constituent requests. While I would speculate that district-Washington contact is a 
normal interaction made on behalf of many constituent requests, my observations 
suggested that some constituents merited more calls and attention from more senior 
Washington staff. Aggressive staff members were more likely to go to elite constituents 
and advertise their services. Here one can see a clean distinction between C’s office not 
having the time to “create work” versus A’s staff visiting with local school 
superintendents and suggesting sources o f impact aid that they would be willing to help 
procure, or the G staff member whose “specialty” was finding funds to build new post 
offices for some local 'friends’. A n d  most importantly, aggressive staff members were
'* Incidentally, this staffer was able to procure federal funds for five post offices during G’s four terms in 
office.
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more likely to invoke the time of the incumbent to make a call in the case o f an important 
constituent.
Finally, district staff on occasion intervened with a state or local bureaucracy that 
received federal funding. In this case the federal staff were usually pretty limited in what 
they could accomplish, other than flexing their muscles and hoping to move officials 
through coercion or inspiration. The routine office does very little to assist in these types 
of cases, and when they do their activities appeared to be quite limited. For example, one 
of B’s staff members was helping a constituent who was being adversely impacted by a 
state highway law that required the constituent to take down a substantial numbers o f his 
advertising billboards, costing him business. B’s staff member suggested that there was 
little more that he could do than make a few phone calls. In another example, a rapidly 
growing town in C’s district, less than twenty miles from his main district office, was 
experiencing significant housing needs to accommodate the new growth. Yet, C’s staff 
had made no contact and the local mayor and chamber director were unaware of C’s 
special interest in housing issues. Another elite constituent suggested that C’s staff, as 
compared to the other incumbents in the area, approached the complex state, county and 
municipal jurisdictional overlaps as more of a “quagmire” than an opportunity for 
successful representation. At the other end of the spectrum, E’s “Economic Task Force” 
attempted creative federal innovations to assist in the expansion or relocation o f industry 
to the district. As with the previous two types of service, the difference here again is one 
of degree. Elite constituents merit more staff time, calls, and the possible involvement of 
the incumbent. While I did not observe staff undertaking this kind of service for average 
constituents, some assured me that they did occasionally when they encoimtered a
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constituent that they legitimately thought they could assist with minimal cost in time and 
resources.
Each of these three types of service to constituents created gratitude. Perhaps the 
best example of the value of service was seen in the parent o f autistic child. This 
individual was an active labor member (and Democrat) and led an organization o f parents 
of autistic children. Even though this was a local problem in nature, A’s staff member 
made some jurisdictional inquiries and “helped out a taxpayer.” When I later pressed her 
on the interaction she admitted that there was a mixture of motives driving this 
interaction; she was able to legitimately help a constituent in need at the same time as 
assisting the incumbent. The parent was now a loyal supporter of A’s enterprise.
The staff member that ran E’s “Economic Task Force” also realized the utility of her 
service. In her role as “grant supporter,” she felt that her job was vital to the incumbent 
primarily because she helped to “build the community - - to bring better businesses into 
the community” and to “show that E has an interest in the district.” She was frank in her 
admission that the constituents she was serving were likely to be wealthier, as well as 
“opinion leaders” and voters. Again, we see dual motivations at work. While she 
recognized the good for the community that her work generated, she also welcomed the 
political support that such activism generated.
Service does not always produce successful outcomes for elite constituents. Based 
on my observations, the gratitude seems to be generated more from the effort than from 
the successful resolution of service.’^  So the importance of staff in this instance is that
There were several examples, however, where staff activities on behalf o f  some constituents created 
problems for other constituents. Some districts have heterogeneous and competing interests. B’s staff 
suggested that they walked a “tightrope” between oil and dairy, urban and rural, and even race issues in 
their district I observed A’s district director maneuver his way through two delicate situations where he
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they provide visibility and the means for elites to contact a local or federal bureaucrat and 
give them the impression that they have more direct access. This is still an important 
finding in that staff members are an unrecognized entity but that they are out their 
communities digging up stuff for their bosses to do and representing them throughout the 
district.
One-on-Qne interaction
Interaction with constituents need not be based entirely on requests for service. As 
was the case with A’s staff, and to a much smaller extent with E, attempts to co-opt elite 
constituents were based heavily on aggressive one-on-one interaction. The incumbent 
and staff had notable faces that they wanted to drop in on in communities they visited. 
Examples from one community visit included a doctor, a used car dealer and a property 
developer. They wanted to assess the political, economic, and social condition of these 
communities, frequently asking the elite constituents “what do you need from us?” A’s 
district staff had an extremely flexible definition of “office hours” relative to other 
district enterprises. These staff interpreted the concept of an “office hour” as a chance to 
get out and mingle with the community. Other staff, notably B and D’s, were much more 
constrained in their visits, often sitting in an empty room or passing small chit-chat with 
senior citizens for up to two hours. While I noted in Chapter Three that B pursued this 
function personally, his staff did not. Because A’s staff made this penetration o f the 
district an important goal for five o f its seven staff members, they were able to obtain a
was promoting the development o f a new prison and a new company to competing towns, both within A’s 
congressional district Finally there was a case where C’s staff requested a Department o f Transportation 
on behalf o f a group o f concerned citizens. While the requesting constituents were content with C ’s 
request local government and development officials were n o t Perhaps the biggest problem created by 
staff activism is heightened expectations. One o f C’s constituents detailed the failed efforts o f an 
incumbent who formerly represented the town. While C did not deliver roads or government jobs, he did 
not promise them. The other incumbent and staff promised several projects and failed to deliver.
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much greater visibility throughout the district as compared to that o f a sole incumbent 
such as B or C. The one-on-one interaction is premised on the fact that it is the contact 
that matters. Sometimes these visits will generate work, sometimes the staff can use the 
interaction to pass on information from the incumbent, but usually the interaction is 
performed simply to maintain the relationship. In the case o f B or C, the one-on-one 
interaction was much more personal in nature, conducting visits largely for their own 
informational purposes, as opposed to any promotional purpose. A’s staff believed tliat 
elite constituents “were on the team even if they don’t know it.”
Group interaction
D’s staff were no less aggressive than A’s staff. Instead of focusing on interactions 
with individual constituents, D’s enterprise sought to co-opt elites through their group 
membership. In the case of D’s enterprise, four staff members interacted with various 
constituent groups as a means of touching the different communities and their leaders 
throughout the district. Through membership in the health care, aging, agriculture and 
military communities, the staff hoped to relay to elites in the community that D was 
effectively doing her job. Each of these four staff were further driven to persuade elite 
constituents to: 1) include them in the important groups for the issue area that each staff 
member represented, 2) provide them in-depth information about their issues and groups, 
3) get them to work with the incumbent on legislative issues that would benefit both the 
group and D, and 4) to hopefully procure their endorsements and assistance for the next 
election.
431
Politick
District staff also conducted one-on-one interaction with the elected officials in their 
areas. I refer to this behavior as "politicking" and is different from the activity just 
mentioned because of the class of people it serves. Staff members commonly referred to 
this kind of behavior as “courting the courthouse.” In its most simple fashion, it is 
dropping by to visit local officials or regularly calling them to discuss their issues and 
concerns. More sophisticated and aggressive staff will do cross-jurisdictional work to 
help them get funding or regulatory relief for local projects. The crea tive  aggressive staff 
members even allowed local officials to share credit for this work. In one case, a staff 
member pulled together federal funding to establish a veteran’s coimcil but let a state 
representative take the credit for the initiative. Such behavior solidifies the incumbent’s 
base and encourages on-going gratitude.
"Politicking” is another of the two-way relationships in which incumbents and staff 
members engage. In this case, each incumbent (the federal and the local/state) has his or 
her own personal coalitions. So, underneath each member of the House exist numerous 
personal coalitions at the state, county and local levels. Interacting with these elected 
officials gives the staff the opportunity to collect additional surveillance about the district 
and to pass along information about the incumbent. In a pinch, effective “politicking” 
with local officials will have laid the groundwork to borrow or utilize their electoral 
coalitions. If they are ignored, then the phone banks and lit drops in the last few weeks of 
a campaign might come up short o f volunteers. Incumbents “politick” with elected 
officials for five reasons: 1) It helps acquire information by putting these lower limbs to 
work gathering information for the enterprise. A local judge in B’s district was an old
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rival but because of B and staff attention to hlm, he became a good “source of 
information” to B as he has “his ear to the ground all the time.” Many constituents 
perceived the lower level officials as being more accessible and imderstanding o f their 
issues. A business owner fiom C’s district believed that the “higher you go, the bigger 
the issues, the less contact they have.” Working with local officials allows the district 
enterprise to reach or understand the kind of constituent who wouldn’t ordinarily contact 
a federal legislator. A state senator from C’s district who was a personal friend and 
political supporter of C also suggested that on occasion it was her job to act as a 
“lobbyist” for their shared constituency. As the business owner noted, the federal staff 
simply have too much ground to cover, and in a routine office such as C’s they aren’t 
really even looking to interact with elite constituents. In these cases, it helps greatly to 
have local officials like the state senator who will represent the incumbent’s interests to 
local elites and let the incumbent enterprise know when steps need to be taken. 2) To 
ensure that potential primary challengers below them are happy and unlikely to run 
against them. The incumbent who doesn’t pay attention to officials below them runs the 
risk of a primary challenge or an unexcited base. 3) Interacting with other elected 
officials and their supporters gives the incumbent a mechanism to broadcast a message to 
his or her base more quickly. For example, one staff member frequently discussed with 
elected officials the fact that his employer was not like “other” incumbents. This staff 
member talked about how the role of money, political parties, and interest groups (labor 
and Christian) are used to demonize opponents but that talking to the locals allowed him 
a way of saying that “our incumbent just ain’t like that.” 4) Interacting with local elected 
officials builds a farm team of potential replacements when it is time to move on. S)
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Finally, in a district where there is less of a friendly infrastructure below the incumbent, 
interacting with elected officials of the opposite party can minimize the damage or threat 
A mayor o f one of C’s larger towns gave distinct “non-endorsements” to candidates 
running against C because of her respect for his positions and personal contact with her. 
A’s office followed the same strategy with a much more aggressive tact. One of A’s staff 
suggested that he sought out state legislators either at home or dropped by their capitol 
offices so that at least “it makes it harder for them to badmouth you.” It is also likely that 
local and state officials might come to have pragmatic relationships with incumbents 
from the opposite party who are unlikely to be defeated or leave office anytime soon.
This appeared to be the case by the end of A’s second term. The many Democrats o f  his 
district had seemed to be moving towards a state o f peaceful coexistence rather than risk 
having A seek out potential challengers for them.
Incorporate the elites
One of the most direct ways to co-opt elite constituents into the incumbent enterprise 
was to give them a participatory role. A common vehicle to directly incorporate elite 
constituents was found in what some offices referred to as “advisories forums” or 
“advisory boards.” As discussed in Chapter Three, these groups ranged in their size, 
public openness and utility to the incumbent. The co-optation o f elites seemed to take 
place earlier in the incumbent’s career, when they were both searching for advice on new 
subjects as well as seeking to cement their electoral positions. The example o f H is 
instructive here. Early in his tenure, H recruited elite constituents on a number o f issues 
including health care and transportation. These early advisories were informational 
events for his benefit. He would spend a morning or an afternoon visiting with a small
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group of elite constituents on these issues and solicit their opinions and the attitudes of 
the district. The impact of these early forums was twofold, while he was clearly using 
their information to form his own positions he was also inviting these important 
constituents to become part o f his enterprise. Once these elite constituents were given 
this status, logic would suggest that most would value their continued participation and 
access to a federal lawmaker. Consequently, they most likely became active supporters 
of the incumbent. The number of elites involved in the forums grew gradually over the 
years until their purpose began to change. By the time that H had consolidated his 
position in his district, the advisory forums were structured more to highlight the 
participation of the ‘friends’ o f his campaigns. They had become large public events 
where these same elites from his early forums provided informational reviews to groups 
of constituents. They were more promoting issues consistent with the incumbent’s 
positions than in seeking to influence him, which is logical given that they had become 
incorporated in the incumbent enterprise.
Observe and anticipate the communitv needs
District staff also facilitated the co-optation of elite constituents by observing and 
anticipating community needs. As opposed to waiting to hear from constituents about 
their potential needs, some aggressive staff set up visits with community political and 
economic leaders to discuss their needs and push them proactively towards projects that 
would assist their district. Bankers in A’s district discussed how one o f his staff members 
had “interfaced” with them about A’s positions on their issues and the services that he 
could offer to their communities. E’s “grants-person” had on-going relationships with 
numerous cities in the district. She would regularly call together the mayors and any
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economic development staff with the leading economic elites o f the cities to discuss what 
projects they were working on and what assistance DM’s office could offer. These 
relationships were institutionalized through “Business Opportunity Fairs” and a “District 
Economic Task Force” that sought to procure government contracts and private sectors 
Jobs for the district. While E’s was generally a routine office, this staff member 
“aggressively” observed the needs of the district’s communities and they appreciated her 
leadership and follow-up with the community leaders. Other staff used their 
extracurricular involvement in the community to anticipate potential problems and then 
take leadership roles in resolving the problems. District staff commonly served in 
Chambers of Commerce where they could see what types of businesses the communities 
were trying to recruit. E’s RDSM was even the head of the Chamber in the district’s 
biggest city. Elites spoke highly of his iimovative programs and the assets that he was 
able to bring through his position in the federal government. In these cases they locate 
federal grant programs that would assist them in luring new jobs and grant money to the 
district. Another staff member was active in the United Way where she too could 
anticipate projects that local activists were undertaking and bring the incumbent’s 
resources to help on occasion. There were numerous other types of groups that staff 
members were involved in, some social, some economic. The common factor was that 
staff members could anticipate the needs o f the community and then, through their 
positions as part of the incumbent enterprise, attempt to marshal resources to help resolve 
the group’s goals. In a number of examples elites who were members of these 
organizations spoke appreciatively of staff participation. Furthermore, the appreciation
4 3 6
usually recognized the individual staff member as part of the incumbent enterprise as 
opposed to being a private citizen like the rest of the activist in the group.
The “missing” aggressive staff hurts
The absence of aggressive staff members who pursue elite constituents created clear 
voids in the incumbent enterprise. I observed missed opportunities and the “fallout” that 
accompanied them. In one instance, C’s acting RDSM suggested that because they had 
not filled the RDSM position with a permanent hire, “some voids were not filled because 
there was no one responsible” for interacting with elite constituents and that there was 
“fallout” from not having a strong district person. The “fallout” was an increase in 
requests and projects that went unanswered or were delayed. C, the COS and the RDSM 
had intended on following up the passage of an agricultural spending bill with a forum on 
its impact on farmers in the district. In the end, they did not have the time to interact with 
farmers about the bill. Nor did they assign any other staff members the responsibility of 
interacting with farmers to at least get their feedback. Even though C had a routine staff 
to begin, the departure o f his RDSM created an even greater void and decreased the 
already limited amount o f attention paid to district elites. Consequently, they received a 
substantial amount of negative feedback over the next year and his margin of victory 
shrank noticeably in the rural counties of his district. Several elites in other districts also 
noted the falloff in service from incumbent enterprises when long-serving staff departed. 
It is not unreasonable to assert that failing to replace aggressive staff members or turning 
prematurely away from elite interaction can contribute to defeat at the polls. At a 
minimum, when elite constituents are not tapped by the incumbent enterprise they are 
less likely to become active parts of the incumbent’s campaign efforts.
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What it brines 3: Campaign impact 
Once the elite constituents have been identified and are co-opted as elements of the 
incumbent enterprise, they are more likely to contribute vital resources to the campaign. 
This is not to suggest that only co-opted elites contribute to campaigns. Those elites who 
derive partisan, policy or material satisfaction from the incumbent’s position will likely 
be disposed to help the incumbent regardless of contact with staff. The argument here is 
that activities by the staff to identify and work with elite constituents enlarge the class of 
elite constituents who are committed to the incumbent. The relationship can also flow in 
the opposite direction. Elite constituents and groups understand incumbents’ needs for 
electoral support, ranging from contributions to endorsements, volunteers and votes. 
Consequently their efforts to raise these resources and squelch potential issues and 
candidates of concern help to ingratiate them in the incumbent enterprise. Remember 
that elite constituents and groups also have motivations and policy needs that benefit 
from the reelection of incumbents.
For some elites the resources focus on campaign contributions, while for others it 
might be the ability to give an endorsement, procure volunteers, or work to deter quality 
opponents from running against the incumbent. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, 
incumbents strive to get more contributions, endorsements, volunteers and votes from 
their base, get some of these elements from more independent constituents and hope to 
diminish the threat emanating from their opponent’s base. Efforts to co-opt elite 
constituents from all three groups were perceived to be effective allocations o f staff time 
and resources that likely paid off at election time.
They contribute resources
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People who control resources
Not coincidentally, many of the elite constituents that staff members interact with 
come from higher socio-economic status or belong to groups that are politically active 
and have resources. They are the people who “control campaign resources” (Jacobson, 
1997, p34). They are more likely to be able to make significant campaign contributions. 
Alternatively, they are more likely to be leaders in organizations such as labor unions, 
volunteer groups or professional associations. As such, they are more likely to be able to 
mobilize volimteers and organize events for the incumbent. Elites are also more likely to 
have an impact on how the community communicates. They are the journalists, editors 
and owners of the district’s media sources. If so, they can provide the incumbent greater 
amounts of favorable coverage.
Some incumbents conglomerated these individuals into “networks” that extend their 
district enterprises. While some networks are formal advisory bodies that meet regularly, 
others are simply fund-raising arms that have no institutional structure. In any shape, 
these groups reflect a body of district constituents with resources that are interested in 
committed to the incumbent enterprise. Some incumbents rely upon the leaders of their 
“networks” to perform many political tasks that they do not want or trust their staff to do. 
In the case of H, his “network” head was a former head of a substantial Chamber of 
Commerce who at the beginning took H around to meet the economic leaders of his 
district, and later represented H’s interests in front of these same elites. As his career and 
these relationships progressed, H began to involve his staff in these interactions to the 
point where he now only rarely interacts with people in his “network” for anything other
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than fund-raising requests. The district staff now largely handles requests that emanate 
from CEOs and other elite constituents.
Elites contribute for a variety of reasons 
Favor seeking
Some of the elites who are co-opted into the incumbent enterprise undoubtedly use 
their access for personal or commimity gain. Numerous elites expressed pragmatic 
attitudes about assisting incumbents who did not share their political beliefs or 
backgrounds. Whether it was an economic or social favor, these elites were largely 
appreciative of the access they had to the incumbent enterprise and admitted that 
interaction had an impact on their support. In fact, a business owner in B’s district 
suggested that an active staff and incumbent can “reach the voters” and change their 
minds with service. In her view, the incumbent and staff serve the district interests, with 
a focus on “those at the top” and that ultimately word of this service “trickles down” to 
the average voters. This constituent suggested cynically that service was done with a 
“bottom line (that was) for campaign cash.” I did observe prominent supporters of the 
opposition party interacting with incumbents and staff. In particular, A and his staff were 
proactive in their efforts to recruit supporters of the previous incumbent into their 
enterprise. As noted earlier in this chapter, meetings with Democratic bankers and trial 
lawyers may have been driven by the elites desire to ‘play’ in the political arena, with A 
and his staff providing the best access for them. While it is not likely that many staff or 
incumbents set out to interact with constituents with the primary goal of increasing their 
campaign coffers, this constituent’s remarks imply that some elites perceive the system in 
that fashion and that may drive the reality of their contributions.
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Some groups are more proactive in their desire to contribute to the incumbent 
enterprise. In particular one o f the military communities in A’s district provided a 
number of examples of their electoral pragmatism. Whether it was abandoning E in his 
final losing days of a bid for higher office or coming quickly together behind A, elites in 
this community banded together for effect; to raise campaign contributions and to send a 
message to potential challengers. 1 would speculate that groups such as this community, 
that are heavily reliant on federal government programs, are likely to swing behind the 
individuals whom they perceive are going to win elections. And almost universally those 
are the incumbents. By interacting with these groups throughout the two-year cycle, the 
incumbent enterprise reassures the community that their interests are represented and 
reminds them of the need to keep an incumbent with seniority continuing in office.
In this sense corporations and their PACs are the ultimate defenders of the 
incumbency and the status quo. Generally, these were the constituents most aware o f  the 
incumbent’s seniority and ability to procure funding and regulatory assistance for the 
constituency. A corporate PAC director fi-om B’s district maintained that they supported 
candidates who are “forward looking” with regard to their product area. With further 
probing, he admitted that virtually all of their support goes to incumbents. When asked if 
they would ever support a challenger to B, he “couldn’t imagine that scenario” because B 
qualified his four-part test: 1) He was an incumbent. 2) Furthermore he was the 
incumbent from their district. 3) He was at least interested in visiting their facility and 
hearing their position. 4) And they tend to be in agreement on all issues concerning their 
industry. Because B was affirmative on all four questions, a potential opponent would 
have to be “pretty impressive.” Since incumbents will automatically qualify on three of
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the four answers, and they generally support the interests of their constituency, corporate 
and PAC support is largely a given. Nevertheless, staff interaction with corporate 
citizens keeps them involved in the enterprise as well.
Affirm support
Staff interaction also raises support from new faces in the community. Not every 
constituent who contributes or interacts with the incumbent enterprise does so out o f a 
sense o f material or policy gain. Some constituents who became contributors did so out 
of a sense of gratitude for the personal attention paid to them by the incumbent enterprise. 
The parent of the autistic child from A’s district and a small business owner from B’s 
district who was given advice and support on a legislative issues ultimately became 
campaign contributors because of their interactions with the incumbent’s staff. In the 
case of the parent, he actually switched his activism from one party to the other. A more 
typical recruit, the small business owner was turned from a passive independent into a 
loyal supporter ofB.
The old faces are also part of the incumbent enterprise. People who are social or 
political friends of the incumbent, or constituents who became part of the enterprise long 
ago are often the core of the incumbent’s fundraising base. For the most part these 
people need little prompting (or service) to continue their support. Yet, an aggressive 
interaction with these people keeps them involved and energized in the enterprise. It 
reminds them that they need to “affirm their support” for the incumbent as one o f B’s 
supporters noted. For the most sophisticated elite constituents, staff interaction can be 
used to persuade the “organizers” to help the constituent in ways beyond their simple re- 
election. Staff members were observed taking many opportunities to suggest that they
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were still vulnerable and could use all the help that they could get in the elections. But in 
other situations the designees may be more frank in their assessments that contributions 
can help the incumbent enterprise assist candidates elsewhere and further other goals 
beyond re-election.
Be careful, same people = same money
Incumbents have a tendency to see the same people, serve the same people and get 
the same contributions. However, districts take on new personalities with an influx of 
new population. More commonly, districts change because older constituents retire or 
move away, either way becoming less dependable supporters. 1 noted this transition in 
B’s district in particular. It is for this reason that aggressive elite interaction is a good 
idea. It brings new faces into contact with the incumbent enterprise. Nevertheless, it is 
sometimes difficult to get a senior incumbent to change their style after years in office. 
Consequently, not having staff do elite interaction means the enterprise is in contact with 
fewer constituents who might potentially support the enterprise, laying the groundwork 
for a potential upset.
Not an unlimited pursuit
My observations of staff and incumbents suggest that the incumbent enterprise does 
not largely interact with elite constituents for the object purpose of raising campaign 
resources. While these behaviors do produce sympathetic constituents, 1 did not 
encounter any staff members who would admit that campaign contributions were a 
motivating factor for them. The example of B’s newly elected neighboring incumbent 
serves to illustrate this point. A Chamber official from a town represented by both B and 
the new neighbor suggested to me that the numerous wealthy Republican oil and banking
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officials had been waiting to become part o f  this new incumbent’s team. Yet, after nearly 
two years, their invitations went unfilled and they had yet to see the new incumbent or his 
staff. Consequently, “the campaign money was not looking to go to him.” This example 
says that being attentive to community interests is helpful to the incumbent enterprise.
But it also says that incumbents and staff are not blindly devoted to service that will 
generate campaign resources. Despite the fact that the incumbent was apparently aware 
of whom these constituents were, one could hardly mistake calls or letterhead from banks 
or oil companies, he and his staff had other priorities to attend. This suggests that 
incumbents are not always making the most politically ‘rational’ decisions about their 
next campaigns, or the new incumbent would have made time to get to this community. 
This example also concludes that there is an unmistakable value to serving some groups 
of constituents.
They contribute other resources -  media and volunteers
Elite constituents can contribute more than finances to fund the campaign. I 
observed numerous examples of incumbents and staff interacting with elite constituents 
to influence media coverage and gain volunteer support for their campaigns. For one, B’s 
AA had a relationship with a local newspaper publisher where they regularly attended 
baseball games when the AA was in the district. At times they were even joined by the 
incumbent from the neighboring district. The journalist’s remarks suggested that he was 
positively affected by these visits. Another example was E’s staff member who 
interacted with local journalists when he “dropped-by” a community. He would inquire 
about local affairs and thank the journalists for the positive coverage of E. Interacting
The same can be said for challengers as well. Even those that repeat campaigns against incumbents are 
not always likely to do the most rational things during the off-year, seeking out elite constituents, raising
4 4 4
with media figures from the district had a clear impact on the incumbent enterprise in 
both cases and reflects an important symbiotic relationship for district politics where they 
each benefited. On the one hand, interaction likely results in more positive coverage for 
the incumbent. They perceive that the incumbent is “around” a lot and is “in touch” with 
district interests even if they do not consider themselves supporters of the enterprise. 
Ultimately, this type of attitude is probably reflected in favorable news accoimts of the 
incumbent that make the challenger’s tasks even more difficult. For the district media, 
interaction with the incumbent enterprise gives them valuable ‘information’ to fill their 
airtime or print space. Sometimes the information is valuable access to discuss issues of 
the days, other times it might be nothing more than an annoimcement of a minor grant 
program for farmers or schools. The interaction might also be nothing more than small 
talk about politics or sports that will not be aired to the district. Inciunbents and staff 
perhaps even prefer this latter type of interaction because it requires limited work and 
does not tie the incumbent to specific policy positions, while at the same time developing 
personal relationships with local journalists that might later be utilized to get a 
sympathetic press release nm or an opponent’s story treated more tentatively.
They help to further co-opt opposition 
The campaign value o f elite interaction is not simply to identify elite donors and 
resources to supplement the campaign. It is also to find potential sources of opposition. 
Opposition is here defined as problematic issues or individual constituents who might 
support an opponent. The incumbent enterprise, assisted by elites who have already been 
co-opted, seeks out elected officials, community activists and other “opinion leaders” 
who fit into this potential pool.
campaign contributions, talking to district journalists, etc.
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Mellow the opponents
The most obvious target o f opposition to an incumbent is an elected official from the 
opposition party. A prominent Democratic mayor from C’s district offered her “non­
endorsement” to C’s opponent largely because of his integrity. In other cases it might be 
possible to win such support through active service by district staff. I observed E’s staff 
in particular making efforts to interact with Republican local officials. While they “vary 
as supporters o f the incumbent” it was clear that a number of them were less than 
enthusiastic opponents of E. His staff not only was casually interactive with them while 
they were in town, but they also invited them to participate in the economic development 
element of the enterprise and suggested that they even shared credit with them on some 
state-federal projects. The incumbent and staff pursued these officials with an underlying 
argument that their opposition would be wasteful because the incumbent was so secure.
So why not work together for the development of the community? The end result is that 
the even some of the opposition officials became part of the incumbent enterprise; 
passing along political information, working with the staff and, generally being helpful to 
the staff. In one instance, I even observed two local Republicans solicit a staff member’s 
help in getting E to persuade an individual to run for local office. Partisanship was less 
important here because they were all part of the same ‘team’. Most importantly, these 
officials were unlikely to mobilize on behalf o f challengers to E. Elites in the 
incumbent’s party, as well as those outside of the party, recognized the security of the 
incumbent’s electoral position. Therefore, a cooperative relationship was in the interest 
of both the elites and the incumbent’s office. Interestingly, one might even make the case 
here that interacting with elected officials from the opposition party would save the staff
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from having to interact with many individual constituents who are independent of the two 
parties base. Realistically, most enterprises spent time working on the swing voters 
instead of opposing partisans they were unlikely to recruit.
Entice those in the middle
There were numerous observations of constituents who were firmly independent, or 
perhaps even regular supporters of the opposition party who became elements of the 
incumbent enterprise. In some cases they joined the ‘team’ because it was the prudent 
thing to do if they legitimately wanted to be involved in politics in that district. These are 
the constituents from above who have solidary motivations to be political ‘players’ or 
‘friends’. Even with these types of constituents, staff had a role to play in that ‘players’ 
seemed to demand contact from the incumbent enterprise if they were legitimately going 
to be involved. One constituent of this type remarked that an incumbent “is only as good 
as” his or her staff, and that if they do their job correctly, they can “breed locals to be 
satisfied and content.” In other cases, the efforts of incumbents and staff lured citizens 
who were not active and might not have voted for them, into becoming active 
contributors to the enterprise. Here the best example is the one of B’s constituents who 
had a legislative request for his floral business. He first interacted with the district staff 
and then went on to B and his Washington staff. After legislation was passed, this 
individual began to volimteer on B’s campaigns, eventually becoming a key campaign 
coordinator, assisting with ad production, representing B at events and generally helping 
out all elements of the campaign. While this is an extreme example, it is not far fetched 
to imagine that service generates volunteer activities or contributions from grateful 
constituents. Further testimony to the impact o f the impact on constituents was offered
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by one of C’s staff members. C’s RDSM noted that his relationship with district elites 
changed after he returned to the federal ofBce from his stint running C’s campaign. One 
he returned from the “other side”, elite constituents offered more frank political 
assessments of the district requests for assistance that blurred what had previously been a 
strict separation between campaign and federal office. That attitude was reflected in the 
testimony of one economic leader who referred to this staff member as an “excellent 
campaigner” and a “great contact” that is “helpful” to the city’s economic interests (12/23 
p4). He made no distinction between the individual as a campaign or a federal staff 
employee.
While B clearly did not have an aggressive outreach program, the experience of one 
of his constituents suggests that even casual contact helps, and reminds us that staffs are 
an advantage for incumbents and a problem for challengers. In this case, a banker from 
B’s district who had a couple of positive interactions with B and his staff on personal 
issues after he first moved to the district, has remained a supporter despite his general 
political independence (7/7 p6). When asked if he would support other candidates 
against B he noted that he “doesn’t nm in politically active circles so it would be a reach 
for anyone to call an independent, nonpolitical middle-class banker.” Ultimately, when 
the support of these basically non-political elites coalesces with a base that is engaged, 
the incumbent is a daunting political force in the district, leaving only the hard-core 
partisans as a support base. When it comes time to raise resources to challenge an 
incumbent, the partisan base is not usually sufficient.
Attract all the resources
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Perhaps the most important impact of interaction with opposition and independent 
elites is its impact on potential donations to the challengers. Elites frequently made 
remarks such as: “Why mess with a good and growing thing?” The constituent who 
noted this exact phrase was not overwhelmingly a fan of A, but was clear that he would 
not support anyone else. A prominent attorney who was a personal friend of C’s 
opponent still supported C because of his interaction with his enterprise, his integrity, and 
the need to preserve a senior incumbent. The more aggressive and savvy staff realized 
that there were other constituents out there who might be made part o f the enterprise 
despite the fact that they were seemed to be supporters of the opposing party’s 
candidates. These ‘other’ constituents are individual with propensities to play both sides 
of the political fence, but who “stick with good things” when they interact with them.
For example, B’s “organizer” mostly supported Republican incumbents. However, he 
became firmly committed to B and told a potential quality challenger to B that he could 
not help him. While he does occasionally give small amounts o f contributions and advice 
to challengers, he does so only for prospective reasons. And the assistance he gives is 
clearly insignificant as compared to his incumbent support. The “organizer” went on to 
give an example of the one time that he went against this rule and backed a challenger to 
a liberal state senator whom he’d previously supported. After the senator was re-elected, 
the “organizer” was quick to build back his relationship and has worked closely with the 
official and his staff ever since. One of A’s pragmatic players worked both sides and 
“tried to be vanilla in his approaches.” He was a Republican who heavily supported state 
and local Democratic officials. As was the case with B’s senator, there does not appear 
to be any long-term sanction to contributing to both sides for these types o f players. A is
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unlikely to be upset that his constituent is giving to state lawmakers in his district even 
though there are possibilities that they might be future opponents. In fact, at some level 
A might prefer to have donors who are good with the local community so that the locals 
want to keep both officials and not have them run against each other. At a minimum 
having donors who play both sides allows the incumbent enterprise to hear rumblings 
early. The lesson these examples draw for the aggressive office is that they should never 
write off interacting with an elite contributor based on their party contributions. For the 
challenger, however, these examples demonstrate the difficult task in lining up a support 
base to run against incumbents.’^  It was observed that even personal friends and natural 
constituencies of parties were made less enthusiastic campaign contributors because of 
the efforts of the incumbent enterprise. Without the support o f these individuals, a 
credible campaign is difficult to mount against an incumbent. Elite constituents can be 
persuaded to help incumbents not only through contributions or volimteering, but also 
through simply not offering political support to a potential challenger.
They help to deter quality challengers 
The cumulative impact of all the functions of staff interaction ultimately come to a 
head with the final benefit this work procures for the incumbent enterprise; their efforts 
help to deter quality challengers from deciding to nm in the first place. While the 
literature has established that incumbents rarely face what would be considered quality 
challengers, this dissertation helps to identify further reasons why these individuals keep 
themselves “hidden.”
FEC and Tray.com provide useful tools to analyze the shifting membership o f the district enterprise over 
time. Individual contributors can be identified by name, address or by candidate support. One could use 
these sites to check to see who was against them in their first campaign as compared to more recent reports.
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Literature
According to the literature, quality challengers tend to appear when there is 1) an 
open seat or 2) the incumbent’s previous election is won by a small margin (Jacobson, 
1997, p35). It is a given that incumbents want to avoid close elections. So raising 
substantial campaign contributions and co-opting sources of contributions/votes/support 
then is a proactive strategy to deter quality challengers. While the presumption of some 
of the literature (see especially Cox and Katz, 1996) is to focus on the result of low 
quality challengers over the “direct influence” of incumbents or their ability to “scare 
o ff’ challengers, my observations suggest that we should not sell the “scare o ff’ element 
short. My findings seem more in line with those of Jacobson and Kemell (1983), 
Jacobson (1997), and Fowler and McClure (1990). At the aggregate level, Jacobson 
found that potential challengers and contributors are often scared off by the preemptive 
actions by the incumbents. He believed that incumbency advantage then becomes a 
“self-fulfilling prophecy” as viable challengers are dissuaded from launching campaigns, 
as seen in Figure 5.3 above. Fowler and McClure also tangentially demonstrate the 
impact of these subtle relationships on incumbent advantage. They echo Jacobson in the 
aggregate, in finding that good challengers are dissuaded from ever launching campaigns. 
Contextually, tj^ey also demonstrate the variables that operate in one district with many 
“hidden” candidates. 1 would argue that efforts by staff and incumbents suggest that 
there is nothing self-fulfilling about weak challengers. Rather, this situation requires 
work by the campaign to raise finances for reelection and by the district staff to interact 
with the relevant groups and constituents. Both of these activities feed the increased
One might also be able to find groups o f elites who play both sides and those who switched to protect the 
incumbent.
451
name recognition and support that ultimately power the incumbent to victory. The 
functions described in the pages above suggest that some district enterprises clearly act as 
causative factors that keep quality challengers and resources “hidden”. They do this by 
serving potential opponents, or more likely undercutting them by serving their base. 
Actuailv serving vour oononents
In the spring of 1999, Mark Neumann, a former Representative and rumored 
challenger to Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin publicly announced that he would not be 
running against the Senator because his staff had done an excellent job assisting his son’s 
application to a service academy. One might suggest that this is the ultimate example of 
elite service; actually serve your potential opponent and make them grateful. While there 
may be other examples of elite constituents who decide not to challenge incumbents 
because they have been directly served by their staff, 1 am aware of none and would 
speculate that these are extremely rare occurrences. Nevertheless, the Neumann example 
provides confirmatory evidence of the value of constituent service. Serving every 
potential challenger, however, does not strike me as being a potentially viable strategy. 
Instead, incumbents can deter challengers by focusing on elites who are independents or 
are from the opponent’s base.
Overwhelm independents
The more aggressive enterprises clearly engaged in staff activities that brought them 
into contact with the independent elements o f the community. A and D’s staff went well 
beyond their base of supporters with their advisory forums, drop-by visits, interactions 
with local journalists, and extracurricular involvement. By reaching out to a broader 
selection o f constituents and groups from the district, the incumbent enterprise provides
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fewer bases from which a potential opponent might emerge. Attending to the interests of 
these groups (and advertising them in the co-opted media) is hoped to make them content 
with their current representation.
Undercutting their base
The most aggressive staff even sought to serve individuals from the potential 
challenger’s base. Echoing Serra and Cover (1992), my results confirm the value o f 
serving constituents who are not initially disposed to vote for the incumbent because of 
their partisan backgrounds. There are limitations to this ' serve-the-enemy’ theory. Staff 
from a liberal Democrat’s office would probably not make inroads with conservative 
Christian activists. Nor would it be a productive use o f time for conservative Republican 
staff members to attend Sierra Club meetings looking to pick up some environmental 
support. Nevertheless. 1 did witness Republican staff attending labor meetings and staff 
from an urban, liberal Democratic office actively working the town halls of the 
surrounding conservative countryside. In both cases, staff admitted that they were 
seeking to dampen some of the previous opposition towards the incumbent.
Relationships with the two mayors in C’s largest cities resulted in them not “working 
hard” for C’s opponent. Their aggressive support for their party’s nominee against C 
might have impacted the outcome of what turned out to be a very close election. Another 
firm example was found in the commitment of A’s DD to attend office hours in the 
hometown of their initial campaign challenger. This was perhaps the crudest attempt to 
actually intimidate or influence a potentially unfiriendly constituency. A’s staff provided 
the best example of how a potential opponent’s base can be diminished. One small 
business owner who was actively involved in E’s enterprise and contributed to A’s first
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opponent was reduced to political inactivity in the district. While he still does not 
identify politically with A, the active efforts of one staff member on two different SBA 
loan requests have made him “less inclined” to ever support a Democratic challenger. A 
constituent from H’s district who had received similar service from a previous incumbent 
suggested that the service even resulted in changing his partisan allegiance to become a 
“loyal” Republican.
Another set o f staff members were more subtle in their efforts to identify problematic 
constituencies. They combed their opponent’s FEC reports to find what went wrong and 
identify particular elites or areas where they did not do so well. These findings then had 
an impact on how they reorganized their constituency efforts for the next term. Several 
towns and occupations were given a higher priority for attention by individual staff 
members in the hope that they would minimize their opposition and dry up potential 
sources o f future opposition. They did not shy away from areas or occupations that 
traditionally identified with their opponents. The impact of these behaviors were seen in 
the attitudes o f an economic elite who had previously been active in Democratic 
campaigns; her efforts would be spent elsewhere because it was a “waste of time” to 
challenge a well-funded and popular incumbent whose staff is “working the district 
hard.” Her advice to the next potential challenger who calls; “Unless there is some 
screw-up.. .1 wouldn’t advise someone to run against him.”
The minimal goal of the aggressive staff in going to see the ‘enemy’ is to divert 
opposition elites from zealously pursuing these activities or candidacy; to dry up their 
resources and potential endorsements. Maximally, their goal is to actually gain the 
allegiance of some of their former foes. The effect of this work can be seen in a
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comment from one o f E’s constituents, a Republican businessman; “why would I want to 
replace E, he’s been so good to me.” The overall consequence o f aggressive service 
work then, is to solidify the incumbent’s advantage whether they obtain the minimum or 
the maximum goal.
My observations suggest that the best advice to incumbents is that elite service is a 
valuable resource to increase the size of the base, recruit new supporters, and minimize 
the hostility of the opposition. They would do well to “aggressively” utilize district staff 
interactions with elite constituents to win substantially, deter quality challengers, and 
avoid surprising defeats in low-tumout midterm elections. This advice is especially 
useful because it does not require their time. In fact, aggressive elite interaction not only 
assists incumbents with their electoral worries, it also grants them “leeway” to pursue 
their other motivations with an enhanced district enterprise.
What it brings 4: ‘Leewav’ to help incumbents in other wavs 
Use elites and staff for other things after the campaign 
If constituents trust their incumbents, they free them from surveillance “until they 
hear otherwise” (Parker, 1989, p24). This dissertation suggests that aggressive district 
enterprises let the constituents “hear” what they want through service and interaction. 
This service does not require thorough depictions o f their legislative efforts. Rather they 
seem to focus on projects that the incumbents and staff are assisting local governments 
with, or the resolution of individual casework, or the incumbent’s efforts on largely 
symbolic issues. In some ways, it is as if  the staff are simply distracting the constituents 
from other substantive issues. Mayhew believed that incumbents don’t have to win on 
legislation for all constituents, just put up the good fight for people with resources, votes
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and endorsements (1974, ppl 11-125). This seems to be somewhat true for the aggressive 
staff enterprise and its pursuit of elite interaction.
The fourth and final benefit o f elite interaction is the on-going relationship that elites 
have with the enterprise after the election and as the tenure in office wears on. In a way, 
elite interaction increases the resources and size of the district enterprise. There are more 
people gathering intelligence, looking out for the incumbent’s interests, speaking highly 
of his or her record, and perhaps even more people directly supporting the campaign 
efforts. Consequently, the incumbent can afford to spend less time paying attention to 
district issues as his or her enterprise is supplemented with the involvement of reliable 
district elites. If the incumbent has talented aggressive staff in the district and a reliable 
supplement of elite constituents in the enterprise, they can possibly even transfer some 
resources to the Washington office to focus on goals beyond re-election.
Incumbents have multiple goals
My observations confirmed that incumbents are more than Mayhew’s simple (1974) 
single-minded seekers of reelection. If Mayhew were correct, incumbents would rarely 
leave home. The tensions in incumbent responsibilities have long been noted. For one, 
Fenno (1978) depicted three disparate goals for legislators that drive those tensions; re- 
election, institutional influence, and making public policy. As the powers and burdens of 
Congress and the individual legislators expanded, so to did the resources they were 
provided to do their jobs and fulfill these multiple objectives. Loomis (1979) profiled 
these staff increases and suggested that the staff act as a “small business” in the employ 
o f the incumbent. Salisbury and Shepsle (1981b) added that some incumbents were able 
to utilize their positions in leadership to procure more resources and reduce some of
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Fenno’s tradeoffs. Similarly, Kingdon (1981) and Parker (1992) talked in aggregate 
about resources and efforts at home that “buy leeway” or “allow the incumbent to 
maximize discretion” on Fenno’s latter two goals; institutional position and policy­
making. Unfortunately this literature focuses largely on Washington staff. Again, the 
notion that Washington is where government takes place and home is where the 
campaign takes place fails to capture the important political tasks of the district staff.
This dissertation agrees with the above literature that incumbents have resources and that 
they utilize them to procure “leeway”.
Staff and elites reduce the tradeoffs that are necessary to fulfill those goals 
Re-elect
If incumbents have effective and aggressive district staff, they can heavily reduce the
attention that the incumbent must pay to the reelect function. The aggressive district staff
will work to increase the constituents’ familiarity with and support of the incumbent.
They will co-opt potential support for the opponent, and perhaps even assist to deter
quality challengers from running in the first place. The aggressive enterprise helps to
%
relieve the incumbent of re-election pressure by interacting personally with individual 
constituents (A) or with relevant constituency groups (D). They will seek out elite 
constituents who desire “constant” relationships and will use their involvement in the 
community to find relevant issues and promote the enterprise to their friends and 
colleagues. Elite constituents can enlarge the enterprise and become a presence in the 
district; the “eyes, ears and voice” in a fashion not unlike the staff themselves. In areas 
of the district where there are no offices and staff cannot regularly interact with
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constituents, elite supporters are valuable “defenders and promoters” of the incumbent 
A’s aggressive operation seemed to particularly recruit and interact with supporters in the 
small and mid-sized cities of the district that do not normally receive political attention. 
The aggressive staff from a newly elected incumbent will help to persuade constituents of 
their employer’s sincerity and hard work. The early constituency work of one of D’s 
neighboring Incumbent’s was largely regarded as having scared off a number of quality 
challengers. In his first bid for re-election, this incumbent faced a third-tier opponent 
despite the fact that he was a freshman Republican who occupied a district that regularly 
votes Democratic at the top of the ticket.
Staff can also help incumbents that don’t like to campaign, or who don’t like people. 
As funny as it sounds, some politicians, especially some of the older incumbents, were 
observed to not like people very much. More commonly, an incumbent may not know or 
like a particular part o f a district. In larger geographical districts, the aggressive staff can 
act as helpful surrogates. If they do not, the incumbent must spend valuable time 
traveling to remote reaches of the district to represent constituent interests, or risk turning 
these areas into fertile territory for the opponent. While staff in distant areas cannot be 
total substitutes for the incumbent, they can surely reduce the amount of attention an 
incumbent must pay to large portions of his or her district.
Policv
The aggressive staff that interacts with constituents can go beyond a re-election 
impact and also assist the incumbent’s policy-making goals. The district staff members 
bring the constituents and their issues closer to the incumbent. Most basically, the staff 
enterprise has a policy impact because they serve the needs o f the constituents, usually
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echoing the incumbent’s desire to “make good policy.” Staff can also assist with this 
goal while they are conducting surveillance of the district. Their interactions might turn 
up issues or concerns that could lead to ideas for new legislation. Alternatively, this 
interaction provides the incumbent, and Congress as a whole, with a picture window 
overlooking the impact of the laws that they pass. One might even consider district staff 
to be part of the oversight process. They have a policy impact because they serve the 
needs o f constituents.
Elite constituents can assist the policy impact of staff by helping to “set up” issues.
In a sense, supportive elites, especially those in local government offices can be helpful 
to the incumbent enterprise if they are willing to do the legwork on service requests by 
organizing meetings, making phone calls, requesting forms, etc. In routine offices like 
C’s, district elites have little choice but to be proactive. Nevertheless, this activism by 
elites is helpful to the incumbent and staff because it preserves their time. The aggressive 
office similarly benefits from such elite activism. In either case, the incumbent enterprise 
is reliant upon the expertise o f local elites. In one case a mayor of a large city regularly 
briefed the local staff on the status of housing and transportation programs in the city and 
what federal bureaucracies they were working with. In another case a university official 
regularly briefed the district staff on the grant programs that he was working with the 
incumbent’s Washington staff. He offered that it was useful to him to have informed and 
proactive staff assisting him in the district, as well as in Washington. The majority of 
district staff had little exposure to federal, state or local government programs. While 
intensive training is offered to the staff, it does not measure up to the experience of a 
mayor or economic development officer who have been involved in the community.
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applying for grants, filling out forms for years. The assistance o f such elites is invaluable 
to the incumbent enterprise. If these individuals have not been identified and co-opted, 
staff may lose valuable time having to learn about district issues, grant applications, etc. 
Institutional
Ultimately the district enterprise assists the incumbent with the third goal by 
allowing him or her to spend more time in Washington, accumulating the knowledge and 
contacts necessary to advance within the institution, or traveling to other states to help the 
campaign activities of potential allies in the legislature. With any of these goals, the 
incumbent will have less time to spend in the district and will be more reliant upon their 
staff to represent their interests at home. They may desire a committee chair, a leadership 
position in the party structure, or simply the weight amongst their colleagues to pass 
legislation they deem important. In short, the district staff and elite’s work provides them 
with the “leeway” to pursue the goals that they desire most, be they electoral, policy or 
institutional. E’s staff had long accepted that their role freed up his time to work on 
policy issues and chair an important subcommittee. He rarely returned home and the 
staff did their best to represent him in his absence. A’s rise in the party leadership put his 
district staff under the same pressures only much earlier in their tenure in office. While 
they initially struggled with this responsibility, it appeared that their reaction over time 
was similar to E’s staff; they embraced their supportive role as necessary for the greater 
good o f the enterprise. A constituent noticed their effort: “(A) wants his people treated 
well, and with a big district and time commitments for the party stuff that he has to do, he 
is reliant on relatively confident and independent staffers.”
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The most sophisticated elite constituents will understand these demands. It is for this 
reason that they are so valuable to the district enterprise. If they comprehend that the 
incumbent must purposely be away from the district, they will perhaps make fewer 
demands on the staff and act in ways that are more supportive; gathering surveillance, 
acting as an “opinion leader” who speaks highly of the incumbent to the local 
community, and maintaining their involvement in the campaign enterprise. The elite 
constituent can further assist the institutional goal by not only cooperating with district 
staff to maintain the district position, they can also continue to make generous 
contributions to the incumbent’s campaign that can be forwarded on to other more 
vulnerable incumbents, thus enhancing the incumbent’s position in the legislature. 1 
would speculate that this is a very limited class of constituents however.
Progressive ambition 
Finally, staff enterprises that have done an effective job with elite interaction help 
that incumbent when he or she wants to nm for higher office. From the incumbent’s 
perspective it is useful to cultivate elites for moves to higher office, for their 
contributions, connections and personal encouragement. As was just noted, incumbents 
who have desires beyond their current situations need to travel to other parts of state, in 
the case of H running for Senate, or even other parts of the country, in the case o f A 
running for position within the party.
The relationship is also useful from the constituent’s perspective because they may 
desire a connection to a high profile figure for material, policy or purposive reasons. 
Constituents regularly made remarks that confirmed these motivations. Some dropped 
names, like the constituent who repeatedly mentioned that he “knows a senator” quite
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well. Other suggested that higher-ranking ofBcials would be useful for their 
communities. Still others held out the hopes that their current incumbents would “go 
higher” as if  they vicariously advanced with them. Even elite constituents who were not 
disposed to ideologically agree with the incumbent were seen to become part of the 
incumbent enterprise if they were “being groomed” for higher office. In this case, a 
constituent felt that ideology was less important than working with staff o f a high profile 
incumbent who could do positive things for the home state.
The campaign lingo suggests that incumbents need to maintain a solid base of 
contributors, resources and votes. The base is worked for campaign resources and the 
development of a solid reputation to ensure regular re-election but also to make sure that 
the incumbent gets extra votes from them in case they make the jump to higher office. A 
quick example, while H was utilizing his staff to “aggressively” interact with his partisan 
base as he traveled across the state in anticipation of a Senate run, E had allowed his staff 
to operate in a more routine fashion. Ironically, an unexpected opening for the Senate 
occurred in E’s state and his base was not prepared. He was out-raised and out- 
campaigned by an opponent who beat him even in his own congressional district. H 
probably continues to work his base, five years on, still waiting for his chance to run for 
higher office.
It did not appear that all incumbents and staff behaved as if progressive ambition 
figured largely into their motivations. The best example here was B’s newly elected 
neighbor who had yet to visit a portion of his district The district, as one constituent 
characterized it, was rife with Republican money seeking a “fresh face”. It often 
appeared that incumbents and their staff could be overwhelmed by the demands of the
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early years and were more concerned about simply getting to first base than swinging for 
complete adulation and higher office at their first crack at bat. The behaviors o f the 
newer incumbents suggested that they thought they could move around the bases later in 
their career. The behaviors of the senior routine incumbents who were comfortable in 
their House seats confirmed this metaphor.
Conclusion
This chapter suggests the following piece of advice to incumbents and their district 
enterprise: be aggressive, avoid close elections, don’t be afi-aid to reach out to elites from 
the opposing party, and use the extra time that staff provide by working on legislation and 
seeking position in Congress. This dissertation is about the varying ways in which 
district staff are allocated and utilized and the ways that they affect representation and 
election outcomes. This chapter detailed a specific and very important function of district 
staff: the manner in which they interact with elite constituents. It found that a significant 
part of incumbency advantage can be traced to service to elites, which engenders future 
support and decreased opposition at the polls.
After reviewing the literature on incumbency advantage and the value of constituency 
service, I laid out the case for why incumbents, staff and elite constituents interact on a 
regular basis. Elites are constituents that have greater levels of political interest and 
knowledge and consequently enjoy greater access to the incumbent enterprise. From the 
incumbent perspectives, elite interaction is a cheap and effective way to both represent 
constituent interests and advance their own multiple, and even competing, goals. 
Variations in elite interaction were explained largely as a consequence of the varying 
motivations of each of the three actors in this equation. Specifically, elite interaction was
Redistricting could give him more o f that city? An elite thought about this.
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seen to provide surveillance of the district, the co-optation of elites into the district 
enterprise, a source of campaign resources, and an on-going source of political support 
and surveillance that allows the incumbent to focus on re-election and their other goals.
This chapter showed the important function of staff in their most useful piupose to the 
incumbent enterprise. The final chapter will examine the larger consequences o f the 
activities performed by district staff.
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Chapter Six 
Consequences of District Staff Activity
Conclusions
Congressional district staff members are important assets to members of the U.S. 
House of Representatives. Along with elite constituents they perform important 
functions and provide considerable “leeway” for the incumbents to pursue other 
activities. The functions and relationships of district staff have been previously 
understudied. The evidence offered in this dissertation leaves the discipline with some 
new concepts and variables to ponder, the consequences of which are deserving of 
heightened attention from the discipline and society at large. Most importantly, 
congressional district staff enterprises serve to subvert the free, fair, and competitive 
electoral process designed by the founders.
Why do incumbents employ district staff? Before the roles and functions of district staff 
could be explained it was necessary to first place them in the context of the incumbent. 
Much of the literature's understanding of the behavior and motivations of congressional 
incumbents is centered on the concept of incumbency advantage. Chapter One detailed 
the rise of incumbency advantage from the 1950s and the subsequent explanations 
offered by the literature. The increased utilization of resources by incumbents, district 
staff included, seemed to be tied into a paradoxical trend related to incumbency 
advantage. Despite the fact that incumbents have enjoyed impressive reelection rates in 
the House of Representatives, they continue to have a perception of vulnerability and
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allocate resources that they might use both in Washington and at home in the district.
The literature seems to satisfactorily address incumbent’s perquisites as far as it concerns 
Washington-based staff and the aggregation of resources such as travel, mailings, and the 
amount of casework. Nevertheless, my observations suggested that there were elements 
of the district enterprise that were neglected by the discipline’s treatment o f congressional 
staff. A review of the discipline’s literature on congressional staff revealed a body of 
evidence that was almost exclusively centered on Washington staff and its impact on the 
legislative process. There were virtually no takers to the calls to study the shape and 
contributions of those staff back in the district. Chapter One concluded that this research 
was necessary and would help to further understand incumbency advantage.
Chapter Two turned to the question: why not district staff? The literature has not 
deemed district staff to be a vital element o f the incumbent enterprise. So I took forth to 
study them in depth, while also looking at the types of people they interact with as well as 
the incumbents they serve. Chapter Two laid out the need for a theory-building 
dissertation about district staff that would be based largely on contextual examination.
The dissertation was justified precisely because there was little investigation of the 
district behaviors of incumbents and what existed was largely based on survey results and 
aggregations of staff behaviors. While there are limits to contextual research based on a 
small number of cases. Chapter Two suggests that the benefits of observation far 
outweigh the limitations, especially in the case o f a theory-building dissertation. Neither 
journalists nor political scientists were foimd to provide adequate explanations o f the 
tasks performed by district staff. Chapter Two went on to lay out the methods o f research 
and descriptions of the thirteen case studies included in this dissertation.
4 6 5
Who are district staff? And what do they do? Chapter Three provided both basic 
answers to these questions and also a direction for more comprehensive analysis. It 
found that all offices confront issues of hierarchy amongst the different types of 
individuals employed in the office. Generally speaking there are a number of routine 
behaviors that each district enterprise performs and these tasks help to build a 
"reputation” for some incumbents. It is at that point, however, that the similarities end. 
Some offices were found to have more aggressive orientations where they reached out to 
different sets of constituents in different fashions than their more routine colleagues.
Most importantly, the aggressive staff members performed many political activities that 
seemed to have a larger impact on the constituents and the political campaigns in the 
district. Chapter Three also suggested that the discipline would profit by understanding 
district staff behavior as being partly driven by the staff motivations. In other words, the 
elected officials are not the only "rational” actors in the incumbent enterprise. Staff 
members, like incumbents, were found to have a variety of motivations driving their 
behaviors. These motivations were also reflected in the varying manners in which they 
came to work for the incumbent.
The fact that some offices operated differently than others was the central question of 
Chapter Four. While the case set was too limited in size and diversity to completely 
answer the question o f why offices vary, it did propose a number of variables that seemed 
to impact observed behavior. As part o f a theory-building dissertation, this Chapter 
merely sought to lay out some possible variables worthy o f future research on district 
staff. The observations suggested that the incumbent’s “personality” or philosophy about 
staff were of greater importance in explaining the variation between the offices than were
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more typical factors such as seniority, geography, partisanship or age. The “personality” 
seemed to be a hybrid of the incumbents’ electoral status, philosophy of representation 
and their own personal connection to the district interests. Whether the incumbent was a 
"trustee” or a “delegate” was secondary to the district “personality.” Based on the case 
studies, four different “personalities” were developed that seemed to capture the nature of 
why incumbents allocate their staff in different fashions. Chapter Four, like the 
preceding chapter, suggested that the motivations of the staff themselves also have an 
impact on the overall structure and functions of the district enterprise.
Finally, the dissertation turned to the function that most starkly divided the different 
types of offices: the degree to which they interacted with elite constituents. Previous 
research on incumbent and constituent interaction had focused exclusively on casework 
and had mostly concluded that service was of some electoral value to the incumbent.
This research did not, however, address the value of the more aggressive staff behaviors. 
The fifth, and final question of this dissertation then, was: why elites? The simple answer 
to that question is that incumbent enterprises interact with elite constituents because this 
is a cheap and effective behavior that has multiple rewards. It is cheap and effective 
behavior because elite constituents are well informed, easy to find, enjoy access to 
incumbents and staff, and perhaps most importantly, have resources that the incumbent 
enterprise desires. Elite interaction satisfies not only elite motivations, which are diverse 
in and of themselves, but also the requirements of incumbents and the district staff. In 
sum, incumbent-staff-elite interaction satisfies the motivations of each actor and brings 
rewards to the incumbent enterprise. These rewards vary fi'om personal political goals, to 
desired social contact, to communitarian impulses. The interaction also serves some very
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specific political purposes. The interaction provides surveillance on the nature o f the 
district. It brings an important “slice” of constituents closer to the incumbent, making 
them feel like part of the team. Staff members were observed to co-opt this “slice” of 
elites into the inciunbent enterprise in a variety of fashions, from one-on-one interactions 
to formal incorporations of the constituents into the district office. Once part o f the team, 
those elites were more prone to offer resources that facilitate the re-election of the 
incumbent. Finally, the continiting support of the elite constituents (providing 
information, campaign resources and other modes of assistance to the enterprise) allows 
the incumbent to reallocate his or her personal time and staff resources to other goals, 
usually more Washingtonian in nature. Staff interaction with home elites is even 
beneficial to candidates with progressive ambition because of the scarce nature o f the 
incumbents' time and their need for greater campaign and political resources. Chapter 
Five argues that a significant part of incumbency advantage can be traced to service to 
elites, which engenders future support and decreased opposition at the polls.
Consequences
The consequences of this research have an impact on numerous levels. First, the 
findings suggest to incumbents and staff that there are varying ways in which they can 
perform what many of them seemed to think was one universal way of carrying out 
district tasks. Second, staff functions, most notably elite constituent interaction, have 
consequences for the nature o f representation and the outcomes of congressional 
elections. Much congressional research fails to examine the normative implications of 
incumbency advantage. Because of this impact, I will suggest the possibility of 
perquisite reform. Finally, the nature of the district enterprise and the role of district staff
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have an impact on how the discipline should look at a number o f district political 
behaviors such as incumbency advantage and the incumbent enterprise. These are 
significant issues especially given how frequently absent the incumbent is from the 
district. All o f these levels would benefit from a deeper understanding of the wider 
incumbent ‘‘enterprise” and the impact it has on the American political system.
For Staff and Incumbents themselves
The allocation and utilization of district staff have important consequences for 
individual legislators and staff. Observations showed that district staff were utilized in 
varying numbers and at different levels of aggressiveness by incumbents. The more 
aggressive incumbents and staff perceived their behaviors to have a definite electoral 
value. As such they devoted greater time and resources to their interactions with the elite 
constituents that could most assist the incumbent enterprise.
A thorough description o f the potential uses o f district staff from Chapters Three 
through Five might cause some incumbents and staff to rethink their district operations. 
Some of these thoughts would reflect the hierarchy of their offices: How is the hierarchy 
of their office structured? Is their most significant adviser at home or in Washington? 
Other questions would center on the political and campaign needs o f the incumbent: Is 
their staff structure at all determined by constituent opinion? Do they want their district 
staff to be more or less “aggressive? Are there certain types of outreach functions that 
might be more successful at reaching constituents than what they are currently utilizing? 
Do they want to establish a larger enterprise that helps them to fulfill their multiple 
goals? Can an expanded enterprise save the incumbent trips home? Do they find their 
enterprises to be effective? And finally, they might think about what constituents they
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grant the most access to: Do they make a distinction between average and elite 
constituents? Do the staff and incumbent interact with constituents in extracurricular 
settings? Is one behavior more appropriate than the other? Is it appropriate for staff to 
act on behalf of the incumbent? Does being a campaign supporter or donor grant one 
special access? Does interacting with these individuals help at election time? There are 
many more questions that might be posed, but one can see that the subject matter of this 
dissertation might give incumbents and staff pause to reconsider their purpose and 
functions.
One of the main implications this research might have for incumbents is how to deal 
with the tradeoff of time and staff resources. Many of the previous questions center 
around the issue of whether the incumbent wants to spend relatively scarce resources in 
the district or in Washington. So the first clear temporal tradeoff is between pursuing 
divergent goals. The literature largely suggests that incumbents tend to sacrifice district 
resources as the electoral pressures become less threatening and they seek to utilize more 
resources for their Washington goals, spending less time being attentive to district 
interests.' The questions above (and the answers provided in Chapter Five) suggest that 
many of these questions are not mutually exclusive. Utilizing valuable staff and 
resources in the district can assist the incumbent with the policy and the institutional 
goals in ways the literature had not previously discussed. Yet, I would admit that 
reallocating more staff to the district would result in a net loss to the incumbent’s ability 
to pursue their other goals. Instead, the argument might be made that incumbents should
‘ See especially Bom (1982). This is not to suggest that incumbents do not protect district interests in 
other fashions, perhaps through committee membership or funding that ‘‘represents” the district. 
Alternatively, Parker (1989, p i07) and others refute the “decline” theory and suggest that most incumbents 
retain a constant “home style” for the entirety of their careers.
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be less hasty in reallocating staff to Washington as they acquire seniority. Incumbents 
might be best advised to keep one or two empowered surrogates in the district who can 
act to represent the incumbent with important political constituencies and who can play 
important roles in the incumbent’s campaign. Keeping these resources in the district will 
keep elite constituents content and allow the incumbent to focus on the Washington 
goals.
The other tradeoff concerns how incumbents would like their district staff to spend 
their time. Because there are relatively few district staff and because each office 
represents roughly half a million people, there are definite constraints on their time. Most 
staff offered that the longer the incumbent and staff are in office, the more invitations, 
drop-by visits, letters, phone calls and emails come into the office. If the district 
enterprise is going to remain aggressive it will probably have to sacrifice the extent to 
which it can deal with many of the routine functions, especially given that the very nature 
of aggressive interaction generates more routine work for the staff. Part-time employees, 
interns and caseworkers can only perform so much of this workload. So incumbents and 
their ranking district staff members (RDSM) have important decisions to make about how 
they will allocate their resources and whether they will “aggressively” engage the district. 
These kinds of decisions will most heavily impact the remote district offices where one 
staff member represents a portion of the district and must conduct the aggressive and 
routine tasks for that area. For example, individuals who were overwhelmed with routine 
tasks staffed three of the four remote offices in B’s district. Any attempt at aggressive 
behaviors would have severely cut into their casework responsibilities. District
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enterprises that are more geographically concentrated and have only one office can much 
more easily make these allocation decisions.
A third tradeoff is reflected in the types o f people that incumbents might hire for the 
district office. Incumbent C’s staff introduced the possibility of hiring other ‘‘fresh” or 
"campaign” faces for the district staff. The “fresh faces” are more like the 
"professionals” from Chapter Three; they are not tainted by partisan or campaign 
experience and tend to be hired because of their contacts, abilities and experiences 
outside the realm of the permanent campaign. The tradeoff is that while the “fresh face” 
might have more clear motives, maturity, and patience, they tend to have more limited 
electoral connections and value. The “campaign face” is the opposite side o f the coin; 
they seemed to be younger, more willing to perform extracurricular activities and 
continued to be involved in the incumbent’s campaign activities. Their motivations were, 
problematically, more self-serving and many expressed a desire to ‘make a difference’ or 
move to Washington. One of B’s staff members was “in a hurry” to get on with her 
political career and demonstrated little or no patience or interest for the district but was 
energetic in her routines. Not surprisingly, she was a “campaign” face who had just 
recently graduated from college. Perhaps the tradeoff was best seen in the two US 
Senators from C’s state. According to constituents and C’s staff, the senior senator 
preferred to hire staff that were older, more experienced and tied to their communities, 
even if it meant that they might cost the office budget a bit more and their energy levels 
would not be as high." The junior senator’s staff were almost universally younger, more 
aggressive and from his campaign. The style of person in these offices definitely
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impacted the style o f representation the offices carried out and was confirmed by 
virtually every elite encountered. It was generally not a problem identifying staff 
members who preferred the aggressive tasks to the routine fimctions. Rather, to fulfill the 
advice from above about keeping qualified surrogates in the district, the incumbent would 
be best served with a hybrid of the “fresh” and the “campaign” faces; someone who has 
the interest and the energy levels to be active in the extracurricular affairs of the district 
but at the same time is content to focus on the district and not wander to other political 
arenas.
From a different perspective, it might also be suggested that staff already do too 
much and incumbents should restrain their reliance on surrogates. This normative focus 
finds its roots in questions about the impact and appropriateness of Washington staff 
raised by Rosenthal (1971, 1973) and Malbin (1980). Malbin’s work suggested that 
Washington staff have too much authority to initiate legislation, negotiate policy 
compromises and that they cause incumbents to be distant from each other, insulating 
them in their own large enterprises. Rosenthal demonstrated that legislative staff gave 
incumbents “alternative” sources of information and similarly impacted the distribution 
of power within the legislature. The observations of this dissertation suggest that the 
same argument might be made relevant to district staff; that the incumbent who has an 
effective district enterprise and does not return home regularly might insulate themselves 
from district interests. Whether or not their reliance on district staff representing their 
political interests causes them political vulnerability was an issue discussed in Chapter 
Five. The issue here is whether it is appropriate for incumbents to rely upon district staff
'  This difference is also partly explained by the fact that the senior senator is a senior member o f  the 
majority party and has supplemental committee staff that the junior incumbent does not enjoy.
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to represent them. My inclination is that district staff provides a different kind of 
representational dilemma than do Washington staff. In Washington, the enterprise is 
confronted by a multitude of competing interests, some from the district, others from 
outside the district. Choosing to represent some interests outside the district might even 
negatively impact district interests. The district staff members, on the other hand, almost 
exclusively interact with constituents and interests from their home districts. Therefore, 
their interactions are driven by the desire to find out important district interests and 
represent them to the incumbent. This is not to suggest that the activities of home staff 
do not raise representational questions. The issue of elites, access, and competing district 
interests will be discussed below.
This research also suggests to incumbents and staff that the staff members 
themselves are potential beneficiaries of the service that they perform on behalf of the 
absent incumbent. While not all staff harbor ambitions to run for higher office, elite 
interaction minimally helps them to interact with larger numbers of constituents in a 
shorter period of time than by relying on simple case-by-case interaction with average 
constituents. Perhaps it is the case that significant numbers of aggressive district staff 
will seek political careers as a result of their employment. Numerous staff suggested an 
interest in future runs for elective office. Most likely, their activities have an impact on 
the candidate pool and the ability of quality challengers to get elected.
Finally, this research demonstrates to staff and incumbents the potential electoral 
value of their behavior. Interactions with elite constituents, elected officials and potential 
campaign supporters have a demonstrable impact on the outcomes of elections whether 
they were simply passing along information or were “aggressively” supporting the
Consequently, it was less of a tradeoff for the senior senator to spend extra resources at home.
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campaign enterprise. Observations suggested that some staff were more aware of the 
electoral connection than were other staff, the literature and the average voter. With the 
increasingly personalized nature of congressional campaigns, and the individual 
enterprises that go with them, it is unlikely that incumbents will cease using their staff to 
perform political tasks that ultimately help them at election time. In fact, I speculate that 
the future trend will be towards more aggressive district functions.
For Congress and our political system
A mixed bag
Based on analysis of staff characteristics, Hammond (1984) suggested that future 
research should study the consequences of varying distributions and goals of staff on the 
wider political system beyond the legislature. Following Hammond’s advice, I was able 
to identify a number of areas in the wider political arena that are impacted by district 
staff. The justification often used by members o f Congress in expanding their perquisites 
is the increased level of representation that such resources provide. The increased 
numbers of staff in the district offices certainly enhance representation in many ways. 
Yet, district staff members in some settings also serve to bias representation in favor o f a 
select group of elite constituents at the expense o f the rest of the constituency and the 
nation at large. The more aggressive offices tended to spend significant portions of time 
and resources interacting with elite constituents.
Representation and campaigns seemed to be intimately related in the area of 
congressional district staff. Here, the aggressive district enterprise detracts from the free, 
fair, and competitive election process through their interaction with district elites, 
aggressive staff courted a specific group of constituents (elites) with the hope that they
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would become supporters of the incumbent, or at least less active supporters o f the 
opponent. Their gratitude for being served might cause them to be co-opted by the 
enterprise, bringing the elite constituents into an on-going relationship with the district 
staff. Because of their contribution to the maintenance of incumbents in office, district 
staff members also have an impact on political parties, interest groups and the overall 
spending of the federal government.
Staff varv bv number, bv mission, bv aggressiveness
As Chapters Three through Five demonstrated, district enterprises vary in their levels 
of staffing and the aggressiveness of their mission. My observations suggested that 
different “personality” types influenced the focus of the different offices. The personal 
and the policy offices were relatively less aggressive about pursuing elite constituents 
than were the electoral and partisan enterprises. Where the personal office seemed to 
drift between elite and average constituents depending on the incumbent’s interests and 
time, the policy inciunbents more aggressively targeted certain types o f constituents or 
issues, regardless of their standing. For example, a number of Incumbent C’s staff 
worked intensively on commimity housing issues because the incumbent stressed the 
issue, an issue that affected both elite and poorer constituents. The electoral and the 
partisan enterprises were generally more active in their interaction with elite constituents, 
albeit with different types of elites. The partisan office was often focused on maintaining 
existing relationships with elite supporters who were long part of the incumbent’s base, 
while the electoral enterprise sought to interact with and co-opt new faces. As one o f A’s 
constituents noted, the electoral enterprise appears to be more highly motivated by issues 
of “image” and popularity than are the other offices. Along similar lines, a constituent
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from C’s district suggested that some officials were “finishers” while others seemed more 
content to simply be “door-openers” for the constituents. The implication in both cases is 
that representation by the electoral incumbents is much more superficial than it is from 
the other incumbents. At any rate, representation is definitely affected by the 
“personality” of the incumbent enterprise.
Things staff do that enhance representation 
The routine
Many district staff were observed conducting activities that enhance representation. 
Given the long-standing argument by incumbents that they need many staff to help them 
serve the needs of their constituents, it is not surprising to find the district staff engaged 
in these activities. Staff members keep the incumbents apprised of the issues and the 
personalities in the district. They serve as a contact for constituents and provide them 
with information through letters, phone calls and forums for those with particular 
problems. Also in every office 1 wimessed some staff members who were responsible for 
the representation o f general district interests. They covered meetings that the absent 
incumbent simply did not have time to attend. In every office I observed that at least 
some staff were responsible for mediating constituent’s casework concerns with local, 
state and federal government agencies. In fact, incumbents and staff would probably 
argue that this is their most substantial enhancement to the representative process. They 
would argue that they give the access and responsiveness to individual constituents that 
anonymous ombudsmen and bureaucrats do not. In a word, they suggest that they ‘care’ 
more about their individual constituents. This was the central argument driving most of 
the increases in perquisites available to incumbents over the past four decades; because of
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the increasing complexity of government it was important for individual legislators to be 
able to appropriately provide representation for their constituents. Whether the concern 
is about the constituent’s issues or currying electoral favor is a moot point, in either case 
the staff members are motivated to serve. In fact, one might make the argument that 
district staff members help to equalize some of the inadequacies of representation in 
American politics. Staff members were observed interacting with or on behalf of lower 
income constituency groups on issues like health care, low-income housing, and impact 
aid for poor school districts.
Whether the staff members are conducting a typical casework request or interacting 
with an elite constituent they are assisting with oversight of local, state and federal 
bureaucracies. Regardless of the socioeconomic status of the constituent, the interaction 
allows the district staff to demonstrate to the incumbent the impact of legislation and 
executive decisions. Johannes (1979) and Macartney (1982) both found that casework 
was an effective means of oversight as staff members see the impact of laws and 
regulations firsthand. Elite interaction can take that oversight even further than the 
typical complaint emanating from casework. Here, the district staff will interact with 
elite constituents and obtain better, more timely feedback than waiting for the average 
constituent to be negatively affected and write or call the district office. For example, I 
observed this type of interaction between staff and a tax attorney in one case and with a 
local economic development specialist in another case. Furthermore, the elite constituent 
will likely have already done some o f the legwork or will be able to more accurately 
specify the problem and a potential remedy, while the average constituent merely 
supplies symptoms that require fixing. The average constituent is much less likely to
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know about the district staff or know where to contact them. In this sense, proactive 
oversight with elites might help to represent the concerns of the average constituents 
before they become problems. Finally, district staff members not only give effective 
representation to all the district’s constituents, but because they tie together local, state 
and federal policies, they also provide a healthy support mechanism for the maintenance 
of federalism.^
And the aggressive
Some of the more aggressive staff behaviors also serve to enhance representation for 
district constituents. While it was established that all offices listen to their constituents to 
some extent, my observations portrayed some offices as being much more effective 
"listeners.” In other words, because they went to more meetings, sought out more 
constituents with drop-by visits, and had more interactive settings with community 
groups and elite constituents in the district, the aggressive staff had a better understanding 
of district issues and were more active in facilitating private and public assistance to 
those needs. In fact, the aggressive staff enterprises were more likely to “listen” and 
assist with cross-jurisdictional issues where there was little that they could do beyond 
adding their voice to those of the community. In these cases and others, the aggressive 
enterprise could often act as a central organizing point for a community. Along those 
lines, surrogates and extended enterprises were much more commonly used by the 
aggressive incumbents than by the more routine. The aggressive offices were also more 
likely to be staffed by individuals who belonged to community groups in their spare time, 
or by individuals who were much more proactive in communicating with community 
leaders. Finally, some incumbents, especially conservative Republicans, made the case
See especially Burkinan, 1993.
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that allocating staff resources to the home district was consistent with their ideology to 
bring government closer to the people. Others might suggest an electoral motive as well!
The average congressional district today contains well over a half million 
constituents. Even the most homogenous states and districts are home to a myriad of 
individuals, groups and concerns that even the most proactive incumbent cannot hope to 
effectively contact and represent. In this sense, the presence of a handful of district staff 
members assists the incumbent in reaching out to the multiple ‘"arenas” of district elites, 
interests and issues. An aggressive district staff enhances representation by reaching out 
and connecting the incumbent to these varying concerns.
It might even be argued that the campaigns of incumbents enhance the representation 
that they provide. Based on the issues collected by their travel, their staffs interactions 
with constituents, and with polling data, the incumbent’s campaigns usually seek to 
reflect major constituent interests. In short, the work of all the incumbent’s enterprise 
seeks to find and highlight areas of agreement between the incumbent and the 
constituents.
Each of the functions above suggests that district staff members are effective tools of 
pluralist representation. Staff members toil in obscurity and anonymity to help different 
interests throughout the district. At a minimum, one might find evidence of Dahl’s 
polyarchy of competing group interests, where staff members interact and serve the 
multiple "arenas” of elite-led interests.
The reality of my observations underlined a more mixed conclusion. While the 
presence of district staff members enhance representation in some manner, they also 
serve to undermine or bias it as well. Several examples show that it can be difficult to
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assess which constituents are actually benefiting from staff behavior. Clausen (1973) 
suggests that much of the incumbents’ representational behavior is “invoiimtary” in 
nature and stems from their personal attitudes and cognitions as much as it is a deliberate 
political activity. The same might be said about district staff. For some, elite interaction 
is a "cheap and effective” means of representing all district interests. For others, elite 
interaction is motivated by a desire to promote the incumbent enterprise or maybe their 
own political career. When district staff members assist a local government or business 
with the recruitment of a new industry or the provision of a subsidy (as was the case with 
E's economic development staff member) the impact is probably more diffuse. While the 
elite community leaders improve their political and economic positions, one might also 
make the argument that the average members of the community will experience a “trickle 
down” benefit of jobs and growth. From this point of view elite representation is simply 
a quicker way o f representing mass interests and it really does not matter which 
constituents directly contact the district staff as the ultimate beneficiaries are the entire 
community. Another mixed example would be the consequences of district staff as 
community leaders. Surely it can be argued that staff who are active in the economic and 
social groups provide the entire community with a positive link to the federal government 
and any assistance it can provide. Again, the staff presence helps to make jobs “trickle 
down”, and the funding for a road or dilapidated school improves the entire community. 
Yet. when staff attend Rotary meetings or drop by a banker’s office they just as 
frequently were discussing issues of personal political or economic interests as they were 
focusing on the entire community. In some cases staff even admitted that they were 
performing the interaction for their own benefit.
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Aggressive service often biases representation 
Things that staff do that bias representation
“Who gets what takes place far from Washington and differs from what is in our civics 
books” (Macartney, 1982 p80).
Despite their shared service to low-income constituents and federalism, I did observe 
variation amongst the different offices’ commitment to serving the entire district equally. 
In some offices elite constituents received relatively more attention than in others. One 
of H's district staff said bluntly, “you will treat those you know and recognize much 
better” than those you do not know. As was mentioned in an earlier chapter, 8 of 10 
constituents know that incumbents can help them but only 1 o f 2 will likely call or write 
the office. Because elite constituents know where to find staff and appreciate the service, 
access and political information that they provide, they are more likely to be the 1 or 2 
constituents. Some district enterprises focused more of their time and energies on 
continuing to assist these 1 or 2 constituents at the expense of finding more general 
problems throughout the district that would benefit the other 8 or 9 constituents. Given 
the discussion above about the tradeoffs that staff experience in performing their jobs, the 
issue of how much they interact with certain constituents gains relevance. My 
observations suggest that some aggressive staff focus considerable time and resources on 
representation of relatively small portions o f their district. Consequently, one of the 
major consequences of the district staff perquisite is that it serves to bias representation in 
favor of some constituents at the expense of other. As I will also note below, this service 
also has an impact on the entire size and nature of the federal government.
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In addition to the mixed evidence cited just above, other observations more clearly 
portrayed district staff acting directly on behalf o f elite concerns. With numerous cases 
of cross-jurisdictional issues, requests for bureaucratic relief or government assistance, 
district staff admitted that they were assisting the direct personal interests of elite 
constituents. Elite service is fed by two complementary impulses. First, district staff 
seek out a smaller “slice” o f elites from the multiple “arenas” in the district simply 
because they do not have time to inquire as to the economic needs of every constituent. 
Second, because elites are more knowledgeable about the process, attend similar social 
events, and are more comfortable approaching and dealing with district staff, they are 
much more likely to find themselves in contact with district staff than are more ‘average’ 
constituents. Consequently, district staff often see the district through they eyes of their 
elite contacts. My observations of these interactions suggested that the elite constituents 
were making requests that would benefit their personal financial settings at least as 
frequently as they were interacting on behalf of broader community interests. This is not 
to say that this style of representation is wrong or unethical. Rather, it does suggest that 
much of the representation conducted by district staff is biased to a certain segment of 
constituents at the expense of the broad majority. Some elite constituents were aware of 
this disparity and enjoyed the access granted to them. One elite, clearly a member of A’s 
extended enterprise, suggested that his input to A was worth “ten tallies” from average 
constituents. 1 did not generally observe staff interacting with constituents in a manner 
reflective of Dahl’s polyarchy. Rather, each incumbent enterprise appeared to have a 
distinct electoral base and set of political fiiends and allies with some smaller group of 
interests and personalities that they were reaching out to co-opt. Perhaps it is the case, as
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Parker suggests (1992, p. 105), that the American people can find some virtual
representation of their interests among the ranks of the other 434 legislators if they do not
find dyadic similarity with their own incumbent. This style of representation is
troublesome, again considering the fact that elite constituents have the knowledge and
resources to seek out representation. The average constituent has neither the time nor the
resources to contact incumbents from other districts who might share their economic,
social or ideological point-of-view. Elite constituents appear to receive better
representation all the way around. A recent editorial sums it up accurately:
But the poor do not have any money to throw at Congress and poverty is 
not a matter of great concern to the donor class. So it’s not at all 
surprising that this Congress would be voting to kill home heating 
subsidies for the poor, and summer jobs and other programs for 
disadvantaged youngsters (Herbert, 1998).
Furthermore, there were numerous examples of staff interaction that were more 
clearly aimed at specific material or social benefit for the elite constituents, with no 
diffuse benefits to “trickle down” to the masses. For example, elite constituents appeared 
to be more likely to receive intervention from district staff to assist with bureaucratic 
regulations. In some cases this intervention freed up programs or funding that did indeed 
probably create more jobs. In other cases with the RTC or 1RS, the intervention 
benefited a much smaller class of people. My observations suggested that average 
constituents were much less likely to approach staff with the requests for help about their 
own or their business's financial health. As Macarmey (1982) identified with constituent 
casework, there is a cost to such service. There is a zero sum cost to staff time and
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resources where service to some constituents “comes at the expense of others.”  ^
Macartney suggested that interactions for constituents have four possible results, ranging 
from no impact, to an expedited assistance for a constituent, to assistance that they would 
not have gotten without staff assistance, and ultimately to service that they should not 
have gotten (favoritism). My observations o f elite assistance confirm his general finding 
that staff assistance usually helps to expedite inquiries more quickly (the second 
possibility). As opposed to Macartney, I also suggest that staff regularly assist elites with 
programs that average constituents are not aware that exist. I would specify that the 
“others” are frequently elite constituents who “get more of what there is to get and get it 
sooner.”
The elite relationships that inciunbents have in Washington with individuals from the 
telecommunications, banking or cable industries have all resulted in “reform” efforts in 
recent years that were heralded to benefit consumer interests. In each case, the 
beneficiaries were ultimately the industries themselves. My observations suggest that the 
same interactions take place between elites and district staff but with the same basic 
impact.^ A banker from B’s district suggested that he interacted with staff members so 
that they might be “helpful” to the entire community. It is doubtful that his lobbying
* Interventions on behalf o f specific constituents have zero sum costs. Perhaps the best example of the 
tradeoff was the small business owner who asked C to request that the DOT perform a costly study before 
they built a new bridge which would cost $123,000 and take 1 K years to complete). The city engineer 
suggested “it was completely unnecessary but C did what any member o f congress would do.” The zero 
sum is notable here because it was requested by an elite constituent. I speculate that elite constituents know 
how to ask the staff for assistance and can make their cases more effectively as compared to a regular 
constituent whose house or small business would have been moved without the intervention o f incumbent.
 ^Furthermore, because of the ability of elite constituents to evade campaign contribution limitations 
through donations of soft money resources that ‘indirectly’ benefit the incumbent’s campaign, the 
opportunity for access and quid pro quo relationships has expanded considerably in the past ten years. In 
simple dollar terms, it is much more worthwhile to sit down with an elite constituent when they are not 
limited to a $4,000 per couple per election contribution. One would have to be naive not to imagine that 
elite constituents who donate thousands o f ‘soft’ dollars to the incumbent’s parties do not want to talk about
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efforts have a diffuse impact that is as beneficial to the entire community as it is to his 
bank’s shareholders. In another case a prominent attorney and banker (who were usually 
Democratic donors but subsequently appeared on A’s contributor list) had an hour-long 
meeting at an exclusive social club with A to discuss several legislative issues that would 
affect the home state. In still another case a journalist from B’s district detailed the 
efforts of sophisticated elites to make alliances across race, party and interest group lines. 
In a quest for local power, some elites were willing to sell out broader community 
interests. The incumbents and staff can figure into this equation with their involvement 
in these local alliances. This is especially the case for incumbents who actively 
encourage the civic and political involvement of their staff. In all three cases above I 
would suggest that average constituents did not have the opportunity to discuss their 
political and economic interests with the incumbent and it is doubtful that the elites take 
it upon themselves to be “helpful” to the entire community.
Staff and incumbents are active in elite social circles
As Bullock and Brady (1983) found that senators largely share the policy positions 
of the reelection constituency and not the geographic constituency, I would assert that 
incumbents and staff pursue the service interests of the “slice” of constituents with which 
they most frequently interact. Some will justify an elite focus as a “cheap and effective” 
means of representing the entire constituency. I would simply echo Bullock and Brady 
(1983) in that the distant and imtouched constituencies are less relevant to the incumbent 
enterprise. The proximity of district elites to the incumbent enterprise not only serves to
their legislative priorities with staff and incumbents. In this sense, the district enterprise is an element of 
campaign finance reform that has previously been overlooked.
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bias representation, it also has a negative impact on the competitiveness of congressional 
elections.
The campaign activities detract from free, fair and competitive elections 
Free, fair and competitive elections?
Madison’s designed a U.S. House of Representatives that was to reflect immediate 
shifts in public opinion because its composition was determined by frequent, free and 
competitive elections.'’ For the first century and a half, this vision largely applied and 
congressional careers remained short. Tenure in office and incumbency advantage have 
changed quite dramatically in the past half century. Perquisite use by incumbents is 
certainly a factor in these developments. In that sense, congressional district staff 
members detract from the free, fair and competitive electoral system designed by the 
founders. As if incumbents were not already ensconced in their seats, this dissertation 
outlines yet another factor that assists them in maintaining their positions. Jacobson and 
Kemell (1983) identified that the outcomes of congressional elections are influenced by a 
number of strategic actors: incumbents, challengers, and the political parties themselves. 
This dissertation suggests that district staff and elite constituents be added to the list of 
strategic actors that set the stage for the outcomes of congressional elections.
Federal staff are “not allowed” to impact elections.
“It is clear from the record that Congress has recognized the basic principle that 
government funds should not be spend to help incumbents gain reelection.”’
* See especially Federalist Papers 52 and 53.
 ^Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 P. Supp. 672, (D.D.C. 1982), afFd, 461 U.S. 911 (1983).
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This U.S. District Court ruling emphasized existing federal statutes prohibiting 
certain types o f electoral involvement by Congressional staff. As was noted in Chapter 
Five, while the Hatch Act does not apply to Congressional employees, there are 
nevertheless some restrictions on staff involvement in their employer’s campaigns. Most 
specifically they are prohibited from using federal government resources or working on 
the campaign while they are on the federal clock. There are also strict procedures 
governing leaves of absence and part-time employment to ensure that the federal and 
campaign settings are kept distinct. In the words of a House ethics attorney, staff 
members are advised that dual roles are proper “as long as the two are kept apart” 
(Morgan, 1997). It is a mistake to think that Congressional staff only impact election 
outcomes with their involvement in campaigns. As Chapter Five laid out, district staff 
(and government funds) most likely have a more substantial impact on election outcomes 
through their ‘federal’ work over the eighteen months before the campaign season truly 
begins.
The “Gray” area -  the real “permanent campaign”
The District Court ruling just mentioned seems comically out o f touch with the 
findings of this dissertation. While arguments were made above for the legitimate 
representational value of both the routine and the aggressive staff functions, some 
incumbent enterprises clearly utilize government resources to prepare for re-election. It 
is often hard to distinguish between the ‘federal’ and ‘campaign’ impact of many o f these 
activities. For example, some staff and constituents talked about efforts to build a 
“reputation” for the incumbent for the first eighteen months of the two-year term. To 
build the “reputation”, the staff will listen to constituent concerns and seek to address the
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issues at hand. Some staff will also “listen” much more intently and proactively seek to 
address these types of issues before they become problematic. Finally, staff will “talk” to 
constituents in drop-by visits, community meetings, or through the local media. They 
will “talk” about the success of the incumbent in representing district interests. While 
journalists and the literature talk about the “permanent” fund-raising campaigns of 
incumbents, it is an oversight to not also consider the “reputation”-building activities of 
district staff as part of the “permanent campaign.” This is clearly a resource that 
challengers do not enjoy.
Elite interaction
The activities of district staff provide an advantage that challengers have little chance 
of counteracting; an advantage that begins operation two years before the election 
actually takes place. The main advantage of this work is the interaction that the district 
enterprise has with elite constituents over that two-year period. The aggressive district 
enterprise will surveil the district for issues, personalities and groups that potentially 
would have political interests or concerns. The aggressive enterprise will then usually 
seek to interact with and co-opt any such person or group.
Elite constituents generally provide the mechanisms to identify, recruit and finance 
candidates for elective office. This small group of constituents has a disproportionate 
influence over the campaign contributions, news coverage, and organizational 
endorsements in a congressional district. While there are plenty of elite constituents with 
resources who are not touched by the incumbent enterprise or are not active in their 
communities, those who are active are often linked to the incumbents, and they are the 
constituents who are often most likely to ‘play’ in political campaigns. In short, the
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incumbent enterprise has the motive and the opportunity to solicit these constituents long 
before a potential opponent can hope to mount a challenge. Given the influence of this 
select group of constituents, aggressive political activity by district staff makes the slim 
chances of electoral success even more remote for the average challenger. Consequently, 
many decide never to run in the first place. Chapter Five maintained that elite interaction 
by aggressive district enterprises co-opts elites and their resources and ultimately deters 
challengers and results in high rates of re-election for incumbents. Staff and incumbents 
serve elite constituents from all parts of their districts; their electoral base, “slices” of 
independents, and possibly even some elites from interest groups or communities who are 
ordinarily opposed to the incumbent's party. An aggressive district staff can further 
solidify the incumbent’s position by working to make elites content and not interested in 
recruiting or financing a challenger. The “tmseen” candidates and resources remain 
hidden in part because of the efforts of district staff.
Even if a quality challenger emerges and finds resources for his or her campaign, 
they must still confront an incumbent enterprise that has spent the previous two years 
serving constituents and advertising its connections with district interests. The 
advertising that will come from the incumbent enterprise over this two-year period often 
serves to district voters from potentially significant topics that could become campaign 
issues. Rather, the incumbent enterprise will seek to remind the constituents o f the active 
service provided by the incumbent and his or her staff over the previous term. They also 
might highlight clear areas of agreement with constituents (e.g., the importance of
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protecting Social Security). Most importantly, this advertising is a taxpayer-financed 
perquisite not enjoyed by challengers.*
It usually does not get this far, however, as most incumbents do not confront quality 
challengers. Fowler (1995) concluded that the lack of quality challengers in 
congressional elections poses a threat to the health of American democracy. The most 
recent elections provide some numbers to consider. The victors in the 2000 
congressional campaigns outspent the challengers in over 400 races. Incumbents 
accounted for nearly 400 of those cases. This dissertation maintains that it is not so 
much the fact that the victors outspent the challengers as it the case that most of the 
challengers ran anemic and under-funded campaigns with no chance of winning. Elite 
constituents in the vast majority of districts did not appear interested in recruiting and 
financing challengers to current incumbents. In the months prior to the election, the 
pundits announced that there were only about thirty truly contested congressional races in 
the entire nation. Clearly, the health of American democracy suffers when only seven or 
eight percent of congressional elections are truly competitive. It can be argued that low 
turnover increases legislative oversight o f the executive and retains more specialized 
knowledge within the legislature. Yet, in the current electoral setting of rough partisan 
parity, low turnover will continue to drive legislative gridlock and the propensity o f each 
party to blame the other for the lack of policy accomplishments.^ With such electoral 
parity, oversight is almost a given and because the legislative pace is so slow there is
’ I do accept that there are strict rules governing the disbursement o f campaign mailings in the weeks 
leading up to an election. 1 would also accept that the amount o f mail disbursed by incumbents has 
declined over the past decade. Yet, I would also point out that district staff themselves serve as advertising 
tools throughout the two-year term, speaking to groups, writing letters and dropping-by to visit elite 
constituents.
’’ See Jones (1994) for the counter argument; that the contemporary divided govenunent is as electorally 
productive as previous areas o f unified party control.
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more than adequate time for voices outside of the institution to weigh in on legislative 
decision-making. With gridlock, incumbents can return home to their constituents and 
make the case that they continue to work hard for district interests.
Elites promote longevity of inciunbents
Chapter Five recognized that elites value the stability and power of a long-serving 
incumbent. Their relationships with incumbents and staff seemed to frequently be built 
on years of interaction, and some even spoke of their relationship as an investment 
worthy of protection. Many constituents suggested openly that they supported 
incumbents despite personal or ideological disagreements. The incumbent enterprise is a 
useful tool to promote the personal and community interests o f elite constituents. 
Furthermore, elite constituents would seem to have little interest in abandoning senior 
incumbents given the competitive electoral situation nationwide. This attitude is 
confirmed by the small number of quality challengers financed by elites in the 2000 
elections. Here again lies the deleterious impact of congressional district staff. Their 
longstanding relationships with elite constituents and the 'investment’ that elite 
constituents perceive lead to limited electoral choice and accoimtability for the majority 
of constituents in a congressional district.
All gray is not gray: Quid pro quo
Given that staff members play a role in subverting the competitive election process, 
it is also logical to connect their influence right back to the act o f representation 
discussed earlier in this chapter. The uneasiness of elite constituent access was 
confirmed by C’s RDSM after he returned to the federal office from running C’s 
reelection campaign. Because federal “designees” are allowed to be actively involved in
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all facets of campaigns, some district staff members never truly leave the campaign world 
and operate in a murky gray mixture of both settings. For example, A and D’s RDSMs 
were continuously involved in the political and campaign matters of their employers. 
Conversely, C’s RDSM was surprised to note that when he returned to the federal staff 
his conversations with people from the “other side” were more “openly about politics.”
He had entered the murky gray area where “designees” will talk to constituents about 
legislative issues and then cross the hall and talk to them on a different phone about 
financial support of the campaign. Incumbents who operate in this gray area will employ 
a "blurred line” between the two worlds. In the words of former Democratic senator Sam 
Nunn, "you always want someone in (the top job) who is in close touch with your 
constituents” (Morgan. 1997). In both campaign and research settings I have observed 
staff lurking in the gray area that exists between the clearly demarcated federal and 
campaign worlds. The aggressive enterprises seemed to operate quite comfortably in a 
system with such permeable barriers.
Ultimately, I would suggest that some elite interaction is based on quid pro quo 
relationships. Whether aggressive interaction with elite constituents is truly 
representative behavior is in the eye of the beholder. However, interaction based on quid 
pro quos is truly not defensible. I did not observe any staff engaged in quid pro quo 
exchanges given their illegal, or minimally unethical nature. Secondary depictions and 
my personal campaign observations suggest that such exchanges do take place. By their 
own admission, one of the military communities firom A’s district and several bankers 
and attorneys from other districts clearly established that their relationships with 
incumbents were based on their need for help in exchange for the campaign support that
4 9 3
they offered. While the military community might make the “trickle down" defense for a 
quid pro quo relationship, the other examples much more clearly benefited a small group 
of elites at the expense of the wider community. One Republican staffer suggested 
"being on Ways and Means, there may be some cross-pollination but every effort is made 
to never have any quid pro quo" (Jones, 2000). A top Democratic staff admitted that the 
practice of fund-raising by legislative staff has been “going on forever, but it’s much 
more prevalent now." These journalistic accounts of staff activities (and “cross­
pollination”) suggest that one would be naïve to believe that quid pro quo relationships 
do not occasionally take place between incumbents, staff and elite constituents.
Staff themselves detract
It is not only the aggressive political behaviors of staff that serve to exacerbate the 
problems of uncompetitive elections. It seems that staff themselves are becoming more 
directly part of the equation and are detracting from free and competitive elections 
because they themselves become candidates. Some district staff are active in the same 
social and political circles as incumbents and elite constituents. When incumbents leave 
office their own staff members often replace them. Hemnson (1994) noted the increasing 
electoral success of former staff in congressional elections. Like Fowler above, he 
concluded that having more staff as candidates will continue to reinforce the lack of 
turnover and the presence of careerism. Given that some staff have electoral motivations 
(Chapter Three) and that these same staff often “aggressively" interact with elite 
constituents (Chapter Five), it is not surprising that staff are running for and winning 
seats in Congress. Because staff largely share the ideological positions of the incumbent 
and because they have interacted with constituents that “matter”, one might even argue
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that a staff member replacing an incumbent is really not electoral turnover as much as it 
is a continuation of present representation. When staff members are factored into the 
candidate pool o f open seat races, the number of competitive elections diminishes even 
further. The same arguments about congressional careerism would seem to apply to staff 
members who assume their positions in office. While the staff members bring experience 
and contact with district issues and personalities that will help to represent district 
interests, they also bring contact and experience that will make them difïïcult to remove 
from office. They may also enjoy that same “leeway” that they worked so hard to 
provide for the incumbents.
Weakens partv and collective accountability
One might argue that aggressive representation by district staff and the types of 
campaigns that they conduct are reflections of American culture. The campaigns are 
expensive and media-driven but they are also disproportionately centered on the 
advancement of the individual. The motivations of individual incumbents, staff members 
and elite constituents were fi’equently observed taking primacy over more communitarian 
interests. If American politics are truly “atomistic” (Hertzke and Peters, 1992), then the 
behaviors of district staff contribute to that outcome. By maintaining “candidate- 
centered” enterprises, district staff members also contribute to the weakening of political 
parties.
Fenno (1978) and Parker (1989) foimd that modem incumbents are highly concerned 
about gaining levels of trust with their constituents, which may ironically contribute to 
the decline of congressional approval. Incumbents are “spending time on activities that 
are perceived to receive too little attention” (Parker, 1989, p58). Consequently,
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constituents feel that members are both more responsive and effective than the collective 
body. In the final analysis, members run on their own against the institution; “the 
performance o f Congress is collective, but the responsibility for congressional 
performance is not” (Fenno, 1978, p.67). Jacobson echoed Fenno’s logic twenty years 
later: the system encourages “individual responsiveness but collective irresponsibility” 
(1997 p4).
The expanded use of the congressional district enterprise has reinforced the general 
decline of American political parties. This dissertation noted the wide enterprise that 
exists in a congressional district: staff, elected officials, supporters, contributors, etc. 
These individuals’ participation appears to be much more driven by their connection to 
the incumbent than to the party structure. The behavior o f these individuals, the staff and 
incumbents further fuels the decline of political parties detailed in Chapter One. Because 
staff members seek to solidify personalized coalitions o f support for individual 
incumbents, the ranks of individuals who might previously have been party activists are 
being co-opted into the ranks of the individual incumbent enterprise. Because of these 
efforts, there are simply fewer bodies and resources to fuel the political parties. 
Furtliermore, the decline of patronage jobs within parties and the creation of them for 
incumbent enterprises have shifted the loyalty of many hard-core activists who formerly 
worked for the party system. Candidate-centered politics are alive and well!
Because incumbents are able to solidify their electoral positions with their own 
enterprises, it places them in a position to be more independent of party influences within 
the legislature. In 1994, the Republican leadership suggested to their numerous freshmen 
that district interests should be made subservient to national party issues. They could do
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this by sending their chief advisers to the district and solidifying their electoral bases.
For two years, the House leadership was able to fight the candidate-centered impulses 
that had previously served to complicate partisan control of the legislature. They may 
have been aided in this control partly because many of the young incumbents’ key 
advisers were in the districts instead of Washington. At any rate the partisan control of 
the House from 1994 was imdone in the subsequent Congress by individual incumbents 
who wanted to pursue personal and district policy interests.
Given that the recently elected legislature is nearly equally divided between 
Democrats and Republicans, the prospects for changed behavior on the part of the 
incumbents and staff appears imlikely. The campaigns of 2002, and those for the near 
future, are likely to continue this emphasis on individual achievement at the expense of 
collective achievement. The attitudes of elite constituents seem only to reinforce the 
candidate-centered impulses o f the system and preserve incumbency advantage. One 
individual that contributed to a variety of candidates ranging from liberal Democratic 
state senators to moderate members of Congress and conservative U.S. Senators, did not 
consider the consequences for divided government that he helped to finance. It did not 
occur to him that by supporting incumbents of opposite political philosophies that he was 
fueling legislative gridlock and the lack of clear accoimtability that voters would 
subsequently confront. From his perspective he was assisting individual candidates that 
would have a positive impact on his personal and community interests. National political 
divisions were simply less relevant
The overall impact o f an empowered and aggressive district staff helps the incumbent 
operate with less reliance on party institutions. The incumbent and staff who are in touch
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with district sentiment and regularly communicate and interact with the constituents have 
the ability to represent and explain their behaviors to their constituents independent of the 
national parties’ efforts. Without the aggressive enterprise, the incumbent would be 
much more reliant upon the accomplishments and public relations efforts of the party 
leadership.
Interest groups
There are also consequences for the future of political participation and interest group 
activity. While the political culture is suffering from decreased levels of local 
participation, interest groups at the national level are actually invigorated. As Fowler 
( 1993) has pointed out congressional campaigns today are truly “federal” because of the 
combination of national and local groups that candidates must utilize in order to win an 
election. This paradox is another reason to emphasize the political activity of elite 
constituents. For it is through the elite constituents spread across congressional districts 
that the national interest groups have the resources to be active and influential. So while 
many elites may not be active at the local level for their broader community, many are 
active through their trade, professional, religious, or ideological associations. 
Traditionally national interest groups mobilized their grass roots in congressional districts 
to influence a particular incumbent. Today, the contact of national groups with elite 
constituents (known as “Astroturf lobbying”) reduces the cost to the national associations 
and allows them to target a few key individuals in an incumbent’s district. If these elite 
constituents remain active through their national associations (by fax and email) it will be 
easy for incumbents to address their issues and capitalize on their combined political 
power (and contributions). For the incumbents that assist these national associations, the
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reward will come in the form o f the national association contacting their local 
membership lists and directing them to vote, contribute and volunteer. Alternatively, the 
national association might just forward their membership list to the incumbent enterprise 
and let them utilize the resource as they see fit.
While elites who are interested in ‘local’ issues will probably always exist, their 
dwindling numbers suggests that the face of elite interaction and representation will 
probably change with the nationalized issues, faxes and emails. In this way, elites will 
find it even easier to achieve “virtual” representation by sending their support to 
sympathetic incumbents in districts far afoot. Yet again, this development would bias 
representation in favor of those elite constituents who have the means and know how to 
organize national groups, and to communicate and contribute to remote incumbents. 
While this provides accountability in the aggregate, it does not provide an outlet for free 
and competitive elections for the average constituent who does not choose to be active in 
national associations. If this trend continues, inciunbents should also be wary of focusing 
on the nationalized interests at the expense of losing contact with the ‘local’ elites and 
interests.
Growth of government programs
It is natural to expect that incumbents should serve their constituents. Procuring 
funding and regulatory approval for bridges, roads, schools, military bases, etc., is a basic 
component o f representation. Yet this service has costs. Each incumbent who represents 
his or her constituents in such a manner comes at a cost to constituents in otI:er districts. 
Government grants and new industries have a system-wide zero sum impact. Opening a 
new plant in one district usually means that jobs are being moved from another district.
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Service to elite constituents biases the act of representation to the particular at the 
expense of the broader national interest. This competition is intensified when they lure 
businesses seek funding for roads and development projects for elite constituent in their 
districts, each incumbent trying to serve their own elite constituents better. There almost 
seems to be a cyclical process of dependency where incumbents perceive their electoral 
advancement or preservation to be dependent upon the good grace of the elite 
constituents who make the requests for assistance and are components o f the district 
enterprise. Furthermore, efforts to assist elite constituents with their business or personal 
financial matters absorb staff time that might be used for other activities that could 
represent larger numbers of constituents. Who is being represented in each case is again 
in the eye of the beholder. Perhaps the argument could be made that elite service is less 
about a positive or a negative impact than it is about competing interests within and 
between districts. When pondering the relationship of district staff, elite constituents and 
representation, one might consider whether the founders truly intended for incumbents to 
become such long-serving “masters of public business” fortified with substantial 
campaign resources and a publicly-financed set of legislative staff dedicated to bringing 
even more “public business” to each constituency. I speculate that they would be 
shocked by the interaction of these factors and their relationship to the size of the federal 
budget today. They would probably call for political reform.
A call for reform?
Congressional district staff members are an integral part of incumbent advantage. 
This resource is worth hundreds of thousands of dollars per year in staff salary, not to 
mention the value of free media and word-of-mouth advertising that the staff members
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perform on behalf of the incumbents. Calls to review the cost or basic purpose of district 
staff are not common. In the 1940s, several legislators sought to forbid ail constituent 
services by incumbents and establish nonpartisan ombudsmen to mediate with constituent 
requests. While incumbents had very few resources at that point in time, there was little 
enthusiasm to give away what they did have. Further efforts in the 1960s to add 
ombudsmen in each district to complement district staff were similarly met with a cold 
congressional response. More recent efforts to reform incumbent behavior have largely 
focused on term limits, campaign finance reform, or marginally limiting the overall 
budget for staff offices.
There have been no calls since the 1940s to eliminate congressional staff. Given the 
fact that staff members enhance representation on behalf of the absent incumbents and 
because the legislators need staff support to counterbalance a sizeable executive staff, it 
would not be advisable to tie incumbent’s hands and remove this perquisite. However, 
given the enormous political value that the staff provides, any efforts to limit, remove or 
abolish the perquisite have been met with fierce congressional resistance.
Major reform of congressional staff is not likely in the foreseeable future because as 
incumbents increasingly desired lengthy congressional careers in the latter half o f the 
Twentieth Century, they institutionalized themselves with perquisites and other resources 
(Fowler 1993). Parker suggested that the expansion of these perquisites allowed 
inciunbents to “maximize their discretion” and pursue other goals: “more money, more 
leisure, or more political power, not just policy influence” (1992, p48). While arguments 
are made that these perquisites improve representation, make government more efficient, 
and bring the incumbents closer to the people (See Johannes, 1984), it is also clear the
See Macartney, 1975, p.322; Johannes, 1984, pp. 216-225.
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incumbents and staff have come to realize the enormous political value that staff, ofBces 
and unlimited travel to the district provide. The fact that incumbents hire young, hungry 
and aggressive politicos to complement smaller numbers of staff driven by more 
humanitarian or communitarian motives underlies the belief of the incumbent enterprise 
that it can serve both political and representational goals. In 1994, when the House 
Republicans instituted some procedural reforms and cutbacks in staff, it is instructive to 
note that the numbers of district staff were left in tact. In fact, in the aftermath of these 
cutbacks, district staff rose as an overall portion of personal staff. While there have been 
few reforms and incumbents clearly enjoy the staff perquisite, 1 would suggest some 
regulation of district staff behavior is in order.
If one desires reform that will somewhat curtail incumbency advantage and perhaps 
reduce legislative branch expenditures, a potential avenue would be to limit the campaign 
activities of federal district staff. Given the fact that incumbents will always have a 
campaign and a governance role, it is not advisable (or perhaps even possible) to 
eliminate federal staff involvement in the campaign enterprise. Scheduling and planning 
campaign events and crafting speeches and remarks naturally combine both worlds. It 
would be difficult to fully segregate an incumbent’s time and message so some bridge 
between the campaign and governance worlds needs to remain. However, eliminating the 
ability of the federal staff to raise or spend campaign resources would likely reduce some 
of the incentive to “aggressively” interact with elite constituents. The incentive to 
“aggressively” serve to gather information and build incumbent name recognition would 
remain. Yet, the elite ability to contribute to the enterprise could be made more complex. 
This reform is also logical given the lack of public financing of elections. Why should
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incumbents benefit firom taxpayer-assisted resources to their campaigns when challengers 
do not?
One of the arguments against reform is that it is too complex or that it impedes on 
reasonable representational behaviors. For example; “The same newsletter that keeps 
constituents informed about government can be packaged to convey images that have 
electoral appeal. The intertwining of electoral and representational purposes in the use of 
these resources makes it difficult to effectively regulate usage without impairing 
representational responsibilities” (Parker, 1989, p.84). But 1 think this is less problematic 
with the fund-raising behaviors of the staff. As opposed to a newsletter, there are no 
"representational” responsibilities that can be identified with elite interaction for the sake 
of fundraising. Furthermore, this is a practical, easy-to-achieve reform that has no visible 
constitutional implications.
An alternative to the abolition of fund-raising might be a disclosure system similar to 
how attorneys bill their hours to their clients. Federal staff in both Washington and the 
district would note their meetings and whom they called on the phones and whether each 
activity was campaign or federal in nature. This reform would minimally provide voters 
with information about the nature of the district enterprise. It would likely be extremely 
complex and difficult to complete and enforce, not to mention that it would be hard to 
relay this information to voters! Consequently, the abolition of fund-raising abilities 
strikes me as a much more logical reform, with more useful consequences.
I do recognize that in the whole scope of incumbency advantage, that this reform is 
minor. Yet, it would minimally reduce the hypocrisy identified above and clean up the 
system to reduce the appearance of conflicts o f interest (and make them pay for it). The
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co-opting of elites would likely continue. It would simply be made more complex by one 
more person or one more phone call. But that one person or call would not come at the 
expense of the taxpayers and would begin to level the playing field between incumbent 
and challenger.
This reform would also serve as a first step that might lead to additional behavioral 
changes on the part o f incumbents and their staff. There are some elected officials who 
draw absolute divisions between their campaign and federal staff. In these cases, the 
“designees” are limited to the scheduling and press functions described above. In my 
role as the campaign coordinator for a United States Senator who follows these standards, 
1 am limited to ftmd-raising and overtly political events. 1 operate independent of the 
federal staff with no knowledge of the types of issues or specific individuals they are 
pursuing and federal staff know not what 1 do. 1 do not knowingly solicit contributions 
from individuals who have been assisted by service or legislation from the senator’s 
federal enterprise. In the senator’s own words, 1 work on the “dark side” of American 
politics, never coming into contact with the well-lit and legitimate side o f constituent 
service. While 1 accept that incumbents would still be advantaged by other aggressive 
behaviors of staff, this reform might spark more incumbent enterprises to operate in a 
manner that is both ethically more pure and imposes no campaign costs on the taxpayers.
Furthermore, one might make the argument that shifting incumbent enterprises to the 
“policy” nature discussed above provides ‘better’ representation and improves the general 
health of our democracy. If incumbents and staff were willing to forgo the political 
advantages that accrue from elite service, they might allocate more staff time and 
resources to behaviors aimed at the constituents who could more truly benefit from the
5 0 4
attention. For the most part, staff members do not spend time scouring the poor 
communities of their districts looking for problematic patterns in government assistance 
programs, or finding ways to help small farmers or business owners effectively market 
their products. Staff members defense would most likely be that they do not have the 
time to go out into the district and then deal with all of the service requests that these 
investigations would generate. Yet, some district enterprises perform exactly these sorts 
of behaviors with elite constituents and they would probably also argue that 
representation is in the eye of the beholder.
Academic consequences and future directions of research 
Consequences for discipline 
This dissertation has four important consequences for the discipline. The biggest 
contribution of this dissertation was the elaboration of a fresh variable from which we can 
examine incumbency advantage. As Chapter Five demonstrated on a number of different 
levels, district staff members have an impact on the electoral fortunes of incumbents that 
the literature has previously not addressed. I am not suggesting that this variable has the 
causative impact of campaign spending or incumbent name recognition. Yet, I would 
argue that the behavior of the district staff enterprise not only acts as an intervening 
variable on the ability o f candidates to raise campaign funds and increase their name 
recognition, I would also suggest that district staff are an independent variable directly 
influencing election outcomes by having a direct impact on who challenges the 
incumbent and the support that they are able to draw firom constituents within the district. 
Future studies of incumbency advantage should take steps to include some measure of 
district staff activity.
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The second contribution is the suggestion to rethink the size and purpose of the 
incumbent enterprise. The enterprise includes more than simply the incumbent and the 
Washington staff. Chapter Five showed that it can also include even more than the 
district staff. Previous definitions, most notably Salisbury and Shepsle (1981), were 
useful but generally did not include district staff and completely disregarded the possible 
inclusion of district elites and supporters. This dissertation suggests that the discipline 
reconsider its definition of the incumbent enterprise to include a much wider range of 
actors. At a minimum, the definition needs to consider the functions, resources, 
motivations and ambitions of the individual district staff. Fox and Hammond (1975) 
were correct in their conclusion that the perceptions, goals and motivations of 
Washington staff affect office organization. Evidence from Chapters Three through Five 
demonstrates that the same conclusion applies to district staff as well. Some definitions 
might consider the inclusion of a few key advisers or a “kitchen cabinet.” Fenno (1978) 
even identifies a personal constituency of the incumbent’s key supporters and friends. 
Preferably, the definition would be widened to include those elite constituents who are 
co-opted and provide the incumbent enterprise with valuable surveillance of the district, 
participation in aggressive functions such as “advisories” and forums, and ultimately 
become campaign supporters. Conducting a longitudinal observation of an incumbent 
and his or her staff would most likely demonstrate the formation and impact of an 
extended district enterprise.
Given that some staff enterprises likely have an impact on elections and that they 
interact with a wide range of elite constituents, the discipline should devote more 
attention to understanding the circumstances which cause said variation. It should take a
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much wider look at the routine and aggressive functions from Chapter Three and test 
whether the variables from Chapter Four have any causative or correlative relationships. 
What factors impact the incumbent’s decision about allocating resources to the district 
and setting the office hierarchy? I would suggest that the research would benefit by 
including: cases from a wider geographical pool, from more regions, different cultures, 
cases where the incumbent has different levels of power or seniority, and cases from the 
majority and minority party. I would also suggest studying incumbents from more 
disparate electoral settings. One might include incumbents who face weak or strong 
challengers, and whether they are opposed by a new opponent or one recycled from 
earlier campaigns. One might also look at how staff members are impacted by open seat 
races. Do staff members from the previous incumbent seek to be involved? Do 
campaign workers from the open seat candidates become the staff upon victory? Further 
research on these disparate settings would contribute to our understanding of the district 
enterprise.
Finally, the incumbent-staff-elite interaction described in Chapter Five suggests that 
a two-step flow continues to operate in American politics. Whether the concept is 
seriously considered by academics is less relevant than the fact that a number of 
incumbents, staff and elite perceived their behaviors to be a “cheap and effective” way to 
interact with large numbers of constituents and promote the incumbent enterprise. This 
interaction was built on the assumptions that elite constituents exist and like to be 
contacted, and that interacting with them results in successful advertising to larger 
numbers of "average’ constituents in the elites’ communities. I do not argue that all
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incumbents and staff operate on the basis of these assumptions but there were significant 
numbers that did.
Future research directions
The research design utilized in this dissertation was appropriate and effective. Data 
gathered by a combination o f observations and intensive interviews from actors on all 
three sides of the interaction provided a full contextually based understanding of the 
allocation and utilization o f congressional district staff. Patience and careful data 
gathering resulted in a fruitful collection of observations. I would recommend that future 
research continue with some of the important methods and findings of this dissertation. 
For instance, the contextual observation of incumbents, staff and elite constituents proved 
very fruitful in developing the hypotheses of this dissertation. I believe that these 
observations were of much greater utility in understanding these actors’ behaviors and 
motivations than questionnaires would have been. There were, nevertheless, 
methodological improvements that I might suggest for future research on congressional 
district staff and elite interaction.
Wider data set
The most obvious addition to the study would be the addition of a wider data set. I 
was able to expand on Macartney’s (1975) request that staffing patterns beyond Los 
Angeles county be studied. Yet, given more time and resources, it would be advisable to 
select a set of cases that exhibit a much greater range of variables. Most obviously, I 
would advise utilizing cases from varying regions and distances from Washington, as 
well as a larger group of cases that permit comparisons based on the age, race and gender 
o f the incumbents. A wider set of cases might confirm the importance of the
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"personality” variable, or it might suggest that these more typical variables drive the 
variations and utilizations of district staff. Alternatively, one might use a data set with a 
randomized set o f case studies. In either case, the conclusions would probably allow one 
to expand on the findings of this contextual research.
Longitudinal study
Regardless o f the number and location of the case studies, 1 would suggest that future 
studies conduct longer visits at varying points during the two-year election cycle.
My visits were largely snapshots in time, taken during one to two week visits to each of 
the primary districts. 1 offer that the visits should be longitudinal in two fashions. First, 
in the short term, there should be different visits to the primary case studies at different 
time points during a two-year cycle; early in the term, late in the term, when a 
controversial issue is at hand, when things are just plain slow, during a recess, during the 
middle of a busy week where the incumbent is gone, during a district work period, during 
the adjournment period just before the election, and in the months directly after an 
election. Limited observations of different offices in each of these time settings 
suggested that sequence and timing are important variables that should not be 
overlooked.
Second, the incumbent enterprises should be examined at different points in their life 
cycles. 1 compared junior and senior incumbents in this dissertation but it might be a 
more relevant finding to study the same legislator as both a junior and a senior 
incumbent. The longitudinal analysis would also focus on the staff. Hammond (1984) 
suggested that there is little data on what staff do after they leave Congress. How long do 
they stay in the offices? Where do they go after they leave? Do they run for office? And
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are they successful? Multiple data points would provide interesting answers to these 
questions and that of the evolving relationship between the incumbent, staff and elite 
constituents.
Other methods
Perhaps there are other methods of observation that would provide equally fruitful 
data. After completing several of my observations I also realized that the Zimmerman- 
Wieder (1977) “diary-diary method” would provide equally penetrating analysis, 
especially in regard to the degree to which staff interact with elite constituents. In this 
method, the subjects maintain diaries of their activities. These diaries would then 
become the basis of intensive interviews. 1 felt that my research design more effectively 
uncovered the staff-elite interaction than did previous survey-based studies that could not 
really see what staff members were doing. Given the '‘grayness” of many district staff 
activities, much of their more political behavior tends to be less recorded and talked 
about, so a diary method provides a provocative approach if one could ensure that the 
subject would honestly record his or her activities. The “diary-diary method” would take 
that observation to an even deeper level. The “diary-diary method” is not the only other 
research design that might be appropriately used to study district staff. One might also do 
content analysis of office memos and training guides, or perhaps even do a participant- 
observant study as an employee of one particular staff office. Finally, after more study to 
build on this contextual data in this dissertation, it would be appropriate to develop 
survey instruments to study all district staff. This dissertation suggests the discipline has 
not yet grasped these variables well enough to proceed with such a research design.
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Look more thoroughly at elites
Finally, I would encourage future research to continue to look at staff functions from 
the elite constituent perspective. As noted in Chapter Five, I would encourage greater 
utilization of the FEC websites that provide names, addresses, and donor histories of 
campaign contributors. Their website (at www.FEC.gov and imofficially at 
www.trav.coml provide ready-made lists o f elite constituents in a congressional district. 
These lists could be used simply to identify elites who interact with the incumbent 
enterprise or perhaps could be used to construct a larger survey in future research 
designs. One might even do a study of contributors to both party’s candidates in a district 
and determine how many elites within that district seem to play on both sides. The 
research could be followed up with interview requests to those bipartisan contributors.
.At any rate, 1 suggest that future research is in fact necessary because of the substantial 
consequences of district staff functions that were mentioned above, for incumbents, for 
our democratic system and for the discipline.
Concluding remarks 
Congressional district staff members enhance the representation performed by 
incumbent members of the United States House of Representatives. However, staff 
behavior also biases the representational process and detracts from the competitive 
election system designed by the Constitution. There is a serious need for future study of 
the overall impact of district staff and other perquisites. The evidence of this dissertation 
concludes with a call for future reform to level the playing ground and return to free, fair 
and competitive elections. It is important that journalists and academics get beyond
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merely accepting congressional incumbency advantage as an iron law o f political science 
and begin to question the consequences o f its existence and the tools that sustain it.
This dissertation and Chapter Five in particular contribute to the body of literature on 
incumbency advantage. The role of Congressional district staff is worthy of future 
consideration as there have been no new variables on incumbency advantage in recent 
years, and the literature’s understanding o f the district staff is quite limited. Observations 
of the motivations and behavior of the district staff enterprise demand inclusion in the 
discipline’s imderstanding of what goes in the district and why inciunbents get re-elected. 
Contextual data shows the impact of aggressive staff enterprises -  how they identify elite 
constituents, and serve them with the goal of co-opting them into the district enterprise 
where they will ultimately support the incumbent with valuable resources and deter 
quality challengers. This dissertation is an important first step in the recognition of the 
impact of congressional district staff. Future research is warranted, unless of course the 
calls for reform are heeded. In which case, district staff would hopefully become much 
less electorally valuable and not so interesting to study.
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A ppend ix :
A few of the topics for
Interview Questions and Observations 
For Incumbent members of Congress
I ) What kind of district do you have? (What kind of town is this...)
2) What do you see when you go home and see the represented, your constituency?
3) Who are your strongest supporters?
4) What consequences do these perceptions have for his or her behavior?
5) Do you consult with other members (state/nearby delegation) on staff sizes? Do you 
wonder why or you are like fellow or neighboring members (in staff allocations and 
activities)?
6) Who do you spend time with (or who is it "strategically profitable" to be with)?
7) Could somebody represent you at important meetings (or do you already employ 
somebody to do that)?
8) How much latitude do you have in choosing a presentational style? (Is it your choice or 
does the district confine you?)
9) What explains your success? Is it issues, your voting record, your service...?
10) How much does each (especially service) help?
II ) How (or do you) present yourself to your strongest opponents, the "never get" votes? 
(Neutralize?)
12) Could anyone else contest the district (service-wise) or is it too segmented (too many 
bits, too much to know)?
13) Do you have open Office Hours? - How do you inform constituents?
14) Would friends/elites tell you about soft spots?
15) What did you do before election to Congress and how does that impact how you carry 
out constituency service?
16) What criteria do you use in hiring staff?
For District Staff
I ) Describe the hierarchy or relationship between the Representative, the Admin. Asst., and 
the District Director. Maybe use a normal day or case to illustrate.
2) How has the structure/function o f the office changed over time? How has your job 
changed over time?
3) Does your office conduct any activities/functions that you believe are unique as 
compared to other offices?
4) How did you come to work for the Representative? (a personal fiiend, or previous 
business or political connection) Did you work on campaign for the Representative?
5) Are you phone boimd or out in the district? Break down your day for me.
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6) What is your preferred technique of presentation (face to face, personal, mobilize groups, 
issues)?
7) Do you consult with other staffs (state/nearby delegation)- to consult on staff sizes and 
activities. Why are you dis/similar to the fellow or neighboring ofGces?
8) Could you personally represent the representative at important meetings? What kind of 
credibility/authority do you have w/ constituents? Or who do constituents see when they 
see you?
9) Do you work with party activists in activities?
10) Do you work with state representatives? On what kinds of things?
For District Elites
1 ) Are there traditions or expectations of service from previous incumbent? What about 
expectations over this incumbent's career?
2) Do you look to other districts to compare or even ask them for service?
3) Do you expect to deal directly the member or is the staff adequate? How receptive do 
expect each to be?
4) Did you work on campaign for the Representative? Or have you contributed to his/her 
campaign?
5) Why are you politically (in)active? Is it for personal, ideological, business needs...?
6) "Incumbent need not worry about reaching the leaders, activists, elites. They will reach 
him." WILL YOU?
7) How would you prefer to be represented? (how should MC present self to you)? (face to 
face, personal, mobilize groups, issues) Other people?
(Business Elites)
1 ) What kinds of services could a Representative perform that would be helpful to you?
2) Would you not oppose a member out of a sense of "self-preservation"? In other words, 
can/do you see the incumbent as the best alternative, sort of like a "known commodity"?
3) Are there traditions or expectations of service from previous incumbent? What about 
expectations over this incumbent's career?
4) Do you look to other districts to compare or even ask them for service?
(Partisan/Political Elites)
1 ) How supportive should a Representative be of the local party operation?
2) What is role/connection of the incumbent and his/her staff to local party? Would you 
consider them to be a "surrogate electoral organization"?
3) Wliat kinds of services/functions could a Representative perform that would be helpful to
you?
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